

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
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
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During the past three decades the United States has utilized its armed forces often, and in a wide variety of ways. Most of these uses have had an international political dimension; that is, they may have influenced the perceptions and behavior of political leaders in foreign countries to some degree. This study, however, is concerned with only those instances in which military unit were used in a discrete way to schieve specific objectives in a particular situation. There were 215 such instances between 1945 and 1975.

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Clearly, the use of the armed forces as an instrument for supporting American foreign policy is a subject of great interest. It is also one of conjecture. Yet, to date, there has been little research devoted to the topic. The empirical record itself is sparse: this study is the first to present a systematic compilation of where, when, and how the United States has used its armed forces for political objectives. Moreover, there have been virtually no rigorous evaluations of the utility of the armed forces in these roles. And, still fewer studies have aimed at advising decision—makers as to when such operations are likely to succeed; even fewer at how to maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces in these political roles. These are the aims of this study.

The study concludes that the demonstrative and discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives should not be an option which decision makers turn to frequently, nor quickly, to secure political objectives abroad, except under very special circumstances. We have found that over the longer term these uses of the armed forces were not an effective foreign policy instrument.

Decisionmakers should not expect such uses of the armed forces to be able to serve as viable substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies; policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad, and incorporating diplomacy and the many other potential instruments available to U.S. foreign policy.

We have found, however, that in particular circumstances, demonstrative uses of the armed forces can sometimes be an effective way—at least in the short term—of securing U.S. objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to U.S. interests from worsening more rapidly than more fundam_ntal policies can be formulated. Thus, at times, and although decisionmakers should view these options with some caution, the demonstrative use of the armed forces for political objectives is a useful step to shore up a situation sufficiently so that more extreme adverse consequences can be avoided, so that domestic and international pressures for more forceful and persons counter-productive actions can be avoided, and so that time can be good for sounder policies that can deal adequately with the realities of the situation to be formulated and implemented.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Notwithstanding the above, the authors take full responsibility for the content of the study.

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"And Aaron cast down his rod before Pharaoh and before his servants, and it became a serpent." Exodus, VII:10.

INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 1944 the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegün, died in Washington; not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were sweeping across France and east Europe toward Germany, and Berlin and Tokyo were approaching Götterdämmerung. Sixteen months later, however, the Ambassador's remains were the focus of world attention as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed forces as a political instrument. On March 6, 1946, the U.S. Department of State announced that the late Ambassador Ertegün's remains would be sent home to Turkey aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, visibly the most powerful surface combatant in the United States Navy and the ship on board which General Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan's surrender.

Between the Ambassador's death and this announcement, not only had World War II ended, the Cold War--yet untitled--had begun. In addition to conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union over Poland, Germany, Iran, and other areas, the Soviet Union had demanded the concession of two Turkish provinces in the east and, in the west, a base in the area of the Dardanelles.

On March 22, the <u>Missouri</u> began a slow journey from New York harbor to Turkey. At Gibraltar the British Governor had a wreath placed on board. Accompanied by the destroyer <u>Power</u>, the great battleship was met on April 3rd in the eastern Mediterranean by the light cruiser <u>Providence</u>. Finally, on the morning of April 5th, the <u>Missouri</u> and her escorts anchored in the harbor at Istanbul. (1)

The meaning of this event was missed by no one; Washington had not so subtly reminded the Soviet Union and others that the United States was a great military power, and that it could project this power abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of the Missouri, or it together with other U.S. actions that followed, deterred the Soviet Union from implementing any further planned or potential hostile acts toward Turkey will probably never be known. What is clear, is that no forceful Soviet actions followed the visit. Moreover, as a symbol of American support for Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the visit of the Missouri was well received and deeply appreciated by the Government of Turkey, the Turkish press and, as near as anyone could tell, by the Turkish citizenry at large. The post-mortem report by the American Ambassador stated that to the Turks, the visit indicated that:

the U.S. has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by [the] USSR to destroy Turk[ey's] independence and integrity. (2)

Three decades later, on August 18, 1976, two American officers supervising the pruning of a tree in the Korean demilitarized zone were attacked by North Korean soldiers and killed. The U.S. response was prompt. On the scene, the U.N. military commander in Korea, General Richard G. Stilwell, accused North Korea of "deliberate murder" and demanded an apology and punishment of the North Koreans involved. The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, termed the attack "premeditated murder" demanded "amends," and warned that such attacks would not be accepted.

At the same time, certain military preparations were then taken, U.S. forces in Korea were placed on increased alert, two U.S. tactical aircraft squadrons flew to Korea from bases in the United States, and the aircraft carrier Midway and accompanying vessels sailed from Yokosuka, Japan for Korean waters. Finally, a few days after the initial incident, a large force of American and South Korean soldiers entered the demilitarized zone and cut down the offending tree while armed helicopters circled overhead and B-52 bombers patrolled the border.

North Korea never did apologize for the incident, nor did it announce (publicly at least) any punishment for the North Korean soldiers involved in the incident. A North Korean representative at the Military Armistice Commission did, however, term the incident "regretful"—a marked departure from previous behavior. And, at a subsequent meeting, North Korea submitted several business-like proposals for avoiding such incidents in the future. (3)

Earlier in the Summer of 1976, the United States was involved, albeit less directly, in another international incident. Following the July 3rd raid by Israeli commandos on Entebbe airport in Uganda to free passengers of a hijacked aircraft held hostage by Palestinian extremists, long-standing tensions between Uganda and Kenya intensified markedly. The two states had not gotten along for some time, but when the Israeli raiders landed at the Nairobi airport on their way back to Israel with the freed hostages, Uganda's President Idi Amin threatened military retaliation.

As the war of words between Ugandan and Kenyan leaders continued, a U.S. P-3C maritime patrol aircraft landed at the Nairobi airport; apparently the first of what was to become a routine operation. A day later, a U.S. frigate, the Beary, entered the Kenyan port of Mombassa for what was termed a "courtesy port call." And at the same time, the U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger entered the Indian Ocean from the Pacific for a "routine periodic deployment." Although U.S. officials refused to publicly link any of these military operations to the Uganda-Kenya tensions, privately, U.S. reporters were told that they were meant as a show of support for Kenya.(4)

In each of these three incidents, as in hundreds of others since 1945, U.S. military forces were used without significant violence to underscore verbal and diplomatic expressions of American foreign policy. Historically, of course, the United States has not been the only nation to use its armed forces for political objectives. In their day, all the great powers have engaged in such activity; in the contemporary age, the Soviet Union has been a frequent practitioner of the political uses of the armed forces.

Yet, to date, there has been little research devoted to this topic. The empirical record itself is sparse: this study is the first to present a systematic compilation of where, when, and how the United States has used its armed forces for political objectives. Moreover, there have been virtually no rigorous evaluations of the utility of the armed forces in these roles. Few studies have aimed at advising decisionmakers as to when such operations are likely to succeed; even fewer at how to maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces in their political roles.

This study addresses some of these questions. It has three broad objectives:

First, to describe the historical record; that is, to identify the incidents in which the United States has used its armed forces for political objectives between 1945 and 1975, and to determine the broad trends in such uses of the armed forces in terms of the context in which the military units were employed, and variations in the size, type, and activities of the military units themselves.

Second, to evaluate the effectiveness of the armed forces as a political instrument by analyzing such factors as the size, type, and activity of military units involved in the incident; the nature of the situation at which they were directed; the character of U.S. objectives; the international and domestic context in which the incident occurred; and the extent and type of diplomatic activity which accompanied the use of the armed forces.

Third, to advise policymakers as to where such incidents are likely to recur in the future, and what might be done to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. armed forces in this sort of activity.

Concept

The United States has utilized its armed forces often and in a wide variety of ways, since the Second World War. Most of these uses have a political dimension; that is, they are liable to influence the perceptions and behavior of political leaders in foreign countries to some degree. This study is concerned with only some of these uses of the armed forces: those instances in which the armed forces were used in a discrete way for specific political objectives in a particular situation. A discussion of the full range of uses of the armed forces which may have political consequences, some of which are liable to be of greater continuing significance than the episodic uses reported here, is presented in chapter two.

In some cases it is obvious that a particular use of the armed forces falls into the area of interest of this study. In many others, however, it is not. Thus, one of the first tasks of the study was to define rigorously the concept under investigation. Only after definitional criteria were established did it become possible to search a large number of sources systematically, and to determine whether each instance of military activity discovered there should be included in the study. The definition which was employed for this purpose was as follows:

A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Thus, five elements had to be present if an incident was to be considered a political use of the armed forces for the purposes of this study.

First, a physical change in the disposition (location, activity, and/or readiness) of at least a part of the armed forces had to occur. Mere references by policymakers to the military (e.g., verbal threats) were not considered to constitute a use of the armed forces. Military activities were taken to include: the use of firepower, the establishment or disestablishment of a permanent or temporary presence abroad, a blockade, an interposition, an exercise or demonstration, the escort or transport of another actor's armed forces or materiel, a visit by a military unit to a foreign location, an evacuation, the operation of reconnaissance, patrol, or surveillance units in a non-exercise context, or a change in readiness status. Readiness measures were taken to include changes in alert status, the mobilization or demobilization of reserve forces, and the movement of units toward or away from specific locations.

Second, behind this activity there had to have been a certain consciousness of purpose. Virtually all military activity has some political consequence. Only in those cases when a specific political impact appeared to be a significant objective of the national command authority—e.g., a member of the National Security Council—in initiating action, did the incident qualify for inclusion in the study.

Third, decisionmakers must have sought to attain their objectives by gaining influence in the target states, not by physically imposing the U.S. will. Generally speaking, armed forces may be used either as a political or as a martial instrument. When used as a martial instrument, a military unit acts to seize an objective (e.g., occupy territory), or to destroy an objective (e.g., attack an invading army). In both of these examples, attainment of the immediate objective itself satisfies the purpose for which the force was used. When used as a political instrument, the objective is to influence the behavior of another actor—i.e., to cause an actor to do something that he would not otherwise do, or not to do something that he would otherwise do. Thus, the activity of the armed forces units themselves does not attain the objective; goals are obtained through the effect of the force on the perceptions of the actor. Only instances of force used in this latter fashion were of interest.

Fourth, decisionmakers must have sought to avoid a significant contest of violence. Although a war may result from a use of the armed forces which otherwise meets the terms of the definition, the initiation of war must not have been the intent of the action, if the incident was to be included. Of course, even the most intense and protracted war may constitute a political

use of the armed forces--if the objective is to cause the opponent to capitulate without necessarily totally destroying his capacity to fight. Nevertheless, such large-scale uses of violence were not of interest in this study.

Finally, some specific behavior had to have been desired of the target actors. To be included, a use of the armed forces had to have been directed at influencing specific behavior in a particular situation; or, at least, to have occurred because of concern with specific behavior. Many military operations are designed to promote good relations between two nations in a diffuse sense. Annual bi- or multilateral U.S. armed forces exercises, such as REFORGER in Europe and UNITAS in Latin America, and good will cruises, such as the AMITY visits to African ports, are examples of this phenomenon. Such incidents were not included.

Indeed, the definition of the political use of the armed forces may be further clarified by a full listing of the sorts of military activity which were excluded.

- The Korean War and the U.S. involvement in the war in Indochina between March 1965 and March 1972, were excluded. In these wars, U.S. armed forces were used primarily as a martial instrument. Objectives were gained or lost as a direct result of the outcome of violent interactions between opposing forces. The symbolic value of the military force, the effect of its use on the perceptions and expectations of decisionmakers, was relatively unimportant. (5)
- · Uses of U.S. armed forces deployed abroad to defend directly U.S. property, citizens, or military positions, were not considered political incidents for our purposes. In these incidents, components of the armed forces were used in response to immediate threats. Examples would include actions by troops patrolling the Korean demilitarized zone, the use of Army troops in the Panama Canal Zone to control demonstrations, and incidents at Guantanamo between Marine sentries and suspected infiltrators. This military activity was not designed to cause foreign policymakers to terminate the undesirable activity, but to terminate it in a direct fashion (e.g., by shooting an infiltrator). However, in those cases when the United States reinforced a military deployment overseas in response to infiltration or some other hostile activity, it was assumed that the symbolic political value of the reinforcement was at least as important as any immediate improvement in military capabilities. Thus, incidents of the latter type were considered political uses of the armed forces.
- · The psychological reinforcement of previously established behavior through the continuous presence or operation of military forces abroad also was excluded. While the stationing of U.S. armed forces abroad certainly is a political act, and perhaps the most important political function served by U.S. armed forces, such activity helps to maintain previously established behavior rather than to establish new behavioral patterns. Only the initial establishment of an overseas presence, the disestablishment of such a presence, or a significant change in the size of the overseas deployment was included in the list of incidents. The continuing effects of maintaining forces overseas are examined as an independent variable affecting the effectiveness

of discrete political uses of the armed forces.

- Routine activity primarily directed at maintaining or improving combat readiness was excluded. This category of events includes most training exercises and maneuvers, and most visits to foreign ports by U.S. warships. Although there has often been political fallout from these interactions between U.S. military forces and individuals in foreign nations, most routine military activity is simply not deliberate in its political consequences.
- · Miscellaneous forms of support provided routinely to foreign governments in non-conflict situations were not considered. Examples of these activities include disaster relief, search and rescue operations, and the movement of refugees. Usually, these operations have had a political objective, but a very diffuse one: to enhance U.S. influence in the recipient nation. Consequently, they did not meet the definitional requirement of specificity.
- The provision of military assistance was not considered. Again, this activity encompasses an important political dimension, but the factors determining the success or failure of military assistance—which is usually given over a protracted period of time—are likely to be quite different from those affecting the outcome of discrete political uses of the armed forces.
- Incidents in which non-combatant forces were used to evacuate American citizens from areas of impending conflict were not included. Actually, such incidents are rare, insofar as most instances of evacuation have coincided with the use of combatant forces. And in these latter incidents, the primary U.S. purpose usually was not to rescue Americans directly, but to cause foreign leaders to stabilize a threatening situation. Cases in which combatant forces were employed were included in the list of incidents.
- The use within the United States of active or reserve military forces to control civil disturbances, to aid in relief efforts following national disasters, and to achieve other objectives were not examined. Uses of the armed forces abroad may serve important domestic political objectives, however, and these were included in the study.

Incidents and Sources

Using the above definition, 215 incidents have been indentified in which the United States utilized its armed forces for political objectives between January 1, 1946 and October 31, 1975—an arbitrary cut-off date that was necessarily imposed on the research. A list of these incidents is presented in appendix A. The character of the incidents, and the character of the U.S. military involvement in them are described and analyzed in chapters three and four, respectively.

In seeking incidents, a wide variety of sources were examined. They fall broadly into three categories: official records of military organizations such as fleet histories; chronologies of international events, such as that which appears in the Middle East Journal; and compilations of U.S. military

activity prepared by government agencies and other researchers for various purposes. A full list of sources consulted, with methodological notes, is presented in appendix B.

The Approach

The heart of the study is the question of effectiveness, or utility. When do discrete uses of the armed forces help to satisfy U.S. foreign policy objectives with regard to particular situations abroad? Does the size, type, or activities of the forces involved matter? Can utility be enhanced by diplomatic or other levers of policy in conjunction with the military operation? Are particular types of objectives more likely to be satisfied than others?

Answers to these questions, and similar ones, were sought through three distinct types of analyses.

First, a sample of incidents was selected for systematic and rigorous analysis of outcomes. Fifteen percent of the full set of incidents (33 incidents) were chosen at random in a sample structured so as to proportionally represent the full set of incidents in terms of the size of the U.S. military involvement; the degree of Soviet involvement; the nature of the East-West relationship at the time; and the situational context in which the incident occurred. The characteristics of the sample closely parallel those of the full set of incidents in both these and most other dimensions, as shown in appendix C, in which the sampling methodology is described.

For each of the incidents in the sample, the available literature, documents, and newspaper accounts were investigated so as to determine the following: U.S. objectives vis-à-vis each participant, and whether or not those objectives were satisfied within six months and retained over three years following the use of U.S. armed forces; the size, type, and activity of U.S. armed forces involved in the incident; the character of the targets in relation to U.S. objectives; other activities (e.g., diplomatic) undertaken in support of United States objectives along with the use of the armed forces; and, finally, the state of certain U.S. domestic conditions. In the analysis, the degree of satisfaction of U.S. objectives is related to each of these other factors with the aim of highlighting the crucial variables determining whether or not a political use of the armed forces is likely to be successful or not. This analysis is presented in chapters five through eight. A bibliography for the 33 sample incidents is presented in appendix D.

Second, more detailed assessments were made of the specific mechanisms through which military operations affected the perceptions and decisions of foreign policymakers during crises in seventeen case studies. Eight specialists were asked to address a lengthy set of questions concerning the United States' use of armed forces in each of two or three incidents. The questions, which are reproduced in appendix E, required that each analyst describe in some detail: U.S. objectives, the instruments of policy directed at those objectives, the character of the situation (and particularly the concerns of foreign decisionmakers), and most importantly, the outcomes of the situation.

Cases were selected so as to contrast differences within particular circumstances in which the United States has used its armed forces for political objectives since 1945. For example, the United States often has used its armed forces to influence the outcome of intra-Arab conficts. The investigator, in this instance, was asked to examine both the 1958 Lebanon Civil War and the 1970 Jordanian Civil War, so as to shed light on how changes between 1958 and 1970 in the global and Mediterranean balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union may have affected the utility of U.S. armed forces in these types of situations. Time was not the only factor used to distinguish among cases, however. There were two Berlin Crises in a period of only three years, for example; the main difference between them being the style and content of the U.S. response.

Six sets of case studies were completed successfully. They are presented in chapters nine through fourteen, as follows:

Chapter	Investigator	Incidents
1 X ************************************	David K. Hall	Laotian Civil War (1962) Indo-Pakistani War (1971)
X 3117	William B. Quandt	Lebanon Civil War (1958) Jordanian Civil War (1970)
XI	Jerome Slater	Dominican Intervention (1961) Dominican Intervention (1965)
XII	Robert M. Slusser	Berlin Crisis (1958-59) Berlin Crisis (1961)
XIII	Philip Windsor	Security of Yugoslavia (1951) Invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968)
	Robert Simons	Seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> (1968) Shoot-down of the EC-121 (1969) Seizure of the <u>Mayaguez</u> (1975)

Third, further insight into the U.S. use of the armed forces for political objectives was sought by examining comparable phenomena undertaken by the Soviet Union. The two superpowers manifest quite different attitudes toward military force, its role in world politics, and how a nation should or should not go about using armed forces for political objectives. As it is frequently the case, a comparison of such different styles can make more clear the underpinnings and assumptions of one or the other. The analysis of Soviet uses of its armed forces for political objectives is presented in chapter fifteen.

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Some Caveats

The overall findings of the study are presented in chapter sixteen. Before turning to those findings, readers should at least examine the conceptual underpinnings of the study, discussed in chapter two, and also should be aware of the following methodological reservations.

One reservation concerns the data used in the study. The research was unclassified, but even a highly classified study would be likely to have encountered difficulties in some areas. We are confident that the list of incidents is an adequate representation of all those instances in which U.S. armed forces were used in a way that would fit the terms of the definition. Analysts undertaking a similar study on a classified basis have indicated that there is a correlation of about .89 between the incident list presented in appendix A and a list of incidents which, under the terms of the definition employed in this study, their data would indicate have taken place. More importantly, the set of incidents utilized in this study are distributed roughly congruently over time and geographic region with the set of incidents that would be derived from the classified data. (6)

Less confidence, however, may be ascribed to the descriptions of the military units which took part in the incidents. Reporting on this sort of data in the unclassified literature—even in official documents—tends to be incomplete, non-systematic, and sometimes contradictory. The activities of some kinds of military units—like aircraft carriers—which are easier to keep track of, tend to be reported more often and more completely than the activities of other types of units; for example, submarines, to cite an extreme case. Furthermore, the reporting of military activity on an unclassified basis has varied widely over time. The quality of this sort of data is relatively poor for the post-World War II period and early 1950s, then improves, but falls off again for the most recent years, as not enough time has passed for the downgrading of classified information to have had an important effect.

In the utility analysis, data shortfalls occurred for some cases in assessing U.S. objectives and some of the details of the situation, and—in a few instances—in assessing outcomes. These problems are discussed in chapter five.

Secondly, this study shares many of the problems which plague any social science research. Of particular importance is the question of causality. We cannot, of course, ever really know what caused decisionmakers to take particular decisions. In most cases, the decisionmaker himself probably does not sort out the various stimuli he receives as to their relative importance. Even if he did, in most of the incidents which form the basis of the study, first-hand accounts are not available; and even if they were, leaders generally have mixed motives when writing their memoirs or speaking to journalists—the creation of an accurate historical record being only one of them.

Consequently, we are concerned in this report not to attribute causality to the use of the armed forces; that is, not to say that such an outcome occurred because of the use of the armed forces. Still, when parallels between cartain uses of the armed forces and outcomes favorable to U.S. objectives are noted, there is the implication of causality. Readers are forewarned that no such implication can be proven, and certainly none is intended.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a distinction should be drawn between utility and wisdom. The former is addressed in this study, the latter is not. In evaluating the utility of political uses of the armed forces, the methodology employed accepts the objectives of U.S. decisionmakers as given, and assesses only whether or not those objectives were achieved. The question of the wisdom of establishing those objectives is one beyond the scope of this study.

Nor does this study judge the long-term security consequences of political uses of the armed forces beyond those specific ways in which the nation's security may or may not have been affected by the discrete and immediate situation in which the armed forces were employed. The long term effects of repeated U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean, for example, on perceptions of the United States in Latin America, and what those effects may or may not imply for U.S. national security over the very long term, are questions which fall beyond the scope of this study.

Thus, regardless of any specific findings concerning the political utility of uses of the armed forces in discrete situations in the past, the conclusions of this study should not be interpreted as necessarily supporting the use of the armed forces for political objectives in future contingencies. In any future situation, decisionmakers would have to weigh the potential political utility of a proposed use of the armed forces, against a variety of potential costs and risks. Each specific case would have to be judged on its own merits.

Footnotes

- 1. Log of the U.S.S. Missouri.
- U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946;
 Volume 3: The Near East and Africa (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 822. Also, see: Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 84 (August, 1958), pp. 41-50.
- 3. Based on reports in the New York Times (August 19-27, 1976).
- 4. New York Times (July 13, 1976) and Baltimore Sun (July 30, 1976).

- 5. The U.S. air war against North Vietnam was initially aimed at a political objective—to compel the DRVN to halt its support for the war in the South. Increasingly, however, this political aim was subsumed by the military objective of stopping the traffic to the south directly. The political objective gained prominence again only during the 1972 "Linebacker" operations. Insofar as it was impossible to define the break-points precisely, we arbitrarily excluded from this analysis the air strikes against the North once the United States stopped identifying a specific provocation for each strike in March 1965.
- Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "A Comparison of the Brookings and CNA International Incidents Projects," Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 76-0455.10, (August 17, 1976).

THE ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

Clausewitz taught that although a state might use military forces to obtain an objective through violent actions, the state's goal is never violence per se but rather the achievement of an objective otherwise unobtainable—i.e., the pursuit of politics by other means. As war is an extension of politics by other means, so too the armed forces without war—by their very existence and by their specific activities—serve political purposes.

The focus of this study is on only a portion of these roles: on discrete uses of the armed forces to achieve specific objectives in particular situations. However, by their very being, as well as by their own general character, deployment, and day-to-day activities, the armed forces can afford diffuse political influence to a state. This wider political implication of the armed forces, their role as a diffuse element of a state's power, deserves discussion as backdrop for the subsequent examination of the discrete uses of the armed forces which forms the core of the study.

Size and Character of the Armed Forces

Most fundamentally, the recruitment of military personnel and the procurement of weapons signal not only that a state has a capability for warfare, but also that it has the will to allocate a portion of its resources to this end. This latter demonstrates the state's resolve to defend its interests in the arena. As such, the greater the resources allocated to the armed forces, the more clearly this resolve is likely to be perceived. Foreign audiences are attentive to changes in the size and composition of military forces; while some may only take note of changes, others may be influenced to act differently than they would have otherwise. Still others may be especially gratified or, on the other hand, may become particularly anxious. Consider, for example, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s. German rearmament was strongly supported by the United States, which presumably was gratified by the rebirth of the Bundeswehr. 'The Soviet Union, on the other hand, became extremely anxious and hostile. And even Bonn's erstwhile allies in Western Europe were discomforted to varying degrees. Yet, those perceptions, and probably actions taken by each of the observing nations as a result of those perceptions, stemmed only from the coming into existence of German armed forces -- the new German army did not have to undertake any specific activities to have such political effects.

Aside from the size of the force, the relative sophistication of weaponry and the reputation of military personnel are likely to have differential political impacts. In other words, the ability of a military force to cause political effects is likely to depend to some degree on whether or not that force is equipped with nuclear weapons, advanced electronic capabilities, supersonic aircraft, and the other appurtenances of modern military technology, and on whether or not the force is reputed to be composed of tough and effective fighters.

In the immediate postwar period, for example, the United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons was of great importance to the common perception that it was the most powerful nation on earth. Similarly, once the Soviet Union also obtained a nuclear capability, that was of great value to the success of Soviet diplomacy. Given these precedents, it should not have been surprising that other nations—France, China, India—should seek to enhance their influence in world affairs through the development of nuclear weapons.

The possession of advanced conventional weapons can confer political influence as well, because of the image of power which those weapons project and because they are perceived as a symbol of a nation's modernity and technological prowess. Such weapons are viewed as an important indicator of a nation's standing in the world. Aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, supersonic aircraft, and advanced tanks not only improve a nation's ability to fight wars, they also influence the attitudes and behavior of other states toward their possessor. No nation has benefited as much in this regard as has the United States. The B-29 bomber, the Missouri-class battleship, and the Midway-class aircraft carrier were potent symbols of American power in the immediate postwar period. Successive generations of bombers, fighter aircraft, warships, and ground combat equipment have helped to maintain the image of the United States as a nation in the forefront of military technology. This image helps to condition the reactions of friends and foes alike to expressions of U.S. desires. Over time, the Soviet Union too has obtained political advantage by the development and display of advanced weapon systems. The effective use of these systems by other nations, as in the October 1973 war, has amplified this Soviet image.

The political significance of new types of weaponry derives not only from the technical capabilities they represent, but from the test of the battlefield. The specters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seem likely to have been of great significance to the success of American and, later, Soviet diplomacy. In the absence of demonstrative effects, nuclear weapons may have received less credence as regards their destructive capability and decisiveness. Or, nuclear weapons might have been classed with chemical and bacteriological weapons: weapons whose use would be so abominable that they could be discounted, more or less, in the calculations which underlie the decisions of foreign policymakers.

Similarly, a military service which has a reputation for competence—hard training, close attention to weapons maintenance, professionalism, toughness—generally obtains more respect and imparts greater political

influence than one lacking such a reputation. The image that an armed force is unfit and unpracticed will have the opposite impact. During the 1950s and even the 1960s, for example, the Spanish Armed Forces were regarded as not only ill-equipped, but comprised of a moon-lighting officer corps and poorly trained conscripts. Consequently, while those favoring Spain's entry into NATO always cited the size of the Spanish army, critics railed about its quality. By contrast, the Yugoslav and Turkish armed forces, while grossly inferior in numbers and equipment to those of the Soviet Union, are reputedly so able to provide a good accounting of themselves in conflict that Moscow may be deterred from engaging in aggression against these countries. These reputations are based, in part, on past combat performance, but few fail to notice also the continuous and rugged training the respected armed forces undergo.

Performance in war, of course, is of great significance to the reputation of armed forces and to the consequent assumptions and decisions of policy-makers. A third of a century and more than a generation later, reputations forged or lost in World War II continue to have considerable significance for the political influence of various armed forces. Both armed forces that gave a good accounting of themselves, (e.g., the Red Army) and those that did not, (e.g., the Italian Army) are remembered. Performance, more than victory or defeat, is the key. In the aftermath of the 1948, 1956, and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, both Israel's image and the political clout of its military forces were enhanced, while Egypt's and Syria's images were tarnished; yet Jordan, also on the losing side, found its image and influence greater than might have been expected. So, too, after the 1973 Middle East War, both Egypt and Syria gained in reputation despite their military defeat.

Thus, the political consequences of the simple existence of armed forces are likely to be greater or lesser depending upon the size of the force, the technological sophistication of its weaponry, and the reputation of its fighting men and women-based in part on past experiences, and in other part on the thoroughness of its training, and its professionalism.

Deployments and Operations

These broad political ramifications may in turn be enhanced (or degraded), or directed toward the attainment of more specific objectives, by the general deployment pattern and day-to-day operations of the military force. Most importantly, by emplacing land-based forces in a foreign nation, or by regularly operating naval forces in a certain region, a state may become better prepared for conflict in that region. The location of its forces abroad means that it can react more quickly to events there. Moreover, it means that it will be more difficult for the state making the overseas deployment to "ignore" untoward events. At the extreme, by their location, forces deployed abroad will become automatically involved in outbreaks of conflict; as when they are located at the edge of

a demilitarized zone across a traditional invasion route. In less extreme and more frequent cases, the fact that a nation's military personnel (and often their dependents) are located in an area of potential conflict means that the state making the deployment can ill afford to shut its eyes to potential threats, or any other potentially hostile development in that region.

For these reasons, the location of forces abroad can sometimes support a nation's policies in that region more directly and effectively than can a force of equal capability which is kept at home; even when provisions are made to move the latter force to the region of interest quickly and effectively when needed. The key is that when the force is not located in the region of concern, the deploying nation has greater flexibility in identifying those times when the force is needed, and thus its commitments, potentially at least, are somewhat less certain.

In short, when forces are deployed abroad, the deploying nation's promises and commitments become more credible. So too do its threats and warnings. The emplacement of forces abroad also may increase a state's general influence in the region, both as an expression of interest and as a demonstration of the viability of its instruments of power. Such influence may be obtained even if the forces are not used explicitly to exert pressure on antagonists or to support friends, insofar as the forces may be perceived by regional actors as an implicit card in the deploying state's hand. It is for these reasons that the United States has maintained Army and Air Force units in Europe, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere for more than 25 years. And it is largely for these reasons too that the United States, and now the Soviet Union, maintain standing naval deployments in several parts of the globe.

The strength of the political effects of the armed forces may be influenced also by the activities undertaken by those forces—excluding still those activities specifically directed at particular situations.

For one, the cohesion of alliances may be strengthened by regular exercises, both unilateral and bilateral. The annual REFORGER exercise in which U.S. ground troops are airlifted to central Europe and engage in maneuvers with other NATO forces supports the credibility of the United States' preparedness to reinforce the Seventh Army quickly -- the permanent U.S. ground force presence on the continent. Exercises of this nature, if not the same scope, also are conducted in support of U.S. allies in southern Europe and in the Far East. Similarly, the annual UNITAS exercise in which U.S. ships circle South America and engage in anti-submarine warfare and other exercises with the navies of various Latin American states is useful for maintaining a favorable relationship between U.S. and Latin American navies. In each of the above instances, the exercise supports and reinforces the perceptions established by U.S. diplomacy: The United States is concerned with the target states' security and interests, the United States is willing to aid the target states militarily in the event of various contingencies, and the United States has the capability to bring this willingness

to fruition

Secondly, visits of military ships and planes to foreign locations on the occasion of inaugurations, holiday celebrations, air shows, regattas, and other special events, also can have political consequences. Visits whose main purpose is to provide rest and recreation to their crews, to replenish consumables, or to make minor repairs, may also have a similar, if less pointed, political dimension. The friendly presence of a nation's military personnel in a foreign city, if well received, can serve to affirm the visiting state's interest in good relations and, often enough, support for the host state. By sending a symbol of its sovereignty—a warship or military aircraft unit—to a place where, in all likelihood, the safety of the military personnel and the ships or aircraft themselves are dependent upon the good will of the host nation, the visiting nation expresses trust in the host, as well as confidence in its strength and good intentions.

Visits also allow a nation to show off its war fighting capabilities and military technology. The visual impression made by a modern warship or military aircraft may not be measured easily, but neither can it be argued that such sights do not leave some impression. Sleek, modern fighting platforms present impressive vistas, indeed. Their visit to a foreign nation is one way of imparting a sense of the visiting nation's technological prowess.

Frequently, visits become so routine that they pass almost unnoticed. A sudden change in a previously established pattern of visits would be noticed, however. In July, 1976, for example, a U.S. warship visited Haifa, Israel—the first visit in more than ten years. The event was trumpeted in the Israeli media and noted in major U.S. and European newspapers, whereas similar visits to Italian ports—a longstanding practice, pass unnoticed. The cancellation of a previously planned visit also draws attention. It is a common way to express displeasure with a decision, policy, or stance of the country which was to be visited. For example, during the tenure of the Allende regime, in Chile, a planned visit by the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise was cancelled.

Disaster Relief and Similar Activities

Armed forces, being well-organized, highly disciplined, well-equipped, mobile, and existing national resources can be quite useful for aiding another state in various contingencies not involving international conflict. Most of these concern disaster relief or prevention. Ground troops have been used to fight fires, remove snow, clean-up after tidal waves and search for survivors after floods, earthquakes, storms, and other natural calamities. Aircraft can rapidly transport skilled military and civilian personnel, field hospitals, medicine, shelters, and even food. Ships, though they usually cannot respond as quickly as can aircraft, are able to deliver larger amounts of supplies more efficiently over a longer period of time. On occasion, moreover, ships close to a disaster have provided immediate aid of great significance.

Moreover, U.S. armed forces hospitals and other facilities and personnel abroad often have been made available for use by local nationals, especially political leaders. On occasion, the latter have been invited to make use of more advanced facilities in the United States itself, and have been transported there by military aircraft. Armed forces also have been used to provide weather information and to help search for missing ships and aircraft on any number of occasions.

No nation has been as active as the United States in providing disaster assistance and similar supportive activities. Britain and France have engaged in these practices for an even longer period than has the United States, mainly in their former colonies. In more recent years, the Soviet Union has followed this lead.

The usual objective of these actions, to the extent that they do not spring solely from humanitarian motives, is to create a good impression or reservoir of goodwill, which can be drawn upon at some future time. Rarely is a specific political objective sought through these efforts. Interestingly, states prone to natural disasters (because of their geographic location and world weather patterns) have come to expect support from particular nations, especially from the United States. Thus, as with deployments, exercises, port visits, and other activities, the absence of participation in disaster relief and rescue efforts may be very noticeable and have major impact.

Military Assistance

Armed forces also are used, of course, to implement arms transfers and to train foreign military personnel. Whether or not arms transfers provide a vehicle for influence with regard to particular issues is a contentious point; there seems little doubt, however, that they often tie countries more closely together in a broad sense. Where an arms transfer program is successful in this political dimension, there will tend to be less suspicion, better communications, and a greater openness between the military personnel (and sometimes the political leaders) of the donor and recipient nations. This has been the case, for example, among the U.S. and West European nations. On occasion, moreover, the initiation, continuance, or curtailment of particular arms transfers may result in the attainment of specific policy objectives.

Sizable arms transfers necessarily involve the use of military personnel from the donor country to instruct recipient country personnel in the usage and maintenance of weapon systems and corresponding military tactics. These military advisors can make contacts with, and may obtain the trust and confidence of the officers with whom they deal. There often is a professional camaraderie among military officers, as in any profession, which can overshadow national distinctions. In consequence, the advisors may be useful

conduits for communicating policy and for creating a favorable impression in the donor country. And individual officers may sometimes be able to influence their professional counterparts on particular issues. These consequences, which can be turned into political gain, are made more important insofar as a growing number of nations are now ruled by serving, or ex-professional military officers.

Other points of contact and potential influence are military schools such as West Point and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Insofar as the institution obtains the respect of the foreign student, it can imbue compatible values (e.g., anti-Communism) and even a degree of allegiance. Lifelong friends and contacts may be made, and a "soft spot," so to speak, may be created. For these reasons, officers of foreign armies are regularly invited to attend senior service schools and staff colleges.

Of course, familiarity need not always lead to respect, it sometimes breeds contempt. All nations that maintain large arms transfer programs have experienced great difficulties, at times, due to tensions between advisors and students, or because of incidents involving visitors and citizens of the host country. It is difficult to assess when such negative experiences are likely to be obtained, nor is that the task of this study; suffice it to note that negative political consequences as well as positive political consequences sometimes result from the interaction of military personnel connected with arms transfer programs.

Of a perhaps less tenuous character are the physical dependencies created by arms transfers. The fact that a nation's armed forces are dependent upon military equipment fabricated in another state is likely to predispose the former to wish to please the latter. Again, this relationship obviously is not absolute. At times, recipient countries have been willing to alienate their donors; the recent experience of the Soviet Union in Egypt being an obvious, and pointed example. Still, there is a price to pay for such disruptions--if nothing else, a degradation in military capabilities while new equipment is sought, one which the recipient country is likely to wish to avoid, if possible. This predisposition to wish to keep the supplier country content is likely to be greater if financial gains are included in the transfer (e.g., if it is a grant rather than a sale), if stocks of spare parts and consumables are kept low, and if the recipient country is in immediate danger of military confrontation. Yet, even in certain cases where all factors pointed to great dependency on the part of an arms recipient, the political influence which usually is assumed to flow from arms transfers has proven to be illusory.

Discrete Political Operations

All these ways in which the armed forces serve political functions-by their existence and character alone, by their location abroad, by the carrying-out of routine exercises and visits, and by their provision of military assistance and various forms of support in situations not featuring international conflict—are virtually ignored in this study. The focus here is placed only on one aspect of the armed forces as a political instrument—those instances in which discrete military moves are taken in connection with particular situations. The more diffuse political ramifications of military forces discussed above are examined solely as factors which may have helped to condition the relative utility or disutility of discrete uses of the armed forces.

In doing so, the study's approach may be somewhat misleading; a caveat which readers should bear in mind. In one sense, the fact that a discrete use of the armed forces has taken place in itself indicates a failure of policy. When U.S. policy is unambiguous, when that policy is in accord with the reality of limits on the U.S. ability to influence world affairs, when U.S. military forces are sized commensurately with the tasks set for them, when they are deployed, equipped, and trained so as to make their ability to carry out those tasks (and the nation's will to use them in those roles) unquestionable, then situations requiring a discrete use of force are less likely to arise. In effect, a discrete political use of the armed forces is a belated attempt to make clear a policy intent or military capability which for one reason or another—domestic dissension, uncertain or inept leadership, inadequate military preparation, or the unreality of the policy objective itself—has come into question.

Thus, in many cases, the discrete use of armed forces indicates that the previously mentioned, more fundamental political roles of the armed forces have fallen into disrepair. Or put another way, when discrete uses of the armed forces do not take place, then the political functions of the armed forces may be best fulfilled. For example, it may be argued that during those periods when the Soviet Union did not put pressure on the Western position in Central Europe (e.g., Berlin) and thus that no special military steps need have been taken, that U.S. troops deployed in Europe were best fulfilling one of their political roles—persuading Soviet decision—makers to accommodate themselves to the status quo in Europe.

This study, however, counts as incidents only those instances when, to continue the example; the Soviets did put pressure on Berlin and the United States did react with discrete military activity. The study does not record, nor obviously could it record, those times when Soviet decision—makers debated, or individually considered, applying pressure to Berlin and then thought better of it. In terms of reducing the risk of war and stabilizing international politics, it is these latter effects of U.S. military forces which are the most beneficial ones. This bias in the study should be kept in mind.

Discrete uses of the armed forces themselves may be usefully discussed in several sub-categories. These pertain to the mode in which the armed forces are employed and the relationship between the use of the force and the target state, a relationship which we shall term the "style" with which

the military units were used. The utility of military activity will depend, in part, upon these factors.

Modes of Military Activity

Modes of using armed forces may be distinguished, first, by the essential character of the relations between actors. Secondly, modes of force may be distinguished by the objective of the acting nation: Whether it is to bring about a change of behavior by the target or a continuance of past behavior.

Coercive diplomacy

When the essential character of relations between two or more actors is hostile, armed forces typically are used as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. As such, military units are used in one or two modes in order to present a direct, indirect, or potential threat to the target: (a) to deter the target from doing something or stopping from doing something; or (b) to compel the target to do or to stop doing something. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union presumably was deterred from carrying out various threats in the 1961 Berlin crisis and compelled in the 1962 missile crisis to stop activating and eventually to withdraw the missiles and bombers it had emplaced in Cuba. By contrast, North Korea was not deterred by the U.S. military response to the seizure of the Pueblo, insofar as North Korean forces shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft over international waters a little more than one year later. Nor was North Vietnam compelled to terminate its support for the war in South Vietnam by several discrete uses of armed forces by the United States in the early 1960s.

Even as they are used to coerce one target in an incident, the armed forces also may be used in one of two other modes to support another actor:

(a) to assure the second target so that it will continue to do or not to do something; or (b) to induce the second target to do or to stop doing something. The literature of coercive diplomacy has devoted much less attention to assurance and inducement than it has to deterrence and compellence. (1) When using armed forces, however, policymakers often consider the assurance or inducement of one set of actors to be as important as the deterrence or compellence of others. In the aftermath of North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo, for example, President Johnson sought to deter any further hostile action by Pyongyang (and to compel the release of the Pueblo and its crew). But in ordering a large naval demonstration and the reinforcement of the U.S. air forces in the Far East, he also sought to assure South Korea so that it would not remove the ground forces it then had deployed in Vietnam.

Similarly, the permanent emplacement of ground forces in Japan and South Korea at the end of the Korean War was as much to assure those states and thus solidify their ties with the United States, as it was to deter new aggression by North Korea and China.

In this study, all four modes of use of the armed forces—deter, compel, assure, and induce—are examined. It is of particular interest, however, to compare certain pairs of modes in light of studies by the behaviorist school of psychology and clinical psychologists interested in "behavior modification." (2) By comparing uses of the armed forces to support—i.e., assure or induce behavior—with uses to coerce—i.e., deter or compel behavior, the utility of using the armed forces as a "reward" may be contrasted with the utility of their use as "punishment," and the respective values of operant and aversive conditioning may be assessed. The comparison of uses of the armed forces to insure the continued performance of existing behavior—i.e., assure or deter—with uses to obtain changed behavior—i.e., induce or compel, permits examination of the relative value of using armed forces for the purposes of behavior reinforcement and modification.

Cooperative diplomacy

Armed forces also may be used as instruments of cooperative diplomacy for particular political purposes in situations not featuring conflict. In these instances, the armed forces are not used to coerce an actor or to intervene in a situation in any martial way—i.e., they are not meant to present a threat to an actor. Nor are they intended as a show of support to one actor vis-à-vis another actor.

Rather, in instances of cooperative diplomacy, the armed forces are used to symbolize a desire or willingness to obtain, strengthen, or solidify a particular relationship; and by doing this, to assure the continuance or induce the performance of some behavior desired of the target. Two recent examples include the use of the helicopter carrier Iwo Jima and later the Inchon to sweep mines from the Suez Canal, thus helping to improve relations with Egypt in 1974, and the exchange of port visits by U.S. and Soviet warships in May 1975, intended to strengthen the atmosphere of détente. The previous background to these two incidents most certainly did include hostility between the United States, on the one hand, and Egypt and the Soviet Union, respectively, on the other. However, the specific uses of the armed forces under question clearly were meant to express a willingness to cooperate.

Cooperative uses of armed forces have occurred far less frequently than have coercive uses. This is probably because while armed forces are clearly a superior instrument of coercion (or of showing support for actors in conflict situations), many other instruments of policy—e.g., economic aid and cultural tours—are available as means of expressing friendship. Moreover, some of these other instruments are better suited for this latter task, just as armed forces are best suited to the task of coercive diplomacy.

Relationship Between the Use of Force and the Target: Style

Regardless of mode, armed forces may be used either directly or indirectly. And in some cases, they may be used only as a latent instrument.

A direct use of the armed forces occurs when the activities of the military units involved clearly are aimed at a particular target without intermediaries. In sending U.S. Marines to Thailand during the 1962 Laotian crisis, for example, President Kennedy used the armed forces directly to assure Bangkok that the United States remained committed to Thailand's security and to deter both the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam from certain actions in Laos. The Marines also served indirectly, however, to compel the Soviet Union and China to take steps to control the Laotian crisis. Neither China nor the Soviet Union were threatened themselves with violence by the Marine deployments; only their allies were threatened directly. Moscow and Peking were coerced indirectly, though, to the degree that they were concerned with their clients' well-being and found the U.S. threat credible. In effect, the difference lies in which nation would be the subject of the violence which is implicitly implied by the military activity.

There are also situations in which the armed forces are used only as a <u>latent instrument</u> and, as such, in none of the four modes mentioned previously. In these instances, policy-makers desire that an actor do something specifically, and the direct or indirect use of armed forces is contemplated to this end. Moreover, changes in the disposition of military units are taken for the sake of preparedness. However, while these preparatory actions may demonstrate the U.S. concern to all parties, no specific attempt is made to communicate the relationship between the military activity and the desired behavior. Indeed, the target state may neither anticipate, observe, nor otherwise become aware of the military activity.

For example, when the situation on Cyprus began to simmer in 1967, elements of the Sixth Fleet were deployed closer to the area. In taking this action, there was no intent on the part of U.S. policymakers to coerce or support the various actors involved; rather the Johnson administration sought to be prepared to take coercive or supportive actions if the crisis developed further. At the same time, it was assumed that the fleet movements would be observed by the participants in the crisis, and evaluated in light of previous U.S. behavior and current policy statements. In short, when used as a latent instrument, military activity mainly reminds the target that the United States can, and might, act.

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The use of armed forces as a latent instrument is akin to what James Cable has termed the "catalytic" use of force. "A situation arises," Cable relates,

pregnant with a formless menace or offering obscure opportunities. Something, it is felt, is going to happen, which might somehow be prevented if force were available at the critical point. Advantages, their nature and the manner of the achievement, still undetermined, might be reaped by those able to put immediate and appropriate power behind their sickle. (3)

A lack of clarity as to what is expected is an important element in latent uses of the armed forces. In 1956, after King Hussein dismissed Glubb Pasha as Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, elements of the Sixth Fleet were placed on alert and other ships were moved eastward in the Mediterranean in an atmosphere marked by confusion on the part of U.S. decision-makers as to whether Glubb's dismissal was an isolated action or indicative of a broad erosion in Jordan's relations with Great Britain. The connection between this naval activity and behavior desired of either Amman or London was never made clear. Nonetheless, the military preparation may have become known to, or had been expected by Amman, and thus predisposed Hussein to consider the consequences of his next steps for U.S. behavior. Similarly, the British Government was certainly aware of, and probably assured by, the naval activity.

Footnotes

- 1. Of this literature, see, for example, James F. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Little, Brown & Co., 1971); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Columbia University Press, 1974); Paul G. Lauren, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy," International Studies Quarterly, 16 (June 1972), pp. 131-65; Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Seapower (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Bruce M. Russet, "The Calculus of Deterrence," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (June 1963), pp. 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966); J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," American Political Science Review, 57 (June 1963), pp. 420-430; Oran B. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton University Press, 1968).
- 2. Among the most prominent volumes in this literature are B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (The Free Press, 1953); and Albert Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969). The concern, of course, is not with the literature per se, but with its implications for foreign policy.
- 3. Cable, p. 49.

Chapter III

THE HISTORICAL RECORD: CONTEXT

The 215 incidents in which the United States employed its armed forces for political purposes between 1946 and 1975 do not comprise a homogenous set. As might be expected, the incidents varied widely in terms of the size and composition of the American military forces which became involved: ranging from a visit to a foreign port by a single warship to the deployment of major ground, air, and naval units against a backdrop including the mobilization of reserves and the placing on alert of strategic nuclear forces. These variations are described in chapter four.

First, it is instructive to consider variations in the environment in which the armed forces were employed. In this chapter, five contextual features are examined: time, region, type of political situation at which the U.S. military action was directed, the level of involvement by the Soviet Union and China -- the United States' two main antagonists during the period under study, and the participation of other actors. In order to put these factors in perspective, it is helpful to begin with a more substantive, multi-dimensional characterization of the incidents.

Recurrent Themes

It is apparent from the analysis that only a few types of situations in each region accounted for a very large proportion of the incidents in which the United States used its armed forces for political objectives.

Only three incidents took place in South Asia; all three were related to wars between India and its neighbors -- in 1962 with China, and in 1965 and 1971 with Pakistan. Eight of the ten incidents that took place in Sub-Saharan Africa involved internal strife in Zaire or Tanzania, principally in the early- and mid-1960s. In the third area of relatively low activity, South America, virtually all of the incidents concerned relatively minor U.S. demonstrations of friendship to various states.

In the Central American/Caribbean area, where a much greater number of incidents took place, nearly one-half involved the rise to power of Fidel Castro, attempts to oust him from power, Castro-supported insurgencies, or the security of the U.S. base at Guantanamo. All of these incidents took place between 1958 and 1965. Several other incidents also involved Cuba—the most important concerning attempts by the Soviet Union to enhance its military position in the area (the 1962 missile crisis and the construction of submarine facilities in 1970). Almost another one-third of the incidents in the Caribbean concerned domestic conflicts in either Haiti or the Dominican Republic, or disputes between those two states.

Of twenty incidents in the Far East, more than one-half concerned conflict between China and Taiwan, the last such incident taking place in 1963. Most of the remaining incidents concerned North Korea's conflict with South Korea and attacks on U.S. military units on or near the Korean Peninsula. The last such incident was in 1971. (1)

In Southeast Asia, one-half of the incidents were related to North Vietnam's support of, or participation in conflicts within the former SEATO Protocol States of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. These incidents occurred either between the initiation of conflict in the area in the late 1950s and full U.S. entry into the war in 1965, or between the mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 and the collapse of governments friendly to the United States in 1975. Another 10 percent of the incidents in Southeast Asia stemmed from the colonial war in IndoChina between France and the Viet Minh. A third type of situation provided another 15 percent of the incidents: domestic strife in Indonesia and the "confrontation" with Malaysia, beginning in 1956 and lasting until President Sukarno was ousted from office in 1966.

In the Middle East, one-third of the incidents were accounted for by either internal strife in Jordan and Lebanon, or those two nations' bilateral relations with the United States. Only three of these types of incidents occurred in the last ten years of the study period (1966-75), however. (2) One-fourth of the Middle East incidents were directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, most frequently stemming from violence between Egypt and Israel. Of perhaps greater significance, three-fifths of the Arab-Israeli incidents occurred in the last ten years. Most of the remaining incidents that took place in the Middle East involved U.S. demonstrations of friendship to various states, the Yemeni civil war, or Arab oil policy.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the incidents in Europe is the fact that the Soviet Union participated in three-fourths of them. Of this sub-group, almost two-fifths concerned U.S. actions to reassure individual states coming under Soviet pressure, particularly Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the early post-war years. Another one-fourth of the European incidents in which the Soviets participated pertained to Berlin; the last such incident taking place in 1965. A further one-fourth of these incidents concerned either U.S. responses to other hostile Soviet acts, or U.S. initiatives to reduce tensions in Europe. Of those European incidents in which the Soviet Union was not involved, more than one-half were related to Cyprus.

During the last five years of the study time frame (1971-75), U.S. sctions related to the war in Southeast Asia accounted for the majority of the incidents. The last of these were the evacuations from Vietnam and Cambodis, and the <u>Mayaguez</u> incident; all three symbolic of the termination of U.S. commitments and military involvement in this area. Also of particular prominence in the 1970s were actions taken with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab oil policy.

From another perspective, it is of interest that a large number of those incidents which occurred during the last ten years involved either the termination of involvements abroad (e.g., the 1973 mineclearing of Haiphong Harbor), or actions aimed at improving relations between states (e.g., visits to ports in the Soviet Union in 1971 and 1975). As described below, this new emphasis in the character of U.S. political uses of the armed forces reflects the completion of a cycle in U.S. foreign policy.

Distribution of Incidents Over Time

The distribution of incidents over time is depicted in Figure III-1. The distribution can be categorized into four periods: 1946-48, 1949-55, 1956-65, and 1966-75.

For the three years immediately following the Second World War, the annual average number of incidents (8.0) ran slightly above the average for the entire 30 year period (7.2 incidents per year). After 1948, however, the United States began to use its armed forces less frequently for political purposes; the annual average for the period 1949-55 was only 3.4. Beginning in 1956, the use of armed forces for political objectives became more common, and the number of incidents per year increased gradually, peaking at 20 incidents in 1964. On the average, 12.0 incidents occurred each year during the period 1956-65, which stands quite apart as a time of great American activism. This activist period ended abruptly, in 1966, when there were only three incidents. And the frequency of incidents has remained relatively low ever since.

An important question is, what accounts for these changes in the number of incidents each year? To answer this question, we examined the relationship between variation in the annual number of incidents and a number of indices reflecting either changes in the international environment in which U.S. policy functioned, or domestic changes in the United States. Statistics summarizing the most interesting relationships are presented in Table III-1.

Of the international indices, the most important factor seems to have been whether or not the United States was, or was recently involved in a limited war. During both the Korean and Vietnam wars, and for several years following the end of each of those conflicts, the United States appears to have been reluctant to use its armed forces elsewhere. This stands to reason: fewer unengaged forces were available, and military officials would have been reluctant to become involved in situations which might have resulted in new demands on U.S. military resources. Additionally, once the Korean and Vietnam conflicts became unpopular in the United States, political leaders were likely to have been loathe to risk further alienation of their constituents. This latter explanation is highlighted by the relatively sharp increase in the correlation when three years (an arbitrary choice) were added to the actual period of fighting. Apparently, the psychological consequences of a direct military involvement persist beyond the war itself, and have an important effect on policy decisions.

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Table III-1

Simple Correlations Between Annual Number of Incidents and Various Measures of Change in the International and Domestic Environment

Simple Correlations (r)

Measure of Change	All Incidents	Incidents involving major components of force only(a)
U.S. not engaged in Korean and Vietnam Wars(b)	.39	
U.S. not engaged in Korean and Vietnam Wars plus three years(c)	.58	The second of th
Opportunities (d)	150 .44 ball	.29
Relative U.S. and USSR nuclear strength(e)	37	27
President's popularity(f)	.50	.50
National confidence(g)	.58	.47

- (a) Major force components are defined as: (a) ground combat forces larger than one battalion; or (b) naval forces at least as large as two carrier (or battleship) task groups; or (c) land-based combat air units at least as large as one air wing.
- (b) 1946-49, 1954-64, and 1973-75
- (c) Annual number of wars, domestic upheavals, and large-scale hostilities as defined and measured by Edward Azar, Probe for Peace: Small State Hostilities (Burgess, 1973); and updated by Edward Azar.
- (d) 1946-49 and 1957-64
- (e) End of year ratio of force loadings: number of nuclear weapons deployed on ICEMs, SLEMs, and long-range bombers.
- (f) Annual average approval of the President's performance, as surveyed by the Gallup Poll.
- (g) Annual average Standard and Poors composite stock price index discounted for both inflation and real economic growth.

A second international factor which is relatively highly correlated with the frequency of U.S. use of the armed forces for political purposes is the number of opportunities presented by the international system. This, too, is an obvious relationship. When fewer situations develop in which the armed forces can play a role, there are likely to be fewer uses of forces. Data on international and intranational conflicts compiled by Edwar Azar at the University of North Carolina were used to index opportunities.

A third factor which is relatively closely related to the frequency of U.S. political uses of the armed forces is the overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance. The relationship here is an inverse one. As the Soviet Union first broke the U.S. nuclear monopoly, and then gained in nuclear strength relative to the United States, the United States employed its armed forces less frequently for political objectives. This relationship was not notably strengthened by lagging the nuclear balance one year behind the incident frequency — testing the hypothesis that it takes time for actual military strength to affect behavior. Nor was it notably strengthened by having the nuclear balance index lead incident frequency by one year — testing the hypothesis that projections of future strength are the pertinent influence on national behavior.

We are somewhat surprised not to find a clear relationship between changes in the size of the U.S. military deployments abroad, and the frequency of incidents. We examined this relationship for a two year period, with the results shown in Table III-2. While the symmetry in the distribution is strictly coincidental, there clearly was no greater propensity for incidents to occur following reductions in the U.S. overseas presence, as many have suggested would be the case.

Table III-2 Number of Incidents and Change in U.S. Military Deployments Abroad

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Change in Number of U.S. Troops in Region During the Two Years Preceeding the Incident	Number of Incidents
Increased by more than 20 percent Increased by between 10 and 20 percent	37 15
Increased or decreased less than 10 percent Decreased by between 10 and 20 percent Decreased by more than 20 percent	61 15 37
No prior U.S. deployment in region Don't know	24 26

Interest in the relationships between the frequency of political uses of the armed forces and indices of domestic changes in the United States was prompted by differences noted among administrations, as shown below.

	Average number of
Administration	incidents per year in office
" to be sented as to best all sed a date of	care often dir dig a dat \assac
Truman (from January 1946)	5.0
Eisenhower and place to the same what we have	7.3 13.4
Kennedy and I am I am a man and a ma	9.7
Johnson - This and a feel that will be a feel	professional and the second second
Nixon	AND
Ford (through October 1975)	4.3

Do these variations stem from the styles and concerns of the Presidents and their administrations themselves, from their happening to be in office at the same time that variations in the international environment mentioned previously were occurring, or from changes within the United States?

Two particularly interesting results were obtained: (a) a strong relationship exists between the number of incidents and the President's popularity; and (b) an even stronger relationship exists between the number of incidents and the nation's sense of confidence. Presidential popularity was measured by responses to the Gallup Poll's regular question, concerning approval of the President's performance. National confidence was measured by the Standard and Poor's composite stock price index after discounting for both inflation and real economic growth; the index, thus reflects, in one sense, investors' outlook. A rise indicates buoyancy in the national spirit and a more optimistic view of the future; a decline, a more gloomy attitude. The strong positive correlation suggests that at times when the nation was more confident, the armed forces were used more frequently for political purposes.

For all of these relationships, measures of co-variance were recomputed using the annual frequency of only those incidents in which the United States employed major components of its armed forces. (3) This step almost always reduced the strength of the relationship, sometimes starkly. Apparently, the frequency of the more serious incidents — those in which major units of force were used — was relatively more stable throughout the 30 year period. Thus, decisions concerning the United States' involvement in these more serious incidents — those in which, presumably, the nation's interests were more clearly, or closely challenged, are not likely to be as strongly influenced by the domestic and international factors just discussed, as were decisions on involvements in situations in which the stakes were less important.

Of course, the variables mentioned need not be independent determinants of the United States' proclivity to use the armed forces for political objectives. Many of these factors are likely to vary, to some degree, in similar directions

at the same time. Regression analysis was used to measure the degree to which each of these variables, singly and in combination, could be used to account for variations in the frequency with which the United States used its military forces for political purposes.

As a result of this analysis, it appears that three of the factors examined were most important in determining when the United States turned to the armed forces to attain political objectives: whether or not the United States was still, or had been involved within the past several years, in a limited war; the number of opportunities presented by the international environment; and the previously mentioned index of the nation's confidence.

Past or present involvement in either the Korean or the Vietnamese Wars was clearly the most important factor. When "opportunities" or "confidence" was added to that involvement, 57 and 56 percent, respectively, of the variation in the annual number of incidents was accounted for. However, because these latter two variables appear to be related statistically, the use of all three independent variables only raised the strength of the regression equation to 60 percent. The regression statistics are summarized in Table III-3. (4)

Table III-3

Annual Number of Incidents (Y) as a Function of Non-Involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Opportunities, and National Confidence

Annual Number of incidents as a function of:	Regression equation	R ²	F-statistic	Standard error
1. Non-Korean and				
	Y = -1.60			
(+3 yrs) [X ₁] +	+5.7 X1	.57	18.18	3.13
"Opportunities" [X2]	+.30 X2	"	(d.f.=2/27)	in out with
2. Non-Korean and		是中心,中心发现		
Vietnam War years	Y = -3.39	A HOLDER	STEEL SAN TO SEE AS	
(+3 yrs) [X ₁] +	+4.54 X ₁	.56	17.25	3.18
"National Confidence"	+.94 X2		(d.f.=2/27)	mile delim
[X ₂]				A STATE OF THE STA
3. Non-Korean and			And Committee of the	
Vietnam War years	Y = -3.35	M Scotte	the makes to the	
(+3 yrs) [X ₁] +	+5.15 X ₁	.60	12.84	3.11
"National Confidence"	+.48 X2		(d.f.=3/26)	
[X2] + "Opportunities"		TO SEE AN GE	Luc a talane est	The Calledon
[X3]	3 140	Section of the second		100
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Comparison of Actual and Estimated Number of Incidents Figure III-2




Figure III-2 presents the annual number of incidents that would be estimated on the basis of equation number three, which includes the following as independent variables: non-Korean and Vietnan War years (plus three years), "national confidence," and "opportunities." Figure III-2 also provides for each year, a graphic comparison between the number of incidents that would be estimated on the basis of this equation and the number of incidents that actually did occur. The reader should note not only the closeness of the "fit" between these numbers, but also the degree of similarity in directional changes.

The inference which may be drawn from this analysis is that as memories of the Vietnam conflict recede from the American consciousness, the nation may once again more frequently employ its armed forces for political objectives. This may be true especially if an increasing number of "opportunities" are presented by the international environment, or, if the nation's sense of confidence returns to previously high levels.

Regional Focus of Incidents

The regional focus of U.S. political uses of the armed forces has varied widely over time, as shown by the data presented in Table III-4.

Table III-4

Distribution of Incidents by Time Period and Region.
Percentage of Total for Time Period.

Time Period	Western Hemisphere	Europe	Middle East and North Africa	South Asia and Africa	Southeast and East Asia
1946-48	21	63	13	0	
1949-55	₩13	29	8 8 5	4	3 4 ₄₆
1956-65	37 /	12	15	9	27
1966-75	213	15	32	4	36
1946-75	28	20	18	6	28

Over the full period, the incidents were distributed relatively evenly, except for the Southern Hemisphere in which relatively few incidents took place. Europe, the Middle East, Southeast and East Asia, and the Central America/Caribbean area each accounted for approximately one-fifth to one-fourth of the total number of incidents.

The Western Hemisphere accounted for more than one-fourth of the incidents. These have been highly specialized, however, both in time and as regards to location. Virtually all of these incidents occurred on islands in, or in nations on the littoral of the Caribbean. And about three-fourths of the Western Hemisphere incidents took place during the most active period, 1956-65.

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Another one-fourth of the incidents took place in Southeast and East Asia. These were more evenly distributed over time. Interestingly, the United States used its armed forces for political objectives in Southeast and East Asia relatively less during the 1956-65 period than it did both before and after that period. During the period leading up to the Vietnam War, Fidel Castro was more often the target of U.S. military activities than was Ho Chi Minh.

Europe accounted for one-fifth of the incidents, as did the Middle East. More importantly, during the past ten years of the study period, these two regions combined were the scene of about one-half of the political uses of the armed forces.

What is remarkable about South Asia and Africa is how little attention they have received from the United States as regards the political use of armed forces. Indeed, the Southern Hemisphere generally has been the target of very few political uses of U.S. armed forces. When South America, exclusive of Veneguela (a Caribbean littoral state), is split off from the Western Hemisphere figures and added to the South Asian and Sub-Saharan African total, it raises the latter's share of the overall number of incidents to only 13 percent. Either the United States had little interest in what occurred in these distant regions, or it did not expect that the armed forces would be an effective instrument of policy in the Southern Hemisphere. There were, according to the Azar data, numerous "opportunities" for the use of U.S. armed forces, which elsewhere may well have elicited a response.

Finally, it should be emphasized that regardless of these thirty year trends, the last half decade of the study time frame was dominated by incidents in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The end of the war in Vietnam and changing perceptions of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia would seem to make new actions in that area unlikely. The Middle East, by contrast, promises no such change in attention or involvement. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues, regimes in the area remain fragile, intra-Arab conflicts abound, and the oil issue looms large in calculations of U.S. decisionmakers At the same time, both the Soviet Union and the United States are deeply involved, and the Executive, the Congress, and the American public are generally united on policy in this area.

In brief, while the future may feature fewer incidents than the past, a larger proportion of those which do occur are likely to take place in the Middle East. As the effects of the war in Vietnam continue to erode, however, and if the nation's confidence is restored, the United States' use of the armed forces for political objectives may become both more frequent and more diverse.

Political Situation

Political situation refers to the nature of the external events or relationships at which the U.S. use of armed forces was directed. There are numerous ways to characterize political situation; two deserve mention here.

First, the 215 incidents were divided into two categories: those that were essentially intra-national in nature and those that were essentially international. The latter were further compartmented, depending upon whether or not the United States was a primary actor in the pertinent events or relationships leading up to the introduction of U.S. armed forces. In Table III-5, the percentages of incidents in each category are displayed by time period.

Table III-5

Distribution of Incidents by Time Period and Political Situation Percentage of Total for Time Period

		Inte	International		
Time Period	Intra-national	Initially in- volving U.S.	Not initially involving U.S.		
1946-48	33	38	29		
1949-55	38	20	42		
1956-65	51	25	24		
1966-75	34	26	40 %		
1946-75	and decide 44 and special	26	30		

Of note, is the sharp increase in the share of incidents attributable to intra-national events during the period of greatest U.S. activism, 1956-65. During this period, intra-national situations accounted for slightly more than one-half of the incidents, as compared to the one-third share typifying the remainder of the 30 years. In fact, the increase in U.S. involvements in intra-national situations accounts for about one-half of the rise in total U.S. activity during 1956-65. Much of this rise pertained to U.S. efforts to aid various nations in the Caribbean defeat Cuban-

sponsored insurgencies. Other types of situations which contributed to the increase in intra-national involvements included domestic conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam, and difficulties in the Congo.

Intra-national situations were further sub-divided into five categories. Three of these -- insurgency, civil war, domestic turmoil -- involved violence to varying degrees and accounted for about three-fourths of the total U.S. uses of the armed forces directed at intra-national situations (or one-third of all incidents). The other two sub-categories were coups and constitutional changes of government. Clearly, the U.S. became involved in intra-national situations mainly when violence was threatened or actually occurred. The activist period (1956-65) featured a greater incidence of involvements in insurgencies and coups. Overall, 63 percent of the intra-national situations occurred during the activist period, but 81 percent of the insurgencies and 75 percent of the coups took place during those ten years.

Geographically, U.S. concern with intra-national situations appeared to be highly focused. Nearly one-half of the intra-national situations occurred in the Western Hemisphere, and all of these were on the shores of the Caribbean; less than one-fourth of the total number of incidents occurred in the Caribbean. Another one-fourth of the intra-national situations were located in Southeast Asia, mostly in Indochina; as compared to 19 percent of of all of the incidents.

Use of the armed forces for political objectives directed at <u>international situations</u>, on the other hand, shows no clear pattern over time. International uses too were subdivided into more specific situational descriptions, which characterized either the specific relationship that the U.S. armed forces were attempting to influence, or the specific event to which the U.S. was reacting.

International situations not involving the United States initially were divided into: (a) wars between two or more states, (b) sporadic armed conflicts between two or more states, (c) unfriendly But non-violent relations between states, and (d) friendly relations between states. Most (67 percent) of the U.S. actions directed at international situations also involved violence -- both full blown wars and sporadic conflicts. As in the case of the intra-national situations, the U.S. thus seemed to act mainly when conflict was threatened or manifest. Geographically, these U.S. actions were concentrated in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and East Asia; each of these regions accounted for nearly one-fourth of the international, violent incidents in which the U.S. was not involved initially. When the United States directed its armed forces at nonviolent international situations, they were even more narrowly focused geographically -- Europe and the Middle East accounted for 80 percent of these latter incidents. Readers should note the prominence of the Middle East in both violent and non-violent international situations.

International situations in which the United States was a primary actor from the onset included those in which the U.S. responded to specific hostile acts directed at itself, its military forces stationed

in a foreign country, American citizens abroad, or property owned abroad by American citizens. These hostile acts were either political initiatives, or physical attacks organized either by foreign governments or by non-governmental groups. There were a total of 36 such incidents (17 percent of the total). Those which involved physical attacks on U.S. property or military forces tended to take place in the Caribbean area, most often involving Cuba; those which involved hostile political initiatives — usually by the Soviet Union — tended to occur in Europe.

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Participation by the U.S.S.R. or China

One of two criteria had to be satisfied in order for an actor to be considered a participant in an incident: (a) it had to have been a specific target of U.S. decisionmakers in using the armed forces, in that the U.S. must have desired that the actor perform, or not perform, a specific act or, more subtly, be impressed in a particular fashion; or (b) the actor had to play a special role in determining the outcome of the incident. The Soviet Union or China participated in 41 percent of the 215 incidents. Each of their proportional participation dropped off sharply after 1955. Soviet participation rose slightly during the last ten years, but Chinese participation continued to decline (see Table III-6).

Table III-6

Soviet and Chinese Participation Percentage of Total for Time Period

Time Period	Soviet Union	China
1946-48	63	1
1949-55	42	21
1956-65	28	14
1966-75	30	11
1946-75	\	14

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Both Soviet and Chinese participation was highly dependent upon the location of the incident. The Soviets were involved in 75 percent of the incidents in Europe, 60 percent of those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 39 percent of those in the Middle East and only 7 percent of those in the Western Hemisphere. The Chinese were not involved in any of the incidents in these four regions. The Chinese or the Soviets were involved in 85 percent of the incidents in East Asia, but only one-third of those in Southeast Asia. Thus, the overall decline in both Soviet and Chinese participation reflects mainly the reduction in the number of incidents in the regions of their greatest interest — Europe and East Asia, respectively.

In the incidents in which they did participate, the Soviet Union or China threatened to use, or actually employed their own armed forces roughly one-half of the time. In another 20 percent of the incidents, they may have used or threatened to use force, but the data are insufficient to be certain.

The Soviet Union has been involved in three-fourths of those incidents whose political situation was characterized as non-violent relations between states. In these instances, the United States generally has used its armed forces to reassure its allies, or to improve relations with the Soviet Union or Soviet clients. Of final interest, only one hostile act directed at the United States by China resulted in a U.S. use of its armed forces. It is arguable, though, whether Peking was simply not as hostile toward the United States as is generally imagined, or was merely very cautious and selective in manifesting its hostility.

Other Participants

On the average, two other participants were involved with the United States in each incident. Only three-fourths of the total number of participants in all of the incidents were the official authorities of nation-states; more than one-tenth were insurgent groups of one sort or another. Other categories of participants included international or regional organizations, military cliques, and civilian groups.

As might be expected, a relatively small number of actors accounted for a very large proportion of the total participation (Table III-7). Eighteen actors accounted for more than one-half of the total; the leading five actors alone accounted for almost one-third.

The Soviet Union was by far the most active state. Besides the Soviet Union, only two other nations -- Britain and France -- participated in incidents outside their own immediate region. Almost one-half of the total extra-regional involvements took place in the Middle East. The notion that the Middle East has been the crossroads of the world is no cliche.

Table III-7

Principal Participants Number of Incidents in Which Each Participated

U.S.S.R.	73	Israel	13
United Kingdom	35	National Liberation	1.48 943
Company of the second		Front (South Vietnam)	13
China Manager and	30	eda 196 Parines Bride to parentendo.	I IV been
Cuba	25	Taiwan	12
Carrier Market State of	No principal of	Turkey	12
North Vietnam	21	and defining the second of the second	
France	17	Organization of	North Art
Care the book of the	.	American States	11
Egypt	16	Dominican Republic	10
United Nations	16	Greece	10
South Vietnam	14	Jordan	10
		Yugoslavia	10

The incidents in which the actors listed in Table III-7 participated have tended to involve violence, and, secondarily, hostile political initiatives directed at the United States; the latter, most importantly, by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Future Trends

Attempting to predict incidents in which the United States might in the future attempt to attain political objectives by changing the disposition of its armed forces, on the basis of this historical record, would be imprudent. A few broad inferences, however, are worth considering:

At the moment, it seems likely that the frequency of these kinds of incidents will remain relatively low. However, as noted previously, if a large number of opportunities are presented by the international system, if a mood or national confidence, such as that which sustained such involvements during the activist period, 1956-65, returns, or if the disillusion with military involvement which resulted from the Vietnam War dissipates, this prospect could change.

- The Eastern Mediterranean would seem to be the most likely, and most frequent focus of those political actions which are undertaken by U.S. armed forces. Of those few types of situations which have provided the source for the majority of recent incidents, those around the Eastern Mediterranean remain the most active. These include: (a) most importantly, the Arab-Israeli conflict; (b) inter-Arab conflicts; and (c) the Cyprus situation (and other disputes between Greece and Turkey).
- · If incidents in the Eastern Mediterranean do recur, they are likely to require major committals of force insofar as the local participants are well-armed and the U.S.S.R. is more than likely to become involved. This is discussed further in chapter four.
- Elsewhere, as well as in this key region, greater emphasis is likely to continue to be placed on the use of the armed forces to improve or cement relations, as opposed to coercive uses of force.
- · Finally, each of these inferences must be tempered by a simple observation, A number of the situations which previously provided the reasons for a large share of the United States' uses of the armed forces for political objectives, although now relatively quiescent, remain unsettled politically and are potentially renewable. Developments in Southeast Asia seem likely to be an exception to this observation, but included among the potential sources of renewed U.S. involvement, or at least pressures in that direction are: (a) the situation on the Korean Peninusla; (b) the possibility of renewed Cuban support for insurgencies in the Caribbean; and (c) new Soviet pressure on states in Southeastern Europe (e.g., in the event of a succession crisis in Yugoslovia). In any of these cases, based on past experience, one should expect the United States to turn to its armed forces as a means of influencing the outcome of events.

Footnotes

- 1. Of course, the U.S. military deployments which followed the tree-cutting incident in August 1976 would have met the terms of the definition of a political use of military force. The necessity to impose a cut-off on the data collection did not allow its inclusion, however.
- 2. Again, additional incidents have taken place--e.g., in Lebanon--after the October 1975 cut-off imposed on the data collection.
- 3. Based on historical data, major components were defined as: (a) ground combat forces larger than one battalion in size; or (b) naval forces at least as large as two aircraft carrier (or battleship) task groups; or (c) land-based combat air units at least as large as one air wing. See chapter four for further discussion.

Development and and the

4. Robert Mahoney, Jr., used the list of incidents presented in Appendix A as a dependent variable — i.e., the number of times each year in which the U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument in an incident — and the following as independent variables: the state of the strategic balance, Soviet conflictual behavior toward the United States, the amount of conflict throughout the world, and American involvement in limited wars. Among the results of a multiple regression analysis reported are the following figures: R = .84 and R² = .70. See: Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "American Political-Military Operations and the Structure of the International System;" paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Section on Military Studies, Ohio State University, Columbus, October 1976.

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Chapter IV

THE HISTORICAL RECORD: TRENDS IN THE SIZE, TYPE, AND

ACTIVITY OF PARTICIPATING MILITARY FORCES

The incidents described in the previous chapter were not ephemeral events. On the average, the United States employed units of its armed forces in these incidents for 90 days; the maximum level of force employed in the incident was exerted, again on the average, for 56 days. Still, most of the 215 incidents in which the United States utilized its armed forces for political objectives were relatively minor affairs, in which neither the stakes involved (at least for the United States), the amount of force employed, nor the activity of U.S. forces ever attained significant proportions. Other incidents, however, were more serious affairs in which significant U.S. political objectives were at stake and in which commensurate levels of force were employed. And in a few incidents the very survival of the nation seemed to be threatened, indirectly if not directly, and the full panoply of the nation's armed forces were employed to avert the disaster which seemed otherwise inevitable.

In this chapter we discuss variations in the size, types, and activities of the components of the armed forces which were employed in these incidents. Are there certain "modal" components of force utilized when events seem to necessitate a demonstrative use of force? Do these modalities vary in different regions or political contexts? These and similar questions are addressed in the following pages with a view toward discerning the consistencies, as well as the variations in the historical pattern; thereby providing an empirical basis for helping to establish future U.S. force structure requirements.

We begin by examining the types of forces which have been most often employed for political objectives. Then, in turn, we discuss the level of military effort and the specific activities of the military components which have participated.


Type and Size of Forces Involved

Throughout the post-war period, the United States has turned most often to its Navy when it desired to employ components of the armed forces in support of political objectives. Naval units participated in 177 of the 215 incidents, or more than four out of every five. Land-based forces were used in much fewer incidents, and rarely without the simultaneous participation of naval units. Land-based air units participated in 103 incidents, or roughly one-half of the total number. Ground combat units took part in only 45 incidents, or about one-fifth of the total.(1) Moreover, whereas naval forces alone were employed in 100 incidents, land-based air units alone took part in 22 incidents. Ground combat forces alone were used in only three incidents. The combination of land-based air and ground combat units without naval participation also was rare; there were only 12 such cases. These frequencies are summarized in Figure IV-1.

Figure IV-1

Number of Incidents in which Naval, Ground Combat, and Land-Based Air Units Participated

Naval forces



Includes Marine Corps units when deployed on amphibious vessels.

Army units, and Marines when not deployed on amphibious vessels.

Includes Navy land-based maritime patrol aircraft and Army

helicopter transportation units.

This reliance on naval forces has been the case in all parts of the world throughout the post-war period. It has not been sensitive to either Soviet or Chinese participation in the incidents, nor to the political context which led to the U.S. use of force.

- Navy participation ranged from a "low" of 77 percent of the incidents in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, to a "high" of 85 percent of the incidents in East Asia. Navy participation in the other regions fell within this relatively narrow range.
- Although Navy participation sometimes varied sharply from one year to the next, it has been consistently high over time. Indeed, only in five years (1949, 1953, 1955, 1960, and 1966) did the Navy participate in less than 70 percent of all incidents. In nine years, the Navy was involved in every political use of the armed forces. If anything, the trend has been toward greater Navy participation: since 1955, the Navy has been involved, on the average, in more than nine out of every ten incidents.
- Navy participation also has not varied significantly with political context. Naval forces were employed in 76 percent of the incidents stemming from international situations in which the United States was involved from the beginning, 83 percent of the intra-national situations, and 86 percent of those situations characterized as international but not involving the U.S. initially.
- Finally, Soviet or Chinese participation did not seem to make much difference; nor did it matter whether or not the USSR or China threatened, or actually employed force in the incidents when they did participate. Navy involvement ranged narrowly between 78 and 84 percent as a function of the level of Soviet or Chinese involvement.

In short, the Navy clearly has been the foremost instrument for the United States' political uses of the armed forces: at all times, in all places, and regardless of the specifics of the situation. The reasons for this dominance are not difficult to discern.

For one thing, ships are easier to move about than are Army or land-based aircraft units. They can be moved at less increme at cost than can any land-based unit of comparable size. They can be moved more rapidly than can most land-based units. And considering that a larger portion of the Navy's support is organic to the combat unit (i.e., a ship as compared to a battalion or a squadron), they can be moved with less difficulty as concerns the establishment of communications and logistics flows than can Army or Air Force units.

Second, when warships get to the scene of a disturbance, they are less disruptive psychologically than are land-based forces and thus are likely to be less offensive diplomatically; if desirable, naval forces can remain nearby, but out of sight. Even if they are within sight of land, fewer inhabitants of the target state are likely to be aware of their presence than would be the case for land-based units. And actual interactions between sailors

and local citizens can be more tightly controlled than they can between soldiers and the people living near the deployment zone. Thus, naval forces can be used more subtly to support foreign policy incentives—to underscore threats, or warnings, or promises, or commitments—than can land-based units, and they can do so without necessarily tying the President's hand.

Of course, if the President wished to make a hand-tying gesture—for example, so as to demonstrate resolve, he would be better advised to turn to land-based forces for the political demonstration. Such voluntary cessions of flexibility are rare in international politics, however.

Third, the frequent recourse to the Navy is partly the result of tradition or habit. After all, for most of U.S. history, the Navy was the only military instrument which could be used for these purposes—there were no, or few forces abroad, and technology did not yet permit the movement of land-based forces except over very long periods of time by sea. As a consequence, the Navy, far more than the other two military services, has come to think of its employment for political objectives as one of its principal missions ("show-the-flag," "presence," "crisis diplomacy"). Moreover, the Navy, again to a greater extent than the other services, has incorporated certain measures in the design of its forces which enable it to perform better in such operations; for example, the construction of underway support ships which permit operations in regions remote from bases.

The above said, let us look in some greater detail at those naval, ground, and air units which have been used as political instruments.

Naval Forces

Not surprisingly, when the U.S. Navy did become involved in these incidents, it most often utilized sea-based airpower. Aircraft carriers took part in 106 incidents in all; 60 percent of those involving naval forces and slightly less than one-half of all the incidents.(2) Carriers were used proportionally more during the 1949-55 period, a time generally of lesser naval participation, than at other times, but the differences over time periods are relatively minor, as shown below:

Period	Naval participation as percentage of all incidents.	Carrier participation as percentage of naval involvements.
1946-48	88	46
1949-55	and n ew orders of	58
1956-65 1966-75	91	54 47

Also not surprisingly, the use of aircraft carriers tended to take place more often in regions where the United States maintained a continuous carrier presence, than elsewhere. In the Seventh Fleet's operating area, carriers took part in 75 percent of those incidents in East Asia in which any naval forces were involved; and 63 percent of those in Southeast Asia. In the Sixth Fleet's area, carriers participated in 55 percent of the total naval involvements in both the Middle East/North Africa and Europe. The latter, of course, primarily are accounted for by incidents in the Balkans and Cyprus. Elsewhere, the use of carriers was not nearly so common. Carriers were used in less than one-third of the Navy's involvements in Africa, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.

Of course, the decision to use or not to use a carrier in a particular incident may be as much a function of the nature of the situation as it is of the immediate availability of carrier decks. For example, incidents in the Western Hemisphere typically did not involve the USSR, nor any other actor with sizable military forces, and hence could be handled by lesser U.S. forces. In other words, perhaps the carriers are wisely deployed on a continuous basis in just those areas in which they are likely to be needed, rather than being used in certain areas simply because they are available. This alternate hypothesis is supported by two observations.

First, carriers tended to be used more in political contexts characterized by international violence than in other types of situations. Carriers participated in 70 percent of the former, but only in 49 percent of all other types of political contexts. Presumably, faced with the prospect of intervening in a shooting war, the United States turned to its more powerful warships.

Second, there is a clear relationship between Soviet or Chinese involvement and the use of carriers. Aircraft carriers were involved in 65 percent of those incidents in which U.S. naval forces were used and Russian or Chinese military forces also participated, and in 67 percent of those U.S. naval involvements in which the Soviets or Chinese threatened to, but did not actually employ armed forces. On the other hand, carriers were involved in only 26 percent of those incidents in which the U.S. Navy and the Soviets or Chinese participated, but in which the USSR and China neither employed nor threatened to employ force. And carriers took part in only 46 percent of those U.S. naval involvements in situations in which there was no Soviet or Chinese participation.

It should be noted that Soviet and Chinese involvements with threats or actual military activity tended to occur in East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe—the areas where carriers were most readily available. Thus, there is again the question of whether the carrier deployments in these regions stem from anticipation of Soviet/Chinese military activity, and thus an anticipated need for carriers.

When aircraft carriers were used in an incident, only one carrier taskgroup took part roughly one-half of the time (51 incidents). Two carrier task groups were utilized on 25 occasions, and three on 11 occasions. More than three carrier task groups took part in 11 incidents, the largest carrier deployments—upwards of six carriers participating—taking place during the Off-shore Islands crisis (1958), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the crisis which followed North Korea's shooting down of an EC-121 aircraft (1969), and the Line-backer Operation in response to the North Vietnamese Easter offensive in 1972.

All told, two or more carriers were used in 47 incidents. Most of these major naval involvements (68 percent) occurred during the 1956-65 period; only 13 percent occurred before 1956, and 19 percent have occurred since 1965. One-third of the major naval involvements took place in Southeast Asia; nearly all in connection with the Indochina War. Approximately another one-third occurred in the Middle East, stemming from a variety of causes; plus, of the eight major naval incidents in Europe, five stemmed from developments in the Balkans, again focusing attention on the Mediterranean. The Western Hemisphere accounted for only 9 percent of major naval involvements, as compared to 27 percent of all naval involvements. All of the major incidents in the Western Hemisphere took place in the Caribbean. South America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa did not witness a single major naval involvement.

Amphibious forces were used in 71 incidents; 40 percent of the Navy involvements and 33 percent of all the incidents.(3) Participation by emphibious units tended to be proportionally even, regardless of region, with the exceptions of Southeast Asia, where amphibious units tended to participate in a larger share of the incidents (54 percent), and East Asia, where amphibious participation tended to be lower (10 percent). Activity by amphibious units in Southeast Asia were mainly attempts to bolster the former SEATO protocol states, and preparations for various contemplated but never executed operations related to unrest in Indonesia.

There were no significant variations over time in the use of amphibious forces, although it might be noted that during the last three years of the study period (1973-75), amphibious forces were involved in 43, 60, and 75 percent of the naval incidents, respectively (for a total of 9 incidents out of 16). The length of this trend is too short to impute any great significance to it, however, and an explanation can be seen below.

As would be expected, there was considerable overlap between the use of amphibious forces and aircraft carriers. U.S. decisionmakers have been reluctant to commit ground forces without also dispatching air cover. Amphibious forces alone participated only in 15 incidents. Both amphibious forces and aircraft carriers were involved in 56 incidents; one-fourth of the total. This is an extraordinarily high percentage and demonstrates the central role played by the "Navy/Marine team" in political-military operations.

Surface warships of one sort or another were involved in a total of 149 incidents. In most of these, however, they were present as escorts for aircraft carriers or amphibious forces; this being the case in 120 incidents. Warships

operated independently of other naval forces in only 29 incidents. Most often in these latter cases, one or two destroyers were used to patrol a particular strait or section of coastline (e.g., to detect suspected Cuoan infiltrators in the Caribbean). Also relatively frequent were cases in which one or two destroyers stood by for the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens during periods of turmoil in various localities.

Of historic interest only is the fact that battleships participated in seven incidents. The last occurred in 1969 when the New Jersey, on its way back from duty off Vietnam and headed for de-activation (again), was diverted to the East China Sea as part of the U.S. naval build-up following the North Korean shoot-down of the EC-121. The last incident involving a battleship before that took place in 1957. The use of the battleship Missouri to return the body of the Turkish Ambassador in 1946, incidentally symbolizing renewed U.S. interest and military power in the Eastern Mediterranean, will stand, however, as one of the most imaginative uses of U.S. military power in the post-war period.

Submarines definitely were involved in fourteen incidents; they most probably were not involved in 104 incidents; they may or may not have been involved in 97 incidents. The data contain only one incident in which a submarine was used independently of other naval forces, (4) although there may have been four other cases of independent submarine activity aimed at political objectives. In short, it is simply impossible to say anything very interesting about submarines in a study based on information in the public domain.

Finally, there were at least eight incidents (and maybe as many as 24) in which non-combatant naval ships were used for political objectives independent of warships. These incidents covered a wide range of activities; often, however, the activity was a port visit designed to promote better relations between the United States and a hostile nation—such as the visits of hydrographic research vessels to Novosibirsk in 1963 and 1971. In one sense, a support ship or auxiliary vessel is better suited for port visits between adversary powers, because the symbols of potential conflict are less intrusive than when a warship makes such a visit. Interestingly, during the most recent U.S.—Soviet port visit exchange (in 1975) warships were used. Readers are left with the task of divining the possible significance of this step.

Ground Combat Forces

The Army is the military service which has been used least often as a discrete instrument for political objectives. This is not to gainsay the Army's importance. As has been noted, the maintenance of a continuous U.S. ground force presence in Europe and Korea may well be the most important way in which U.S. armed forces have served political objectives; insofar as this presence may have conditioned the expectations of foreign leaders to such an extent that

discrete uses of forces have been needed less often. The point is, though, that U.S. decisionmakers have turned to the Army only infrequently when desirous of a discrete, demonstrative, politically-oriented use of force as defined in this study.

All told, Army ground combat forces took part in 39 incidents, 18 percent of the total. (5) When the Army did become involved, it typically did so in force. In more than one-fourth of the incidents in which Army ground combat forces were involved, the Army utilized more than one full division. Four of these eleven major incidents occurred between 1968 and 1973; four others occurred between 1958 and 1962. More than one-half of the Army's multiple division involvements (six incidents) took place in Europe, generally stemming from controversies over Berlin.

The next most frequent Army ground force operation was of multiple battalion through full brigade size. (6) There were nine of these incidents, but the last one occurred twelve years ago in 1964. For the most part, this probably reflects constraints on Army resources due to the deployment of considerable forces to Vietnam while maintaining large forward deployments in Europe and Korea. Indeed, Army manpower was so tight that troop levels in Europe had to be drawn-down during the Vietnam build-up. Given the strain these demands placed on Army manpower, Army ground combat forces seem to have been utilized elsewhere during the period of the Vietnam War only for the most serious contingencies, those in which larger than brigade-size forces were required. A similar gap in battalion-level operations occurred during the Korean War. While there was one multiple-battalion operation in 1946, in 1947 and in 1948, and then one again in both 1954 and 1955, there were none from 1949 through 1953.

Most of these multiple-battalion-level operations took place in Europe (five of nine incidents). Three others occurred in Southeast Asia. Generally, Army forces were used proportionally more in Europe: forty percent of the incidents in which Army ground combat forces were involved occurred in Europe, as compared to only 20 percent of all the incidents. On the other hand, only 16 percent of Army ground combat involvements took place in the Western Hemisphere and 8 percent in Southeast Asia, as compared to 27 percent and 20 percent of the total number of incidents, respectively.

Rarely did the United States attempt to inject ground forces into a situation via airlift. There were only eight such cases definitely, and possibly seven others. In each of the eight, relatively small units were involved—twice a company, four times a battalion, and twice several battalions. These incidents were relatively evenly distributed geographically: two in the Caribbean, two in Europe, two in the Middle East, and two in Southeast Asia. With the exception of the response to the 1968 reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, all of the incidents in which U.S. troops were airlifted took place between 1956 and 1964.

More often, when U.S. decisionmakers wished to inject ground forces. quickly into a situation, or at least to threaten such an action, they turned

to the <u>Marine Corps</u>. Marine ground combat forces took part in 77 incidents, twice the Army total.(7) In all but six of these incidents, the Marines were moved to the region of the incident, or had already been deployed in that region, on amphibious ships.

This dependence on the Marines is not hard to understand. Indeed, the sort of limited politically-oriented operation which makes up most of the incidents may well constitute the essence—that is, the central self-perception. of purpose—of the Corps. Marine units have been used in such operations as far back as 1798, and the Corps' official history lists a sizable number of incidents which took place before the Second World War that would meet the terms of the definition of a political use of the armed forces used in this study. (8)

Moreover, the Marines are equipped, trained, and organized for quick reaction, limited operations, and flexible utilization. Most importantly, Marine Corps units have been maintained affoat in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and more often than not in the Caribbean, throughout the post-war period. Most of the incidents in which Marine ground combat forces took part involved solely the alerting and/or movement of these previously forward-deployed units.

It is for these reasons that the Marine units employed in these incidents most frequently ranged in size from several companies up to a full battalion—the size of the units maintained afloat. Forty-four of the 77 incidents involving Marine ground combat forces included units of roughly battalion—size.

Over time, Marine involvements have followed closely the general pattern of incidents. There were a small number each year in the late 1940s, and an even smaller number from 1949 through the mid-1950s. Then the frequency with which the Marines were utilized increased, remaining relatively high through 1965, when it returned to previously low levels. The Marines were more frequently involved during the past few years, but these incidents included a number of withdrawals and evacuations—a factor which helps to explain the previously mentioned increase in the rate with which amphibious forces participated in incidents.

Fully one-third of the Marine involvements took place in Southeast Asia (only one-fifth of all the incidents occurred there). Everywhere else, the Marines were involved in proportionally fewer incidents, even in the Mediterranean and the Caribbean where units are kept afloat. Clearly, the threat of injecting U.S. ground troops, represented by the movement or alerting of Marine ground combat units, has not been one made lightly or often by U.S. decisionsakers, except in Southeast Asia.

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that one-half of the Marine involvements (38 incidents) occurred in violent situations—either inter-state conflicts or civil wars; only one-third of the total number of incidents fell into these categories. Interestingly, the most frequent use

of Marine units occurred during civil wars; there being 20 such cases. Aircraft carriers, which also tended to be used during violent situations, were preferentially used in violent interactions of the inter-state kind. This distinction no doubt reflects the nature of the stakes involved for the United States. In civil wars, typically the most pressing U.S. concern is to protect the lives of American citizens. The outcome of the domestic situation is usually also of concern, but generally a second-order worry. To actually protect Americans at the scene of a conflict, U.S. combat troops are required. In inter-state conflicts, on the other hand, it is the outcome of the situation itself which is usually the primary concern-i.e., protecting an American client-regime or group. In such cases, violence can be used or threatened relatively indiscriminately, as with airpower.

Land-based Air Forces

Three types of land-based air units were employed during the study time period, for a total of 103 incidents. Land-based air units provided the only U.S. military presence in only 22 of these incidents, however.

Most frequent was the use of <u>transport aircraft</u>—either to move U.S. equipment or, less often, to move U.S. troops to a target state, or to transport a target nation's equipment or troops within the region of concern. Fixed-wing aircraft were used in these roles on 52 occasions; helicopters on 14 occasions. (9) The size of the units involved ranged from less than one squadron (or one helicopter company) in about one-fourth of the cases, to one or more wings in another one-fourth of the incidents. The remaining one-half of the incidents fell somewhere between.

These types of operations occurred most often in Southeast Asia (28 percent of the incidents), and slightly less often in Europe and the Middle East (18 and 20 percent of the incidents, respectively). The distribution of these incidents by type of situation closely approximated the distribution of all incidents. There was a slight tendency for transport aircraft to be used more often after 1955, than before.

Land-based combat aircraft were utilized more sparingly: Air Force units took part in 34 incidents, Marine Corps units in 12 incidents; (10) in five of these incidents aircraft from both services were involved. Most of the incidents apparently were significant events, as full wings or even larger units took part in 60 percent of these cases. One factor which may have affected the decision as to the size of the unit required was Soviet participation; the Soviets took part in more than one-half of the cases in which land-based combat aircraft were used, far more than their rate of participation in all cases. There was a concentration of land-based combat air operations during the 1958-62 period, reflecting mainly tensions in Central Europe: one-third of the uses of land-based combat aircraft occurred during these five years, but only one-fourth of all the incidents.

Geographically, the use of land-based combat air also was relatively concentrated--roughly one-fourth of the pertinent incidents occurred in each of three regions: the Caribbean, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Marine air tended to be used most in the Caribbean; three-fourths of the incidents in which Marine air units participated were located in this region. The remaining Marine combat air involvements were related to conflicts in Indochina. Air Force combat aircraft were used most often in Europe, next often in Southeast Asia, and thirdly in East Asia. A related difference between the two services is that the Air Force involvements were related most often to hostile political initiatives, and especially to Soviet threats against Berlin.

Finally, in 27 incidents the United States used <u>land-based patrol or reconnaissance aircraft</u> for political objectives.(11) Most frequently, these were Navy maritime patrol craft used to surveil for suspected Cuban-supported guerrillas in the Caribbean. Sixteen of the 27 incidents took place during the 1956-65 period, the time the U.S. was most active in seeking to help governments in the Third World to defend themselves against domestic movements supported by foreign nations. Two-thirds of these incidents took place in the Caribbean; 60 percent concerned situations of domestic strife.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Before leaving the topic of the type of military components which have become involved in the incidents, a special note should be made of the implicit, and sometimes explicit threat to use nuclear weapons.

Of course, many U.S. military units, particularly naval vessels, are sometimes equipped with nuclear weapons for tactical uses. Warships, for example, may have nuclear warheads on-board for surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine weapons; aircraft carriers may carry nuclear air-to-ground ordnance. Consequently, any movement or other involvement of these forces in an incident may imply, in one sense, a nuclear signal. These implications do not, however, interest us here. Only more deliberate nuclear threats, whether implicit or explicit, are of concern. For this reason, note was made whenever forces which at the time had a designated role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war took part in one of the political incidents, in such context that a nuclear signal of some type could be inferred. There were 19 such incidents (Table IV-1), including five distinct sub-types:

- e An overt and explicit threat was directed at the USSR through global actions of U.S. strategic forces in only two incidents—the Cuban missile crisis and the October 1973 war in the Middle East. This fact demonstrates the relative caution with which U.S. decisionmakers have approached the risk of nuclear war.
- In ten incidents, Air Force strategic bombers were moved either closer to the Soviet Union or China, placed on increased alert, or their withdrawal

"able IV-1

Incidents in Which Strategic Nuclear Forces Were Involved

U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
Inauguration of President in Uruguay	February 1947
Security of Berlin	January 1948
Security of Berlin	April 1948
Security of Berlin	June 1948
Korean War: Security of Europe	July 1950
Security of Japan/South Korea	August 1953
Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support	May 1954
China-Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands	August 1954
Suez crisis	October 1956
Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
China-Taiwan crisis: Quemoy and Matsu	July 1958
Security of Berlin	May 1959
Security of Berlin	June 1961
Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
Withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey	April 1963
Pueblo seized by North Korea	January 1968
Arab-Israeli War	October 1973

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from a region abroad was delayed, in the context of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese tension. Six of these incidents occurred in Europe, the first in 1946 when, after a U.S. aircraft was downed over Yugoslavia, six B-29s flew to Germany and rather ostentatiously (and menacingly) flew along the border. Such a display was repeated on three other occasions. The fourth occurred in 1950 when, in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean war, U.S. strategic bombers were stationed in Europe. The last occurred during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, when the planned withdrawal of B-47s from Europe was delayed.

Deployment of U.S. strategic aircraft to the Western Pacific occurred four times--once to reassure South Korea and Japan in connection with the end of the Korean war, twice during Offshore Islands crises, and finally during the <u>Pueblo</u> Crisis.

- o In four incidents, Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, then playing a key role in U.S. strategic strike plans, were used to help attain political objectives in the Middle East or Europe. In only one of these incidents, however—the 1958/59 Berlin Crisis—was the nuclear signal probably deliberate.
- o In two peculiar incidents, U.S. long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command were flown to nations in the Western Hemisphere (Uruguay in 1947, and Nicaragua in 1954), apparently to reassure U.S. allies. The Nicaragua case, perhaps, makes more sense insofar as it occurred in connection with maneuvers to overthrow the Soviet-backed Arbenez government in Guatemala.
- Finally, in one case, a U.S. strategic submarine, the <u>Sam Houston</u>, was used to reassure a U.S. ally. In 1963, following the withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey, the <u>Sam Houston</u> visited Izmir. That port visit, the only such visit to a foreign port by a U.S. strategic submarine, clearly was meant to demonstrate to Turkey that the U.S. retained a strategic presence in the region.

In short, the United States has used nuclear threats sparingly; moreover, their use was more common in earlier years—when the U.S. strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was dominant—than it was more recently. One-half of the nuclear incidents occurred during the first ten years (one-third) of the study period. Three-fourths occurred during the first fifteen years (one-half) of the study period. During the last ten years, there were only two incidents involving strategic nuclear threats.

Readers will understand, of course, that references above relate solely to discrete political uses of nuclear weapons. Like Army ground troops deployed overseas, staregic nuclear forces serve vital political objectives on a continuous basis, perhaps thus obviating the need for discrete and explicit utilization.

Levels of Force Used in Incidents

Variations in the types and size of military units which have been involved in the incidents, and the infrequent inclusion of strategic nuclear forces, make if difficult to discuss, in the aggregate, the significance of the involvement in terms of the level of force mustered by the United States. To alleviate this difficulty, a scale was constructed which, based on the historical data, roughly ranked "military level of effort." For example, when combatant naval forces were involved in an incident, they typically included one carrier task group. A carrier task group was therefore considered to constitute the "standard" naval force component. When two or more carriers were involved in an incident, it was considered to have been a use of a "major" component of force; i.e., a more significant incident. When the naval forces involved in an incident did not include an aircraft carrier, the incident was considered to have been less significant in that it required only a "minor" component of force. Similar assessments were made for ground forces (12) and land-based air forces, (13) with the results shows in Table IV-2. Granted,

Table IV-2
Level of Force Uses by Force Type

	Ty	pe of force	
Level of force	Naval forces	Ground forces	Land-based Air forces
Major	Two or more air- craft carrier task groups	More than one battalion	One or more combat wings
Standard	One aircraft car- rier task group	No more than one battalion, but larger than one company	One or more combat squadrons, but less than one wing
Minor	No aircraft carriers included	No more than one company	Less than one combat squadron

the units listed for each rank are quite different in terms of manpower or any other measure of size. However, that is not the point. What the classification does is to provide a rough ranking of "military level of effort" based on aggregate past experience.

Next, these levels of conventional force were combined with the strategic nuclear factor in an intuitive fashion, resulting in the scale shown below.

Level of Force Scale

Size and type of forces involved Greatest Effort Use of strategic nuclear unit plus at least one "major" force component (naval, ground, or air). 2. Two or three "major" force components used, but not strategic nuclear units. Either one "major" force component or strategic nuclear unit used. At least one "standard" component of force used, but no "major" components and no strategic nuclear units. Least Effort "Minor" components of force used only, and no strategic nuclear units.

Nuclear force "use," as previously noted, refers to the involvement of weapon platforms participating, at the time, in strategic nuclear strike plans; and the reasonable inference that a nuclear signal of some sort was intended. The scale is tailored to the existing data; the obvious holes in it (e.g., a "standard" component of force plus strategic nuclear force units) simply do not occur in the data. In scaling the incidents, it also seemed to make sense to consider the political use of a battleship as equivalent to the use political use of an aircraft carrier.

As would be expected, most of the incidents were, in terms of military level of effort, of less significance, as shown below:

Le	vel of Effort	Number of Incidents
Greatest Effort	1.	15
	2.	18
at I represented	3.	46
Least Effort	4. 5.	64 72.

The most significant incidents, the 33 which scored a 1 or 2 on the level of effort scale, are listed in Table IV-3.

Table IV-3
The Most Significant Incidents*

Region	Vane	Date Incident Began	Strategic Nuclear Force Units Used
Europe	Security of Berlin	April 1948	Yes
	Security of Berlin	June 1948	Yes
	Security of Europe	July 1950	Yes
	Security of Berlin	February 1959	No
	Security of Berlin	May 1959	Yes
	Security of Berlin	June 1961	Yes
	Cyprus Crisis	January 1964	No
	Invasion of Czechoslovakia	September 1968	No
Middle East	Sues Crisis	October 1956	Yes
	Political Developments in Jordan	April 1957	No
	Political Developments in Syria	August 1957	No
	Political Developments in Lebanon	May 1958	No
	Political Developments in Lebanon	July 1958	Yes
	Political Developments in Jordan	July 1958	Yes
	Civil War in Jordan	September 1970	No
	Arab-Israeli War	October 1973	Yes

^{*} Incidents scoring 1 or 2 on level of force scale; strategic nuclear force units were involved in incidents ranked number 1.

Table IV-3 (Continued)

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Region	Name.	Date Incident Began	Strategic Nuclear Force Units Used
East Asia	Civil War in China	April 1946	No
	and of Korean War	July 1953	No
	Security of Japan/South Korea	August 1953	Yes
	.Tachen Islands Crisis	August 1954	Yes
	Quemoy/Matsu Crisis	July 1958	Yes
	Seisure of the Pueblo	January 1968	Yes
	Shoot-down of the EC-121	April 1969	Yes
Southeast Asia	Civil War in Laos	January 1959	No
	Civil War in Laos	April 1962	No
	Tonkin Gulf Incident	August 1964	No
	North Vietnam Offensive	May 1972	No
	Collapse of South Vietnam	March 1975	No No
	Seizure of the Mayaguez	May 1975	No No
Caribbean	Guatemala Accepts Soviet Bloc Support	May 1954	Yes
	Trujillo Assassinated	June 1961	No
	Cuban Missile Crisis	October 1962	Yes
***	Civil War in Dominican Republic	April 1965	No

Geographically the significant incidents were distributed relatively evenly among Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. Five of the eight incidents in Europe concerned Berlin, but the last of these occurred fifteen years ago. In fact, there have not been any significant incidents in Europe since 1968. By contrast, significant incidents in the Middle East have occurred more recently, the last only three years ago. Surprisingly, only two of the eight significant incidents in the Middle East stemmed from the Arab-Israeli conflict; the other six had to do with intra-Arab conflicts.

There were seven significant incidents in East Asia, three stemming from the civil war in China, and four from conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Like Europe, though, East Asia was not the scene of any significant incidents in 1970-75. The six significant incidents in Southeast Asia all had to do with the Indochina war, and highlight the nation's entry into, and exit from, that conflict.

Finally, there were four significant incidents in the Caribbean, two of which were related to the Dominican Republic. It is fascinating that the 1954 decision by the Arbenez government in Guatemala to accept military aid from the Soviet bloc was sufficient to occasion a major response from the United States, which included the temporary deployment of strategic bombers to Nicaragua-meant, it would appear, as a signal of American commitment--and the movement of an aircraft carrier task group, a Marine amphibious battalion and air-wing, five land-based patrol aircraft squadrons and several related actions.

The distribution of incidents by U.S. level of military effort, region and time period is shown in Table IV-4. The distribution of the significant incidents over time is very similar to that of the overall number of incidents. So too is the distribution by type of situation, although a slightly larger percentage of the significant incidents stemmed from inter-state situations not involving the United States initially than was the case for all the incidents.

There is a strong relationship, however, between U.S. military level of effort and Soviet or Chinese participation. As shown in Table IV-5, the United States used major force components proportionally more often when either the USSR or Chinese military forces actually were, or threatened to become involved in incidents.

The most inconsequential uses of force, those involving only "minor" components of force, tended to occur proportionally more often in the Western Hemisphere, and proportionally less often in Europe. The key, of course, is the absence or presence of the Soviet military threat. Interestingly, no more than a "standard" component of force has ever been used in either sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, or South America. Minor force components also tended to be used more often during the 1956-65 period, when the United States was most actively pursuing its political objectives abroad through the

Table IV-4
U.S. Level of Military Effort, by
Region and Time Period

Number of Incidents

Region		Milita	ry Level	of Reco	et.	Total
	1_		3	4		
Western Hemisphere	2	. 5	6	18	32	60
Europe	5	3	12	19	4	43
Middle East	4	4	. 7	7	16	38
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia	0	0	0	6	7	13
Southeast Asia	0	6	17	8	10	41
Bast Asia	4	3	4	6	3	20
Time Period		-				Ì
1946-48	Ş	1	6	11	4 -	24
1949-56	5	1	10	9	7	32
1957-65	6	10	24	31	41	112
1966-75	2	6	6	13	50	47
TOTAL	5	18	46	64	72	215

Table IV-5

Percentage of incidents at each level of effort U.S. Level of Military Effort as a Punction of Sowiet-Chinese Participation

Nature of Soviet/Chinese participation

S. Jenni of Reford	Used force	Threstened to	Participated, but no use of force	Did not
. Medicar suggests plus "sujer"	æ	, b	0	8
. No or three "mjor" components	8	•	п	
. Sectors esepare or one "se,jor" component	. 51		8	59
. "Standard" components only	91	•	13	
. Things components only	π		15	67
All loyels	19	8	77	59

demonstrative use of the armed forces, than either before or after that time period.

Generally, the more significant actions tended to occur fairly regularly, while the frequency of incidents featuring only minor components of force fluctuated.

Activities and Readiness

Typically, U.S. armed forces employed for political objectives did very little in an operational sense. In 68 incidents (one-third of the total), the military activity could only be characterized as, at most, providing a presence. That is, forces were moved from one place to another, or their alert status was raised, but they did not undertake any specific operation. Presumably, the movement or change in alert status was meant to prepare for some activity which might have become necessary, and to remind participants in the incidents of U.S. military power so that they would be reassured or intimidated, as the case may have been.

Most often, the forces that were used for these "presence" missions, as well as most other activities, came from standing U.S. deployments nearby. In 167 incidents, three-fourths of the total, U.S. forces already operating within the theater which was the scene of the situation of concern were either moved or placed on an increased alert status without movement. In only 92 incidents, less than one-half of the total, were U.S. forces operating outside the theater of concern redeployed or placed on a greater alert status. Reserve forces were mobilized in only three incidents.

The data in Table IV-6 summarize the activities of U.S. armed forces in the 215 incidents. In view of the latter's dominant position in part experience, the table shows the data separately for those incidents in which naval forces were involved, and those in which the Navy did not participate.

As noted, simply providing a presence was by far the most frequent activity; the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia were each the scene of one-fourth of these actions.

Visits to foreign ports and the conduct of patrols or other reconnaissance and surveillance missions each were carried out in 44 incidents, thus tying as the second most frequent activity. Europe accounted for one-half of the port visits, the vast majority occurring along the northern Mediterranean littoral.(14) About one-half of the reconnaissance activities took place in the Western Hemisphere, mainly during the 1956-65 period, when the United States was most actively concerned about Communist infiltration into the Hemisphere.

On 30 occasions, U.S. armed forces, almost always naval forces, carried out an exercise or demonstration in connection with a political situation

Table IV-6

Activities of Naval and Other U.S. Armed Forces When Used for Political Objectives, 1946-75

Number of incidents

Type of Activity	Naval forces	Other forces alone
Providing a U.S. presence	68	1
Visit	44	0
Patrol/Reconnaissance/Surveillance	3 5	9
Exercise/Demonstration	. 29	1
Movement of military equipment or forces to a target	22	8
Movement of a target's military forces or equipment	13	8
Evacuation	. 18	1
Use of firepower	14	4
Emplace ground forces or occupy territory	. 10	8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Interposition	6	1
Escort of a target's forces	5	2
Demonstrate transit rights	indiate 4 contin	3
Blockade	3	0
Other	4	0

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abroad, most often in Europe. On the same number of occasions, U.S. armed forces transported military equipment to a target state in extraordinary circumstances. Airlift was used in only eight of these incidents, sealift the other times. Regardless of which mode was used, the Middle East was the most frequent destination.

The other types of activity generally of a manifestly more "military" nature, were undertaken in no more than one-tenth of the incidents. In this regard, the following are worth noting:

- Firepower or other physical force was used in only 18 incidents, nine of them in Southeast Asia (exclusive of the period March 1965 to March 1972). Such "violence" was used on only four occasions before 1964, in four incidents in each of 1964 and 1965, and six times over the period of 1971-75.
- · Activities undertaken most often in the absence of naval forces included reconnaissance, the movement of a target state's military forces or equipment, and the movement of equipment to a target state.
- When U.S. ground forces actually were emplaced on foreign soil, as contrasted to the movement or alert of Marines on amphibious ships without disembarkation, they were moved by air almost as often as by sea.
- · Traditional naval activities--interposition, escort, demonstration of transit rights, and blockade--took place relatively infrequently.
- · And finally, fully 40 percent of the armed evacuations mentioned in the incident list took place in the Caribbean.

In summary, although U.S. armed forces have been used frequently for political objectives over the past thirty years, only relatively infrequently have they had to do anything in a specific operational sense. Typically, the armed forces—and particularly naval forces—have provided a U.S. presence on (or near) the scene of the incident, and presumably have prepared to take action, but the situations precipitating the military activity have generally run their courses before the armed forces were required to take more specific action. When specific operations were carried out, they most often were of a passive character (e.g., visits, patrols). Manifestly military actions—e.g., the use of firepower, the establishment of a blockade—were required very infrequently. The question is, what influence did this passive and preparatory activity have on the decisions of the foreign leaders participating in the incidents; which leads us to chapter five.

Footnotes

- 1. Excludes Marine units when deployed by ship.
- 2. It is possible that carriers were used in eight additional incidents, but the data are too fragmentary to be certain.
- 3. There were ten additional incidents in which amphibious forces might have been employed, but the data are incomplete.
- 4. The 1962 visit of the Polaris submarine, Sam Houston, to Izmir.
- 5. Army ground forces were possibly used in two additional incidents.
- 6. Usually there are three or four battalions in an Army brigade.
- 7. Marine Corps ground combat units possibly were involved in 14 additional incidents.
- 8. Capt. William D. Parker, USMCR, A Coneise History of the United States Marine Corps, 1775-1969 (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1970).
- 9. Fixed-wing aircraft may have been used in five additional incidents; helicopters may have been used in four additional incidents.
- 10. Air Force and Marine air combat units may each have been involved in one additional incident.
- 11. Land-based patrol or reconnaissance aircraft may also have been involved in two additional incidents.
- 12. Army and Marine Corps units.
- 13. I.e., Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft.
- 14. Readers will recall that only port visits which clearly served specific political purposes were included in the list of incidents.

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Chapter V

UTILITY ANALYSIS: OBJECTIVES OF POLICYMAKERS, AND MODES AND STYLES OF USING ARMED FORCES

Introduction

While decisionmakers have turned to the armed forces frequently as an instrument with which to support policy, one of the most critical questions to be asked is, to what effect? Looking back over the three decades since World War II ended and during which U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument once every other month, on the average, both policy-makers and the public at large have an interest to know whether or not these actions were useful or of value in supporting American foreign policy. More than this, though, it is important to consider what difference it made, if any, when, for example, armed forces were used in particular ways, when certain sized or types of forces were used, or when special situational factors were present.

In approaching the question of utility, this section of the study examines the relationship between the use of armed forces and the behavior desired of each of the other actors in 33 incidents, which together comprise a 15 percent sample of the full 215 incident file. The concern, however, is not to assess whether or not a particular behavior was the result of a particular use of force. That is done in the case studies. Rather, this section focusses on the extent to which the use of armed forces was associated, in aggregate, with positive and negative outcomes related to the behavior desired of the other actors in the sample incidents.

The section begins with a discussion of why the analysis concentrates, first, on the performance of desired behavior rather than on the satisfaction of the motivation of policymakers; and, second, on the association between desired (and undesired) outcomes and the use of armed forces rather than on the notion of the successful (and unsuccessful) use of armed forces. Following this, the behavior desired of each other actor by U.S. policymakers is determined as are the outcomes related to that behavior in the short-term (the six months immediately after the use of force) and over a longer period (the following two and a half years).

We then examine the relationship between, on the one hand, short and longer term outcomes, and on the other, the objectives of policymakers, the modes and styles of using armed forces, the sizes and types of armed forces used, and their deployment patterns and activities. Finally, we consider the significance of situational characteristics, American diplomacy, and particular qualities of the actors to the relationships between outcomes and uses of armed forces.

A structured sample was used for the analysis insofar as it was

impossible to investigate the utility of using armed forces in all 215 incidents. The choice of a 33 incident (15 percent) sample constituted a compromise between two conflicting concerns: considering an adequate number of cases and the necessity to consider each case adequately. Table V-1 presents certain descriptive characteristics of the incidents that were selected, and will familiarise readers with the sample.

In general, the sample strongly reflects the profile characteristics of the full file. To the extent the selection procedure did skew the sample, it gave less emphasis to Europe and the first postwar decade and gave more emphasis to the Middle East and the past decade. The silk lining is that the sample is more relevant to current concerns than it would have been otherwise. Details of the sample selection process and of the degree of similarity between the sample and the 215 incident file are presented in Appendix C.

The Performance of Desired Behavior

The focus of this analysis is on the performance by other actors in an incident of behavior desired by U.S. policymakers, not on whether or not the motives of U.S. policymakers were satisfied. Motivation is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine in any situation, let alone in 33 international incidents. Motives, among other things, may be singular or multiple in number, subliminally or consciously held, personally- or other-directed, domestic or external in nature, and future or present oriented.

For example, what were President Kennedy's motives when he confronted the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis? Was it a concern for the physical defense of the United States, Soviet aggressiveness in the world at large, American leadership in the West, the forthcoming congressional election, his own influence and relations with the Congress, his leadership of the Democratic Party...? What were President Eisenhower's motives in sending troops to Lebanon in 1958, President Truman's in sending ground troops to Europe following the onset of the Korean War, or President Ford's in responding to Cambodia's seizure of the Mayaguez and its crew?

After any international incident there is always considerable dispute as to "why" U.S. policymakers behaved as they did. Post-factor explanations by the decisionmakers themselves (as in memoirs) do little to ease such speculation; for there is then a question as to the motives behind the explanation. There is much less argument, however, about the behavior that was sought of the other parties to the incident. In that regard, there is usually firmer evidence: statements, written communications, etc. Thus, while there is considerable dispute about why President Kennedy acted as he did in the Cuban missile crisis, there is little argument about his principal operational objective vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: the withdrawal of Soviet offensive missiles and bombers from Cuba. Similarly,

Table V-1

Description of Incidents in the Sample

Date U.S. use of force was				
initiated	Situation	Region	Context	Principal Actors
1. APR 1946	Communist threat in <u>Greece</u> preceding outbreak of civil	Burope	Intra-state Non-violent	Greece, Greek Communist Party, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
2. NOV 1947	Communist threat in Italy preceding 1948 elections	Burope	Intra-state Non-violent	Italy, Italian Communist Party
3. AUG 1953	Security of Japan/South Korea after Korean War	East Asia	Inter-state Non-violent	China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union
4. APR 1956	British influence in Jordan threatened	Middle. East	Inter-state Non-violent	Jordan, United Kingdom
5. Jul 1956	Exypt nationalises Suez Cemal	Middle East	Inter-state Non-violent	Egypt, France, United Kingdom, Soviet Union
6. ocr 1956	Security of U.S. military bases/personnel in barceo	Middle Zest	Wielent threat to U.S. armed forces	Wiolent threat France, Morocco to U.S. armed forces
7. AUG 1957	Political developments in Syria; security of U.S.	Middle East	Inter-state Non-violent	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Syrian armed forces group, Egypt, Turkey, Soviet Union
8. MAY 1958	Security of VP Mixon in Venezuela	Cen Amer/ Carib	Wiolent threat Venezuela to U.S. Vice President	Venezuela
9. APR 1959	Cube supports insurgents in Pensus	Cen Amer/ Carib	Intra-state Violent	Cuba, Panama insurgents, Panama, Organization of American States
10. AUG 1959	Civil wer in Laos	Southeast	Intra-state Violent	China, Laos, North Vietnam, Pathet Lao, Soviet Union
11. FEB 1960	Exiles overfly Cuba; security of Guantanamo	Cen Amer/	Intra-state Violent	Cuba, Cuban exile group

Table V-1 (continued)

Description of Incidents in the Sample

Date U.S. use of force was				
initiated	Stuation	Region	Context	Principal Actors
12. JUL 1960	12. JUL 1960 Breakdown of order in Congo	Sub-San Africa	Intra-state Violent	Belgium, Congo, Katanga, United Nations, Soviet Union
13. JUN 1961	Trujillo assassinated in Dominican Republic	Cen Amer/ Carib	Intra-state Violent	Dominican Republic, Dominican armed forces-civilian group
14. JUL 1961	Iraq threatens to invade Kurmit	Mfddle East	Inter-state Non-violent	Arab League, Iraq, Kuwait, United Kingdom
15. 713 1962	Communist gains in South	Southeast Asia .	Inter-state Violent	North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Viet Cong
16. Mr 1962	civil War in Laos	Southeast Asia	Intra-state Violent	Chine, Laos, Laos neutralists, North Vietnam, Pathet Lao, Thailand, Soviet Union
17. FEB 1963	Inauguration of Pres. Juan Bosch in <u>Lominican Rep</u>	Cen Amer/ Carib	Intra-state Non-violent	Dominican Republic, Dominican armed forces
18. JAN 1964	Coup and war in South	Southeast Asia	Intra-state Violent	North Vietnam, South Vietnam, South Vietnam armed forces, Viet Cong
19. Jul. 1964	Cube supports insurgents in Dominican Republic	Cen Amer/ Carib	Intra-state Violent	Cuba, Dominican Republic, Dominica insurgents
20. JAN 1965	Innania accuses U.S. of planning a coup	Sub-Sah Africa	Hostile but Non-violent pol. act di- rected at US	Tanzania
21. 728 1965	War in South Wetnam (Qui Nhon barracks attacked)	Southeast Asia	Violent attack on US armed forces	North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Viet Cong
22. MAY 1965	Cube supports insurgents in Venezuela	Cen Amer/ Carib	Intra-state Violent	Cuba, Venezuela, Venezuelan insurgents

Table V-1 (completed)

Description of Incidents in the Sample

Date U.S. use of force was				
initiated	Struction	Region	Context	Principal Actors
23. Aug 1967	23. AUG 1967 CYDEUS crisis	Burope	Intra-state Violent	Cyprus, Cyprus (Turkish populace), Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom, United Nations
24. JAN 1968	North Korea seizes U.S.S. Pueblo	East Asia	Wiolent attack on US armed forces	North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union
25. DEC 1968	[Beirut Airport]	Middle East	Inter-state Violent	Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians, United Nations
26. APR 1969	North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121	East	Violent attack on US armed forces	North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union
27. AUG 1970	Rocers Plan ceasefire accepted by Egypt, Israel and Jordan	Middle	Inter-state Wolent	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Soviet Union
28. OCT 1970	USSR establishing base at <u>Cientueros</u> (Cuba)	Cen Amer/ Carib	Hostile but non-violent pol. act di- rected at US	Cube, Sowiet Union
29. MAY 1972	North Vietnam offensive in South Vietnam	Southeast Asia	Inter-state Violent	China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Soviet Union
30. DEC 1972	Wetnam peace negotiations stalled	Southeast	Inter-state Violent	North Vietnam
31. FEB 1973	Civil war in Laos	Southeast	Intra-state Violent	Laos, Meo Tribe, North Vietnam, Pathet Lao
32. MAY 1973	Conflict between <u>lebanon</u> and Palestinians	Mfddle East	Intra-state Violent	Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians, Syria
33. NOV 1974	Availability and price of oil from <u>Persian Gulf</u> area; Arab-Israeli conflict	Middle East	Unfriendly but non-violent relations with U.S.	Egypt, Organization of Arab Pe- troleum Exporting Countries, Saudia Arabia

President Eisenhower sought to insure that a leftist or Arab nationalist government allied with Nasser was not installed in Lebanon in 1958, President Truman sought to deter Soviet aggression and to reassure European allies, and President Ford sought to obtain the release of the <u>Mayaguez</u> and its crew.

In each incident the desired outcomes may have been only instrumental to other objectives policymakers had in mind. However, the immediate outcomes were the focus of their attention and the necessary first steps. And it was to obtain these operational objectives that policymakers expended their energies and the nation's resources, including the use of the armed forces. Perhaps President Ford's basic objective was to avoid giving further evidence of U.S. weakness after the defeat in Vietnam. But even so, to accomplish that, he had to first obtain the release of the Mayaguez. President Ford's underlying motives were, at best, uncertain. His operational objective, though, was clear.

This is not to argue that operational objectives are always easily identified with great confidence. Indeed, there are many situations in which it is difficult to do this, if only because they are essentially minor incidents which have passed relatively unnoticed, and for which there is little information available. In other cases, the policymakers themselves were unclear about facts of the situation and, at times, about what it was they wanted to happen (or not to happen). It is no easy task, for example, to determine what exactly U.S. officials had in mind regarding Spanish behavior when they allowed a naval visit to Spain in 1952, or what President Nixon hoped to obtain by deploying the Enterprise to the Indian Ocean during the 1971 Bangladesh War. (1)

Nevertheless, it is suggested that a focus on operational objectives —the behavior desired of the individual foreign actors by U.S. policy—makers in the incident—allows the consideration of more objectively determined and empirically verifiable phenomena. In large part, this is due to the fact that policymakers must deal more directly with operational objectives, which are usually defined in relatively narrow and specific terms, than is necessary as regards their own motives. As a consequence, public statements, documents, and memoirs show much greater agreement about operational objectives than they do about motives. Similarly, there is greater agreement among scholars and other analysts who have studied such incidents.

A focus on operational objectives is also more relevant to the interests of Americans at large and allows a more useful examination of the utility of using armed forces as a political instrument. It is not the motivation of policymakers which affects the interests of the United States. What affect U.S. interests are the manifestations of that motivation in the form of specific objectives, decisions taken to obtain those objectives, and the reactions by foreign decisionmakers to resulting U.S. activity: military, diplomatic, or otherwise.

In many instances policymakers will have more than one, and sometimes conflicting objectives in mind as regards a single actor. After President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower sought to persuade Britain and France not to intervene militarily; but he was also concerned not to alienate London and Paris and thereby weaken the Atlantic alliance. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic in 1961, President Kennedy wanted Trujillo's political heirs to give up power. At the same time, he was concerned to prevent the latter from acting violently toward American citizens, insofar as the United States was implicated in the plot.

When multiple objectives concerning a single actor's behavior do exist, one particular concern is typically more important than the others and will dominate U.S. decisions. In fact, the two cases just cited are the two in the sample that were the least clear in this regard. There was much less difficulty in determining, for example, that President Truman's principal objectives in using the armed forces to influence political developments in Italy in 1947-48 were to maintain the de Gasperi Government in power (by winning the February 1948 elections) and to caution the Italian Communist Party against engaging in largescale violence. Notwithstanding President Nixon's motives for ordering the "Christmas" bombing of Hanoi in December 1972, it seems obvious that his principal operational objective, as regarded North Vietnam, was that the latter should sign an acceptable peace agreement.

Neither Success nor Failure, but Outcomes

It would be best if the utility of using armed forces as a political instrument could be examined and discussed in terms of the success and failure of using armed forces to achieve objectives; and the circumstances in which armed forces were used with success and failure. As words and concepts, however, success and failure imply causation, which cannot be theoretically determined. Moreover, insofar as the political phenomena being examined here are concerned, it is impossible to determine the linkages that would necessarily have to be made in order to provide an empirical chain of evidence such as physical scientists often present. In order to even approach the latters' type of work, a much larger number of incidents would have to be examined, verifiable interviews would have to be held with individual participants, and the latter would have to be reasonably precise in stating what their perceptions and calculations were during incidents. It goes without saying that these individuals would have to be honest, self-conscious, and able to recollect their thoughts at the time.

The objective of this exercise would be to determine not only what those actors did more precisely, but even more importantly, to establish their perceptions of U.S. uses of armed forces during incidents and the role those perceptions played in guiding their behavior. Ideally, this approach would allow a determination of when and in what circumstances

the use of armed forces as a political instrument has been a necessary condition to influence actors to perform desirable behavior. Such a study is not possible. Nor are memoirs, news reports at the time, nor secondary analyses very helpful in this regard. Even when they are available, they are more suggestive than conclusive.

The scientific method might have been brought to bear more strongly in this analysis if the sample of incidents selected could have been compared with a group of incidents in which armed forces were not used as a political instrument. Following a comparative analysis of this nature, it might be inferred, for example, that the use of armed forces was a necessary condition if outcomes were positive when armed forces were used and negative when they were not used. If outcomes were favorable in both types of incidents it might be inferred that the use of armed forces was unnecessary.

This approach would require that a much larger number of incidents be examined and that the two sets of incidents be comparative—i.e., share similar characteristics that would otherwise be considered important variables. Such experimentalism is a regular mode of analysis where the subjects of inquiry are protons, laboratory bred rats, and even controlled groups of human beings. This approach does not lend itself very well, though, to analyses in which the subjects are individuals and groups in diverse societies which have different values, levels of information, allies, etc. Moreover, the less the similarity between incidents, the greater the number of incidents that have to be examined. The simple pairing of incidents that might occur at different times or involve different actors would be especially questionable.

Our examination does incorporate these notions to the degree that longitudinal or "before and after" comparisons were possible with reference to individual incidents. If an incident is considered to comprise a number of rounds rather than to run smoothly from a starting point to a finishing point, a comparison can be made between two or more of those rounds; for example, between the period before armed forces were used by U.S. policymakers and the period after they were used. Of course, other developments might occur independently or in response to U.S. actions, and lessen the validity of even that comparison.

This analysis focusses on the outcomes related to the principal beharior desired by U.S. policymakers of each other actor in the 33 incidents. Favorable or unfavorable outcomes are determined both for the six month period following the use of armed forces and for a longer period thereafter (the following two and a half years). The consideration of only immediate outcomes would be misleading insofar as some outcomes are ephemeral. The longer term perspective allows a consideration of durability.

In some instances, of course, a longer term perspective is irrelevant, as actions of earlier concern are no longer interesting -- e.g., deterring the use of force by Britain and France against Egypt, of interest after the onset of the Suez nationalization crisis, became irrelevant in

October 1955.

In focussing on dort and longer term outcomes related to the operational objectives of U.S. policymakers, the study refrains from attempting to assess the enduring implications and widespread ramifications—i.e., the greater "wisdom"—of U.S. actions for more general national interests. Not that this is unimportant. One can readily imagine instances in which desired outcomes were obtained in the immediate sense, and perhaps even retained over a longer term, but at the same time, consequences of a more important and adverse nature were set in motion.

For example, actors earlier coerced into performing some specific behavior may later increase the size of their armed forces or develop new weapon systems having important implications for U.S. national security —consider, for example, the argument that Gen. DeGaulle was confirmed in his belief that France should develop an independent nuclear capability as a result of U.S. actions during the Suez crisis.

Moreover, other actors, not party to the incident at all, but observers, may draw undesired conclusions and take actions adversely affecting U.S. security and other interests. Perhaps Peking felt freer to initiate the 1958 Offshore Islands crisis because of the perception that the United States was too involved in Lebanon to support Taiwan firmly. Was Khrushchev's behavior in the 1961 Berlin Crisis influenced by President Kennedy's minimal support of the Cuban exiles during the Bay of Pigs disaster? We may never know the answers, but questions such as these are important ones. Nevertheless, determining the utility of using armed forces for particular outcomes itself was an extremely laborious task. Considering the long term consequences of those actions for the nation's interests in a wider context was not possible.

Notwithstanding the focus of this analysis being on the association between the use of armed forces and outcomes, it is often difficult not to make at least implicit inferences of success and failure. The full implications of such inferences therefore deserve elaboration. "Success" in using armed forces in order to, for example, reinforce the performance of a desired behavior would imply a determination that the actor was otherwise unresolved as to whether or not to continue to perform the desired action, and that the use of armed forces by the United States was perceived and did indeed coerce or persuade the actor not to change the behavior in question. If the desired behavior was going to be performed in any case, however, the use of force would be of no consequence, even if the actor did perceive and consider it. "Failure" would imply that the actor did not perceive the use of force or did perceive it but was not assured or deterred. Thus, failure can be determined with greater confidence: all that is necessary is to observe the non-performance of a desired behavior.

Alternatively, success could imply that a use of the armed forces influenced the views and confidence of others around an individual actor, and thereby allowed or forced the "actor" to perform the desired behavior

in a more circuitous fashion. Insofar as only a very few political leaders rule with absolute authority, the influence exacted upon factions and individuals, as well as upon formal or informal policy debates in general, may be the most frequent avenue of satisfaction.

The conclusion that armed forces were used successfully where the objective was to modify the actor's behavior, or to compel or induce an actor to do something different, would imply a similar finding--i.e., that the actor performed a desired behavior in consequence to a U.S. use of armed forces and that in the absence of this action the desired behavior would not have been performed.

It is worth noting, finally, that neither success nor failure can be inferred at all when, as a result of prudence, uncertainty, or confusion, armed forces are used only as a latent instrument. If the use of armed forces was not intended to influence another actor's behavior, it would be mistaken to view the behavior that did occur as a mark of success or failure. More appropriate in that instance would be a reference to the fortunate or unfortunate use of the armed forces.

For example, when General Kassem of Iraq threatened to seize Kuwait after the latter became independent in 1961, a small U.S. naval deployment was made to the Persian Gulf area. There is no indication that U.S. policymakers communicated a threat to Iraq or even the information that the deployment had been made. It would appear that the deployment, while being a preparatory action, was not intended to influence General Kassem. If the deployment actually was perceived by General Kassem and influenced him favorably from the point of view of U.S. policymakers, this might be considered pleasing or fortunate. To consider this a successful use of the navy as a political instrument, thereby implying intent when there was none, would be flattering but not a description of reality. Conversely, if General Kassem had acted to seize Kuwait, it would be equally unreasonable to suggest that the deployment failed as a deterrent.

The Actors in the Incidents

It will be recalled from chapter three that one of two criteria had to be satisfied in order for an actor to be considered a participant in an incident. To repeat: (a) the actor had to have been a specific target of U.S. decisionmakers in using the armed forces, in that the U.S. must have desired that the actor perform, or not perform, a specific act, or, more subtly, be impressed in a particular fashion; or (b) the actor had to play a special role in determining the outcome of the incident. Mere interest in an incident or essentially inconsequential behavior on the part of an actor was not considered enough to warrant inclusion.

Fifty-two different actors were involved in the 33 incidents. These included national governments (32), military factions (3), international and regional organizations (4), and insurgent and various civilian groups (13).

As one might expect, some actors were involved in more than one incident. The Soviet Union was a participant in 12-i.e., approximately one-third of the sample incidents; and six other actors (China, Cuba, Egypt, United Kingdom, North Vietnam and South Vietnam) were involved in four or more. If all of the actors in each of the 33 incidents are added together, one finds that a total of 116 actors participated in the 33 incidents. The seven individual actors (including the Soviet Union) just mentioned as participating in four or more incidents account for more than a third of this total participation.

Objectives and the Uses of Armed Forces

Table V-2 presents in categorical terms for each actor in the incidents, the principal action desired by U.S. policymakers, and the mode (assure, compel, deter, induce) and style (direct, indirect, latent) in which armed forces were used in order to obtain that behavior (see chapter two). Where the mode is not in parentheses, armed forces were aimed at an actor directly; where the mode is in parentheses, armed forces were used indirectly. Latent uses of force, also denoted in parentheses, are presented in the same column with modes both for convenience and to indicate that force was not used in these instances in any one of the four possible modes. Table V-2 also lists the outcomes relative to each objective after first, six months and, second, three years following the U.S. use of force.

It was not possible to determine the U.S. operational objective in the case of only one of the 116 participants in the 33 incidents examined. (2) In eight other instances, an objective was determined vis-à-vis a specific actor, but the use of the armed forces in the crisis was clearly not pertinent to that objective. For example, in sending Marines to Morocco in 1956 in the midst of disturbances there owing to France's actions in the Suez crisis and in Algeria, the Eisenhower Administration sought to insure that Rabat would protect American citizens and military installations. France was an actor in the situation and the objective of U.S. policy at the time was to persuade France to withdraw gracefully from North Africa. But the use of the Marines was in no way related to that objective; only to the objective vis-à-vis morocco.

Nor was the reinforcement of Guantanamo in 1960, following an overflight of Cuba and dropping of leaflets and perhaps a bomb by Florida based anti-Castroites, aimed at the anti-Castro group in any way. The concern, it would appear, was to deter a Cuban reprisal against Guantanamo. The exile group was an actor, but not a target of the U.S. military activity. Similarly, Jordan was an important actor in the Middle East ceasefire agreement in August 1970, but the U.S. use of reconnaissance aircraft to observe the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area was not directed at Jordan.

In several instances outcomes were not able to be determined. For example, it was not determined whether, following U.S. military actions:

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

Incident/ Actors	Greek Communist Party Greece United Kingdom Soviet Union Reposlavia	italism Commist Party Italian Commist Party Italy	Janua's, fores-1953: China Japan Japan Burth fores South fores Soriet Indon	Jorden-1956: Jorden Volted Kingdon	Spec-1976: Appt. France United Eingdon Soviet Union
Substantive Action Desired of Actor	Do not use force against government of Greece Meintain regime authority Continue relationship with Greece Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Greek Communists Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Greek Communists	Do not use force against government of Italy Maintain regime authority	Do not use force again against South Korea Maintain security (sovereignty) Do not use force again against South Korea Maintain security (sovereignty) Do not use force (overflights) again against Japan	Continue relationship with United Kingdom Continue relationship with Jordan	Restore relationship with United Kingdom Do not use force against Egypt Do not use force against Egypt Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Egypt
Mode in Which a/ Armed Forces Was Used	а а Дъа	04	PADAD	ප ච	<u> </u>
Outcome b/ 6 Mos. 3 Trs.	Z AA A . Z	O. O.	.	64 C 4	222/2
Outcome by	ZAZ A Z	P. P.	P P P P P	22	z K K z

Table V-2 (continued)

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

	Incident/ Actors	Substantive Action Desired of Actor	Mode in Which a Armed Forces	Outcome ^b / 6 Mbs. 3 Y	A E
v	Proceo-1956: Norceco France	Protect U.S. military installations in Morocco None relevant	U I	ο, ι	Δ. 1
2	Seria-1957: Perpt	Do not begin to support or spur undesired be- havior by Syria	Э	2	2
	Ireq Jorden Lebenon	Provide support to Turkey Provide support to Turkey Provide support to Turkey	ннн	222	2
1 8.81	Saudi Arabia Syria Turkey	Provide support to Turkey Give up regime authority Initiate use of force against Syria	Ĥo∢	22 0	ZZŽ
	Sowiet Union	Do not begin to support or spur undesired be- havior by Syria	(e)	z	Z
E)	group dimen to the same	Seize regime authority	н	Z	Z
æ	Venezuela Venezuela	Protect Vice President Mixon and party	S	- Д	NA.
6	Panama-1959: Cuba Panama insurgents	Curtail support of insurgents in Panama Terminate use of force against government of	& &	<u>с</u> , с.	a , z
	OAS Pensure	Provide support to Panama Maintain regime authority	(4)		ο, ο,
ä	China Laos North Vietnam Pathet Lao	Curtail support of Pathet Lao Maintain regime authority Terminate use of force against government of Laos Terminate use of force against government of Laos Terminate use of force against government of Laos	(6,400€	2	Z Z Z Z Z
	morno narios	The same of the sa			

Table V-2 (continued)

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

		日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日本の日	\ `		7	
	Incident/ Actors	Substantive Action Desired of Actor	Mode in Which Armed Forces Was Used	Outo	Outcome 3 Yrs.	
ä	Cube-1960: Cube Cuben exile group	Do not take action against U.S. base at Guantanamo None relevant	Q I	α, 1	A. I	
ğ	Congo-1960: Belgium Congo Katanga United Nations Soviet Union	Maintain alliance with U.S. Do not allow U.S.S.R. influence in Congo Don't know, but none apparently relevant Restore order in Congo Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Congo (Lumumba Government)	99 • 9	4214 Z	44 14 Z	4. 14 June
ដ	Dominican Republic Dominican armed forces -civilian group	Give up regime authority Seize regime authority) ပ ◀	; A A	; д д	
ä	Kursit-1961: Areb League Ireq Kuwsit United Kingdom	None relevant Do not use force against Kuwait Maintain security (sovereignty) Continue relationship with Kuwait	. ĐĐ∢	. 1848	1 44 44	7-11
r hit	Weinsm-1962: North Vietnam South Vietnam Viet Cong	Curtail support of Viet Cong Continue (increase) use of force against Viet Cong Terminate use of force against government of South Vietnam	(O) I O	z ο, ο	Z Z Z	

Table V-2 (continued)

0

Incident/ Actors	Mod Arm Arm Substantive Action Desired of Actor Was	Mode in Which Armed Forces Was Used	Outcome by 6 Mos. 3 Yrs.	A
16. Laos-1962: China Laos Laos Laotian neutralists North Vietnam Pathet Lao Thailand Soviet Union	Curtail support of Pathet Lao Give up regime authority Seize regime authority Curtail support of Pathet Lao Terminate use of force against government of Laos Maintain alliance with U.S. Curtail support of Pathet Lao	විජිජි≎ප∢ව	교 교 교 교 교 교	ZAGZZGZ
17. Dom Rep-1963: Dominican Republic Dominican armed forces	Meintain regime authority Do not use force against government of Dominican Republic	4 ∩	Д Д	ZZ
18. Wetnem-1964: North Vietnam South Vietnam South Vietnam Forces Viet Cong	Curtail support of Viet Cong Continue (increase) use of force against Viet Cong None relevant Terminate use of force against government of South Vietnam	OH 1 O	ZZ 1 Z	ZZ I Z
19. Dom Rep-1964: Cube Dominican Republic Dominican Republic in- surgents	Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Dominican insurgents Meintain regime authority Do not use force against government of Dominican Republic	0 4 0	6.6. 6.	QZ Z
20. Tanzania-1965: Tanzania	Do not take action against U.S. citizens or assets	(E)	Δ.	NA

Table V-2 (Continued)

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

Incident/ Actors		Mode in Which Armed Forces Was Used C	Outcome by 6 Mos. 3 Yrs. N N N N
22. Venezuele-1965: Cube Venezuelen Insurgents	Terminate use of force against government of South Vietnam Vietnam Curtail support of insurgents in Venezuela Terminate use of force against government of	()	z Ž
Venezuela 23. Crorus-1967:	Venezuela Maintain regime authority	(O) 4	24
	Meintain regime authority Do not use force against government Meintain alliance with U.S. Do not use force against Cyprus	<u> පිපප</u> ු	~ ~ ~ ~ ~
	Continue relationship with Cyprus Provide support to Cyprus		<u>о</u> , о,
24. Pueblo-1968: North Korea South Korea Soute Union	Do not use force again against U.S. armed forces Continue to use force in South Vietnam Do not been to summort or sum undesired be-	ДΗ	Φ. Φ.
	havior by North Korea	(a)	ρ
25. Lebenon-1968: Larael Lebenon	None relevant Maintain regime authority	, (1 0
Palestinians United Nations	Do not use force again against Israel None relevant	<u>j</u> g,	42 I

Table V-2 (continued)

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

	Incident/ Actors	Substantive Action Desired of Actor	Mode in Which Armed Forces	Outcome ^b / 6 Mos. 3 Yrs.	7
•	26. EC-121-1969: North Korea South Korea Soviet Union	Do not use force again against U.S. armed forces Maintain alliance with U.S. Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by North Korea	0 4 (6)	0 Z 0	42 4
	27. Borers Plan-1970: Egypt Israel Jordan Soviet Union	Do not use force again against Israel Do not use force again against Egypt None relevant Do not begin to support or spur undesired behavior by Egypt	ен - (6)	AA 1 A	
•	28. Clentueros-1970: Cube Soviet Union	Do not allow Sowiet submarine base in Cuba Terminate construction of submarine base in Cuba	UU	A. A.	Ф.Ф.
N II	29. Wetnam-1972a: China North Vietnam South Vietnam Soviet Union	Curtail support of North Vietnam Terminate use of force against South Vietnam Continue (increase) use of force against Viet Cong and North Vietnam Curtail support of North Vietnam	 (O ∀ (O	· Ä	22 22
.	30. Wetnam-1972b: North Vietnam	Terminate use of force against South Vietnam	U	ο.	¥
	31. Lacs-1973: Lacs Meo Tribe North Vietnam Pathet Lac	Maintain regime authority Continue use of force against Pathet Lao Terminate use of force against Laos Terminate use of force against government of Laos	∢∢ ∪∪	0.0.0.0	ZZZZ

Table V-2 (completed)

Actors, Principal Actions Desired of Them, Modes and Styles of Force Used, and Outcomes

Incident/		Mode in Which	Outcome	a .
Actore	Substantive Action Desired of Actor	Was Used	6 Mos. 3 Yrs.	Yrs
32. Lebenon-1973:				
Tehenon	Contine (increase) use of force equinat	•	•:	
	Palestinians	3	a	Z
Palestinians	Terminate use of force against government of			
	Lebanon	$\widehat{\Xi}$	Q,	Z
Syria	Do not use force against Lebanon	E	۵.	Z
33. Persian Culf-1974:				
Bopt	Negotiate with Israel .	(9)	۵,	NA
OAPEC	Maintein oil flow to West	۵	۵	•
Saudi Arabia	Maintain oil flow to West	Q	۵,	¥

CODES:

- Mode in which armed forces was used: A (assure); C (compel); D (deter); I (induce); L (situation is of concern-not a mode but a style of using armed forces).
 - Outcome: N (desired behavior not performed); P (desired behavior performed); DK (don't know); NM (not applicable). A

Cuba curtailed its support of the insurgents in Venezuela in 1965; or the Soviet Union and China exerted pressure upon Hanoi to halt the 1972 Spring offensive. Longer term outcomes of the 1974 use of naval forces in the Persian Gulf area could not be determined insofar as not enough time had elapsed. In a number of instances the objective was irrelevant from the longer term perspective.

It is interesting to note that in each of the sample incidents, armed forces were used as an instrument of coercive rather than cooperative diplomacy--i.e., in each incident the overriding relationship involved hostility between two foreign actors or between a foreign actor and the United States, and U.S. policymakers used or contemplated the use of armed forces to coerce one or more targets.

Relationships between outcomes and objectives, and the significance to outcomes of different modes and styles of using armed forces are the subject of chapter six. The remainder of this chapter examines the substantive objectives of policymakers vis-à-vis the 107 actors in the 33 incidents, and the modes and styles in which armed forces were used as a political instrument. These data are summarized in Table V-3.

Objectives

In using armed forces as a political instrument, policymakers were most concerned with three types of behavior: the use of force by one actor against another, the support given by one actor to another (third) actor, and regime authority. For example, during the 1962 Laotian Crisis, the Kennedy Administration had as objectives that the Pathet Lao should terminate its use of force against the Laotian Government; the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam should curtail their support of the Pathet Lao; the Laotian Government of Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan should give up power, and the Laotian neutralists led by Prince Souvanna Phouma should obtain power. Objectives related to these three basic concerns accounted for 37 percent, 25 percent, and 15 percent, respectively, of the total 107 actions desired in the 33 incidents. (3)

When the concern was with the use of force by an actor, the objective generally (30 percent of the total 107) was that the actor should not use force—i.e., "do not use force," "do not use force again," "terminate the use of force." In the remaining instances in which the use of force was of concern, the objective was that an actor should use force. In this latter regard, while there were a number of instances in which the objective was that force should continue to be used, in only one instance—the 1957 Syrian crisis—did Washington actually favor an actor's first use of force. The objective in that instance was not that Turkey should use its armed forces in order to attack Syria, but rather that Ankara should manipulate (i.e., maneuver) its forces in such a way as to coerce the Syrian Government so that internal political changes would be more likely. (4)

The general objective when third party support was of concern was that one actor should not support another actor-i.e., "curtail support," "do not

Table V-3

Objectives, Modes, and Styles of Using Armed Forces
Number of Instances

Direct and Indirect Uses a

	Assure	la ter	Induce	Compet	Total Direct Uses	Total Indirect Uses	Latent	Total
Use of Force	3 (0)	10 (0)	5 (0)	11 (2)	8	ટ	6	9
Continue use	2		a		9	0	1	4
Do not use		4			4	•	9	2
Infitiate use	-				4	0	0	.
Do not use again		9	н		~	0	-	8
Terminate use				11 (2)	n	Q	-	7.
Regime Authority	(0) 6	(0) 0	1 (0)	2 (0)	12	0	=	16
Give up				2	8	0	1	8
Meintein	8				∞	•	8	10
Seize	7	. W	-		8	0	1	m
Third Party Support	0 (1)	3 (4)	3 (0)	(4) †	10	12	5	27
Curta11				(4) 7	4	7	0	п
Do not initate		3 (4)			æ	-	3	2
Provide	(E)	April 1	.		ĸ	- 10° - 10°	8	9
Ally Relationship	1 (0)	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	1	σ	5	9
Continue	1				1	0	4	5
Restore					0	0	1	r
Other	(0) 5	3 (0)	(0) 0	4 (1)	12	1-1	5	18
TOTAL	18 (1)	16 (4)	(0) 6	21 (10)	73	15	28	701

g/ Indirect uses of armed forces are in parentheses.

begin to support or spur undesired behavior." These objectives accounted for 20 percent of the total actions desired. In all but two of the 21 instances relevant in this regard, the actor of concern that was lending the support was a Communist state, generally the Soviet Union or China, and otherwise North Vietnam, Cuba, or Yugoslavia. The two instances of non-Communist third-party support concerned Egypt's support of Syria during the 1957 Syrian crisis, and Castro's support of Panamanian insurgents in 1959.

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In the remaining instances when the concern was with third party support, the objective was that one actor should "provide support" to another actor. Four of these six instances were related to the 1957 Syrian crisis.

Regime authority, which accounted for 15 percent of the total actions desired, refers to the political will and courage to hold on to or seize political authority--i.e., control the "state." In using armed forces in the 1959 Laotian crisis, for example, one principal objective was to embolden the Laotian Government so that it would not allow its authority to slip and perhaps disintegrate. U.S. armed forces were used in a similar fashion to support the Governments of Greece and Italy in the immediate postwar years.

Most frequently, the concern was that an actor should maintain its control of the state. However, on two occasions (Syria, 1957; Dominican Republic, 1961) the objective was that an existing government should be changed. In the case of Syria, a faction composed of more moderate military officers—i.e., friendly to the United States—was supported against a Syrian military government, about which President Eisenhower wrote later, "the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken control..." (5) The Dominicans supported by the Kennedy Administration in the Spring of 1961 were a mixed group of senior officers and civilians who shared a common personal hatred of Rafael Trujillo.

In a number of instances Table V-2 lists the maintenance of authority by a government as the principal matter of concern in the context of ongoing domestic violence-i.e., Laos, 1959 and 1973; Panama, 1959; Venezuela, 1965. While U.S. policymakers also wanted to assure those governments so that they would continue to use violence against insurgent groups, the more immediate and principal concern was to reinforce confidence and political will.

Although small, a fourth category of concern—the relationship of a U.S. ally with another actor—stands out with special reference to latent uses of the armed forces. In all of those instances pertaining to an ally's relationship with a third party, the ally was Britain, and the concern was that the latter should retain at least a degree of influence with the relevant third party. For example, after General John Glubb (Pasha) was dismissed in 1956 by King Hussein, Washington became concerned about the future of London's special relationship (and influence) with Amman.

Other concerns included the protection of U.S. citizens and military installations, the maintenance of the national security of states in threatening but non-violent situations, the maintenance of U.S. alliances, nascent Soviet influence and turmoil in the Congo, the establishment of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and interim negotiations in the Middle East.

Modes in Which Armed Forces Were Used

In relation to the substantive behavior desired of each actor, armed forces were used either as a manifest or latent instrument. When armed forces were used manifestly, policymakers sought to assure, compel, deter, or induce an actor's behavior.

In 1963, for example, the helicopter carrier <u>Boxer</u> and an amphibious support ship (the <u>Rankin</u>) were present in the harbor of Santo Domingo when Juan Bosch was inaugurated President of the Dominican Republic. At the same time, a sizable American delegation led by Vice President Johnson attended the inaugural. These two actions, together with official U.S. statements and economic aid were meant to demonstrate American support for the new Bosch Government. Specifically, U.S. policymakers sought to assure that Bosch would take various actions to strengthen his government and avoid falling victim to a coup, and to <u>deter</u> the Dominican armed forces from staging a coup against the Bosch Government.

In early 1962, for the first time, an American combat unit took part in the conflict in South Vietnam: U.S. Army helicopter units supported South Vietnamese ground forces in operations against the Viet Cong. Shortly thereafter, a United States Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron took up duty at Soc Trang, and the helicopter carrier <u>Princeton</u> established a presence nearby in the South China Sea. These and other non-military actions taken by the Kennedy Administration were meant to <u>induce</u> South Vietnam to make a greater effort in the war, to <u>compel</u> the Viet Cong to stop fighting, and to <u>compel</u> North Vietnam to stop supporting the Viet Cong.(6)

In 79 of the 107 instances (74 percent) in which U.S. policymakers desired that an actor should perform a particular behavior, armed forces were used as a manifest instrument with which to obtain that objective. In the remaining 28 inctances armed forces were used only as a latent instrument; hence, in this latter group of instances they were not used in any one of the four modes mentioned above. Of the 79 instances in which armed forces were used in order to obtain an objective, they were used most frequently (39 percent) to compel an actor to do something. Armed forces were used least frequently

(11 percent) to induce behavior. They were used in 24 percent to assure behavior and 25 percent to deter behavior. If the four categories are grouped together, the use of armed forces was evenly divided between actions to reinforce—i.e., assure or deter—behavior and actions to modify—i.e., induce or compel—behavior. Viewed another way, though, the concern was much more frequently to coerce—i.e., compel or deter—behavior than it was to support—i.e., assure or induce—behavior. In general, it may be noted that when policymakers sought to compel or deter behavior the United States and the other actor were antagonists in the incident. Conversely, when the concern was to assure or induce behavior, the United States and the other actor were "friends" if not allies in the incident.

Armed forces were used in order to deter or compel an actor's behavior when the concern was that force should not be used, one actor should not provide support to another actor, or an actor should give up political authority. Armed forces were used in order to assure or induce behavior when the concern was that force should be used, one actor should provide support to another actor, or an actor should maintain or seize control of the state.

An exception to the use by policymakers of armed forces in order to deter or compel an actor not to use force was the August 1970 use of reconnaissance aircraft in order to induce Israel to observe the ceasefire agreed to by Tel Aviv and Cairo in connection with the Rogers Peace Plan. Armed forces were used in this instance as an instrument for supporting Israel and not as a tool for coercion.

Styles of Using Armed Forces

When the armed forces are used as a manifest instrument with which to support policy, they may be addressed directly or indirectly at an actor. For example, in response to North Vietnam's Easter offensive in 1972, bombing was initiated by B-52s and carrier aircraft against Hanoi and Haiphong, and North Vietnamese ports were mined. Force was used, in this instance, directly against North Vietnam. Indirectly, however, this use of force was also meant to coerce Moscow and Peking to counsel Hanoi to slow down or cut the offensive short.

Armed forces may also be used as a latent instrument. In these instances, changes in the disposition of forces will occur, but aside from increased readiness, the most policymakers mean to indicate to other actors is American interest in the situation. Thus, force is not used in any of the four modes considered above. For example, in January 1965, after two U.S. diplomats were accused of "subversive activities" and expelled from Tanzania, the destroyer <u>Richard E. Kraus</u> was deployed so as to be able to reach Tanzania within ten hours. No other action was ever taken, however, either by the <u>Richard E. Kraus</u> or by any other American military unit. While U.S. policymakers contemplated the necessity of further

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action--e.g., an evacuation of American citizens--it is questionable whether Dar es Salaam ever became aware of the deployment that was made.

Armed forces were used directly--i.e., to militarily support or coerce a particular actor--with reference to 60 percent of the total 107 objectives of U.S. policymakers in the 33 incidents. Armed forces were used indirectly--i.e., to support or coerce one actor by militarily supporting or coercing another actor--with reference to 14 percent of those objectives, and as a latent instrument with reference to 26 percent. In six incidents (Jordan, 1956; Suez, 1956; Tanzania, 1965; Cyprus, 1967; Lebanon, 1968; Lebanon, 1973) latent uses constituted the only way the U.S. used its armed forces.

When the concern was with another actor's use of force or regime authority, U.S. armed forces were usually used directly. Armed forces were generally used directly or indirectly when third party support was of concern. When an ally's relationship with another actor was of interest they were used as a latent instrument.

Viewed another way, when armed forces were used directly, the concern was most frequently with the use of force by another actor; and when used indirectly, the concern typically was with third party support. When armed forces were used as a latent instrument, the concern was more likely to be with an actor's use of force than anything else; however, latent uses of force were distributed more evenly than were direct and indirect uses of force.

Finally, it is interesting to note that armed forces were used indirectly only in a total 10 percent of those instances when policymakers sought to assure, deter, or induce behavior, but in 32 percent of those instances when the concern was to compel behavior. Insofar as compellance is probably the most risky mode in which to use armed forces, policymakers may have felt that the level of risk could be reduced if force was used indirectly rather than directly in these instances.

SUMMARY

During the 30 year period after World War II United States policy-makers used armed forces principally to achieve objectives related to three types of foreign behavior: the use of force by another actor, support given by one actor to another actor, and regime authority; and in that order. In general, U.S. armed forces were used to oppose or moderate change of an existing situation, especially change occasioned by violence; hence, the objectives of policymakers for the most part were to oppose the use of force by another actor, to oppose the support given by (Communist) actors to other actors, and to support the maintenance of authority by actors. Much less frequently, armed forces were used to support an actor's use of force, to support the aid given by one actor to another, and to bring about governmental change.

When armed forces were used manifestly to achieve objectives rather than only latently, they were used most frequently to compel an actor's behavior and least frequently to induce behavior. If the four modes in which armed forces were used are grouped into different combinations, armed forces were used with equal frequency to reinforce (deter and assure) and modify (compel and induce) behavior; but much more frequently to coerce (compel and deter) than to support (assure and induce) behavior.

Generally speaking, armed forces were used to coerce behavior when the objective was that an actor should not use force, should not provide support to another actor, and should give up political authority. Conversely, they were used to support behavior when the objective was that an actor should use force, provide support to another actor, and maintain or seize control of the state.

When armed forces were used in one of the four modes and not latently, they were much more frequently aimed directly rather than indirectly at an actor. When the concern was with another actor's use of force or regime authority, policymakers generally used armed forces directly; using armed forces directly and indirectly when the concern was with third party support. Viewed another way, armed forces were aimed directly most frequently at another actor's use of force and indirectly most frequently at third party support.

Armed forces were used as a latent instrument with reference to fully a fourth of the objectives in the 33 incidents. Latent uses of force were predominant in those instances when an ally's (the United Kingdom) relationship with another actor was of concern; although armed forces were used latently most frequently when the use of force by another actor was of concern.

Footnotes

- 1. Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," in Harold Stein (Ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions (University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 667-705; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (Admiral, USN Ret.), On Watch: A Memoir (Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 363-69; James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis," (Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 108, February 1973).
- 2. I.e., Katanga Province (led by Moise Tshombe) in the 1960 Congo crisis. This incident encompasses only the first stage of that crisis: the period between the outbreak of the mutiny by the Force Publique in July 1960 and the coup d'etat staged by Joseph Mobutu in mid-September

Footnotes (Continued)

- 1960. The objective of ending Katanga's secession appears to have been embraced by U.S. policymakers only after the Kennedy Administration took office. During the earlier months Katanga was certainly a matter of issue, but no clear policy objective appears to have been formulated. Perhaps the best examination of Administration attitudes toward Katanga, but one that we do not find conclusive, is the analysis by Stephen R. Weissman, in American Foreign Policy in the Congo. 1960-1964 (Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 74-77.
- 3. Percentages presented in tables are to the nearest tenth of a percentage point; those presented in the text are to the nearest percentage point. It is important to keep in mind that these figures are exact measures only in relation to the sample incidents and the methodology used. Otherwise, they are only suggestive.
- 4. At the same time, it has been argued elsewhere, covert CIA operations sought to help matters along inside Syria. See: Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics. 1945-1958 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 293-96; Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 187-88.
- 5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Doubleday, 1965), p. 196.
- 6. The idea, of course, was not that these military actions would by themselves compel the Viet Cong and North Vietnam to change their behavior. Rather, these actions were meant as a signal of American willingness to become even more heavily involved, if necessary, to maintain a non-Communist and independent South Vietnam.

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Chapter VI

UTILITY ANALYSIS:

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND

THE USE OF ARMED FORCES

We turn now to an examination of the relationships between uses of U.S. armed forces and the outcomes of the sample incidents. How frequent have positive outcomes been when the armed forces have been used as a political instrument, in the short term and over the longer term? Also, of what significance have different types of objectives been, and what has been the importance of differing modes and styles of force use? Of course, the nature of armed forces usage has itself varied. Differing levels and types of forces have been employed, deployments have been made both within and between theaters, and the activities engaged in by the forces used have been diverse. Thus, we have before us here three basic questions: the relationship between outcomes and the use of armed forces generally; the importance to this relationship of differing purposes; and the significance of using armed forces in different ways. Answers to these questions, as we shall see, are complicated.

Overall Outcomes of Incidents

It is interesting to consider, first, whether overall--looking at all of the objectives of policymakers in an incident--the short and longer term outcomes of the incidents were favorable or unfavorable. In some incidents, of course, all outcomes were positive (e.g., Cienfuegos, 1970); in others, outcomes were uniformly negative (e.g., Vietnam, 1965). In still others, results were mixed. One approach to determining overall "success" or "failure" is to establish a particular percentage of positive outcomes as a criterion.

If a criterion of two-thirds is used--i.e., if two-thirds of U.S. objectives in the incident were fulfilled, then the overall outcome is considered favorable--then it may be said that in the short term the outcomes of 24 incidents were favorable and 9 were not. In short, the overall outcomes of three quarters of the incidents were favorable (see Table VI-1).

Over the longer term, however, the overall "success" rate dropped to less than one-half as only 13 outcomes were favorable and 16 were unfavorable. A significant proportion of the positive outcomes obtained in the short term were lost over the longer term. Obviously, not every incident is as important as the next; nor is every objective in an incident as important as every other objective. No weighting schemes were considered, however.

Table VI-1 Overall Outcomes of Sample Incidents

	6 Months	3 Years	And the second s	6 Months	3 Years
1. Greece, 1946	ซ	U	18. Vietnam, 1964	U	U
2. Italy, 1947	F	r	19. Dominican Rep, 1964	F	U
3. Japan/S. Korea, 1953	ř	r	20. Tanzania, 1965	F	NA
4. Jordan, 1956	F	U	21. Vietnam, 1965	U	U
5. Suez, 1956	. v	Ū	22. Venezuela, 1965	U	U
6. Morocco, 1956	F	r	23. Cyprus, 1967	ř	F
7. Syria, 1957	U	, v	24. Pueblo, 1968	F	F
8. Venezuela, 1958	r	NA	25. Lebanon, 1968	υ	U
9. Panama, 1959	F	F	26. EC-121, 1969	F .	F
10. Laos, 1959	υ	U	27. Rogers Plan, 1970	F	F •
11. Cuba, 1960	r	r	28. Cienfuegos, 1970	r	F
12. Congo, 1960	Ü	F	29. Vietnam, 1972a	F	U
13. Dominican Rep, 1961	r	r	30. Vietnam, 1972b	F	NA
14. Kuwait, 1961	F	F	31. Laos, 1973	F .	U
15. Vietnam, 1962	r	U	32. Lebanon, 1973	r	U
16. Laos, 1962	F	U	33. Persian Gulf, 1974	r	NA
17. Dominican Rep, 1963	.	U	it approached the special	44.40	

Code:

- ode:
 F) Favorable
- U) Unfavorable
- NA) Not applicable

Individual Outcomes and the Political Uses of Armed Forces

Table VI-2 presents data showing the share of all outcomes which were positive from the U.S. perspective, broken down by the objectives of U.S. policymakers, and the modes and styles in which armed forces were used in order to achieve those objectives.

In the short term, favorable outcomes were obtained with respect to a large proportion (73 percent) of the objectives for which U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument. However, the "success" rate declined substantially when objectives were evaluated over the longer term. Indeed, outcomes pertaining to more than one-half of the principal objectives were not positive for a period of three years. To take an extreme case, all of the outcomes following the use of B-52 bombers over Laos in early 1973 were positive in the short term. The Laotian Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma continued to act with some confidence. The Meo tribe continued to fight in support of that government, and North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao did terminate their use of force. Over the longer term, however, none of these outcomes were sustained; new fighting began and, eventually, Laos was taken over by the Pathet Lao.

It is to be added that the decline in "success" between the short and longer term periods occurred for every type of objective but the miscellaneous category "other"; and with respect to every mode and style of using armed forces.

Of the three principal categories of objectives, positive outcomes were obtained in the short term most often when regime authority was of concern, less often when the use of force by another actor was of concern, and least often in regard to third party support. Over the longer term, positive outcomes also were most frequent when the concern was with regime authority; the decline in positive outcomes in regard to the use of force by another actor was so great, however, that no real distinction is to be made between the latter and the frequency of positive outcomes with respect to third party support.

Outcomes were much more frequently favorable when armed forces were used in order to reinforce—i.e., to assure or deter—existing behavior, rather than to modify—i.e., to compel or induce—behavior. Outcomes also were favorable more often when armed forces were used as a direct rather than an indirect instrument. In the short term, outcomes were more frequently positive when armed forces were used directly rather than latently; however, in the longer term the reverse was the case.

Table VI-2

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive From the U.S. Perspective, By Type of Objective, Mode and Style of Use of Force

ersea de la successión esta el como de la co	6 Months		3 Years	
	Percentage of Positive Outcomes	Size of Denominator	Percentage of Positive Outcomes	Size of Denominator
OBJECTIVES:				2008
Use of Force Continue use Do not use Initiate use Do not use again Terminate use	75.0 71.4 70.0 100.0 87.5 71.4	40 7 10 1 8 14	30.6 14.3 50.0 75.0 0.0	36 ^d 7 8 b 0 a 8 a 13
Regime Authority Give up Maintain Seize	87.5 66.7 100.0 66.7	16 3 10 3	62.5 66.7 60.0 66.7	16 3 10 3
Third Party Support Curtail support Do not initiate Provide	45.8 50.0 50.0 33.3	24 8 c 10 6	29.6 9.1 50.0 33.3	27 11 10 6
Ally Relationship Continue Restore Other	83.3 100.0 0.0 88.9		33.3 40.0 0.0 92.3	6 5 1

MODE of Use of Force:				
Assure Compel	94.7 67.9	19 28 ^c	61.1 17.9	18 ^d
Deter Induce	85.0 33.3	20 9	66.7 22.2	18 ^b
STYLE of Use of Force:				
Direct	79.4	63 ^a	44.1	59 ^e
Indirect	53.8	13 ^b	28,6	14 ⁸
Latent	67.9	. 28	52.0	25 ^c
TOTAL:	73.1	104°	43.9	98 [£]

a. No outcome could be determined in one instance.

b. No outcome could be determined in two instances.

c. No outcome could be determined in three instances.

d. No outcome could be determined in four instances.

e. No outcome could be determined in five instances.

f. No outcome could be determined in nine instances.

Substantive Objectives

The use of armed forces by other actors. When another actor's use of force was of concern to U.S. policymakers, outcomes were favorable in three out of every four instances in the short term and in three out of every ten instances over the longer term. Excluding the single instance when the objective was that an actor (Turkey, in the 1957 Syrian Crisis) should "initiate" the use of force, differences in the frequencies of positive outcomes that were related to individual objectives were small in the short term; although cutcomes were somewhat more frequently positive when the objective was that force should not be used again. In the longer term, outcomes were much more frequently positive when the objective was that force should not be used again or should not be initiated than when U.S. policymakers sought for an actor to continue or terminate the use of force. Regarding the last, positive outcomes never endured for three years.

The reason why outcomes were relatively more frequently positive in the short term and much more frequently so over the longer term when the objective was that an actor should not use force again (after having just used force) was probably that the relevant actors, in at least a number of those instances, had no intention of using force again. Two of these outcomes pertained to Israel's and Egypt's non-use of force during the three year period between the August 1970 ceasefire and the October 1973 War. In two other instances, China and North Korea may have had no intention of using force in the three years immediately following the Korean War, whether or not the U.S. permanently emplaced troops in the Far East. The one instance that accounts for the decline in the "success" rate for this category pertains to North Korea's shooting down of the U.S. Navy EC-121 a little over a year after the <u>Pueblo</u> was seized.

Support given by one actor to another. Outcomes were least frequently positive when objectives concerned support given by one actor to another actor-for example, North Vietnam's continued support of the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao in the early 1960s. These outcomes were positive in less than one out of every two instances in the short term and in less than one out of every three in the longer term. Favorable outcomes were particularly infrequent in the longer term when the objective was that an actor should curtail its support of another actor.

All four of the instances in which outcomes were negative and the objective was that support should be given by one actor to another were related to the

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1957 Syrian crisis when the Eisenhower Administration desired that several Arab states support Turkey vis-a-vis Syria.

Regime Authority. Of the three principal categories of objectives of interest to policymakers, outcomes were most frequently favorable when regime authority was of concern; outcomes being positive in almost nine out of every ten instances in the short term and in almost two out of every three in the longer term. Outcomes were especially likely to be positive in the short term when the objective was to embolden or give confidence to an actor to act to maintain its authority—e.g., the use of force in 1959 to insure that the government of Panama would deal firmly and effectively with a Cuban supported insurgency.

Of note, in the case of the 1961 incident in the Dominican Republic, the objectives that the Trujillo family should give up power and that another group should seize power were obtained in November 1961 (just before the six month cut-off point), but only after a second use of the armed forces by the Kennedy Administration.

Ally relationship with another actor and "other" concerns. Outcomes were positive in the short term in all five instances when policymakers had as their objective that an ally should continue a relationship—and maintain its influence—with another actor. Over the longer term, however, only two of these five outcomes remained positive. Both the short and longer term outcomes were negative in the one instance when the objective was that an actor should restore a relationship with an ally—i.e., Egypt in the crisis following President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.

Taken together, the remaining objectives (in the category "Other") were met with an extraordinarily high proportion of positive outcomes over both the short and longer terms. It may be that positive outcomes were more likely to be obtained immediately and retained when armed forces were used for very specific objectives—e.g., the protection of American citizens and assets abroad (Morocco, 1956; Venezuela, 1958; Cuba, 1960), the termination of construction of a Soviet military base in Cuba (Cienfuegos, 1970; remember also the Cuban missile crisis), and the continued flow of petroleum from Arab oil producing states (Persian Gulf, 1974). It may also be the objectives were spurious in some cases—e.g., U.S. citizens were not really threatened.

Modes in Which Armed Forces Were Used

In the language of coercive diplomacy, the proportions of positive outcomes in the short term were exceptionally high when armed forces were used to reinforce behavior. Despite considerable declines in "success" rates, positive outcomes also predominated over the longer term in these instances. When the objective was to assure that an action would be performed (e.g., that the United Nations would act to restore order in the Congo in 1960), positive outcomes resulted with regard to 95 percent of the objectives after six months, and 61 percent of the

objectives after three years. When the objective was to deter behavior (e.g., Cuba from taking action against the U.S. base at Guantanamo in 1960), positive outcomes occurred 85 percent of the time after six months and 67 percent of the time after three years.

Less positive results were obtained when the objective was to modify behavior, particularly over the longer term. After three years, positive outcomes resulted with regard to only 18 percent of the objectives when armed forces were used to compel an action (e.g., to influence China and the Soviet Union to curtail their support of the Pathet Lao in 1959); and 22 percent of the objectives when policymakers sought to induce an action (e.g., to persuade South Vietnam to take more effective military action against the Viet Cong). The greater short-term rate of positive outcomes was attained when the objective was to compel an action; unfortunately, the decline over time was most pronounced in these cases as well (from 68 percent to 18 percent). The decline was smaller when the concern was to induce behavior, but this reflects the extremely low proportion of favorable outcomes after six months.

If outcomes related to the use of armed forces to assure and deter-i.e., reinforce-behavior are combined, 90 percent were positive in the short term and 64 percent were favorable over the longer term. If those outcomes related to the use of armed forces to compel and induce-i.e., modify-behavior are taken together, 59 percent were favorable in the short term and 19 percent were favorable in the longer term. Why were outcomes more frequently positive when policymakers sought to reinforce rather than to modify behavior? Two explanations come to mind.

In many instances in which U.S. policymakers wanted to reinforce behavior, the actor may have intended to continue the desired behavior in any case. Hence, the objective desired by the United States was not in question, and the use of armed forces was irrelevant in those instances. No doubt, this was true in some instances; however, it may also be true that it is simply easier to reinforce than to modify behavior. The behavioral psychology literature suggests that this is the case for individual behavior. Moreover, aside from the decisionmaker's anxiety about the unknown, and his greater comfort in repeating familiar behavioral patterns, it may be especially difficult to induce or compel new behavior because of political constraints on the target actor. To compel behavior may be particularly difficult insofar as the target actor is concerned not to lose "face" and, consequently, power and influence, domestically and internationally.

In the short term, when armed forces were used to assure that an action would be performed, it made virtually no difference what the objective was, outcomes being almost uniformly positive (see Table VI-3).

Table VI-3
Use of Armed Forces by Objective and Mode
Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive in Each Cell

Substantive		6 Mc	onths			3 Yea	rs	
Objective	Assure	Compel	Deter	Induce	Assure	Compel	Deter	Induce
1. Use of Force	100.0ª	69.2	90.0	60.0	0.0ª	0.0	60.0	40.0
2. Support by Third Party	100.0ª	50.0	71.4	0.0ª	100.0ª	9.1	71.4	0.0ª
3. Regime Authority	100.0	50.0ª		0.0ª	55.6	50.0ª		0.0ª
4. Ally Relationship	100.0ª	-		;; 	100.0ª	••	19.7 *	
5. Other	80.0	100.0	100.0ª	1 1455 Told A.J. (77 A.)	80.0	100.0ª	100.0ª	a esta est Dispu ese
6. All Objectives	94.7	67.9	85.0	33.3	61.1	17.9.	66.7	22.2

a. Denominator was less than five.

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When armed forces were used coercively-i.e., to compel or deter-or to induce behavior, outcomes were more frequently positive when the use of force by another actor rather than support of a third party or regime authority were of interest. Thus, following the shooting down by North Korea of a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft in 1969, Pyongyang did not provoke the United States further, being deterred, perhaps, by the large U.S. naval forces which were deployed in the Sea of Japan and the deployment of Air Force aircraft from South Vietnam to South Korea. By contrast, the visit of the battleship Missouri to Athens in April 1946 did not deter Yugoslavia from lending support to the Communist-led insurgency in Greece which began not too long after the Missouri's visit.

In the longer term, it is of interest that when armed forces were used to induce an action, outcomes were most frequently positive when they concerned the use of force, and that when policymakers sought to deter an action, favorable outcomes were most frequent when the objective related to third party support and the use of force. By contrast, no positive outcomes endured when armed forces were used to assure or compel behavior related to the use of force by another actor.

Style of Using Armed Forces

Outcomes were positive much more frequently both in the short and longer terms when armed forces were used directly rather than indirectly. However, in the short term, outcomes were almost as frequently positive when armed forces were used as a latent instrument as when they were used directly; in the longer term, outcomes were most often positive when the armed forces were used only latently—e.g. the U.S. response to developments in Cyprus in 1967. Prudence, it would appear, had its virtues; it is questionable whether the direct or indirect use of armed forces in the instances when armed forces were used latently would have occasioned larger percentages of positive outcomes, particularly in the longer term.

When armed forces were used directly, outcomes were very frequently positive in the short term except when the objective concerned support given by one actor to another (see Table VI-4). The same was true as concerns latent uses. When

Table VI-4

Use of Armed Forces by Objective and Style of Use

Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive in Each Cell

		6 Months			3 Years	
Substantive Objective	Direct	Indirect	Latent	Direct	Indirect	Latent
1. Use of Force	82.8	0.0ª	66.7	29.6	0.0 ^a	42.9
2. Support by Third Party	44.4	60.0	20.0	30.0	33.3	20.0
3. Regime Authority	83.3		100.0ª	50.0	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	100.0ª
4. Ally Relationship	100.0ª	-	80.0	100.0ª		20.0
5. Other	91.7	100.0 ^a	80.0	88.9		100.0ª
6. All Objectives	79.4	53.8	67.9	44.1	28.6	52.0

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Denominator was less than five.

third party support was of concern, outcomes were most frequently positive when armed forces were used indirectly. In the longer term, the difference with regard to the last was minimal, however.

Finally, it is worthwhile to note the decline in the percentages of positive outcomes when armed forces were used directly and the objectives concerned either the use of force by another actor or regime authority. In no instance, it may be added, did a positive outcome endure when it was desired that the use of force by an actor should be terminated. By contrast, positive outcomes endured in more than four out of five instances when the objective was that an actor should not use force again (after having just used force).

Outcomes and the Level. Type. Theater Movement

and Activities of Armed Forces

In April 1969 North Korean aircraft attacked and shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121 recommaissance plane flying on a routine mission. All of the crew members were killed. Only months earlier the crew of the <u>Pueblo</u> had been released. In response to this new provocation, President Nixon ordered a show of force of major proportion: six aircraft carriers, the battleship New Jersey, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were directed to the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and other waters proximate to the area; land based combat aircraft were redeployed from South Vietnam to South Korea; and various units in the United States were readied for deployment to the Far East.

In radically different circumstances and at quite the other end of the spectrum of forces that might be used as a political instrument, a single destroyer was dispatched in response to the sudden worsening of relations between the United States and Tanzania in January 1965. Similarly, when the Soviet Union appeared to be in the process of establishing a submarine base in Cuba in 1970, only a destroyer and recommaissance aircraft were utilized. And concern with developments in Morocco during the Suez Crisis led to the deployment of only a company of Marines.

Are positive outcomes more often associated with greater amounts of force or particular types of forces, or with the movement of those forces, or with certain things that they do? These and similar questions are explored in this section. The data in Table VI-5 describe the level, type, theater deployment, and activities of U.S. armed forces in the sample incidents.

The data in Table VI-5 indicate that units associated with strategic nuclear forces were used together with at least one major conventional component of the armed forces in two of the incidents (Japan/S. Korea, 1953; <u>Pueblo</u>, 1968). In four incidents, two or more major conventional components, but not strategic nuclear units were used (Syria, 1957; Dominican Rep., 1961; EC-121, 1969; Vietnam, 1972a); and in nine other incidents a single major conventional component

Table VI-5

Level, Type, Theater Movement and Activity of Armed Forces

1. 在一次数额。		100	M	Mamber and Size of	Units Involved			Care and the Control of the Control
Incidente		Overall Level of Armed Forces Used	Army (AR) or Marsine (MC) Ground Forces	Air Force (AF) Marine (MC) Combat Aircraft		<u>Other</u>	Movement Within or Stween Theaters	Activity
1. Greece, 1946		4					Intra	Visit
2. Italy, 1947		4			5		Intra	Visit
3. Japan/S. Korea,	. 1953	-	DIV MC	N 0			Inter	Emplacement Visit
4. Jordan, 1956	1	r		3 -	2 CV		Inter, Intra Presence	Presence
5. Susz, 1956		•	BAT NC (A)	· \$500	2 CV		Inter, Intra	Exercise
6. Morocco, 1956		5	COM MC			U TA	Inter	Emplacement
7. Syrda, 1957		8	BRG MC (A)		3 C4	S TA	Inter, Intra	Exercise, Transport,
8. Venezuela, 1958	60	3	2		1 CV	D TA	Inter, Intra	Presence
9. Paname, 1959	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	2	(v) 24 14			AT U	Intra	Surveillance
10. Laos, 1959		3	BRG MC (A)		3 04		Inter, Intra	Presence, Surveillance,
11. Cuba, 1960		7		S MC		78,019	Inter	Emplacement
12. Congo, 1960		4	COM MC (A)		1 00	L TA	Inter	Evacuation, Transport
13. Dominican Rep, 1961	1961	8	U MC (A)	U AF	3.00		Inter, Intra	Exercise
14. Kuwatt, 1961		3	BAT MC (A)				Inter, Intra	Presence
15. Vietnam, 1962		5	COM AR			S TH	Intra	Emplacement, Tactical Support, Transport

Table VI-5 (Con't.)

Level, Type, Theater Movement and Activity of Armed Forces

			umber and Size of Units Involved	Unite Inwolved			
	Overall Lavel of Armed Forces	Army (AR) or Marine (MC) Ground	Air Force (AF) Marine (MC) Combat	Battleship (BB) Aircraft Carrier (CV) Helicopter		Movement Within or Between	
Incidents	Deed	Porces	Aircraft	Carrier (LPH)	Other	Theaters	<u>Activity</u>
16. Lace, 1962	•	# S			1 8S,U TA Intra	Intra	
17. Dominican Rep. 1963	, t	BAT NC (A)			l* :	Intra	riesence, visit, iransport
18. Vietner, 1964	•	BRG AR		A) D	N TA	Inter, Intra Presence	Presence
19. Dominican Rep. 1964	964 5)			U PA	Intra	Surveillance
20. Tensenia, 1965					1 SC	Intra	Presence
21. Piemer, 1965	3		S AF	3.04		Inter, Intra Bombing	Bombing
22. Masguela, 1965	\$				U.SH	Intra	Presence
23. Cyprus, 1967	1			1 CA		Intra	Presence
24. Pueblo, 1968	-		W AF	3 04		Inter, Intra Presence	Presence
25. Lebenon, 1968	5				U SH	Intra	Presence
26. EC-121, 1969	88.25 *00.86	U AR (?A)	aw n	1 BB 6 CV	UPA UTA	Inter (? alert)	Presence, Surveillance
27. Logers Plan, 1970					U.PA	Inter	Surveillance
25. Cienfuegos, 1970	5		4		UPA	Intra	Escort, Surveillance
29. Vietnem, 1972a	2		A A	6 04	i i	Inter, Intra	Inter, Intra Blockade, Bombing
30. Vietnæ, 1972b	•		W AF	n cv		Intra	Bombing 1-1%
							2

Table VI-5 (Con't.)

Level, Type, Theater Movement and Activity of Armed Forces

	(Jerenal)	Number and Size of	f Units Involved Battleship (BB)			
Incidents	Level of Armed Forces Used	Army (AR) Air Force (AF) Aircraft or Marine Marine (MC) Carrier (CV) (MC) Ground Combat Helicopter Forces Aircraft Carrier (LFH)	Aircraft Carrier (CV) Helicopter Carrier (LFH)	Other	Movement Within or Between Theaters	Activity
31. Lacs, 1973	3	W AF			Intra	Bombing
32. Lebanon, 1973	L			HS D	Intra	Presence
33. Persian Gulf, 1974	4		, 1 cv		Inter	Exercise
300						

One major component is the equivalent of two or more aircraft carrier (or battleship) task groups; or, a ground force larger than a battalion; or, a combat air unit at least the size of a wing.

A standard component is the equivalent of one aircraft carrier (or battleship) task group; or, a ground force larger than a company, but no larger than a battalion; or, a combat air unit at least the size of a squadron, but less than the size of a wing. A minor component is the equivalent of forces smaller than a standard component; or, other types of forces.

General: U Size unknown; ? Don't know

Level of Armed Forces Used (i.e., alerted and/or deployed):

- 1. One or more major components and strategic nuclear force unit.

 2. Two or more major components; no strategic nuclear force unit.
 - 3. One major component; or strategic nuclear force unit.
- t. Standard component.
- 5. Winor component.

Army/Marine Ground Forces:

(A) Afloat

COM Less than or equal in size to a company

More than a company but less than or equal in size to a battalion SAT.

MG More than a battalion but less than or equal in size to a brigade

More than a brigade but less than or equal in size to a division

Air Force/Marine Combat Aircraft:

L Less than a squadron of aircraft

More than or equal in size to a squadron but less than a wing

W More than or equal in size to a wing

Other

SC Neval surface combatant

S Submarine

PA . Pixed wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft

TH Transport helicopter

IA Transport aircraft; see combat aircraft re unit size

SH Ship; type unknown but probably not a battleship, aircraft carrier or helicopter carrier was utilized. Nuclear forces were not used alone in any of the sample incidents. No more than standard or minor components of conventional armed forces and no nuclear force units were used in the remaining 18 incidents.

In chapter five it was related that the 33 incidents selected for the examination of the utility of the use of armed forces as a political instrument comprised a structured rather than a random sample of the total 215 incidents. One of the four variables that was used to derive the sample pertained to the level of U.S. armed forces used; and as appendix C indicates, the sample was structured so as to include a significant number of incidents in which policy-makers made use of major force components.

Table VI-6 compares the levels of armed forces that were used in the 33 sample incidents with those levels of armed forces that were used in the other 182 incidents in the full 215 incident file. The data in this table indicate that the sample under-represents incidents in which lower levels of armed forces were used and over-represents incidents in which major force components were used apart from strategic nuclear-associated units.

Table VI-6

Level of Armed Forces Used in Sample

and Non-Sample Incidents

		Sample	Incidents	Non-Sample	Incidents
Les	vel of Armed Forces Used	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total
1.	One or more major components and nuclear force unit	2	6.1	13	7.1
2.	Two or more major components; no nuclear force unit	.	12,1	14	7.7
3.	One major component; or nuclear force unit	9	27.3	37	20.3
4.	Standard component	8	24.2	56	30.8
5.	Minor component	_10	_30.3	_62	34.1
	Total	33	100.0	182	100,0

An aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, or battleship was used in 20 of the incidents; Army or Marine ground forces were used in 14 incidents; and Air Force or Marine combat aircraft were used in nine incidents. Other units—e.g., transport aircraft, surface combatants, and fixed wing maritime reconnaissance or patrol aircraft—were used in 17 incidents, but in only eight incidents in the absence of the above mentioned types of force units.

Although it is not indicated in the table, aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers and battleships almost always were accompanied by a number of surface combatants. The latter therefore were included in the category "other" only when carriers or battleships were not used. It was determined that a submarine was present in only one incident—Laos, 1962. While Laos, of course, is land-locked, naval vessels used in this incident were deployed to the Gulf of Siam, near Thailand, which also was an actor.

The fact that we did not come across information that submarines were used in any of the other 32 incidents is probably a function of the sources available on an unclassified basis—i.e., submarines are likely to have been present in a number of other incidents, especially those involving major naval task groups. The political significance of submarine operations, however, in all probability, is minimal precisely because a submarine's presence usually is not known. The one submarine action reported here may, on the other hand, have had some political significance insofar as it was apparently observed publicly.

Forces were deployed from another theater to the theater of interest in 18 incidents, and within the theater of concern alone in 15 incidents. The emplacement of ground forces, the bombing of a target, blockade, or the tactical support of an actor occurred in nine of the sample incidents. These may be considered an especially intense or manifest use of armed forces. The activities of the forces used in the remaining 24 incidents included port visits, exercises, establishment of a presence, evacuation, transport, surveillance, and escort.

Table VI-7 presents both short and longer term outcomes with reference to the levels and types of armed forces used, and their specific movements and activities.

Level of Armed Forces

The data show that definitely in the short term and, generally speaking, in the longer term too, outcomes were less likely to be positive when greater levels of force were used unless nuclear forces were used together with one or more major conventional components. In saying this, however, it must be borne in mind that the use of greater levels of armed forces, and also intertheater (vice intra-theater) deployments, and activities of higher intensity, may have been associated with objectives presenting a greater degree of difficulty or implying a greater level of risk. For example, it may have been a more difficult task to oust governments in power in Syria (1957) and the Dominican

Table VI-7

Percentages of Outcomes Which Were Positive

By Level, Type, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces Used

This Foodsylo szelt	6 M	onths	3 Years	
they rest as all our	Percentage of Positive Outcomes	Size of Denominator	Percentage of Positive Outcomes	Size of Denominator
Level of Armed Forces			niconiari tem 14	
One or more major components and nuclear force unit	1 100.0	8	8 7. 5	8
Two or more major components; no nuclear force unit	2 47.6	21	18.2	22
One major component; or nuclear force unit	63.0	27	25.0	24
Standard component	83.3	24	70.0	20
Minor component	87.5	24	50.0	. 24
Type of Armed Forces				
Ground force	59.6	52	39.6	48
CV/BB/LPH	64.3	70	39.1	64
Land-based combat aircraft	83.3	24	48.0	25
Other description of the second secon	66.1	56	37.0	54
Theater Movement		ncheterne des int 7 des la Sert Capit 5 desarra des	l marine de la calla All Banks tomas for t All World Woods	.
Inter (and Intra)	59.6	57	42.3	52
Intra only	89.4	47	45.7	46
Activities		ne de la laction de la company de la laction de la company de la company de la company	TOTAL ATTACHMENT OF	5354 5354 5254
Bombing, Blockade, Emplacement or Tactical Support	85.2	27	35.7	2 8
Other	68.8	77	47.1	70

or Technical Support

Republic (1961) than it was to successfully counter Cuban supported insurgencies in the Caribbean (Panama, 1959; Dominican Rep, 1964; Venezuela, 1965); or to show North Korea that an attack on an American ship would not be tolerated (<u>Pueblo</u>, 1968) or to control the situation in Southeast Asia (e.g., Vietnam, 1964 and 1965) than it was to insure the safety of American citizens and military installations abroad (Morocco, 1956; Venezuela, 1958; Cuba, 1960; Tanzania, 1965).

a Pil Robbinson

Even so, insofar as larger forces were more likely to have been used in order to achieve more difficult objectives, the fact remains that those more difficult objectives were less frequently obtained than were the easier objectives for which lesser size units of the armed forces were used. The implication is that policymakers ought to be wary of using armed forces for political objectives when they believe that the objectives will be difficult to attain and thus will require sizable components of force, unless they are willing to introduce the threat of nuclear war—i.e., use an armed forces unit which has a designated role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war.

Outcomes and the use of strategic nuclear forces. Units associated with the strategic nuclear forces were used together with major conventional force components in only two sample incidents (Japan/S. Korea, 1953; <u>Pueblo</u>, 1968). However, in the complete file of 215 incidents, nuclear and major conventional force components were used together on fifteen occasions (see Table VI-8). These uses of strategic nuclear force components ranged from the deployment of a few Strategic Air Command bombers to the general alert and deployment of U.S. strategic forces (as occurred during the Cuban missile crisis).

The Soviet Union was an actor in twelve of these fifteen incidents, nine of which may be termed crises—i.e., the superpowers confronted each other in a situation in which, it may be argued, American policymakers perceived there to be a danger of an imminent conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the three other incidents in which Soviet involvement was a factor, policymakers used nuclear—capable forces as a warning to a third actor, or as a warning to the Soviet Union in a situation in which policymakers probably did not perceive a serious danger of imminent superpower conflict. In the two Middle East incidents in 1958, in which Moscow was not an actor, policymakers appear to have used nuclear forces as a deterrent in anticipation of Soviet involvement. Finally, in the 1954-55 Tachens Islands crisis, the U.S. desired to deter China from aggressive action against territory held by Formosa.

Again, using a criterion of two-thirds, the <u>overall</u> outcomes of the nuclear incidents were favorable in almost every one of these fifteen incidents in the short term, and in three-quarters of them over the longer term. Virtually the same may be said about individual outcomes: approximately nine-tenths were positive in the short term and three-quarters were positive over the longer term.

Table VI-8

Incidents in Which Nuclear and Major Components of Conventional Armed Forces Were Used Together

1946 - 1975 "

Incident	Degree of Soviet Involvement and Nature of Situation ^a
1. Security of Berlin, April 1948	oled to the Automotives
2. Security of Berlin, June 1948	Nuto evices A
3. Korean War: Security of Europe, July 1950	Endels tolly and common by
4. Security of Japan/South Korea, August 1953	B
5. China-Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands, August 199	54 C
6. Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support, May 1954	B
7. Suez crisis, October 1956	A
8. Political crisis in Lebanon, July 1958	contract of the contract of th
9. Political crisis in Jordan, July 1958	Carried and Sign During's a
10. China-Taiwan crisis: Quemoy and Matsu, July 1958	(form) (april april apri
11. Security of Berlin, May 1959	toda Mile term Arcens Producti National Anna Bender Stragger
12. Security of Berlin, June 1961	risk migo kork ozomi za
13. Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, October 19	062 A
14. <u>Pueblo</u> seized by North Korea, January 1968	ng to Paris and a Baran Araba and a sa
15. Arab-Israeli War, October 1973	The second secon
a Code:	ne general and relative

- A. Soviet Union an actor; danger of imminent superpower conflict perceived
- by U.S. policymakers.

 B. Soviet Union an actor; no serious danger of imminent superpower conflict perceived by U.S. policymakers.
- C. Soviet Union not an actor.

Both in the short term and over the longer term, positive outcomes were especially frequent when the concern was to assure behavior, and much less frequent—approximately six out of ten—when policymakers sought to compel behavior. When the concern was to deter behavior, outcomes were invariably positive in the short term. The frequency of positive outcomes declined somewhat over the longer term, however; after three years, approximately seven out of ten outcomes were positive. Policymakers almost never sought to induce behavior by an actor in the nuclear incidents. Thus, the pattern which emerges over the longer term is that when nuclear forces were used together with a major conventional force component, positive outcomes were least frequent when policymakers sought to compel an actor to do something, more frequent when the concern was to deter an action, and most frequent when policymakers sought to assure behavior.

Of the twelve occasions on which the concern was to coerce-i.e., compel or deter-Soviet behavior, outcomes were positive in ten instances in the short term and in nine over the longer term; in short, frequencies of positive outcomes were very much the same as those in the fifteen "nuclear" incidents generally. Several caveats about the unfavorable outcomes related to Soviet behavior are in order, however.

First, the two unfavorable outcomes in the short term (and, thus, two of the three over the longer term) were related to the two Berlin incidents in 1948—i.e., the deployment of a B-29 Group to Germany and other U.S. military actions in April 1948 did not deter the Soviets from instituting the blockade two months later; and various U.S. military actions, including the deployment of additional Strategic Air Command bombers to Europe after the blockade was effected did not compel the Soviets to end the blockade within six months. Further, these two negative outcomes in the short term, and the third over the longer term (Berlin, 1959) were all related to the security of, and Western access to Berlin, an issue that would appear to have since been defused. On the other hand, it will be noted that these three incidents in which the Soviets were not successfully coerced over the longer term comprise one-third of those incidents in which a serious superpower confrontation occurred.

Level of armed forces and style of use. While few differences in the percentages of positive outcomes were observed among direct, indirect, and latent uses at different levels of force (see Table VI-9), it is of some interest to note that when more than one major conventional force component was used apart from nuclear force units, outcomes were most frequently positive when that level of force was aimed directly at an actor rather than when it was aimed indirectly or used latently.

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Table VI-9

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive,

By Level and Style of Use of Force

Level of	Direc	t	Indire	ect	Later	it s
Forces	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
1.	100.0	85.7	100.0	100.0	• •	•••
2.	60.0	21.4	25.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
3.	64.3	15.4	66.7	0.0	60.0	50.0
4.	84.6	60.0	100.0	•••	480.0	80.0
5.	100.0	60.0	50.0	30.0	83.3	20.0

One other note. It will be recalled that the 33 incident sample, in comperison with the 182 non-sample incidents, over-represents incidents in which major force components were used and under-represents incidents in which only standard or minor force components were used. As a result, positive outcomes were probably less frequent in the sample set of incidents than they were in the other 182 incidents.

Type of Armed Forces Used

The use of land-based combat aircraft stands out as being the most closely associated with positive outcomes. Moreover, the use of land-based combat aircraft was associated in eight of nine incidents with the use of at least one major conventional force component—i.e., one of the three "highest" force levels. Discounting the two incidents in which both nuclear and major conventional forces were used together, it would appear that positive outcomes occurred more frequently when land-based combat aircraft were used than when major ground force or naval force components were introduced. It is worth noting that like nuclear—associated units, land-based combat aircraft were not used as a latent instrument. It would not be far—fetched to suggest that actors may view the distinctive capabilities of these two types of forces with greater alarm; although, it is perhaps the case also that when they are used, the determination of policymakers is perceived as being greater.

Of further importance is the relationship between positive outcomes and land-based, as compared to amphibious ship-based marine ground forces. The data in Table VI-10 suggest that both in the short term and over the longer

Table VI-10

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Outcomes and Type of Ground Forces

increase increased	Percentage That Were P	
Ground Forces Used	6 Months	3 Years
1. Sea-Based Only	39.1	15.0
2. Land-Based Only	66.7	53.3
3. Land and Sea-Based Together	85.7	61.5

term, positive outcomes were much more frequent when land-based, rather than sea-based ground forces were used (leaving aside the use of other types of forces in these incidents). Positive outcomes were even more frequent, however, when land-based and sea-based ground forces were used together. Thus, amphibious ship-based ground forces would appear to have been a useful complement to land-based ground forces.

One further note, the distinction made between types of ground forces is not strictly a distinction between the Army and the Marines. While the sea-based ground forces that were employed were always Marines, land-based ground forces included both Marine and Army units.

Type of armed forces and style of use. Positive outcomes were least often obtained when ground forces were used; however, the direct use of ground forces, was, in the short term, more likely to result in a favorable outcome than when ground forces were either used indirectly, or as a latent instrument (see Table VI-11). For example, during the 1959 Laotian crisis,

Table VI-11

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive

By Type and Style of Use of Force

Type of Armed	Dire	ct	Indir	ect	Late	ent
Forces_	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
Ground Force	71.9	40.0	42.9	14.3	38.5	54.5
CV/BB/LPH	66.7	32.4	55.6	20.0	63.6	60.0
Land-Based Combat Aircraft	85.7	50.0	66.7	40.0		
Other	72.7	37.5	50.0	30.0	61.5	41.7

the 3d Marine Expeditionary Force, including a Regimental Landing Team, was deployed on amphibious assault ships in the South China Sea in the company of other naval units, including three aircraft carriers. These forces were aimed directly at supporting the Laotian Government and coercing North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. While the subsequent behavior of these actors was satisfactory from the American perspective, this was not the case as concerned the behavior of the Soviet Union and China, at whom those forces were aimed indirectly. In the longer term too, outcomes were much more frequently positive when ground forces were used directly rather than indirectly.

When major naval forces were used, outcomes were positive in almost two out of every three instances in the short term, but in only two out of every five in the longer term. Variations in the style (direct, indirect, latent) of using major naval forces were associated with only minimal differences in the frequencies of positive outcomes.

Movement

Incidents in which only intra-theater movements were required were usually those in which the two lowest levels of armed forces were involved—e.g., the use of a destroyer and reconnaissance aircraft based in the Caribbean area for the surveillance of Soviet actions to establish a submarine base in Cuba in 1970. Thus, it is no surprise that short-term outcomes when only intra-theater movements were made were more frequently positive than outcomes when inter-theater deployments (associated with the three higher levels of force) were required. Over the longer term, differences in outcomes between inter-and intra-theater deployments were minimal, however, except as concerned latent uses of force—in which case outcomes were much more frequently positive when only intra-theater deployments were made (see Table VI-12). One might speculate

Table VI-12

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive

By Theater Deployment and Style of Use of Force

Theater	Dire	ect	Indir	ect	Late	nt
Deployment	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
Inter (and Intra)	69.4	46.9	50.0	33.3	38.5	36.4
Intra only	92.6	40.7	60.0	20.0	93.3	64.3

that in these instances positive outcomes were probably inherent in the situation—i.e., the U.S. objective would have been fulfilled no matter what the United States did.

Activities

Notwithstanding the lesser probability of positive outcomes when larger conventional forces were used, the engagement of the involved armed forces components in activities of a more manifest nature (e.g., bombing) did make positive outcomes in the short term more probable; the frequencies of positive outcomes when intense and less-intense activities were engaged in being 85 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Still, pessimism is warranted as regards the longer term. While more manifest actions appear to have had an immediate positive impact, even when the objectives may have been more difficult, the effect was not lasting. In fact, the less intense activities of smaller conventional forces operating on an intra-theater basis were associated with higher success rates over the longer term.

Activities of armed forces and styles of use. Positive outcomes were forthcoming more often when manifest activities were aimed directly rather than indirectly at an actor (see Table VI-13). If armed forces were used directly

Table VI-13

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive

By Activities and Style of Use of Force

	Dire	ect	India	ect	Late	ent .
Activities	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
Bombing, Blockade, Emplacement, or Tactical Support	90.5	40.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Other	73.8	46.2	55.6	50.0	65.4	47.8

and engaged in more intense activities when policymakers faced more difficult situations, then it might be argued that considering the minimal difference between the frequencies of positive outcomes when intense and less-intense activities were undertaken, the frequency of positive outcomes when intense activities were undertaken was higher than would have been expected otherwise. As concerns indirect uses of force, the denominators are small, but the outcomes

were wholly negative over the longer term, which suggests that more manifest but indirectly aimed activies were futile.

Presence. Of particular interest is the activity termed presence, or the mere appearance on the scene of U.S. armed forces. In ten incidents this was the only activity performed by U.S. forces which, almost always, were seabased and included naval combatants either alone or in the company of Marine amphibious units—e.g., in immediate response to the mob violence that was directed at Vice President Nixon and his party in Caracas in May 1958, a presence was established near the Venezuela coast by an aircraft carrier task force and battalion-sized Marine amphibious force.

In these ten incidents the frequency of positive outcomes was 81 percent in the short term and 52 percent over the longer term. While both of these figures are relatively high, two or more major force components (apart from nuclear force units) were not used in any of these ten incidents. In the three incidents in which one major force component alone was used, the frequency of positive outcomes was an average 63 percent in the short term and a relatively higher than average 38 percent over the longer term-considering those other incidents in which this level of force was used. The higher figures for the ten incidents together reflect the outcomes of six incidents in which major force components were not used and one incident in which a major component was used together with nuclear force units. Cases in which the only activity was the establishment of a presence also tended to be those in which armed forces were used as a latent instrument. In short, outcomes were very frequently positive when relatively small sized forces were deployed in a low-keyed fashion, while policymakers sought to wait upon rather than force developments.

Of perhaps greater interest are four other incidents in which the only activity performed was surveillance, or surveillance and presence together—e.g., the use of a destroyer, a minesweeper and P2V aircraft to patrol the Caribbean in response to a Cuban supported landing of insurgents in Panama in April 1959. In these incidents the frequency of positive outcomes was 93 percent in the short term and 69 percent over the longer term. While minor force components were used in three of these four incidents, in every instance those forces were used directly or indirectly to obtain U.S. objectives. Thus, the selective use of a small force to patrol an area or perform a reconnaissance mission would appear to have been adequate for the successful pursuit of policy.

Outcomes as a Function of the Usage of

Armed Forces and Type of Substantive Objective

The remainder of the chapter examines the relationship between outcomes and differing uses of armed forces with reference to, first, each of the three principal substantive objectives of policymakers, and, second, the individual modes in which armed forces were used. Table VI-14 presents percentages of positive outcomes as a function of the level, type, deployment pattern, and activities of U.S. armed forces, and of the type of substantive objective.

Table VI-14

Levels, Types, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces, and Objectives Percentage of Outcomes in Each Cell That Were Positive

		Use of Force	Force	Regime Authority	thority	Third Party Support	pport	Ally Relationship	tionship	Other	
		6 Mos	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs
level of Armed Forces											
		1. 100.0	80.0			100.0ª 100.0ª	100.08	er i szest		100.0ª 100.0ª	100.09
83	2.	2. 100.0	20.0	0.09	40.0	1.11	9.1			0.0ª 0.0ª	0.0ª
or me units	ų	46.2	10.0	100.04	66.78		0.0	75.0	25.0a	100.0ª 100.0ª	100.0ª
Beandard Component	•	80.0	0.09	100.0 ^a 75.0 ^a	75.0ª		\$0.0		\$0.0e	88.9 100.0	100.0
Whor Component	÷	81.8	18.2	100.0 75.0 ⁸	75.0ª	80.0	66.7		•	160.0ª 100.0ª	100.0a
Type of Armed Forces											
Count Force		75.0	38.5	75.0	50.0	25.0	6.3	\$0.0	\$0.0	90.0 88.9	6.88
CW/88/LPH		65.2	31.6	81.8 63.6	63.6	36.8	19.0	83.3	33.3	81.8 85.7	85.7
Land Based Cambat Aircraft	() () () () () () () () () ()	80.0	35.7	100.08 66.78	66.74	100.04 50.04	\$0.0	(:		75.0	75.08 75.08
Office		8.77	9721	17.8	55.6	42.1 25.0	25.0	•		80.0 87.5	87.5
Auster Movement											
inter (and Intra)		66.7	44.4	0.09	0.04	21.4 18.8	18.8	75.0	25.08	84.6	88.9
force only		84.2	16.7	100.0	72.7	80.0 45.5	45.5	100.00	\$0.0	100.0	100.0 100.0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		一年 美工									,

Table VI-14 (Cont.)

Lavels, Types, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces, and Objectives Percentage of Outcomes in Each Cell That Were Positive

•	Use o	Use of Force	Regime	Regime Authority	Party	Party Support	Ally Rel	Ally Relationship	ಕ.	Other
ities	9 Mos	Mos 3 Yrs	6 Mos	6 Mos 3 Yrs	6 Mos	5 Mos 3 Yrs	6 Mos	6 Mos 3 Yrs	6 Mos	6 Mos 3 Trs
Sombing, Blockade, Emplacement, Tactical Support	80.0	60.0 21.4	100.00g	100.0ª 66.7ª	75.0 0.0	0.0			100.0	100.0 100.0
	72.0	77.0 36.4	84.6	61.5	40.0 38.1	38.1	83.3	83.3 33.3	8.6	84.6 87.5

Use of Force by Another Actor

Of great interest in light of the previous discussion, favorable outcomes were frequent in the short term when two or more major conventional components were used to influence an actor's use or non-use of force. Thus, North Korea did not use force again after shooting down the EC-121 aircraft mentioned earlier. In these instances, moreover, the particular nature of the objectives (e.g., "continue use," "do not use again") were varied rather than singular in nature. Positive outcomes were frequent when another actor's use of force was of concern, irrespective of the level of force used, except when one major force component was used alone.

When only direct uses of force are considered, in contrast with indirect and latent uses, the short term "success" rate for the use of one major conventional force component rises significantly, as it does for different types of armed forces used, theater movements, and activities (see Table VI-15).

Table VI-15

Percentage of Outcomes Which Were Positive in the Short Term

When Another Actor's Use of Force Was of Concern

		Direct	Indirect & Latent		Direct	Indirect & Latent
Level of Force				Force Type		
	1,	100.0		Ground	84.6	33.3ª
	2.	100.0		CV/BB/LPH	70.6	50.0
	3.	55.6	25.0ª	Combat Aircraft	85.7	0.0ª
	4	66.7ª	100.0ª	Other	84.6	60.0
	5.	100.0	60.0			
Theater M	lovement			Activity		
Inter (and intra)	76.5	25.0ª	Intense	85.7	0.0ª
Intra o	nly	91.7	71.4	Less Intense	85.0	60.0

a. Denominator was less than five.

Over the longer term, however, direct uses of major conventional forces (used apart from nuclear force units) were to no avail-e.g., the U.S. response to the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive. Positive outcomes dropped to 20 percent when two or more conventional components were used and to zero when one such component was used. Indeed, the decline was so general that few distinctions can be made among long term outcomes related to the uses of various levels of conventional forces apart from nuclear forces. A contrast might be drawn, however, between uses of land-based combat aircraft (39 percent) and major naval forces (20 percent). In short, it may be argued that if the direct use of major conventional forces had the short term effect of altering an actor's willingness to use force in an incident, little was obtained from a longer term perspective, except perhaps when land-based combat aircraft were used.

Positive outcomes were more frequent over the longer term when inter-theater movements were made rather than solely intra-theater movements. This was not the case in the short term, however, which leads us to question the validity of this finding.

To the extent anything is to be said about activities, it might be argued that some advantage was obtained by a more intensive involvement. However, the decline in positive outcomes over the longer term, dramatic as it was when less intense activities were undertaken, was even greater when more manifest activities were engaged in. One might conclude that insofar as the more manifest activities were ventured because the objective was more difficult, they were of value only in the short term.

Third Party Support

Perhaps most interesting about the use of armed forces to achieve objectives related to the support given by one actor to another is that, in the short term, outcomes were almost always negative when two or more major conventional components were used; over the longer term, the same also was true when one major component was used.

Little distinction can be made as concerns the use of these forces directly or indirectly; at most, some slight advantage was obtained by their indirect use. The most likely explanation is that major conventional forces were used directly when the actors of concern were believed to be more intent on actions inimical to U.S. interests, and those direct uses of force were not as persuasive in such instances as were indirect uses of major forces aimed at less committed actors. In any case, over the longer term positive outcomes were non-existent whether major force components were used directly or indirectly.

Positive outcomes were especially infrequent when ground or major naval forces were used. Noting the small denominator, one should not make too much of those figures related to the use of land-based combat aircraft. As concerns

all types of forces, indirect uses were more often associated with positive outcomes than were direct uses. Of note only is a higher figure (13 percent) for direct uses of "other" forces as compared with direct uses of ground forces (20 percent) and major naval forces (29 percent).

The higher short term figure where more manifest activities were undertaken may indicate, as do those figures relevant to the use of force by another actor and regime authority, that positive outcomes were more likely in these instances because more manifest activities were perceived by actors as symbolic of a greater U.S. commitment and willingness to bring its military power to bear. Over the longer term, more intensive activities were to little avail as regards third party support—e.g., the impact made on North Vietnam's support of the Viet Cong by the U.S. emplacement of forces in South Vietnam and the tactical support given to South Vietnamese forces beginning in 1962. By contrast are those higher percentages of positive outcomes where less intense actions were performed. Inter-theater deployments were of little value in either the short term or longer term.

In sum, even though larger forces, inter-theater deployments, and more intense activities were employed in the more difficult situations, these steps were still of little value over the longer term. With regard to the last, only the use of land-based combat aircraft appears possibly to have been associated with poisitive outcomes. Again, the suggestion is that the use of land-based combat aircraft may make a more powerful impression on foreign leaders than the use of other types of conventional forces.

Regime Authority

In eight of the ten instances when the U.S. objective was only that an actor should maintain its authority, one of the two lower levels of armed forces were used. In the short term, all of those actions aimed at maintaining the status quo were associated with positive outcomes. While the value of using large conventional forces to assure behavior was thus not able to be assessed, it may be the case that such forces are not perceived, and, indeed, are not, necessary to assure behavior. Conventional armed forces of any level, it may be suggested, are adequate or, alternatively, unnecessary as concerns maintenance of regime authority. The same may be said with reference to types of forces used, their deployment, and their activities.

By contrast, in four of the six instances when the objective was that one actor should lose power and another should gain it, two or more major force components were used. Positive outcomes were associated with two of those four instances, both of which pertained to the change of government in the Dominican Republic in 1961. Authority actually changed hands in November 1961, following the second U.S. use of armed forces, coupled with a sharp ultimatum. These findings suggest that while a major use of armed forces may result in a change of government, the latter is still a much more difficult objective to achieve than that of keeping a government in power.

As to longer term outcomes, notwithstanding small denominators, lower percentages of positive outcomes were associated with the use of greater levels of force. To the extent that this statistical association is real and not spurious, it may be suggested that over the longer term those situations which were more difficult to maintain and which had been faced earlier with greater amounts of force, proved in the end to be the most unyielding. Further support for this notion is provided by the strong association between unfavorable outcomes and direct uses of force and the fact that all of the latent uses of force were associated with positive outcomes. In short, insofar as it was more difficult for an actor to maintain authority, greater force was more likely to be used, and directly so, rather than in a latent fashion. But while "success" was made more likely in the short term, those positive outcomes were, nevertheless, more difficult to retain over the longer term.

Outcomes as a Function of the

Usage of Armed Forces and Modes

When used in a particular mode, are some levels, types, deployments, or activities of armed forces more often associated with positive outcomes? Are forces of a particular nature, used in a particular way, better utilized in one mode than in another? Do particular uses of force matter when the concern is to reinforce rather than modify, or to support rather than coerce an actor's behavior? Tables VI-16 and VI-17 present percentages of positive outcomes pertinent to these questions.

Level of Armed Forces

As previously noted, outcomes were less likely to be positive when larger conventional forces were used apart from nuclear force units. This appears to have been true generally when the concern was either to deter or to compel an actor. However, when the U.S. objective was to assure that an actor would do something, positive outcomes were almost always forthcoming irrespective of the level of force used, and when the focus was on inducing behavior, positive outcomes were forthcoming only when a very low level of force was used. Thus, it may be argued, Table VI-16 provides further support for the notion that it is easiest to assure behavior and most difficult to induce it, and that a "continuum of ease" in obtaining favorable outcomes as concerns the four modal uses of force runs as follows: assure, deter, compel, induce.

Of interest, even when greater levels of force were used-typically in situations of greater rather than lesser concern-it was more likely that positive outcomes would result when the concern was to compel an antagonist than when the concern was to induce a friend. Further, positive outcomes were only

Table VI-16

Levels, Types, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces, and Modes of Use Percentage of Outcomes in Each Cell That Were Positive

		Assure		Deter	띪	Induce	9	Compel	4
Level of Armed Forces		6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs
One or more major components and nuclear force unit	ı,	100.0ª	1. 100.0ª 100.0ª	100.0	80.0	100.00	100.00	:	
nents;	2.	80.0	25.08	66.78	66.78	0.0	0.0	57.1	11
One major component; or nuclear force unit	۲.	100.04	50.0ª	:		0.0ª 0.0ª	0.08	63.6	0.0
Standard Component	3	100.03	75.0ª	75.0	50.0		2:	100.04	
Minor Component	۸.	100.0ª	75.0ª	100.08	75.0ª	100.09	50.04	75.0	44.4
Type of Armed Forces									
Ground Force		0.06	1.99	85.7	71.4	16.7	0.0		13.3
CV/BB/LPH		90.9	0.09	75.0	20.0	14.3	14.3	61.1	5.9
Land Based Combat Aircraft		65.7	42.9	100.0	87.5	\$0.0	50.0		12.5
Other.		6.88	62.5	85.7	71.4	28.6	14.3		20.0
Theater Movement									
Inter (and Intra)		88.9	62.5	92.3	81.8	25.0ª	25.0ª	90.0	14.3
Intra only			0.09	11.4	42.9	100.0	0.0	85.7	21.4

Table VI-16 (Cont.)

Levels, Types, Theater Movements and Activities of Forces, and Modes of Use

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	Assure		Deter	e i	Induce	81	Compel	<u>تا</u>
	6 Nos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs
Activities			•					
Bombing, Blockade, Emplacement,								
Tactical Support	100.0	100.0 50.0	100.09	100.0a 100.0a	50.0a	50.0a 0.0a	76.9	•
Other	92.3	92.3 66.7	81.3 57.1	57.1	28.6 28.6	28.6	60.0	28.6
a. Denominator was less than five.	s than five.							

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Table VI-17

Levels, Types, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces, and Combinations of Modes Percentage of Outcomes in Each Cell That Were Positive

		Reinforce	orce	Modify	ᅿ	Support	티	Coerce	밁
Level of Armed Forces		6 Mos	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos 3 Yrs	3 Yrs	6 Mos	3 Yrs
one or more major components and nuclear force unit	H	100.0	85.7	100.04	100.04	100.04	100.04	100.0	80.0
no nuclear force unit	2.	75.0	42.9	37.0	1.1	44.5	12.5	0.09	25.0
or nuclear force unit	e.	100.0ª	50.0ª	53.8	0.0	66.7	33.3	63.6	0.0
Standard Component	•	83.3	0.09	100.03		100.08	75.0ª	80.0	50.0
Minor Component	٠.	100.0	75.0	80.0	45.5	100.0	7.99	83.3	53.8
Type of Armed Forces									
Ground Porces		89.0	68.8	50.0	9.5	63.0	0.04	70.0	31.8
CV/BB/LPH		83.0	55.0	0.84	8.3	62.0	41.2	66.7	22.2
Land Based Combat Aircraft		94.0	66.7	66.7	20.0	78.0	44.4	87.0	50.0
Other		87.5	7.99	55.6	18.5	62.5	0.04	70.4	33.3
Theater Hovement						* 16			
Inter (and Intra)		91.0	73.7	41.0	18.2	58.9	43.8	71.0	44.0
Intra only		88.2	52.9	86.7	20.0	100.0	54.5	81.0	28.6

Table VI-17

Levels, Types, Theater Movement and Activities of Forces, and Combination of Modes Percentage of Outcomes in Each Cell That Were Positive

, et	3 Trs	27.8	42.9	
Coerce	6 Mos 3 Trs	82.4	71.0	
빏	3 Yrs	37.5	52.6	
Support	6 Mos 3 Vrs	87.5	70.0	
Ы	3 Yrs	73.3 6.3	28.6	
Modify	6 Mos 3 Yrs	73.3	50.0	
Tice .	3 Yrs	70.0	61.5	
Reinforce	6 Mos 3 Yrs	100.0	86.2	
	entrities	Bombing, Blockade, Emplacement, Tactical Support	other.	

Denominator was less than five.

moderately forthcoming in the short term when the largest conventional forces were utilized apart from nuclear force units to compel an actor. Nevertheless, this was true only in the short term. Over the longer term, it hardly mattered whether compellance or inducement was the objective—i.e., positive outcomes were not forthcoming as regards either of these two modes when major conventional forces were used in the absence of nuclear force units.

It was also observed earlier that positive outcomes were more likely when the concern was to reinforce—i.e., assure or deter—an actor's behavior than when it was to modify—i.e., induce or compel—that behavior. Certainly, this appears confirmed. Moreover, it also may be concluded that outcomes were not related to armed forces having been used to support rather than to coerce an actor or vice versa. But of further note, while it does appear true that the reinforcement of behavior is easier than its modification when large conventional forces have been used, this is much less so insofar as lesser levels of force are concerned. Minor actions to modify a particular behavior—which perhaps were aimed at easier objectives—were telling.

Type of Armed Forces

Whether the concern was to reinforce or modify, or to support or coerce an actor's behavior, the use of land-based aircraft was associated with higher percentages of positive outcomes than were ground forces or major naval forces. The only mode where this was not the case was the assurance of behavior, in which instance outcomes were frequently positive irrespective of the type of force used. Curious, though, is the decline in positive outcomes in the longer term when land-based combat aircraft were used and the aim was to assure behavior; perhaps of more importance, when combat aircraft were used to deter an actor, the percentage of positive outcomes did not decline over the longer term. When deterrence was the mode required by the situation, land-based combat aircraft clearly appear to have been the most powerful instrument.

Theater Movement

Notwithstanding a greater likelihood of positive outcomes when intertheater deployments were made to compel rather than to induce behavior, such deployments nevertheless were associated with a relatively low percentage of favorable outcomes when the concern was to modify behavior. Such deployments appear to have been much more useful when the concern was to reinforce behavior. The last is significant insofar as it can be argued that inter-theater deployments were more often directed at more important situations and more difficult objectives than were solely intra-theater actions. Not only were short term outcomes positive here; longer term outcomes were too.

As much as might be made of the 50 percent short term figure associated with the use of inter-theater deployments to compel behavior, the longer term figure is extremely low.

Activities

What does appear to have been of special value for modifying behavior, at least in the short term, was the engagement of the forces used in intensive military activities, especially when the concern was to compel an actor to do something. Again though, over the longer term, these actions too were futile. Activities of a more manifestly military nature appear to have been of great value for reinforcing behavior, especially when deterrence was of concern. Of note, those highly positive short term figures concerning actions to both support and coerce actors reflect outcomes when the concern was to assure and deter behavior, respectively.

The Timing of the Use of Force

A matter of issue is whether the timing of the use of armed forces is important to the successful achievement of objectives. It has often been suggested that if armed forces are brought to bear rapidly in an incident, then the likelihood of success will be greater. In particular, it has been argued that it is especially important to apply the maximum force that is to be used rapidly.

In order to examine this question, it was first necessary to determine the dates on which the incident began and on which armed forces units were first used; both are difficult to identify. The latter is mostly a problem of data availability. The former, however, presents a problem of conceptualization as well. Is the beginning date of an incident the date on which the first relevant foreign event—however that is conceived—took place, the date on which a percieved turning point occurred, the date on which the United States Government first took interest in the situation, or the date on which American action or intervention was first contemplated?

In this study, the beginning date of an incident was taken to be the date of the first New York Times story reporting the particular situation which eventually proved of enough concern to U.S. policymakers to warrant the use of armed forces. When the situation or problem had been unfolding over some years, the most recently apparent turning point was used. Although certainly subjective, this approach seemed to be at least no worse than any other which came to mind.

For each incident, two measures were taken: the elapsed time between the first New York Times story and (a) use of any U.S. armed forces unit; (b) use of the maximum level of U.S. armed forces used in the incident. Incidents were then divided into three groups on the basis of whether armed forces were first used during the first, second, or subsequent weeks of the incident.

The data in Table VI-18 indicate that positive outcomes were frequent when the first use of armed forces took place at the very beginning of the

Table VI-18
Outcomes and the Timing of the Use of Force

Percentage of outcomes that were positive

Time elapsed	6 Mc	onths	3.7	ears
of incident and	First use	Major use	First use	Major use
1. 0-7 days	71.2	73.9	39.1	41.9
2. 8-14 days	38.5	38.5	33.3	33.3
3. 15 days or longer	85.7	79.4	50.0	45.2
1. 0-7 days	71.2	73. 9	39.1	41.9
2. 8 days or longer	70.7	68.1	45.0	41.9

a. Data were unavailable for three incidents.

incident, but were even more frequent when force was first applied after the second week. Moreover, if the three incidents in which force was first used during the second week are combined with the seven incidents in which force was used at a later date, it is observed that the timing of the use of force made virtually no difference at all.

'This pattern is repeated when the timing of the application of the maximum level of force is considered. In approximately one-half of the incidents armed forces were first used within a day after the incident began. The frequency of positive outcomes in these instances was roughly the same as in those instances in which force was first used after the first day of the incident. The maximum level of force was applied within the first five days in approximately one-half of the incidents. Little difference was observed in the frequency of positive outcomes in these instances as compared with those in which the maximum level of force was applied after the fifth day of the incident.

Summary

In the short term, a large proportion (73 percent) of the outcomes related to U.S. objectives in the 33 incidents were favorable. Of the three principal categories of objectives, positive outcomes were most frequent when armed forces were aimed at objectives related to regime authority, less frequent when they were aimed at the use of force by another actor, and least frequent when they were aimed at an actor supporting a third party. Over the longer term,

however, the frequency of favorable outcomes declined substantially. Still, positive outcomes remained most frequent when regime authority was of concern.

It was, by far, easier to reinforce (assure or deter) behavior than it was to modify (compel or induce) behavior, both in the short term and in the longer term. As a scale of difficulty, the four modes might be arranged from easiest to most difficult, as follows: assure, deter, compel, induce. When armed forces were used in one of these four modes rather than as a latent instrument, outcomes were most frequently positive when they were used directly (reflecting outcomes related to the use of force by another actor and regime authority) rather than indirectly (reflecting, in turn, outcomes related to third party support).

In both the short and longer term, outcomes were less frequently positive when greater levels of force were used, unless strategic nuclear force units were used together with one or more major conventional force components. The use of larger conventional forces alone did not compensate for the greater difficulty of the situations in which the larger forces were employed. Such compensation, it would appear, however, may be obtained by the use of strategic nuclear forces. When two or more major force components were used alone, positive outcomes were more often associated, at least in the short term, with objectives related to the use of force by another actor than to objectives related to third party support. When regime maintenance was of concern, positive outcomes resulted irrespective of the level of force used; outcomes related to regime change were more problematic, however.

The type of force most closely associated with positive outcomes was land-based combat aircraft. Especially significant was the fact that such aircraft were used most typically in incidents in which at least one major force component was used. Positive outcomes were less frequent when ground and naval forces were used. However, the greater frequency of positive outcomes when land-based combat aircraft were used as compared with naval or ground forces was more apparent in the short term than in the longer term.

It was also observed that positive outcomes were much more frequent when only land based ground forces were used as compared with the use of only seabased ground forces—leaving aside the use of other types of forces. This and the suggestion above about the efficacy of land-based combat aircraft suggests the generally greater utility of land-based forces as compared with sea-based forces.

Outcomes were much more frequently positive in the short term when forces were deployed only within the theater of interest, rather than from one theater to another; however, intra-theater force movements most often took place in incidents which required only lesser levels of force. Positive outcomes in the short term also were strongly associated with the engagement of armed forces in intense activities—even when the concern was to modify behavior. Over the

longer term, though, neither intra-theater movements nor intense activities were as lated with noteworthy frequencies of favorable outcomes. Indeed, in those instances in which intense activities had been the order of the day, the decline in favorable outcomes was especially dramatic.

Finally, outcomes do not appear to have been related to the timing of the use of force.

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Chapter VII

UTILITY ANALYSIS: OUTCOMES AND OTHER U.S. ACTIONS

Prior to some incidents, armed forces frequently were deployed and sometimes employed in the region of interest, treaties implying U.S. commitments sometimes had been signed, the size of the U.S. military deployment in the area had been altered, and presidential or statements by other U.S. officials pertinent to the incident had been made. Other incidents were preceded by no such history. The popularity of the President prior to the use of force also varied greatly. And during the incidents themselves, the amount, quality, and character of the verbal statements and other U.S. diplomatic behavior were varied. Factors such as these may also have played roles in determining the outcomes of the incidents, irrespective of the armed forces' relative importance.

Previous Uses of U.S. Armed Forces in the Region

Some incidents took place in regions where the United States had recently, or was currently, engaged in a war. Indeed, in these cases, the incidents generally were an outgrowth of those conflicts. For example, the Truman Administration's concern with Communist movements in Greece and Italy in the immediate post World War II period was a consequence of the political vacuum that followed the war. U.S. efforts to reassure Japan and South Korea in 1953 were directly related to the way in which the Korean War ended. Incidents during 1972 and 1973 in Southeast Asia were related to the Vietnam War.

With regard to other incidents, the United States had used armed forces as a political instrument on numerous occasions in the region within past years. For example, in the five years prior to the 1964 action to deter a Cuban supported landing of insurgents in the Dominican Republic, U.S. armed forces had been used as a political instrument in the Caribbean area on 26 occasions. In a similar period prior to the Qui Nhon incident in 1965, U.S. armed forces had been used in 15 incidents in Southeast Asia.

By contrast, in other areas the armed forces had been used rarely, if at all, before an incident. No U.S. military actions had taken place in sub-Saharan Africa in the five years prior to the 1960 Congo Crisis; only one had occurred in East Asia in the same number of years prior to North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo.

When a longer term view is taken, positive outcomes do not seem to be related to previous U.S. military involvements in the region (see Table VII-1).

Table VII-1

Outcomes and Recent U.S. Military Involvement in the Region

Number of incidents or if a war occurred in region during past 5 years

Percentage of outcomes that were postive

		6 Months	3 Years
1.	0-4 incidents ^a	62.5	42.9
2.	5-10 incidents ^a	73.0	37.5
3.	11 or more incidents ^a	70.8	52.0
4.	War	89.5	45.0

These cut-off points were used in order that there might be a relatively equal number of sample incidents in each grouping.

However, in the short term, a pattern does appear to emerge: positive outcomes occurred more frequently when U.S. armed forces previously had been used in the region. Postive outcomes resulted very frequently in relation to incidents that took place in Europe right after World War II, East Asia after the Korean War, and Southeast Asia after the U.S. withdrawal of ground troops from Vietnam; favorable outcomes resulted much less often as related to incidents in regions where armed forces had been used only infrequently—i.e., less than once a year on the average during the previous five years.

Demonstrated U.S. willingness to engage in major conflict in a region prior to a political incident may have made actors in the region more sensitive to signals of U.S. military capabilities and resolve to become involved militarily if necessary. In other words, when used against a backdrop that includes a demonstrated willingness to act, armed forces may be especially effective. Conversely, in regions where U.S. armed forces were used infrequently in recent years, actors may have been more prone not to take a U.S. use of armed forces as a political instrument seriously.

This stands to reason. The theoretical literature has long emphasized the importance of credibility for bargaining in conflict situations. (1) And anyone who has played poker seriously can attest the importance of each player's reputation when it comes to having one's threats taken seriously.

Where U.S. troops previously fought in wars, or where a very large number of incidents had occurred previously, outcomes were likely to be positive when nuclear forces were used together with a major force component or two or more major components of the armed forces were used apart from nuclear forces. In the short term, every outcome was positive when those levels of armed forces were used subsequent to U.S. involvement in a war or a very large number of incidents (11 or more in the past five years) in the region. When two or more conventional force components were used alone and without such a back-drop of prior U.S. military involvement, only one-third of the outcomes were positive. In the longer term, one-third of the outcomes were positive when there was a significant prior U.S. military involvement; in its absense, only one out of eight outcomes were positive.

On the other hand, when only one major force component or even less force was used, the percentages of positive outcomes were roughly similar, both in the short and longer terms, regardless of whether or not the United States previously had used force in the region. In short, it appears that when the two highest force levels were used, outcomes were more likely to be positive in those regions in which the United States had previously used its armed forces frequently. By way of explanation, it may be suggested that while the use of very large forces may be particularly credible where such a backdrop exists, such is not the case when only one major component is used. When the United States is really serious, foreign decisionmakers may believe, even greater forces will be used.

Finally, the prior use of armed forces as a political instrument seems to have been most important when the objective was to assure behavior (see Table VII-2). In fact, it seems to have been easier to modify or to deter behavior when the level of previous U.S. political—military involvement in the region was low. One might speculate that the use of armed forces to modify or deter an actor's behavior was more likely to be effective when the latter had little experience and therefore, less confidence in dealing with U.S. political uses of armed forces. Another explanation, though, is that while the experience of the United States being willing to fight a war in a region was significant, previous political uses of force were essentially irrelevant; even to actors whose behavior the United States sought to assure (considering the size of the denominator in Table 2 for the category of 0-4 incidents).

Table VII-2

Outcomes, Recent Uses of Armed Forces in The Region, and Modes

Number of incidents or if a war occurred in region during past five years			utcomes in the si	that ort term
1. 0-4 incidents	Assure 66.7ª		Induce 100.0a	Compel 66.7
2. 5 or more incidents	100.0	88.9	25.0	61,1
3. War	100.0	71.4		100.0ª

*Denominator was less than five.

Prigr Change in the Size of U.S. Forces Deployed in the Region

During the past three decades, the United States has had nothing in the way of a permanent deployment of U.S. combat forces in many regions. Generally speaking, this has been true of the entire southern hemisphere. By contrast, major naval, air, and ground forces have been permanently deployed in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Far East, and the Western Pacific since roughly 1950. Smaller combatant forces have also been stationed in the Canal Zone, the Caribbean, and the Persian Gulf.

On potential significance to the likelihood of positive outcomes are any changes in the size of U.S. forces in the region prior to the incident. For example, in the two year period prior to the U.S. involvement in Italy in 1947-48 U.S. forces in the Mediterranean area increased in size by more than 20 percent; whereas in the same length of time prior to the Cuban supported insurgency in Panama in 1959 U.S. forces in the Caribbean decreased by more than 20 percent. By contrast, no forces had been maintained in and around sub-Saharan Africa during the two years prior to the Congo (1960) and Tanzania (1965) incidents. Prior to other incidents—e.g., Syria (1957), Kuwait (1961), and the EC-121 (1969)—U.S. forces in the region had remained fairly stable in size.

There has been much speculation, typically when such changes are proposed, that changes in U.S. troop levels abroad tend to destabilize a region; most often, this speculation stresses that reductions in U.S. troop levels will encourage foreign decisionmakers hostile to the United States or its allies to become more aggressive—i.e., initiating steps which might lead to conflict. On the other hand, others have argued that increases in U.S. troop levels tend to be provocative, in that they potentially can force antagonists to demonstrate that they will not be cowed. Thus, stability in U.S. troop levels overseas, it is argued, is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for world peace. This theory is not supported by evidence contained in this study.

As a measure of the change in size of U.S. military forces in the region the percentage change in the number of U.S. military personnel in the region in the two year period prior to the incident was used. In the short term, outcomes were much more frequently positive when there had been either a previous increase or decrease in force size than when there had been no change in the size of the forward deployment or when no prior deployment had been maintained (see Table VII-3). Outcomes were most frequently positive in those instances where there had been a previous decrease in the size of U.S. forces.

Table VII-3

Outcomes and the Previous Change in U.S. Regional Deployment

A PORTO	past two years	Percentage of outcom	es that were positive
		6 Months	3 Years
1.	Increase of 10 percent or greater	73.3	41.9
2.	Increase or decrease less than 10 percent	60.5	28.1
3.	Decrease of 10 percent or greater	95.2	52.4
4.	No prior deployment	60.0	75.0

Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period for Military Procurement, Research, and Development . . ., 94th Cong, 2d sess, 1975, p. 118, and Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development . . ., Part 4: Manpower, 93d Cong, 2d sess, 1974, pp. 1072-78. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Comptroller, Directorate for Information Operations.

The decreases in force size bore no ill fruit insofar as the forces that remained, or were able to be moved into the area rapidly, were adequate to the tasks set for them by policymakers. Nor was there a dominant need in those incidents to use major force components (see Table VII-4). Clearly, the force reductions that were made prior to incidents were not sufficient to bring the credibility of the U.S. threats or promises into serious question.

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Table VII-4

Change in Size of Force Deployment and Level of Armed Forces Used in Incidents

Number of incidentsa

Change in regional deployment in past two years	Major Components	Standard and minor components
1. Increase of 10 percent or greater	5	5
2. Increase or decrease less than 10 percent	6	5
3. Decrease of 10 percent or greater	3	5
4. No prior deployment		2

aData were not available for two incidents.

Significant increases in the size of U.S. forces took place generally in a climate of increased tension—e.g., in Europe right after World War II, and the Caribbean and Southeast Asia in the early 1960s. These increases seem to have had a positive effect, as compared with those instances in which policymakers had not increased the size of the forces already in the region or had not had forces readily available at all. The latter grouping, however, includes only the two sub-Saharan incidents mentioned above. It is to be added, though, in regard to these two incidents, that the outcomes were generally favorable in the longer term; moreover, it is questionable whether a prior deployment would have prevented these incidents from occurring or resulted in more favorable outcomes in the short term.

Of potential value might have been an increase in the deployment in those regions where deployments had been made earlier but the size of which had been kept relatively constant. Had the size of the deployment in those regions been increased in anticipation of incidents, the latter might not have occurred at all in some instances, and where incidents did occur, they might have been dealt with more satisfactorily.

The Defense Budget

A different type of political-military background factor is the change in the relative amount each superpower spends on defense. It has been hypothesized, mainly by U.S. defense officials, that foreign

actors are more likely to react positively to U.S. demands when those demands are made at a time when U.S. defense spending, particularly with reference to Soviet defense spending, is increasing. An increase in the U.S. defense budget, which typically receives much publicity in the press in the United States, may support a feeling of greater confidence among friends and inspire greater caution among antagonists. At the end of fiscal year 1961, for example, Rafael Trujillo was assassinated and the United States moved to influence political developments in the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, the U.S. defense budget had increased 8.3 percent in real dollar terms in that fiscal year. In the fiscal year just ending when the 1962 crisis in Laos took place, a 7.8 percent real increase had been registered.

By contrast, a sizeable decline in the defense budget may lead foreign actors to believe the United States is less interested in affairs abroad; friends may become more uncertain and antagonists may be emboldened. For example, in fiscal year 1960, just prior to the Congo Crisis, a 5.6 percent decrease in the United States budget occurred. And in fiscal years 1964 and 1965, when the United States was still using force as a political instrument in Vietnam, defense budget declines of 3.5 and 2.5 percent, respectively, were registered.

Using an increase or decrease in the defense budget of two percent or greater (in real dollars) as a criterion, it may be said that in the years 1946-75 a significant increase occurred in ten years, a significant decrease occurred in fourteen years, and an increase or decrease of lesser significance took place in six years. Table VII-5 presents relationships between outcomes and change in the size of the defense budget.

Table VII-5
Outcomes and the Defense Budget

Real change in size of U.S. Department of Defense budget ^a	Percentage of outcomes that were positive		
	6 Months	3 Years	
1. Increased by 2 percent or greater	82.1	57.7	
2. Increased or decreased by less than 2 percent	58.6	29.6	
3. Decreased by 2 percent or greater	76.6	44.4	

a Includes Military Assistance Program. In relating the change in the size of the defense budget to incidents, the following rules were followed: if policymakers first used force between January and June, the current fiscal year budget was compared with the previous year's budget; however, if the incident occurred between July and December, the budget for the fiscal year that had ended the previous June was compared with the prior year's budget.

Source of data on Department of Defense budget: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1977 (U.S. Department of Defense, 1976), p. 95.

Positive outcomes were most frequently associated with significant increases in the defense budget; however, they were positive almost as frequently when significant decreases occurred. Certainly, the data do not support the thesis that outcomes were positive least frequently when there was a decline in the size of the defense budget. Positive outcomes were least frequent when neither significant increases nor decreases were registered.

Considering the above, it might be suggested that a decline in the defense budget did not signal lesser "will," but rather was associated with a stronger sense of priorities, so that when U.S. armed forces were used, other actors perceived that the United States was particularly interested and determined. But such a thesis may be more rationalization than explanation. Further research is necessary on this subject. For now, the fact that positive outcomes were least frequent when no significant increase or decrease occurred in the defense budget is probably less instructive than it is spurious.

U.S. Commitments Prior to the Use of Armed Forces

Prior to sending Marines and combat aircraft to Japan at the end of the Korean War, the United States and Japan had signed, in September 1951, a security treaty, one portion of which allowed the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan to protect "against armed attack from without." Two weeks before the radar picket ship Kretchmer arrived off the Cuban coast at Cienfuegos, Henry Kissinger, briefing newspaper editors in Chicago, drew an analogy between the U.S. stationing Polaris submarines in the Black Sea and the Soviet Union establishing a base in Cuba for strategic submarines. Ten days later Dr. Kissinger warned Moscow that the establishment of an SSBN base would be viewed as a "hostile act." (2) By contrast, no treaty, Administration statement, or any other relevant action preceded the U.S. response to, for example, the Congo crisis in 1960, or North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo in 1968. Indeed, the range of differences between prior commitments and other actions relevant to U.S. objectives in the incidents is vast.

In examining prior U.S. diplomatic actions which might have influenced foreign decisionmakers either apart from or in conjunction with the use of armed forces, it was thought useful to consider whether or not one of the following three conditions had existed: (a) a treaty between the United States and one of the actors that might be reasonably interpreted (although not necessarily unequivocally so) as a U.S. commitment to, or expression of support for, the objectives of U.S. policymakers in the incident; (b) a statement with similar intent by the President, the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or the Secretary of Defense (when such a treaty did not exist); or (c) a statement by another U.S. Government official or the use of non-military foreign policy instruments (e.g., an increase in economic aid) which tended to increase the ties between the U.S. and the target state.

Intuitively, it would seem that a treaty and, to a lesser extent, a statement by the President or one of his top foreign policy advisors would be given greater weight by a foreign decisionmaker than would either a statement by a lesser U. S. official or a non-verbal Executive action. On the other hand, it might be that treaties become relevant and such statements are made by senior officials only in those situations which present the greatest degree of difficulty--i.e., when positive outcomes are hardest to obtain.

Whether or not the last was true, positive outcomes were more frequent in the short term when a treaty existed or a previous statement had been made by the President or one of his three most senior advisors, than when only a lesser official had made a statement or some other action had been taken (see Table VII-6). It may be suggested that while a problem

Table VII-6

Outcomes and Prior U. S. Commitment

Treaty, or statement, or action able to be interpreted as a commitment to or supportive of desired outcomes.

Percentage of outcomes that were positive

		6 Months	3 Years
1.	Treaty	76.2	29.5
2.	Statement by President, Secretary of State, Assis- tant for National Security Affairs, or Secretary of Defense	100.0	100.0
3.	Other statement or action	62.1	39.3
4.	None of the above	72.0	66.7

a During the six months prior to the use of armed forces.

may have been recognized in these latter instances, the prior verbal or other action was generally insufficient. In these instances a statement by the President or one of the other three officials specially considered might have been of particular value. Indeed, the fact that only a relatively minor official evinced concern with the situation may have been taken as an expression of weakness. Note that positive outcomes were more frequent when no U. S. statements or diplomatic actions were taken prior to the incident, than when only minor actions were taken.

This last finding, however, must be tempered by the fact that those incidents which were not preceded by any of the above-mentioned actions were ones in which the armed forces were used as a latent instrument or when a relatively unexpected threat was presented to American citizens, property or armed forces abroad. In the former type of situation, the relationship between the U.S. use of force and the outcome is not at all clear. The warning against attributing causality to these actions made in chapter one is most appropriate.

Of interest, positive outcomes were associated most frequently with statements by senior administration officials (where a treaty did not exist), rather than with the existence of a treaty. When treaties did exist, negative outcomes often occurred, both in the short and longer terms; these were frequently associated with incidents in Southeast Asia--and the SEATO Treaty Protocol--prior to the U.S. engagement in the ground war in South Vietnam.

The limited number of cases makes is difficult to draw firm conclusions concerning the effects of these prior actions or incidents involving different levels of force. Still, one result stands out. In those instances where a pertinent treaty existed and two or more major conventional force components alone were used, more than 70 percent of the outcomes were positive in the short term. By contrast, when only a statement by a low level official or other action was taken, only 36 percent of the outcomes were positive.

Administration Attention and Use of Coercive Rhetoric

Sometimes the use of armed forces in an incident was accompanied by a strong administration statement relating the reasons for that action and making both its supportive and coercive objectives explicit. Such was the case, for example, when President Nixon, in May 1972, related in a television address to the nation, that he had ordered the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the renewed bombing of North Vietnam. Perhaps the most dramatic instance of such communication in the postwar era was President Kennedy's television speech announcing the "quarantine" of Cuba at the onset of the 1962 missile crisis.

Alternatively, the President and other administration officials have, after the use of force was initiated, implicitly coupled that action with a statement expressing concern, interest, or a description of what U. S. objectives were in the incident, but at the same time not mentioning the use of armed forces at all. For example, after U. S. naval vessels began to "show the flag" in Italian ports and adjoining waters prior to the April 1948 elections, President Truman issued a statement expressing hope for "a free and independent Italy" and his intention, if that objective was threatened, "to consider what means would be appropriate for the maintenance of security and peace" in Italy. (3) Similarly, in regard to the issue of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba in 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers related during the incident that the United States had evidence "beyond a

doubt" of Soviet base construction and was watching the situation "very closely." A week later, lower level U.S. officials related that the continuing presence of two Soviet barges in Cienfuegos was causing concern. (4)

Still other uses of force were wholly unaccompanied by any public statement concerning either the fact that armed forces were being used or even about the incident itself.

Table VII-7 shows percentage of positive outcomes as a function of the level of public attention given to the incident and whether or not coercive statements were made by administration officials. The statements

Table VII-7
Outcomes and Statements by U. S. Officials

	Percentage of outcomes that were positive			
	All statements		Coercive statements	
Statement on situation by	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
1. President	66.7	34.1	53.8	16.7
2. Secretary of State, Assistant for National Security Affairs, Sec-				
retary of Defense	55.0	50.0	57.1	36.8
3. Other U.S. official	86.7	50.0	80.0	42.9
4. None of the above	95.2	54.5	81.8	52.8

that were considered include only those that were made in conjunction with or after the initiation of the use of force, and exclude those that were made prior to the use of force.

Positive outcomes, it is clear, were not especially associated with those incidents when statements were made by the President or other high administration officials as compared, to either incidents in which statements were made by lesser officials or incidents when no statements were made. A finding not shown in the table, however, is that when major conventional force components were used, positive outcomes were more prevalent when the President took note of the incident than when one of the other three officials noted made a relevant statement. In those incidents, 59 percent of the outcomes in the short term were positive when a Presidential statement was made; only 43 percent were positive when statements were

made only by the other three senior officials. When statements were made only by lesser officials or other actions were taken, positive outcomes resulted in all instances; however, these were largely related to incidents in which only one major force component was used. When there were no Administration statements or other actions, major force components simply were not used.

Positive outcomes were much more frequently associated with both coercive statements by lesser administration officials and situations in which coercive statements were not made at all, than with coercive statements by the President and his three principal advisors. But again, insofar as the coercive statements that were made by the President and those senior-most officials occurred more frequently in those incidents in which major force components were used, it is difficult to sort out which factor was the drawing one. If only those incidents are examined in which more than one major force component was used apart from nuclear weapons and in which a coercive statement was made by either the President or one of the other three senior officials, positive outcomes resulted 27 percent of the time in the short term and zero percent over the longer term. When coercive statements were not made by one of these individuals these figures were 70 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The same pattern also appears when incidents in which only one major force component was used are examined. In short, coercive statements by the President and his three senior advisors were to little avail when made in conjunction with only the use of major conventional force components.

Of further interest as concerns coercive statements by the President and the three senior advisors is the significance of those statements for the reinforcement and modification of behavior. The data in Table VII-8 indicate that coercive statements by the President and other high officials, while perhaps of some value when the concern was to assure and deter behavior,

Table VII-8

Outcomes, Coercive Statements and Behavior Reinforcement and Modification

weeks with committee of the committee	Percentage	of outcome	es that were	regitive
by President or one of	6 Mont	<u>18</u>	3 Ye	
three senior advisors	Reinforce	Modify	Reinforce	Modify
Yes	92.9	33.3	72.7	5.6
No	88.5	84.2	61.5	31.6

were to little effect when the interest was to compel or induce behavior. If only those incidents in which major force components were used apart from nuclear weapons are considered, outcomes in the short term were almost

entirely unfavorable (8 percent) when coercive statements were made by these individuals and the concern was to modify behavior. Nor is any support provided the argument that such statements made a difference when the concern was to reinforce behavior.

Personal Diplomacy

In almost one-third of the incidents, a senior administration official went abroad to engage in what is often termed personal diplomacy. These missions took many forms. For example, following President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, first Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and then Secretary of State Dulles went to London. The Murphy mission, President Eisenhowever related, "was to urge calm consideration of the affair and to discourage impulsive armed action." (5) Secretary Dulles had a similar objective on his first trip to London during the crisis. In a second visit, in mid-August, he took part in the London Conference which ultimately drew up a proposed compromise agreement between the British and French position on the one hand, and the Egyptian position on the other. In turn, this agreement was taken to President Nasser by Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia, accompanied by, among others, Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson. A year later Henderson was in Turkey and a number of Arab capitals coordinating policy in regard to the Syrian crisis. More recently, for example, after the <u>Pueblo</u> was seized, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyprus Vance was dispatched to Seoul.

Table VII-9
Outcomes and Visits by U. S. Officials

Type of incident	Visit to an actor state by Adminis- tration official or special envoy	Percentage that were	
		6 Months	3 Years
1. All incidents	Yes	54.3	29.4
the comment of the second of the second	No	82.6	51.6
2. Major force component	Yes	34.8	18.2
used	No	81.8	40.6
3. Standard or minor force component used	Yes	91.7	50.0
	No	83.3	62.5

Table VII-9 presents percentages of positive outcomes for instances in which envoys did and did not go abroad on special diplomatic missions. On the whole, outcomes, both in the short and longer terms, were less frequently positive when personal diplomacy was engaged in than when envoys were not sent abroad. This was particularly the case in those incidents in which large force components were used. When a special visit was coupled to the use of one or more major conventional force components apart from nuclear weapons, only 25 percent of the outcomes were positive in the part term; in the longer term only 11 percent of the outcomes were positive. When such forces were used and no special diplomatic mission were abroad, 79 percent of the outcomes were positive in the short term, and 30 percent were positive in the longer term.

When less than a major component of the armed forces was used and a special visit was made, 92 percent of the outcomes were positive in the short term and 50 percent were positive in the longer term. When no diplomatic mission took place, 83 percent of the outcomes were positive in the short term and 63 percent were positive in the longer term. Thus, it made little difference whether or not a special envoy was sent abroad when lesser armed forces were used.

How does one explain the figures when larger conventional force components were used? Did the envoys bungle their missions and thereby make positive outcomes less likely than if they had not gone at all? Or were special missions made only in the most difficult situations, those least likely to end positively in any case? While instances of the former may be found, the latter is a more reasonable proposition.

Presidential Popularity Prior to the Use of Armed Forces

It often has been suggested that a President's foreign policy and specific actions are more likely to be effective if the President is popular at home, if his policy has the support of the broad body politic. Presumably, foreign actors believe that a President who is more, rather than less popular is better able to carry through on threats or promises and to be able to do so over a sustained period. The limited evidence provided in this study provides support for this hypothesis.

For each incident in the sample, data were collected as to the percent of people interviewed by Gallup who "approved" the performance of the President in the most recent Poll preceding the use of armed forces. These figures were divided into ranked quartiles (see Table VII-10), ranging between 43 percent (Lebanon, 1968) to 80 percent (Vietnam, 1964).(6)

Table VII-10

Outcomes and Presidential Popularity Preceding the Use of Armed Forces

Gallup Poll: Percent who "approve" the President's performance

Percentage of outcomes that were positive

	6 Months	3 Years
1. 0- 59	94.7	47.1
2. 60- 66	56.7	28.6
3. 67- 72	61.9	52.6
4. 73-100	80.0	30.0

Sources: George H. Gallup, Ed., The Gallup Poll, Vols 1-111 (Random House, 1972); The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 56 (February 1970), pp. 8-16, and succeeding supplements.

In the short term, outcomes were most frequently positive when the President's popularity was lowest, and next most frequently positive when it was highest. Considering the first, it would be difficult to argue that foreign decisionmakers were most likely to be swayed by a more popular-i.e., "stronger"--President. If anything, a more powerful argument is that outcomes were most likely to be positive when the President was least popular and, perhaps, perceived as most desperate. To the extent Table 10 actually is explanatory, it suggests, at least in the short term, a curvilinear relationship--i.e., both of the above mentioned theses are correct and outcomes are most likely to be positive when the President's popularity is at the extremes, either high or low.

Presidential Popularity During the Period in Which Armed Forces Were Used

For reasons similar to those discussed in relation to Presidential popularity prior to the use of force, it is worthwhile to consider the change in the President's popularity during the period in which armed forces were used. These changes ranged from only one or two percentage points in relation to incidents such as the Nixon visit to Venezuela in 1958 and Gen. Kassem's threat to Kuwait in 1961, to an increase of six percentage points during the period in which President Nixon mined Haiphong Harbor and renewed the air war against North Vietnam in 1972, and a decrease of 20 percentage points in relation to the use of force in Laos in 1973.

Of course, these increases and decreases in the President's popularity may or may not have been related to the incidents and the coincident use of U.S. armed forces. It might be suspected that the changes that took place during the 1962 Lactian and 1968 <u>Pueblo</u> crises—crises that clearly attracted a good deal of attention—were related, at least in part, to those incidents and U.S. actions. On the other hand, it is doubtful that the changes in Presidential popularity when armed forces were used to deter a Cuban supported insurgency in the Dominican Republic in 1964, or the 1973 fighting in Lebanon, were very much, if at all, related to those incidents. This notwithstanding, the association of a change in Presidential popularity with the use of armed forces may affect the perceptions of foreign actors and hence the effectiveness of the use of force.

As a measure of the change in the President's popularity during the period when armed forces were used, we used the difference in the percent of people who "approved" the President's performance in polls taken just before and just after the use of U.S. armed forces, as surveyed by the Gallup Poll. More specifically, the polls that were used were the last one before the first use of force and the first one after the use of force ended. Polls taken more than a month before or after the use of armed forces were not considered, however; hence the data pertain to only 20 of the 33 incidents. Of the 20 incidents for which data were available, the percent of those who "approved" the President's performance increased in seven incidents and decreased in thirteen.

In the short term 85 percent of the outcomes were positive in incidents in which Presidential popularity increased; 74 percent were positive in incidents in which the President's popularity declined. While interesting, the difference is too small to make very much of; it provides only limited support for the argument that outcomes are more likely to be positive when Presidential popularity increases rather than decreases. Moreover, in five of the seven incidents in which there was an increase in Presidential popularity, that increase was of three percentage points or less; while in seven of the thirteen incidents in which there was a decline in Presidential popularity, the decline was of at least five points. The stronger suggestion thus is that a decline in Presidential popularity is not very likely to affect the outcomes of an incident.

It is interesting to note, though, notwithstanding the above, that if only those incidents in which major force components were used apart from nuclear weapons are examined, in the short term 82 percent of the outcomes were positive when Presidential popularity increased and only 59 percent were positive in those instances when the President's popularity declined. When only those incidents in which more than one major force component were used are considered, the distinction is even greater (see Table VII-11). Consequently, the inference might be drawn that when larger conventional forces were used, outcomes were more likely to be positive if the President's popularity did not at least decrease while force was being used.

Table VII-11

Level of Armed Forces Used and Change in Presidential Popularity

Level of armed forces used		Percentage of outcomes that were positive in the short term		
		Popularity increased ^a	Popularity decreased ^a	
1.	One or more major components; and nuclear force unit		100.0 ^b	
2.	Two or more major components; no nuclear force unit	71.4	27.3	
3.	One major component; or nuclear force unit	100.0 ^b	81.2	
4.	Standard components		100.0	
5.	Minor components	88.9	100.0	

a. I.e., the percentage of those who "approve" the President's performance during the period in which armed forces were used increased (decreased).

It is of further interest to note that the incidents in which major conventional force components were used generally received greater public attention than did incidents in which lesser forces were used. For each incident, the average number of pertinent New York Times Index lines per day was calculated. The incidents were then divided into two groups on the basis of whether they received more or less than the median number of lines per day. Most of the incidents in which at least one major force component was used fell into the group receiving more than the median number of lines per day. By contrast, most of those incidents in which lesser forces were used fell into the group receiving less than that number.

Further, if only those incidents are considered in which at least one major conventional force component was used and the average number of New York Times Index lines per day was above the median, then in the short term 75 percent of the outcomes were positive when the President's popularity increased while only 21 percent were positive when Presidential popularity declined. Thus it might be suggested that if Presidential popularity increased rather than decreased in a climate of greater public knowledge about the incident, then outcomes in incidents in which major force components were used were more likely to be positive.

b. Denominator was less than five.

The relationship between outcomes and Presidential popularity after the use of force was also considered. The data base used was the percent who "approved" the President's performance in the first poll taken (but within a month) after the use of force. Such data was available for 21 of the incidents. The incidents were grouped into ranked quartiles on the basis of those figures (see Table VII-12).

Table VII-12

Outcomes and Presidential Popularity After the Use of Armed Forces

Gallup Poll: Percent who "approve" the President's performance	Percentage of outcomes that were positive		
	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 0- 51	100.0	33.3	
2. 52- 62	57.9	31.6	
3. 63- 68	73.7	22.2	
4. 69-100	90.0	63.6	

As in the case of Presidential popularity prior to the use of force, outcomes were most frequently positive when the President was least popular and next most frequently positive when the President was most popular. Thus, further support is provided to the argument that positive outcomes were most frequently positive when Presidential popularity and domestic support was at the extremes, both high and low, and strong and weak. Interestingly, though, in the longer term, outcomes were, by far, most frequently positive when Presidential popularity was greatest after the incidents.

Outcomes and National Confidence

Finally, we sought to measure the relationship between the frequency of positive outcomes and the degree of national confidence. By degree of national confidence we mean the degree of optimism or sense of assurance in the nation generally that things are going well or getting better. One measure of this is the behavior of investors in the stock market, as measured by stock price indices. Obviously, a survey poll of attitudes held by the populace would be a better indicator of national feeling. We are not aware, however, that any such poll has been taken in regular intervals.

We selected for use in this study the Standard and Poor's composite stock price index. A stock price index may reflect other things besides confidence, however. Therefore, we separated out--i.e., discounted--from the Standard and Poor's index the effects of inflation and real economic growth. The derived index thus reflects the outlook of investors. A rise, it is suggested, indicates buoyancy in the national spirit; a decline, a more doleful mentality. In chapter three it was suggested that the higher this index was, the greater was the frequency with which policymakers used armed forces as a political instrument. A further question is: were outcomes more frequently positive when national confidence was greater, as measured by this index?

Table VII-13

Outcomes and National Confidence

Standard and Poor's Composite Stock Price Index Discounted for Inflation and Real Growth in GNP	Percentage that were P	of Outcomes
	6 Months	3 Years
1. 11.50 or greater	73.5	47.1
2. 10.04 - 11.49	71.0	46.4
301 - 10.03	74.4	38.9

Source of Standard and Poor's Index: Standard and Poor's Trade and Securities Statistics. 1976 Edition (Standard and Poor's Corp., 1976), p.4.

The data in Table VII-13 present a relatively clear answer to this question. No relationship whatever appears to exist between the frequency of positive outcomes and the rise and decline of the modified Standard & Poor's index. Positive outcomes were neither more nor less frequent when the index was either high or low.

Summary

The variables examined in this chapter were generally of little significance to outcomes in the longer term. In the short term, some did appear significant; but perhaps the most important side of the analysis was the doubt cast upon the significance of certain variables which have

been the subject of contention.

In the short term, positive our somes were very frequent when the United States had recently engaged if a war in the area. However, the previous political use of the armed forces in a region was not of consequence when the concern was to modify or even deter behavior; if anything, positive outcomes in these instances occurred more often when armed forces previously had been used as a political instrument less frequently in the region. Previous political use of the armed forces in a region may have been of some particular value when the concern was to assure behavior.

Positive outcomes were more frequent when previous to incidents U.S. deployments in the region had been increased or decreased rather than when no changes had been made in prior deployments or when no prior deployments had existed. The decreases in force size were not harmful, and the increases that were made were helpful. In at least a number of the incidents prior to which there had been no change in the size of a deployment made previously, an increase, had it been made, might have proved useful for obtaining positive outcomes.

Positive outcomes also were more associated with previously made treaties and statements by the President and senior administration officials related to objectives than with other diplomatic actions and statements by lesser Administration officials. However, positive outcomes were not more frequent when the President or one of his most senior foreign policy advisors took public notice of the incident after the use of armed forces was initiated; nor were favorable outcomes more frequent when coercive statements were made by the President, the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs, or the Secretary of Defense. Finally, positive outcomes were not more frequent when Administration officials or special envoys went abroad and engaged in personal diplomacy. In short, diplomacy prior to an incident would appear to have been more significant than diplomacy during an incident.

As to the significance of the President's popularity, positive outcomes were especially frequent when the President's performance rating was at the extremes—i.e., low and high—as measured either immediately before or after force was used. Positive outcomes were most frequent when the President was least popular and presumably lowest in standing with the American people. In these instances, it was suggested, foreign decisionmakers might have perceived the President as being especially committed, if not desperate, to obtain his objectives. Conversely, the high proportion of positive outcomes when the President was relatively popular may have been the result of foreign decisionmakers believing in those incidents, that the President would be able to stand firm insofar as he had public support generally.

Generally speaking, outcomes did not appear effected by a decline in the President's popularity during the period in which armed forces were used. However, a decline in the President's popularity might have made positive outcomes less likely in incidents in which two or more major conventional force components were used—i.e., those situations that presented the most difficulty. No relationship was observed between outcomes and national confidence, as indicated by the behavior of investors. While such confidence may influence policymakers to use the armed forces more frequently as a political instrument, as suggested in chapter three, this was of no significance to outcomes.

Footnotes

- 1. E.g., see Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 74-86; Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 35-36; Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 78-102.
- 2. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, <u>Kissinger</u> (Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 210-211.
- 3. The New York Times, December 14, 1947, p. 1. This statement was issued on the eve of the withdrawal of the last U.S. Army troops from Italy.
- 4. The New York Times, October 10, 1970, p. 4 and October 16, 1970, p. 9.
- 5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Doubleday, 1965), p. 37.
- 6. Data were not collected if the last poll preceded the incident by more than one month. Data was not available for four incidents: Greece (1946), Italy (1947), Morocco (1956), and Cyprus (1967). Data was obtained from George H. Gallup, Ed., The Gallup Poll, Vols 1-111 (Random House, 1972); The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 56 (February 1970), pp. 8-15, and succeeding supplements.

Chapter VIII

UTILITY ANALYSIS: OUTCOMES AND OTHER ACTORS

Chapter seven focused on United States domestic characteristics and other actions by policymakers that might influence outcomes. This final chapter on the utility of armed forces as a political instrument considers the significance for outcomes of the characteristics of other actors in an incident and of relations between those actors and the United States. It is of particular interest, moreover, to consider the significance of Soviet participation in an incident and the character of certain relationships that then existed between the superpowers. Preliminary to looking at the role of the Soviet Union and of other types of actors, it is useful to consider outcomes in structurally different kinds of situations.

Structure of the Situation

Notwithstanding the types of actors that took part in an incident, it may be conjectured that a critical factor in determining outcomes is whether the initial situation or context in which armed forces were used was one of conflict within a state or conflict between states; it being recalled that all of the incidents involved some degree of conflict between actors. Issues essentially internal to a state simply may or may not be more controllable than issues between states.

It might be hypothesized, however, that insofar as the United States often used armed forces to support non-Communist governments, outcomes were more likely to be favorable when those governments had to deal principally with an internal rather than external antagonist. Governments, after all, usually have at their disposal a greater amount, if not a monopoly, of fire-power, and a larger sized information or propaganda apparatus than any other actor within a state. Conversely, though, it might be suggested that when U.S. armed forces were used to support a government, it was because these advantages had been eroded (consider the weakness of the Diem Government in South Vietnam in the early 1960s), or were not relevant to the situation (e.g., the support given to the Bosch Government vis-à-vis the military in the Dominican Republic in 1963).

As in chapter three, incidents which were of an inter-state nature have been sub-categorized into two groups: incidents in which the United States was involved initially, and those incidents in which it was not so involved. Table VIII-1 presents the frequency of positive outcomes in each of these two groups of inter-state incidents, and in intra-state incidents.

Table VIII-1

Outcomes and the Structure of the Situation

Two of Situation		Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive	
	6 Nonths	3 Years	
1. Inter-state: U.S. not involved directly	58.8	37.5	
2. Inter-state: U.S. involved directly	76.5	58.3	
3. Intra-state	81.1	44.4	

The date indicate that positive outcomes were least frequent, both in the short term and over the longer term, when the situation was of an interstate nature not initially involving the United States directly. Outcomes were most frequently positive in the short term when the situation was of an intra-state nature. Of note, in inter-state incidents not initially involving the United States, policymakers were somewhat more frequently concerned to modify behavior than they were to reinforce it; in intra-state incidents the reverse was the case. If it was generally easier to reinforce than to modify behavior, positive outcomes might well have been related to the nature of the task, or the mode in which armed forces were used, rather than to the nature of the situation.

A further indicator that intra-state incidents presented less difficulty than inter-state incidents not initially involving the United States is the observation that policymakers used lesser levels of force in intra-state incidents as compared with these inter-state situations. Major force components were used with respect to 70 percent of the latter type of incidents, but in only one-third of the intra-state incidents. On the other hand, and notwith-standing whether or not intra-state incidents actually did present less difficulty than inter-state incidents in which the United States was not initially involved, the fact remains that positive outcomes were more frequent in the former than in the latter instances.

In inter-state incidents in which the United States was involved directly, the concern also was more often to modify than to reinforce behavior; yet, positive outcomes were the result in three out of every four instances

in the short term, and in three out of every five over the longer term. Hence, if the mode in which armed forces were used is an indicator of degree of difficulty, then it may be argued that positive outcomes were obtained most frequently—and notwithstanding that difficulty—in incidents in which the United States was involved directly. It may be speculated that it was in this type of incident that foreign actors were most likely to perceive the United States to be seriously committed.

The Role of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was a participant in twelve of the 33 incidents in the sample. The USSR, it is to be added, was an actor in all four of the incidents in which China was a participant, and acted in support of other Communist states, insurgent groups, or allies or clients in eleven of the twelve incidents in which it was a participant. How were U.S. armed forces used in relation to the Soviet Union? Twice they were used as a latent instrument. On the other ten occasions, however, force was used to deter (six instances) or compel Soviet behavior (four instances)—i.e., to coerce Moscow.

Positive outcomes to objectives related to Soviet behavior resulted in 64 percent of these instances in the short term and 50 percent over the longer term. As compared with the average short and longer term figures for all actors (73 and 44 percent, respectively), the figures related to Soviet behavior suggest a greater degree of intractability in the short term but a slightly more moderate Soviet stance in the longer term—again, relative to the behavior of other actors.

The significance of Soviet involvement in an incident may be observed, perhaps, by comparing frequencies of positive outcomes related to all of the actors in incidents in which Moscow was an actor, with those frequencies in incidents in which the USSR was not a participant. The frequency of positive outcomes for incidents in which the USSR was an actor was 63 percent in the short term and 43 percent in the longer term. For incidents in which Moscow was not an actor, these figures were 83 and 45 percent, respectively. There is a clear suggestion that Soviet participation was of little consequence in the longer term, but of much significance in the short term. This point will be further pursued in the discussion below of the influence of other types of actors.

Of further interest is the degree of Soviet involvement in an incident. Moscow used or threatened to use its armed forces in six of the twelve incidents in which it was an actor. The data in Table VIII-2 indicate that a relationship does exist between the degree of Soviet involvement and the frequency of positive outcomes. In the short term positive outcomes were less frequent the greater the degree of Soviet involvement. Over the longer term, Soviet participation itself was not so insignificant; but Soviet willingness to use or to threaten to use force would appear of consequence.

Table VIII-2

Outcomes and Degree of Soviet Involvement

	Degree of Soviet Involvment	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
		6 Months	3 Years	
1.	Soviet Union a partici- pant and used or threatened			
	to use force	52.2	37.5	
2.	Soviet Union a partici- pant but did not use or			
	threaten to use force	72.4	48.1	
3.	Soviet Union not a	82.7	44.7	

From the perspective of the international system and superpower competition, 28 of the 33 incidents may be divided into the following three groups:

- a. Incidents in which American and Soviet allies (or clients) were participants, and the Soviet Union also was a participant; of which there were ten.
- b. Incidents in which American and Soviet allies (or clients) were actors, but the Soviet Union was not an actor; of which there were eleven.
- c. Incidents in which an American ally (or client) was a participant but neither the Soviet Union nor any Soviet ally (or client) was a participant; of which there were seven.

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Table VIII-3

Combinations of Types of Actors in Incidents

Types of Actors	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
1. American ally (or client); Soviet ally (or client); Soviet Union used or threatened to use force.	6 Months	3 Years	
2. American ally (or client); Soviet ally (or client); Soviet Union a participant but did not use or threaten to use force.	72.4	48.1	
 American ally (or client); Soviet ally (or client); 	71.0	34.4	
4. American ally (or client)	100.0	71.4	
5. Other	81.8	83.3	
6. All incidents	73.1	43.9	

Table VIII-3 presents percentages of positive outcomes for these three groups of incidents, further subdivided by the degree of Soviet involvement. It suggests the following:

- o Outcomes were positive in all instances in the short term and very frequently in the longer term, when policymakers were able to deal with United States allies (and clients) without the presence (even in strictly a political issue) of the Soviet Union and Soviet allies (and clients).
- o Outcomes were much less frequently positive when an American ally (or client) faced a Soviet ally (or client), irrespective of whether or not the Soviet Union was an actor.
- o Outcomes were positive least frequently when an American ally (or client) faced a Soviet ally (or client) which had the support, in turn, of the Soviet Union, and when Moscow used or threatened to use its armed forces.

The portrait painted above is a sharp one. It was of critical importance whether or not Soviet allies (or clients) were participants, and whether or not the Soviet Union used or threatened to use its armed forces. When Moscow

was a participant, but did not use or threaten to use force, the Soviet presence did not affect outcomes. If anything, it may be argued that in the longer term Soviet influence had a moderating effect on its allies (and clients).

Not surprisingly, the level of armed forces used by policymakers also was strongly related to Soviet involvement in an incident (see Table VIII-4).

Table VIII-4

Degree of Soviet Involvement

and Level of Armed Forces Used:

Number of Incidents

	#	participant	
Level of U.S. Armed Forces Used	USSR not a participant	Did not use or threaten to use force	Used or threatened to use force
1. One or more major components, and nuclear weapons.		1	1
2. Two or more major components; no nuclear weapons.	1		3
3. One major compon- ent; or nuclear weapons	. 6		eg per P ^o rt Per eggenger i Ellen en Japan de To llon seg par M
4. Standard component.	. 6	1 · ·	1
5. Minor component.	8	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1.
Total	21	6	6

Standard or minor force components were used in two-thirds of the incidents in which the Soviet Union was not a participant but in only one-third of those in which Moscow was an actor. Conversely, two or more major force components, or one major force component and nuclear weapons, were used in only one incident in which the USSR was not a participant, but in almost half of the incidents in which Moscow was a participant. If incidents in which Moscow used or threatened to use armed forces are distinguished from those in which there was

Soviet participation but no use or threat to use force, it would appear that the greatest levels of force were used most frequently in incidents of the former type.

In chapter six it was suggested that outcomes were less frequently positive the greater the level of armed forces that were used, except when nuclear weapons were used in addition to major conventional forces. This relationship is especially apparent if only incidents in which the Soviet Union was an actor are considered; it is less apparent when only incidents in which the Soviet Union was not a participant are examined. However, insofar as the sample included only one incident in which both the Soviet Union was not an actor and one of the two greater levels of forces were used, the latter inference is highly speculative.

Conflict and Cooperation Between the Superpowers

Edward Azar has developed at the University of North Carolina, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) collection.(1) This data bank attempts to quantify conflictive and cooperative behavior between 31 nations for the years since 1948. The data are summarized in the form of aggregate statistics with reference to overall cooperative and conflictive relationships between each of the 31 nations and every other nation for each year. It is interesting to examine relationships between outcomes and levels of conflictive and cooperative behavior directed by the United States and the Soviet Union toward each other.

In the COPDAB coding system, individual cooperative acts directed by one actor toward another are coded one thru seven, and conflictive acts are coded nine thru fifteen. The score of one is awarded to the most extreme cooperative act and the score of fifteen is awarded to the most extreme conflictive act. A score of eight is awarded to a "neutral" act. Scores are then aggregated and various statistics are obtained.

For each incident, we determined the mean level of cooperative and conflictive behavior directed by each of the superpowers toward the other during that year, and then grouped incidents in terms of their scores. The groups were established so as to obtain a relatively equal number of incidents in each group. The range of mean annual conflictive behavior directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States during the years in which the 33 incidents occurred was 9.4 - 10.5; that of the United States conflictive behavior directed at the Soviet Union was 9.6 - 10.1. The two ranges for cooperative behavior were both 5.9 - 6.9. Tables VIII-5 and VIII-6 present data on the relationships between outcomes and these scores.

When cooperative behavior between the superpowers is considered (Table VIII-5), a clear pattern emerges, at least in the short term: outcomes of incidents were more frequently positive when, in their broader relations, the United States and the Soviet Union acted more cooperatively toward each other. With

reference to Soviet cooperative behavior toward the united States, this pattern is even more pronounced if only incidents in which the Soviet Union participated are examined; and the pattern is most pronounced when only incidents in which Moscow used or threatened to use force are considered. As might be inferred, positive outcomes were least related to Soviet cooperative behavior in incidents in which the Soviet Union was not an actor. Of further

Table VIII-5

Outcomes and the Degree of Cooperative Benavior Between the United States and the Soviet Union

I. Cooperative behavior by Soviet Union directed at United States

Azar Scale: Mean Score		Percentage That Were Po	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
		6 Months	3 Years		
1.	5.9-6.3	87.5	33.3		
2.	6.4-6.5	72.0	70.8		
3.	6.6-6.9	62.5	32.4		

II. Cooperative behavior by United States directed at Soviet Union

Azar Scale: Mean Score	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 5.9-6.4	80.8	20.8	
2. 6.5-6.6	71.4	43.8	
3. 6.7-6.9	69.4	57.1	

a. Data was unavailable for two incidents (Greece, 1946; Italy, 1947).

Source of data on cooperative behavior: Edward E. Azar and Thomas J. Sloan, <u>Dimensions of Interaction</u>: A Source Book for the Study of Behavior of 31 Nations From 1948 Through 1973, and updated by authors (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1975), pp. 5-8, 145-48.

Table VIII-6

Outcomes and the Degree of Conflictive Behavior Between the United States and the Soviet Union

I. Conflictive behavior by Soviet Union directed at United States

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Azar Scale: Mean Score	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 9.4-9.7	93.1	50.0	
2. 9.8-9.9	56.3	35.5	
3. 10.0-10.5	72.2	44.1	

II. Conflictive behavior by United States directed at Soviet Union

Azar Scale; Mean Scoreb	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
The state of the s	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 9.6-9.7	92.3	61.5	
2. 9.8	53.3	12.5	
3. 9.9	68.3	38.5	
4. 10.0-10.1	73.3	60.0	

- a. Data was unavailable for two incidents (Greece, 1946; Italy, 1947).
- b. Four rather than three groups were used because of the distribution of incidents.

Source of data on conflictive behavior: Edward E. Azar and Thomas J. Sloan, <u>Dimensions of Interaction</u>: A Source Book for the Study of Behavior of 31 Nations from 1948 Through 1973, and up-dated by authors (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1975), pp. 5-8, 145-48.

note, it was precisely when Soviet cooperative behavior was weakest that the use of larger conventional forces was least likely to result in positive outcomes.

In short, the dominant factor, and a significant one, would appear to have been Soviet cooperative behavior directed at the United States rather than American cooperative behavior directed at the Soviet Union. This is not illogical, of course; the frequency of positive outcomes relative to incidents, especially incidents in which the Soviet Union was an actor and the superpowers were protagonists, might be expected to reflect the Soviet side rather than the American side of the relationship.

The relationship between positive outcomes and Soviet conflictive behavior directed at the United States is less clear. Outcomes were most frequently positive when Soviet behavior was least conflictive, both in the short term and in the longer term. Moreover, the relatively high short term figure when Soviet conflictive behavior was greatest is largely accounted for by outcomes to incidents in which the Soviet Union was not an actor.

What emerges on a closer examination of the conflictive data, however, is a dichotomous relationship when the Soviet Union was an actor and a non-relationship when Moscow was not an actor. The frequencies of positive outcomes when the Soviet Union was a participant were 87 percent for the lowest conflictive category (9.4 - 9.7), and 53 percent for the next two conflictive categories combined (9.8 - 10.5). When the Soviet Union was not an actor, the figures for ranges one, two and three were 100, 67, and 81 percent, respectively.

In brief, outcomes were most frequently positive when Soviet behavior was least conflictive, both in incidents in which the Soviet Union was a participant and in incidents in which it was not a participant. When Soviet conflictive behavior was somewhat greater, the frequency of positive outcomes (a) was generally much less in incidents in which Moscow was an actor; (b) was less, but not clearly patterned in incidents in which Moscow was not an actor.

Much the same may be said about the short term relationship between outcomes and American conflictive behavior directed at the Soviet Union. The frequencies of positive outcomes when the Soviet Union was an actor were 92 percent for the lowest two conflictive categories combined, and 53 percent for the next two conflictive categories combined. For incidents in which the Soviet Union was not an actor, these same figures were 71 and 95 percent, respectively.

Two important points emerge out of this examination of Soviet and American conflictive and cooperative behavior. First, positive outcomes occurred more frequently (a) the greater the general cooperative behavior between the superpowers, and (b) when the superpowers acted least conflictively toward each

other. Second, this was especially so for incidents in which the Soviet Union was a participant. The clearest indicator of positive outcomes in the short term was cooperative behavior directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States.

The Strategic Weapons "Balance"

A major issue in recent years has been the significance of the strategic weapons balance between the United States and the Soviet Union for the successful pursuit of American interests abroad. Some have argued that the decline in the United States strategic weapons position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has had already or, at least, will soon have an adverse impact on the success of American foreign policy generally. Others have taken the view that the present balance is adequate from the U.S. perspective and that the relative decrease in U.S. capability which has occurred has not adversely affected the successful pursuit of American interests abroad.

Two indicators of the strategic weapons balance are the relative number of nuclear warheads deployed by each superpower (or force loadings), and the number of delivery vehicles each of the superpowers maintains in its inventory which are capable of striking the territory of the other.(2)

In 1953, when the Eisenhower administration threatened to use, and several times brandished nuclear weapons in the Far East, the United States had approximately 800 aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and more than 1600 nuclear bombs. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had no nuclear weapons deployed operationally. However, by the time of the 1968 Pueblo crisis—the other incident in this study in which the U.S. used a strategic nuclear force—the U.S. advantage in delivery vehicles had been reduced to approximately 2:1; and the advantage in force loadings to 4:1. By the 1972 "Christmas" bombing of North Vietnam, these figures were approximately 1:1 and 2.6:1, respectively—i.e., the U.S. retained an advantage in numbers of warheads, but had "lost" the advantage in delivery vehicles.

Table VIII-7 presents data showing the relationships between outcomes and the ratios of U.S. and Soviet launchers and warheads.

In general, the data do not support the proposition as to the importance of the strategic balance. It was not true that the less the U.S. advantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the number of either nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles, the less frequent outcomes were positive when the United States used armed forces as a political instrument. If anything, the data would support the converse proposition—i.e., the less the "advantage", the more often outcomes were positive; but such an inference would be spurious.

The same pattern emerges, moreover, if only incidents in which the Soviet Union participated are examined. For example, considering only those incidents

Table VIII-7

Outcomes and the Strategic Weapons Balance

I. Number of Warheads (Force Loadings)

Ratio Between the	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
United States and the Soviet Union	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 100:1 or greater	57.9	38.2	
2. 99.9-10:1	70.6	41.2	
3. 9.9:1 or less	93.8	53.3	

II. Number of Delivery Vehicles

Ratio Between the	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
United States and the Soviet Union	6 Months	3 Years	
1. 100:1 or greater	83.3	75.0	
2. 99.9-10:1	46.2	18.2	
3. 9.9-5:1	78.6	46.4	
4. 4.9:1 or less	84.2	47.2	

Sources of data on numbers of United States and Soviet warheads and delivery vehicles:

Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1976), and previous editions; "Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, February 20, 1970 " (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1970), pp. 56-59; The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1973 (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1974); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1974 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 105-10; The Military Balance, 1971-1972 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 56; Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 503-508, 596-600.

in which the USSR took part, and using force loadings as a proxy for the strategic balance, in the short term, outcomes were positive 43 percent of the time when the U.S. advantage was 100 to 1 or greater, 82 percent when the U.S. advantage ranged between ten and 99 to one, and 92 percent when the U.S. advantage was less then ten to one. If we look at a still smaller set—those incidents in which the Soviet Union used or threatened to use force, these figures were 11, 50, and 90 percent, respectively. Thus, although outcomes were less frequently positive when Moscow was most deeply involved, as was suggested earlier in this chapter, the strategic weapons balance is not the explanation for this relationship—i.e., U.S. "failures" vis—à-vis the Soviet Union were not a function of the movement toward startegic parity.

Other Actors

Also of <u>potential</u> significance to outcomes were the types of actors besides the Soviet Union participating in the incidents. While China, which was a participant in four incidents, is of special interest, other actors are considered better in groups, as they relate to the two superpowers—i.e., in terms of their apparent allegiance in the international political system.

Communist states besides the USSR and China, Communist supported insurgent groups, and Soviet clients were actors in fifteen, ten, and seven incidents, respectively.(3) All told, China or one of these other three types of actors were participants in 22 of the 33 incidents.

On the other hand, NATO, SEATO, OAS, and other states with which the United States has mutual security arrangements, participated in seven, seven, seven, and three incidents respectively. Other American clients were participants in eleven incidents. In sum, one or more of these five types of actors were participants in 29 of the incidents. Table VIII-8 shows positive outcomes related to the objectives desired of (a) each of these different types of actors, and (b) all actors in incidents in which each type of these actors was and was not a participant.

In the short term, outcomes were most frequently positive when the actor of concern was an CAS member, an international organization, or a NATO ally's client. The explanation is that in these incidents the Soviet Union was almost never involved, and for the most part, either the U.S. objective pertaining to these types of actors was to reinforce behavior or force was used latently. All three factors, as we have seen, lead to more frequent positive outcomes and are probably a more powerful explanation than actor-type.

Positive outcomes were also frequent in the short term when the actor was a SEATO Treaty or Protocol state. Over the longer term, however, only one-fourth of these outcomes were positive. Not surprisingly, the participation of SEATO actors was associated with the use of force by North Vietnam and insurgent groups, and the use by the United States of major force components.

Table VIII-8
Outcomes and Types of Actor in Incidents:
Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive

Outcomes vis-à-vis all actors in incidents

		Outcomes vis-à-vis		When actor type noted was a participant		When actor type noted was not a participant	
	Actor Type	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years	6 Months	3 Years
1.	China	66.7ª	25.0ª	89.5	38.1	69.4	45.5
2.	Communist State (Besides USSR and China)	71.4	28.6	74.5	34.0	71.7	55.6
3.	Insurgent Group	63.6	0.0	71.8	22.5	73.8	58.6
4.	Other USSR Client	42.9	28.6	51.7	38.5	81.3	45.8
5.	NATO Member	77.8	83.3	51.7	50.0	81.3	41.7
6.	SEATO (Asian) Member or Protocol State	75.0	25.0	66.7	10.3	75.3	58.0
7.	OAS Member	100.0	71.4	93.3	53.3	69.7	42.2
8.	Mutual Security Treaty State	66.7ª	66.7ª	90.9	81.8	71.0	39.1
9.	Other U.S. Ally (or Client)	71.4	50.0	70.3	47.2	74.6	41.9
10.	NATO State's Clients	80.0	60.0	58.3	52.2	77.5	41.3
11.	International Organization	100,0ª	100.0ª	86.4	84.2	69.5	34.2
12.	Other Actor	85.7	75.0ª	75.0	37.5	72.6	45.1

a. Denominator was less than five.

Positive outcomes were least frequent in the short term when the actors were China, insurgent groups—all but one Communist supported(4)—other Soviet clients, and states with which the United States had a mutual security treaty. However, in regard to the last, as well as China, the figures noted are based on only a few cases. Over the longer term, positive outcomes were especially infrequent when the actor was China, another Communist state, an insurgent group, or another Soviet client—or a SEATO state, as mentioned above. Of particular note is the total absence of positive outcomes when insurgent groups were of concern. For the most part, when policymakers were concerned with China or a Soviet client, the United States used major force components and sought to compel (or, secondarily, deter) behavior.

But what of the relationship between participation by these different types of actors and outcomes in the incidents generally? Clearly, incidents in which OAS states, mutual security treaty states, and international organizations were actors almost always resulted in positive outcomes in the short term, and resulted in relatively high frequencies of positive outcomes over the longer term. It would appear that it was useful when an international organization participated in the incidents. However, in incidents in which OAS states or international organizations were actors, invariably standard or minor force components were used. As noted in chapter six, uses of relatively small amounts of force were associated with positive outcomes. Such was not the case in the three incidents in which mutual security treaty states (Japan and South Korea) were actors. In these three incidents, either one or more major force components was used together with nuclear weapons, or two or more major force components alone were used.

In the short term, the fact that China was an actor did not adversely affect the likelihood of obtaining favorable outcomes in relation to the behavior of other actors in these incidents. The participation of the Soviet Union and other Soviet clients would appear to have been much more significant than the participation of Peking.

Over the longer term, a large decline in positive outcomes occurred in incidents in which insurgent groups and Communist states besides the Soviet Union and China were participants, as compared with incidents in which these actors were not participants. Indeed, the participation of these two types of actors and of other Soviet clients appear dominant factors in explaining the prevalence of negative outcomes over the longer term.

The extremely low frequency of positive outcomes associated with SEATO states is indicative of their "special" role as victims. In incidents in which a SEATO state was an actor, only one out of every ten outcomes was positive over the longer term; in incidents in which a SEATO state was not a participant, six out of every ten outcomes were positive. Thus, non-Southeast Asia related outcomes were generally favorable over the longer term, as well as in the short term. Not surprisingly, major force components, but not nuclear weapons, were used in all but one of the SEATO-related incidents.

Of further interest concerning the significance of other Communist states besides the Soviet Union and China, is their role as a supplier of weapons to other actors. Typically, these actors (e.g., North Vietnam and Cuba) were committed to supporting insurgent groups, and they passed on to these groups arms obtained from the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, in a number of these instances, neither Moscow nor Peking may have been as nearly committed as these other Communist states.

The data in Table VIII-9 are perhaps indicative of the commitment and significance of these other Communist states. In the short term, only one-half of the outcomes were positive when the other Communist states were the principal (if intermediary) supplier of arms to an actor; over the longer term, none of these outcomes were positive.

Table VIII-9
Outcomes and Principal Supplier of Arms to Actor

	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
Principal Supplier of Arms to Actor	6 Months	3 Years	
1. United States	85.7	52.0	
2. Soviet Union or China	66.7	33.0	
3. Other Communist State	55.6	0.0	
4. NATO State	69.2	58.3	
5. Unable to Obtain Arms Externally	100.0 ⁸	100.0ª	
6. Independent of Foreign Arms	63.2	42.1	
7. Other/NA/DK	80.0	55.6	

a. Denominator was less than five.

Positive outcomes in the short term related to actors whose principal source of arms was the United States reflect actions by policymakers to assure the performance of behavior by American allies and clients. Of more interest, though, is the complete "success," so to speak, of policymakers in dealing with

actors unable to obtain arms externally—Cuba in 1959 and 1960, the Dominican Republic in 1961, and Egypt in 1974. Lacking the secure support of Moscow or any other major power, these actors were isolated and perhaps more subject to the influence of an American show of force.

Political Responsiveness

Other actor characteristics considered as possible independent determinants of the utility of the armed forces as a political instrument were political responsiveness, attitude toward the existing domestic and international order, and trade with the United States. To some extent, of course, these variables are associated with the roles of actors in the international system. They are perhaps more basic, however, insofar as they are part of the fuel driving the engine of the international system. (5)

By political responsiveness, we mean the degree to which the leadership of an actor state was responsive to domestic or constituent demands and opinion. Presumably, the leadership in an authoritarian (or totalitarian) system is not as responsive as the leadership in a state having a healthy parliamentary system.

One interesting hypothecis is that positive outcomes are more likely to be obtained when the actor of concern is less politically respondive; such a regime is likely to have greater flexibility for action because it can alter course with less concern about its domestic standing. By contrast, it might be argued that political leaders in more open systems cannot be as flexible because of their need to be responsive to constituent views which change only slowly. In this analysis actors were considered to have a relatively more responsive political system if a multi-party system existed. In turn, a multi-party system was considered to be one in which, generally speaking, two or more political parties existed, elections were held, the parties were relatively free to organize and compete in those elections, and the winners were able to take office. Obviously, a certain number of judgments had to be made; and the reader will beware that, at the "margin," these judgments may be disputed. Table VIII-10 presents relationships between outcomes and political responsiveness.

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Table VIII-10

Outcomes and Actor Political Responsiveness

			Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive		
	Actor Responsiveness ^a	6 Months	3 Years		
1.	State in which Competitive Party System Existed	76. 5	66.7		
2.	State in which Competitive Party System Did Not Exist ^b	75.0	48.4		
3.	Communist State or Party	66.7	37. 5		
4.	Civilian or Military Group Within State	83.3	50.0		

- a. Table excludes insurgent groups and international organizations.
- b. Non-Communist systems only.

As might be expected, positive outcomes were least frequent when the actor was a Communist state (or Communist party not in power). What is more interesting, though, is the short term similarity and the long term difference between outcomes for states in which a competitive party system did not exist.

On the basis of this data, it would be difficult to argue that it was easier to influence actors in more closed non-Communist states by using armed forces than it was to influence actors operating in more open systems. This finding must be tempered, however, by the fact that rarely did the U.S. attempt to modify the behavior of open system actors: in no instance did policymakers attempt to compel an actor associated with a competitive party system, and the U.S. concern was to induce behavior only in two instances. Nor were armed forces ever used to deter such an actor's behavior. Thus, vis-a-vis actors with competitive party systems, U.S. armed forces were used either to assure behavior, or force was used only as a latent instrument. By contrast, U.S. policymakers sought to deter, compel, or induce behavior in four out of every ten instances when actors associated with non-competitive systems were

of concern; thus helping to explain the relatively less frequent success rate.

However, if we consider only those instances when the concern was to support an actor--i.e., to assure or induce behavior--the frequency of positive outcomes in the short term for actors associated with non-competitive systems was 67 percent; that for actors associated with competitive systems was 88 percent. Moreover, in the longer term, these figures were 29 and 75 percent, respectively. In short, when armed forces were used to support actors, positive outcomes were more frequent in the short term and more lasting in the longer term when the target was a more open polity. Friendly actors associated with non-competitive systems were less easily influenced.

Finally, positive outcomes were most frequent when the actor of concern was a civilian or military group within a state, usually being supported by the United States. Of note, "success" was relatively more frequent with reference to civilian groups rather than military groups; although the denominations here were small.

Actor Orientation

By actor orientation, we mean an actor's attitude toward political change in the context of the incident. The United States almost always has used its armed forces to support actors defending the status quo and to coerce actors opposing the status quo. Table VIII-11 presents data related to incidents of an intra-state nature and incidents initially involving two or more states other than the United States—i.e., those incidents in which the United States was not involved directly.

The data suggest that positive outcomes resulted more frequently when an actor (that was supported) favored the status quo than when an actor (that was coerced) opposed the status quo. Positive outcomes were least likely when an actor was strongly committed to change. Of note, policymakers sought to compel the latter in nearly two-thirds of the instances when force was used directly and indirectly; but in only one-half of those instances when an actor only "favored" a changed situation. Otherwise, force was used to deter actors committed to or favoring political change.

Table VIII-11

Outcomes and Actor Commitment to Change in Intra-State
Incidents and Inter-State Incidents in Which
the United States Was Involved Directly

Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive	
6 Months	3 Years
66.7	28.1
70.6	35.3
100.0b	75.0b
75. 8	50.0
	That Were 6 Months 66.7 70.6 100.0 ^b

 a. Excludes international organizations and incidents in which the United States was involved directly.

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Trade With the United States

It is often suggested that a state's behavior is more amenable to the influence of another state the more dependent it is on the latter as a supplier and market. A measure of trade dependency is an actor's trade with a particular state as a percentage of its total trade. Table VIII-12 presents data on outcomes and actor trade dependency on the United States, as measured by this indicator.

Table VIII-12

Outcomes and Trade With the United States

	Trade with U.S. As Percent of Actor's Total World Trade	Percentage of Outcomes That Were Positive	
		6 Months	3 Years
1.	0.0 ^b	76.5	33.3
2.	0.1 - 1.9	60.0	40.0
3.	2.0 - 9.9	65.0	42.1
4.	10.0 - 19.9	75.0	85.7
5.	20.0 - 100	83.3	56.3

- a. Includes only actors which were governments of nation states. Non-state actors simply do not "trade" with the United States.
- b. Trade figures for several Communist states—e.g., North Korea and North Vietnam—were uravailable for a number of years. In general, the score of 0.0 was assigned to these actors. Where there was doubt, an actor was not scored at all.

Sources of statistics on trade relations: United Nations Secretariat, Statistical Office, <u>Yearbook of International Trade Statistics</u> (annual); International Monetary Fund, <u>Direction of Trade</u> (annual).

Countries which did not trade with the United States at all included North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba since 1964, and China prior to 1971. Actors which traded very heavily with the United States included, for example, the Dominican Republic, South Vietnam, and South Korea. An anomalous case was that of Cuba, which prior to redirecting its trade to the Soviet Union was extremely dependent on its trade with the United States—e.g., of Cuba's total trade in 1959 and 1960, 68.8 and 50.9 percent, respectively, was with the United States. Interestingly enough, the outcomes related to Cuban behavior in the two incidents in which Havana was an actor in these two years were both positive in the short term (and also positive over the longer term).

It would appear that outcomes were most frequently positive in both the short term and over the longer term the greater the actor was dependent upon

the United States for its trade—with two types of exceptions. The first type of exception is the relatively high frequency of positive outcomes in the short term related to the behavior of actors with which the United States did not trade at all, and which were extremely hostile to the United States. Insofar as armed forces were used to coerce behavior in all of these instances, it may be argued with reference to these types of actors that armed forces were a useful policy instrument in the short term. Over the longer term, however, positive outcomes resulted least frequently when the behavior of this type of actor was of concern.

The second type of exception is the lower frequency of positive outcomes over the longer term related to actors whose trade with the United States was 20 percent or more, as compared with actors whose trade with the United States fell into the range of 10 to 19.9 percent. The negative outcomes in the former instances were related to actors whom, for the most part, the United States was supporting and whose behavior policymakers sought to assure or induce by using armed forces directly. One explanation is that the 85.7 percent figure for actors in the 10.0 - 19.9 percent range is spuriously high. Another, however, is that the American commitment to the actors in the higher range was so great that the tail wagged the dog; or, viewed another way, these actors, which were so dependent on the United States, were also unable, politically or otherwise, to perform the behavior desired by American policymakers.

Summary

Chapter seven was noteworthy largely insofar as it cast doubt upon the significance to outcomes of a group of variables related to American domestic characteristics and actions other than discrete uses of the armed forces. The present chapter, focusing on characteristics of the other actors in the incidents and on relations between these actors and the United States, is of interest for the opposite reason: outcomes did appear related to a number of variables, at least in the short term, and these relationships do not appear spurious.

First, the frequency of positive outcomes was related to the degree of Soviet involvement. As compared to outcomes in incidents in which the USSR was not a participant, outcomes were positive less frequently when the Soviet Union was a participant, and were positive least frequently when Moscow used or threatened to use force. Moreover, the relationship suggested in chapter six between the frequency of positive outcomes and the level of armed forces used by policymakers was found particularly strong for incidents in which the USSR was an actor, notwithstanding the tendency by policymakers to use larger armed forces in these incidents.

In pursuing its own objectives and supporting allies and clients, the Soviet Union was a powerful adversary. Recognizing this, policymakers used larger contingents of the armed forces in incidents in which Moscow was a

participant; but these forces did not wholly compensate for the fact that the USSR was an antagonist. And when Moscow was heavily committed, as indicated, by the use or threat to use force, American objectives were unlikely to be obtained even in the short term.

It was further observed that the frequency of positive outcomes was closely related to the level of cooperative behavior directed by the Soviet Union at the United States. The greater the level of Soviet cooperative behavior directed at the United States, the more frequently outcomes were positive; this relationship being stronger with reference to incidents in which the Soviet Union was an actor, and strongest in relation to incidents in which Moscow used or threatened to use force. Hence, this measure (as developed in the COPDAB collection) may be considered an especially good indicator of outcomes to incidents in which Soviet involvement either occurs or is projected.

By contrast, the strategic weapons "balance" between the United States and the USSR would appear to be of no value as an indicator of outcomes. No support was found for the thesis that positive outcomes were more likely when the U.S. advantage over the Soviet Union was greater, as measured by the ratios of delivery vehicles and numbers of warheads.

Considering the above, it is not surprising that outcomes were more positive in incidents in which OAS states, international organizations, and clients of NATO states were actors; the Soviet Union tending not to be an actor in these incidents. Aside from types of actors which appeared only in a few cases, outcomes in the short term were least frequently positive when policy-makers sought to influence in an incident insurgent groups (all but one were Communist supported) and other Soviet clients. Also in this category, in the longer term, were Communist states besides the Soviet Union, and SEATO Protocol states (the latter as a group of victims).

In general, it would appear that the Soviet Union was more tractable over the longer term than its allies and clients. The latter were, perhaps, more committed than Moscow. Postulating this, it is understandable that in some instances negative outcomes resulted for actors which Moscow was supporting generally at the same time positive outcomes were obtained with reference to Soviet behavior; which leads us to the relationship observed between outcomes and an actor's outlook on the status quo and change.

Insofar as U.S. policymakers invariably supported actors favoring the status quo, and generally sought to assure rather than to induce their behavior, it was not surprising that positive outcomes resulted more frequently in these instances than when force was used to coerce actors opposed to the status quo. Outcomes were least frequently positive when an actor was strongly committed to changing the status quo.

Positive outcomes were not more frequent when an actor's political system was one of a non-competitive nature. In fact, in the longer term, the converse was true; positive outcomes being most often associated with actors operating

in the context of a competitive party system. Even if those actors which policymakers sought to support are examined alone, outcomes were still more frequently positive the more dependent an actor was on trade with the United States; exceptions being, in the short term, actors which had no trade at all with the United States, and, in the longer term, actors extremely dependent on this trade.

Finally, it is interesting to note with reference to the general structure of the 33 incidents that policymakers were highly successful in obtaining their objectives when the United States was involved directly in a situation. Perhaps other actors perceived the United States especially committed in these incidents. Outcomes were much less frequently positive when the situation was of an inter-state nature and the United States was not involved directly; success being obtained most often when policymakers dealt with intra-state situations. However, the latter group of incidents probably presented a lesser degree of difficulty.

Footnotes

- See Edward E. Azar and Thomas J. Sloan, <u>Dimensions of Interaction: A Source Book for the Study of Behavior of 31 Nations from 1948 Through 1973</u> (University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1975).
- 2. The significance of the last is that the calculations used in this examination include: United States intermediate range missiles that were emplaced in Europe at one time (1959-63); a number of U.S. aircraft on forward deployed aircraft carriers during the period when these aircraft were included in strategic planning (1951-61); and forward based intermediate range nuclear bombers such as the B-47 and B-58. The calculations exclude, however, Soviet intermediate range bombers and IRBMs emplaced in the Soviet Union and East Europe.
- 3. By the term "Soviet client," we mean an actor which is especially dependent on the Soviet Union for diplomatic, economic, and (or) military support, and which is not included in one of the other mentioned categories.
- 4. The exception was the support given by Cuba to insurgents in Panama in 1959. We did not categorize Cuba in 1959 as a Communist state.
- 5. As Aron has argued, "the maintenance of the configuration is not the primary or the supreme objective of the actors." Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Praeger, 1967), p. 146.

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Chapter IX

CASE STUDIES:

THE LAOTIAN WAR OF 1962 AND INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971

By David K. Hall

The Laotian War in 1962 and the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 are two Asian crises in which both superpowers, and China were intimately involved. In each of these crises, United States policymakers deployed military forces in order to influence local actors, and perhaps Moscow and Peking as well. Still, U.S. armed forces were deployed with different degrees of skill in international climates wholly different from each other. The local political situations at which the U.S. armed forces were addressed also were very different. And so too were the outcomes!

It is interesting to consider these two cases alongside each other. If things did work out differently in the two situations, it is worthwhile examining why this was so. Insofar as the different outcomes may have been related to the distinctive situational characteristics and to the different ways in which instruments of American foreign policy were orchestrated, policymakers faced with similar decisions in the future might use these experiences to better understand the circumstances in which a use of force may be helpful and how to use force and other policy instruments effectively.

The Laotian War of 1962

Geography determined that Laos would be a battlefield of the cold war. At the close of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Laos was a sparsely populated land of mountains and jungle, a weak and vulnerable nation separating the Communist and non-Communist nations of Asia. On the north, it bordered the newly Communist states of China and North Vietnam; on the south it bordered Thailand, South Vietnam, and Cambodia. The 1954 Geneva accords required the Viet Minh to withdraw to North Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao, the Laotian Communist movement, to move back to the northern provinces of the country pending its integration into a coalition government. All nations except France were proscribed from establishing military bases in Laos. External economic and military aid, such as the U.S. programs begun in 1950, were permitted to continue. An International Commission for Sepervision and Control (ICC) in Laos was created to police the agreements and report any violations to the permanent cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, the United Kingdom and the USSR. (1)

When French colonial rule in Southeast Asia collapsed, defense against further Communist expansion in Asia fell to the United States. The U.S. administration of Dwight Eisenhower believed that establishment of pro-Western governments in both Laos and South Vietnam was vital not only to the political security of Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya, and Indonesia, but

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to the entire island chain of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. September 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created to deter further Communist expansion. Initial signatories included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. A protocol attached to the mutual security pact unilaterally extended its defensive provisions to Laos. South Vietnam, and Cambodia. During the following years, the Eisenhower administration poured \$300 million into Laos in the form of military and economic assistance. State Department, CIA, and military officers in Laos covertly supported Lao politicians who favored close ties with the United States and neighboring Thailand, and opposed a coalition government that included Pathet Lao representation. When, in 1958, Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma integrated the Pathet Lao into his cabinet and the parliament, to comply with the Geneva agreements, U.S. operatives orchestrated Souvanna's removal from power by staging a parliamentary crisis.(2)

After Souvanna Phouma was replaced by a pro-American regime and the Pathet Lao was forced out of the government, Laos drifted steadily toward civil war. The United States threw its support behind the Royal Lao Army and its young commander, General Phoumi Nosavan, a cousin of Thai Premier Sarit Thanarat. The Pathet Lao retreated to the Laotian provinces bordering North Vietnam and China, where they began systematic rally to organize the mountain tribes. The civil war was precipitated by a neutralist coup against the pro-American regime, which led to the reappointment of neutralist Souvanna Phouma as prime minister in August 1960. Thailand imposed a crippling blockade of all food and fuel going to Laos through Thailand. Then the United States refused assistance against the blockade, Souvanna established diplomatic relations with the USSR and opened negotiations with the Pathet Lao. In November 1960, when General Phoumi Nosavan's troops in southern Laos massed for attack on the capital, Souvanna turned to the USSR for an emergency airlift of food, oil, and arms. The assistance came too late. Souvanna Phouma and his neutralist military forces were driven into northern Laos, where they quickly established a new seat of government. The USSR and other Communist states granted diplomatic recognition and military support. In Vientiane, a second government headed by Prime Minister Boun Oum and Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Nosayan received diplomatic recognition and military assistance from the United States. (3)

Despite its temporary victory, the new regime headed by Boun Oum and Phoumi quickly demonstrated its military ineffectiveness in the escalating war. By the end of April 1961, the united forces of neutralist Kong-Le and the Pathet Lao, with the assistance of North Vietnam and the USSR, had mounted a counteroffensive that threatened Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang. The new U.S. administration of John Kennedy was reluctant to intervene militarily to stem the tide. There was heavy pressure from SEATO members Thailand and the Philippines to do so, but the United Kingdom and France favored negotiation. Events in Cuba and Berlin seemed more important; U.S. conventional forces were unprepared; and

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the Royal Lao Army seemed irresponsible. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted on prior presidential assurances of rapid military escalation, including permission to use nuclear weapons, should North Vietnam or China respond to U.S. force.(4)

During March and April 1961, President Kennedy readied U.S. Marines in Japan, Thailand, and the Gulf of Siam for possible introduction into Loas should a cease-fire not be reached. At the same time, the United States decided to support a neutralized Laos and to participate in a new, enlarged Geneva Conference to solve the Laos problem.

In May 1961, resolution of the war entered a phase of protracted and complex international negotiation. The Geneva Conference on Laos convened and a shaky cease-fire was arranged. At Geneva on June 4, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Kennedy agreed on the importance of establishing an effective cease-fire in Laos and on the need for international agreements to ensure Laotian neutrality. In October, at the Laotian village of Ban Hin Heup, Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and Souphanouvong (leader of the Pathet Lao) agreed to create a coalition government with Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. In December, envoys from the fourteen nations represented at Geneva, drafted an agreement guaranteeing the international neutrality of Laos.(5)

Final resolution of the war awaited formation of a universally recognized Laotian government that could initial the Geneva accords. Such a government seemed impossible, because the exact assignment of ministries within any coalition produced unresolvable differences of opinion among the neutralists, rightists, and Communists. General Phoumi Nosavan stubbornly insisted that the rightists be assigned the cabinet portfolios of defense, which controlled the army, and interior, which controlled the police and courts. Despite U.S. pressure on Phoumi to concede the defense and interior ministries to the neutralists, the deadlock persisted. Laotian Communist forces attempted to break the stalemate by attacking 5,000 of Phoumi's troops at the provincial capital of Nam Tha, in the northwestern corner of Laos, in early May. Phoumi's troops abandoned Nam Tha after a brief battle on May 6, and fled across the border into Thailand. some eighty miles to the south. Fearing a permanent breakdown in the year-long cease-fire and a loss of diplomatic bargaining power with the Communist forces, Kennedy ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Gulf of Siam and landed 5,000 U.S. combat troops in neighboring Thailand.(6)

The rout of Phoumi's troops and the landing of American armed forces in Thailand urged events in Laos quickly toward a political solution. On June 11, the neutralists, Communists, and rightists agreed to an internationally neutral coalition government in which the prime minister, defense ministers and interior minister were neutralist officials and the Communists and rightists held an equal number of ministries. On July 23, 1962, the foreign ministers of the fourteen nations at the Geneva Conference initialed the "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos." Between July and

November, the 5,000 U.S. combat forces sent to Thailand were gradually withdrawn to their original stations in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. In Laos, complying with the Geneva accords, the United States withdrew its 666 military advisers to the Royal Lao Army and the USSR removed its 500 military advisers to the Communist forces. Kennedy had achieved his minimal objectives of disengagement of American and Soviet soldiers in Loas, a face-saving neutralization that did not threaten his international or domestic standing, and temporary removal of any direct military threat to the bordering state of Thailand.(7)

U.S. Behavior

The Nam Tha incident in May 1962 affected directly the paramount U.S. interest in Laos: the strategic relationship between Laos and its neighbor, Thailand.(8) U.S. officials had long felt Laos had little intrinsic value, but harmonious relations with Thailand, which was far more important because of size and because it was the headquarters for SEATO, depended on U.S. willingness to prevent the growth of Communist influence in Laos. After the Indochina War, Thailand's overriding security concern was Communist expansion into the Mekong River valley of Laos and the organization of subversive activities among the Thai-Lao and Vietnamese living in the northeastern region of Thailand facing Laos. By May 1962, the Kennedy administration itself had become worried about the insurgency linkage between Laos and Thailand. On May 5, one day before the fall of Nam Tha, Max Frankel of the New York Times reported:

The administration fears that developing subversive activity in Thailand may soon lead to open Communist guerilla warfare there and further extend the trouble zones of Southeast Asia.

Communists from North Vietnam and Laos are said to be helping insurgents in the backward regions of northeastern Thailand along the Laotian frontier. Officials are especially worried about the area's fate if the precarious cease-fire in Laos is broken.

State and Defense Department officials conveyed their concern to members of Congress at a special briefing two weeks ago. . . .

The secret briefing of about fifteen members of Congress was conducted. . . by W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security.(9)

On May 1, a week after the secret Harriman-Bundy congressional briefing, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Haydn Williams sent a letter to Representative Edwin Dooley, warning that the situation in Thailand could become especially serious if efforts to establish a neutral

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government in Laos failed "and if Laos goes Communist." "There would then be on the Thai borders in this most crucial northeast area a government which would very possibly give support to the infiltration of guerillas."(10)

Close relations between the United States and Thailand dated from 1950, when both nations became alarmed at Communist power in China and Vietnam. (12) In the summer of 1950, Thailand quickly dispatched troops and food to South Korea, and the U.S. responded with military, economic, and technical assistance for Thailand. Government cooperation grew particularly close after the anti-Communist strongman Sarit Thanarat staged a military coup in 1957. During the late 1950s, while the Eisenhower administration was openly striving for a pro-American government in Laos, Sarit began secretly funneling soldiers, arms, equipment, and money into Laos to prop up the rightist, pro-American regime of his nephew, General Phoumi Nosavan.(11) By the time the Laotian civil war broke out in August 1960, the Thai government felt fully confident that its U.S. ally, acting either unilaterally or collectively through SEATO, would prevent any leftward drift in Laos, Thailand's buffer between China and North Vietnam. (13) However, the Thai government was profoundly shaken when, in the spring of 1961, SEATO deadlocked on collective action against the successful Pathet Lao-neutralist counteroffensive and the Kennedy administration refused to intervene militarily. That suspicions deepened during 1961-62, when the United States accepted Souvanna Phouma as the next head of government. and then tried to coerce Phoumi to drop his demand for control of the defense and interior ministries in a coalition government. Bangkok opened talks with the USSR on trade and cultural exchanges, and the diplomatic world speculated that Thailand might move toward neutralism and withdraw from SEATO.

The Kennedy administration hurried to reverse the erosion in relations with Thailand by initiating a series of high-level visits by Vice President Lyndon Johnson, General Maxwell Tayler, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Their efforts brought Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Washington for a round of consultations in March 1962. The joint communiqué issued by Thanat and Secretary of State Dean Rusk formally pledged in the United States, without prior consent of other SEATO members, to meet militarily any Communist attack on Thailand. Two weeks later, Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman flew to Bangkok to reassure Sarit that the United States exchange for Thai support for Souvanna Phouma's coalition government, would prevent the Communists from seizing control of Laos. By April 1962, the U.S. diplomatic offensive had reversed much of the damage done in 1961. Then, suddenly, the credibility of these promises seemed at stake when the cease-fire at Nam Tha unexpectedly collapsed in May 1962.

The Kennedy administration recognized the high cost of failing to respond to the breakdown of the Laotian cease-fire. On the other hand, by May 1962, there was a common recognition by the President, his top civilian advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Laos was a decidely undesirable location for direct military intervention. The mountainous jungle terrain,

the tropical climate, and the almost complete absence of communication and supply lines made Laos a military nightmare for U.S. conventional forces.(14) The risk of provoking a Korean-type counterintervention by either the Chinese or the North Vietnamese army was considered substantial.(15) The Kennedy administration had been unable to obtain firm pledges of military support in Laos from either the United Kingdom or France, the other major powers in SEATO,(16) and the complete lack of fighting spirit in the 50,000-man Royal Lao Army made it a certainty that any war would be completely shouldered by the United States and its Asian allies.(17)

The possibility that Thailand might take unilateral military action in Laos added to U.S. concern. By spring 1962, U.S. intelligence had confirmed the presence of 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and a sizable contingent of Chinese military advisers in northern Laos. Any Thai military movement across the border risked confrontation with North Vietnam or China and the end to U.S. hope for a peaceful retreat from Laos. The Kennedy administration had ample evidence that Thailand might take unilateral action if the Communists sought to exploit their military position. In April 1961, when the Pathet Lao pushed to within ten miles of Thakhek on the Laotian side of the Mekong River, Sarit publicly announced that Thai troops would go into action if the town were attacked. On February 13, 1962, when the May 1961 cease-fire momentarily broke down around Nam Tha, Sarit's order was given without prior consultation with the United States or SEATO.(18)

Mingled with Kennedy's international concerns was a natural presidential wariness of the domestic political implications of the Laos problem. Congressional leaders of both parties had made known their opposition to direct U.S. combat involvement as early as April 1961, but a number of conservative congressmen were opposed to a negotiated settlement with the Pathet Lao. When Phoumi and Boun Oum refused to agree to a coalition government, except on terms unacceptable to the neutralists and Communists. the Kennedy administration suspended in February 1962 the \$3 million monthly assistance check that met the Lao Army's payroll. In response, the official organ of the Repbulican National Committee criticized Kennedy for "forcing" the legitimate Government of Laos into a perilous coalition with the Reds."(19) When Nam Tha fell on May 6, several conservative Republicans took the floor in the Senate and House of Representatives to attack the administration for failing to support the rightists and resorting to economic coercion against the United States' own clients. On May 10, while the National Security Council was weighing the American response, former President Eisenhower publicly expressed his doubts about the planned coalition government, observing that this was "the way we lost China." (20) Kennedy and his advisers were abundantly aware by May that a total victory by the Pathet Lao would bring Republican charges of somewhat uncertain political effect that another Democratic administration had materially contributed to the loss of an Asian ally to Communism.

In addition to Kennedy's concerns, the bureaucratic perspective of the State Department represented by Assistant Secretaries Averell Harriman

and Roger Hilsman was particularly influential on U.S. decisionmaking. Since the Laotian cease-fire of May 3, 1961, much of the day-to-day responsibility for managing the problem had fallen to these two senior officials. A major question raised by the fall of Nam Tha was whether it constituted an isolated incident or whether it was the first step in a general Communist offensive. Three days before the battle, the Pathet Lao and their Vietnamese supporters had also captured the last airfield in northern Laos, and some intelligence reports suggested Communist troop movements south toward the Thai border. Whether a large-scale campaign was beginning was difficult to determine, but Harriman and Hilsman argued that it made little difference. The complete rout of Phoumi's 5,000-man garrison would tempt the Communists to go farther now, whether or not that was their original intent. The U.S. strategy of deterrence in Laos had depended on the quite modest, but still important strength of the Lao Army, even though this dependence had considerably complicated simultaneous attempts to pressure Phoumi into a coalition government. This presumed strength had now been thoroughly discredited, and deterrence depended completely on external military forces.

Harriman and Hilsman warned Kennedy that the Pathet Lao and their allies had little incentive to resume political negotiations unless they genuinely feared American intervention. A <u>credible</u> signal of U.S. determination to resist further Communist military nibbling would now require moving American troops into Thailand, not just repeating the naval shows of force in the Gulf of Siam ordered by Eisenhower in January 1961 and by Kennedy again in May 1961.(21) Enough action had to be taken to make the threat convincing, but under no circumstances—even in the face of additional cease-fire violations—should U.S. military action call into question continued U.S. willingness to press for a negotiated neutralization of Laos.(22)

The breakdown in the Laotian cease-fire found the U.S. government generally unified behind Kennedy's operational objectives of reestablishing the May 1961, cease-fire and moving the three Laotian political factions back to the negotiating table (23) After Phoumi's forces were routed at Nam Tha, even the Joint Chiefs were willing to concede the wisdom of a negotiated settlement rather than an attempt to retake lost territory with the discredited Lao Army. (24) The fall of Nam Tha reactivated the articulation of these frequently enunciated U.S. objectives in several channels. Communication was particularly intense with the USSR, the Communist nation perceived as most sympathetic to U.S. objectives in Laos and the nation most capable of exerting leverage over the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese because of its role as the principal supplier of material to both the Communist and the neutralist forces. The U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Llewellyn Thompson met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on May 8 and with Soviet Premier Khrushchev on May 13 to convey directly U.S. concern at the breakdown of the cease-fire and desire that the USSR dissuade the Communist forces from further military action. (25) Similar American views were pressed in Washington on May 9 and May 15 in direct talks between Harriman, Secretary of State Rusk, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. (26) At a presidential press conference on May 9, Kennedy stated that the United States and the USSR were hopeful that they could "bring about a restoration of the cease-fire (sic)."(27)

On May 12, with heavy pressure from Harriman and Hilsman and with the concurrence of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer, who had just returned from an inspection tour of Southeast Asia, Kennedy privately authorized the movement of 4,000 U.S. servicemen to Thailand from their normal stations in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. Included in the President's authorization were 1,800 Marines of the Third Marine Division in Okinawa; 1,200 infantry soldiers from the First Battle Group, Twenty-seventh Infantry based in Hawaii, and 1,000 airmen from tactical fighter groups based in the Philippines, Guam, and Okinawa. (28) On the same day, the State Department announced that a U.S. aircraft carrier task force and a marine battle group of 1,800 men would be moving in the direction of Indochina. (29) On May 14, without public announcement, a U.S. Army battle group of 1,000 infantrymen, already in Thailand on temporary duty for a SEATO airborne exercise ("Air Cobra," staged in eary May), was moved into northeastern Thailand, some thirty miles from the Laotian border. (30)

On the afternoon of May 15, a presidential message announced that 4,000 American marines, infantrymen, and airmen would be landing in Thailand in the coming days, and would "remain there until further orders."(31) At the Pentagon, McNamara revealed the creation of a new United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand, to be headed by General Paul D. Harkins, already chief of U.S. Military Assistance Command, South Vietnam.(32) On Okinawa, an additional 5,000 American troops were alerted for possible embarkation for Thailand.(33) U.S. fighters, tankers, and cargo planes were transferred from Hawaii to the Philippines where they would be in a better position to support U.S. troops destined for Thailand.(34)

During the week following Kennedy's May 15 declaration, U.S. combat troops arrived in Thailand and were deployed along a defensive perimeter in northeastern Thailand facing the Mekong River border with Laos. Eighteen hundred marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade, including their helicopters and jet fighters, were stationed at Udon, only forty miles south of the Laotian administrative capital of Vientiane. Upon arrival, U.S. troops began combined military exercises with Thai forces to acclimate American personnel to the terrain and weather of Thailand.(35) By the first week of July, when U.S. combat strength peaked, some 5,000 American reinforcements had arrived in Thailand—a thousand more than originally contemplated by Kennedy.(36) Combined with the 1,000—man U.S. Army battle group, 700 U.S. Army Engineers, and 300 members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group already in Thailand at the time of the fall of Nam Tha, total U.S. military strength in Thailand crested at 7,000 during the first days of July.(37)

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U.S. military actions in May 1962, were designed to deter further warfare, or advocacy of warfare, by parties involved in the Laotian confrontation. Above all, this show of U.S. armed strength was intended to deter military advances by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops and to discourage Chinese advocacy of such advances. But the Kennedy administration also saw U.S. troop landings in Thailand as a means of strengthening the hand of Moscow, which had been quietly working with Washington since April 1961, to find a peaceful resolution to the East-West confrontation. Collapse of the cease-fire at Nam Tha was taken by the Kennedy administration as a dangerous sign that Moscow's influence over the more aggressive Pathet Lao, Vietnamese, and Chinese had declined. (38) To a lesser degree, U.S. troop movements were intended to preempt any untoward and complicating military initiative by Thailand's Marshall Sarit. (39)

Public statements by U.S. officials, however, only hinted at the possible use of U.S. armed forces in Laos. Administration fears of provoking Communist escalation, of inadvertently deepening the limited U.S. commitment to Laos, or of giving the recalcitrant Laotian rightists renewed hope of support all militated against explicit warnings. One of the sternest U.S. statements of the crisis, the State Department announcement on May 12 that U.S. troops would be moving toward Indochina, had described the action as not just another "show of force," but as an effort to position troops for direct military action if Communist advances continued in Laos.(40) But Kennedy's presidential message justifying the landing of U.S. forces in Thailand described the action as a "defensive act," designed "to help insure the territorial integrity" of Thailand. No mention was made of Laos. Only Kennedy's remark that forces "would remain there until further orders" hinted at their possible use in Laos.(41)

The restricted nature of the U.S. mission was underscored in Saigon on May 17 when General Harkins, Commander of the new United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand, told the press that U.S. troops entering Thailand were under strict orders not to enter Laos, and could not react militarily unless Thailand were invaded. (42) The next day in Bangkok, Harkins went farther, noting that "the troops do not have the right to fire on suspected infiltrators (into Thailand) as of now."(43) Such caution proved a minor embarrassment to Kennedy, when he was asked in a presidential press conference on May 23 to comment on reports that U.S. troops in Thailand were not carrying ammunition. The following day, the U.S. military command in Bangkok announced that live ammunition had been issued to U.S. troops. (44)

The post-Nam Tha military lull was broken in late May by minor fighting in northern and southern Laos. Secretary of State Rusk warned of "very serious problems," and the American press reported intensive administration discussion of military contingency plans for Laos, including the occupation of southern Laos by U.S. forces in Thailand. Such rumors ceased only when a successful Laotian government was formed in June.

While the introduction of U.S. troops in Thailand was designed to force a new cease-fire, the Kennedy administration simultaneously increased its political and economic pressure on its balking Laotian clients. Throughout the spring, the U.S. government had been pressing the rightists to drop their demand for control of the defense and interior ministries in a coalition government. Washington had suspended its monthly \$3 million payroll assistance, and had also hinted that it might terminate deliveries of military equipment to Laos.(45) On March 24, at a personal meeting in Thailand with General Phoumi, Assistant Secretary Harriman was brutally frank. American troops would not come to Laos and die for him, Harriman told Phoumi. The only alternative to a neutral Laos was a Communist one. Phoumi would be responsible for the destruction of his country. Talking to reporters afterward, Harriman implied that military aid would soon be stopped if there were no agreement on a coalition government.(46)

When the Nam Tha garrison collapsed on May 6, the Kennedy administration was furious with Phoumi. The recalcitrance of the Boun Oum-Phoumi regime had led the Communists to break the cease-fire and endangered Washington's neutralization plans, and furthermore, American military experts had been urging Phoumi for weeks to withdraw his 5,000 troops from the highly vulnerable Nam Tha garrison deep in northern Laos. Some U.S. officials suspected that Phoumi had intentionally provoked the Communists in order to coerce the Kennedy administration to resume its support for his regime.

On May 12, after the fall of Nam Tha, the New York Times reported that Phoumi and Boun Oum "were being told that their careers were in peril unless they agreed to meet the neutralist terms for a coalition. (47) In a confidential message to the Vientiane government from its Laotian Embassy in Washington, Harriman was reported as saying,

the Nam Tha events have completely destroyed the U.S. government's confidence in the personality of General Phoumi. The United States cannot extend to him its aid, neither militarily nor financially, or otherwise. The United States cannot support a government in which General Phoumi is the most important personality. General Phoumi ought better to attend to his army, rendering in this way better service to his country than as a political leader. (48)

The U.S. government rejected requests by the rightists for replacement of the more than \$1 million in American arms, ammunition, and equipment lost or destroyed during the Nam Tha battle.(49) In a series of state visits to Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaya, and the Philippines immediately before and after the military defeat, Washington actively discouraged other Asian allies from extending the political or economic support sought by Phoumi and Boun Oum.(50) By landing American troops in Thailand, the Kennedy administration signaled that Vientiane should not see the action as a direct show of U.S. support.

On May 18, Harriman told the Laotian ambassador in Washington that the United States did not foresee a need to dispatch U.S. troops to Laos, "as Chinese troops would never be so foolish as to invade Laos."

General Phoumi cannot cause the outbreak of a world war. By his irresponsible deeds he will only destroy his own country. It is not he who dictates the policy of the United States. (51)

The U.S. ambassador in Vientiane stressed to the Laotian government that U.S. troops had arrived only to defend Thailand, and had no intention of intervening in Laos. (52)

Target Behavior

The behavior of the USSR was crucial to the Kennedy administration's hopes for reestablishing the cease-fire line and completing the Laotian coalition. By May 1962, the United States and the USSR had a well established history of cooperation on Laos. In April 1961, following military threats by the United States, the USSR had actively assisted in bringing about the cease-fire demanded by Kennedy as a prerequisite to U.S. participation in a reconvened Geneva Conference on Laos. At the Vienna summit talks between Khrushchev and Kennedy in June 1961, the two leaders had agreed that Laos was not worth a direct superpower confrontation. In the words of their joint communique on June 4, they pledged

their support of a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and independence, and in this connection they have recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire. (53)

By September 1961, the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom had privately reached the confidential "Pushkin Agreement"—named after Georgi Pushkin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and chief Soviet delegate to the Geneva Conference—which called for the USSR and the United Kingdom, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference to ensure the compliance of members of their political bloc with any negotiated agreements on Laos. (54)

The USSR's cooperation with the United States reflected its own limited interests in Laos. Soviet intervention in the civil war, in December 1960, had been motivated by its growing competition with China for the favor of North Vietnam. The Soviet campaign for influence in North Vietnam had begun in August 1960, with the extension of large credits for industrial expansion. In the winter of 1960, the USSR could not remain aloof from the Laotian civil war for fear of strengthening the pro-Chinese faction in Hanoi.(55) But the Kennedy administration's offer of neutralization was satisfactory for Soviet interests. While willing to assist an

inexpensive war of national liberation in Southeast Asia, Khrushchev had no desire to remain militarily involved in a civil war that threatened to escalate into a Korean-style local war and that had little relevance to basic Soviet interests. Soviet assistance in the neutralization of Laos gave evidence of Soviet support for North Vietnam's interests, and allowed the USSR to argue privately in both Hanoi and Peking that, with patience, Laos would, in Khrushchev's graphic phrase, "fall into our laps like a ripe apple."(56)

When negotiations to finalize the Lactian coalition government stalemated in early 1962, however, the USSR attempted to wash its hands of the thorny problem. In letters to the Communist parties of North Vietnam and China in mid-March, Moscow stated that the USSR was satisfied with the defacto division of power within Laos, but felt that the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Lactian Communists were in a better position to judge what practical steps should be taken next. When the Soviet ambassador in Laos became aware of the Communist forces' plans for a military attack on Nam Tha, he adopted the view that a military loss by Phoumi might drive the Lactian rightists back to the bargaining table. (57) The May breakdown in the cease-fire found the USSR still in agreement with the United States on the objectives of preventing military escalation and completing the coalition government, but the question now existed whether the USSR had leverage on the course of events.

In high level talks in Washington and Moscow on May 8 and 9, the U.S. government reiterated to the USSR its determination to reestablish the cease-fire and complete the coalition government. (58) On May 12, the State Department announced major U.S. troop movements toward Indochina, and by May 13 the American press was speculating that some troops would be landed in Thailand. (59) A clear-cut Soviet response to American communications came on May 15. In a private meeting with Secretary of State Rusk requested by the USSR, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin relayed to Rusk Premier Khrushchev's continued desire to create a coalition government in Laos in the spirit of the Khrushchev-Kenmedy Vienna communiqué. Because of Phoumi's part in causing the breach, however, the USSR felt that the United States had particular responsibility for reinforcing the cease-fire. (60) After his meeting with Rusk, Dobrynin told the American press that it was necessary to put into effect the agreement that was reached at Vienna in June 1961 between Khrushchev and Kennedy. (61)

Official Soviet reaction to the actual American landings in Thailand was moderate and belated. On May 17, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called the military action "very bad," and claimed that it "just complicated the situation."(62) The next day, while on a goodwill tour of Bulgaria, Khrushchev seemed determined to dramatize the potential dangers of the situation for his Chinese, Vietnamese, and Laotian comrades. He firmly predicted that U.S. forces would become involved in a shooting war: "They arrived with their weapons. They did not come to play golf. They

will shoot, and those they shoot will shoot back." He made no suggestion, however, that U.S. military moves posed a threat to successful completion of negotiations on Laos. He consoled his fellow Communists, however, with the additional prediction that "the Americans may fight fifteen years if they want to, but it will not help." The masses in Southeast Asia, he assured, were certain to win over the capitalists in the end. (63)

Khrushchev's signal to his Communist allies was reiterated by Prayda on May 20. Implying that U.S. actions were not the purely "defensive act" painted by American officials, this official newspaper of the Communist party of the USSR condemned the United States for "preparing for intervention in Laos," which "would certainly widen the military conflict and enhance the danger of war not only on the borders of Laos but also in the whole of Southeast Asia. . . . In that case the military intervention of the United States in Laos also would turn into a collective intervention and would inevitably provoke a counteraction by the other side."(64) Prayda concluded that failure to resolve the Laos problem was the worst possible outcome for all parties. During a national radio and television speech from Moscow on May 25, in what was to be the last major Soviet comment on Laos before the incident was resolved, Khrushchev stated that while the landing of U.S. troops in Thailand "seriously hinders a settlement of the Laotian problem," "the Soviet Government has been doing everything in its power to put an end to the war in Laos. . . . The Soviet Government firmly adheres to the position that it is essential to promote the formation in Laos of a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma."(65) Despite Khrushchev's criticism of Kennedy's action, U.S. officials were convinced that the USSR privately was not displeased by the support this lent Soviet warnings to Hanoi and Peking. (66) The moderation of Khrushchev's statements and the generally optimistic tone of the Soviet press on Laos seems to support the accuracy of Washington's analysis.

The USSR's response to U.S. pressure was reasonable. The costs to it of temporarily restraining pro-Communist advances and working toward a coalition government, as the United States insisted, were quite negligible when compared to the potential costs and risks associated with a continued military campaign by the Communist forces. Laotian neutralization would, in fact, constitute a significant victory for Soviet foreign policy-the elimination of a former U.S.-client regime, its replacement by the Soviet-sponsored Souvanna Phouma regime, and, in general, a vivid demonstration of Khrushchev's claim that peaceful coexistence could achieve socialist victories while avoiding major wars with the United States. An apparent international victory at small cost would welcome compensation for recent failure at Berlin. While the Vietnamese and Chinese might question the failure to exploit fully the military balance of power within Lacs, the chance for political success was clearly high if American influence was withdrawn. In contrast, the risks associated with continued fighting were considerable. The possibility that Kennedy was not bluffing could not be ignored, and it was uncertain that the United States could constrain the Thai government. Any escalation would be difficult for the USSR to

avoid, with its 500 advisers in the country lending airlift, logistics, and advisory service to the Pathet Lao.(67)

The United States held both local and strategic superiority vis-à-vis the USSR. Involvement in a war in Southeast Asia would divert resources from more important issues. The Pathet Lao might be even less amenable to Soviet influence and more susceptible to Chinese influence than a neutralist coalition under Souvanna. In general, from the Soviet perspective, the risk of major costs to physical and economic well-being resulting from renewed fighting in Laos outweighed the minimally greater security and influence associated with complete Communist victory, as opposed to a neutralist coalition government.

A more hostile but weaker target of U.S. military signaling was the People's Republic of China (PRC). Unlike the Soviet Union, which chose to aid the Communist forces in Laos largely out of deference to Hanoi's desires, the PRC had a direct and major security interest in the removal of pro-Western influence from its border and the establishment there of a neutral, or preferably pro-Chinese, buffer state. To this end, since 1958, China had supported both the Laotian government of Souvanna Phouma and, in a minor fashion, the military activities of the Pathet Lao. (68) But in 1962, China had neither the economic, political, nor military power to impose its desire in Laos. Economically, China faced severe national problems resulting from the aftereffects of the unsuccessful "great leap forward" program, the withdrawal of Soviet economic and technical assistance, and a recent series of poor grain harvests. (69)

China's political relations with the USSR were strained. The USSR had far greater leverage in North Vietnam and Laos because of its role as principal source of supplies. Militarily, the United States appeared increasingly potent and dangerous because of Kennedy's emphasis on conventional and guerilla warfare. And China remained completely dependent on the strategic protection of the USSR, even as the reliability of that protection was increasingly in doubt.

Lacs was not the PRC's dominant security concern at the time. Throughout the spring, the Chinese nationalists threatened to take military advantage of the economic dislocation evident on the mainland; the PRC responded by intermittent shelling of Quemoy and Matsu and massing troops opposite the offshore islands in mid-June. An equally serious problem was the increasing number of troop and plane incidents in April and May on the India-China border and the series of formal protests exchanged between the two countries. (70) These conditions and concerns made China willing in the spring of 1962 to give political and advisory support to a Pathet Lac-North Vietnamese tactical blow against Phoumi's troops at Nam Tha, but unwilling to be directly involved or to lend support to larger military plans. China's immediate interests were adequately served by the basic objectives of neutralizing Laos in international affairs and pressing Phoumi into a neutralist-led coalition government. (71)

Although not as intimately involved as the USSR in the international diplomacy over Laos, the PRC had still abundant opportunity by May 1962 to become thoroughly familiar with the Kennedy administration's attitudes. both as a member of the fourteen-nation Geneva Conference and through the more private United States-PRC Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw. At Geneva, American and Chinese differences on the implementation of Laotian neutrality had been meticulously mediated and compromised by May 1962, through the efforts of the British and Soviet representatives. At Warsaw, the United States and the FRC had signaled, as early as June 1961, their mutual desire to settle the Laotian issue through international guarantees of Laotian neutrality.(72) Because of this prior communication, Chinese reaction to the landing of U.S. combat troops in Thailand was surprisingly temperate by the day's standards. No formal protest or statement on the matter was made by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. (73) Government reaction was spelled out in greatest detail in a front page editorial in the official Peking Daily on May 19. Acknowledging Kennedy's objectives of "an effective cease-fire and prompt negotiations for a government of national union," the editorial correctly noted that the possibility of U.S. intervention in Laos turned on the future of the Laotian Rightists: having entered Thailand "to shore up the Phoumi-Boun Oum group by deploying military forces in the Mekong area" and "failing to do so, it would carry out direct armed intervention and extend the Lactian war." (The Chinese interpreted another motive for U.S. landings as being in line with their view of U.S. capitalist imperialism -- "armed occupation of Thailand.") But the editorial clearly signaled Peking's willingness to permit internal resolution of the Laotian civil war and reluctance to become involved militarily except as a response to U.S. military intervention in Laos.

We have always maintained that Laotian affairs must be settled by the Laotians themselves, that the affairs of the Southeast Asian countries must be settled by the people of these countries themselves, and that no foreign country should interfere. The Chinese people firmly oppose U.S. imperialist armed intervention in Laos, and absolutely cannot tolerate the establishment by U.S. imperialism in areas close to China of any new military bridgeheads directed against this country. (74)

Meanwhile, in Geneva, China demanded immediate and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Thai-Lao border, but made no threats to boycott the sessions of refuse to sign any agreements reached at them. (75)

Acquiescing to U.S. operational objectives was, in fact, far easier for China than it was for the USSR. China's potential gains from Laotian neutralization were considerable, while the likely costs of military escalation were ominous. Neutralization requiring the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and the termination of all external military relationships promised to remove Laos from the protective orbit of SEATO and thus weaken this long-resented anti-Chinese alliance. Further, neutralization

would probably increase the influence in Laos of the PRC vis-à-vis the USSR. Neutralization would require withdrawal of Soviet military personnel and thus one of the major sources of Soviet influence over the Pathet Lao and the neutralists. Because of Laos' proximity to China, the PRC had the advantage in any peaceful competition to develop influence through economic and cultural ties. In a joint statement signed with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in April 1961, Souvanna had agreed to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with Peking. In January 1962, China had established a legal basis for ongoing involvement in Laos by agreeing with Souvanna on Chinese construction of a major road running from Mengala, China, to Phong Saly, in northern Laos. (76)

The costs of major fighting in Laos, on the other hand, were potentially heavy for the PRC. China would find it extremely difficult to stand aloof from any major war on its southern border, and yet the Soviet move toward disengagement from Laos indicated that the USSR would be quite reluctant to lend major assistance there. In March 1962, when Chinese officials in Laos asked the Soviet ambassador for increased supplies for the Pathet Lao, the Soviet response was evasive. (77) Nor would China find it easy to conduct military operations in Laos. Only 25,000 Chinese troops were customarily stationed near Laos, and intervention in force would create formidable logistical problems because of the rugged terrain of both China's bordering Yunnan Province and northwestern Laos. (78) These factors had all contributed to China's careful avoidance of direct military involvement in Laos, even when Souvanna Phouma had personally requested the assistance of Chinese pilots in 1962. (79)

Thus, in terms of Chinese physical and economic well-being, as well as China's long-term influence over events in Laos, support for international neutralization was preferable to all other avenues open to the PRC in May 1962.

The third target of U.S. military actions in May 1962 was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). While American officials estimated that DRV soldiers constituted only 9,000 to 10,000 of the combined Communist and neutralist force of 35,000, these North Vietnamese soldiers were considered to be by far the best enemy troops. Washington felt it highly unlikely that any major fighting could continue in Laos without the active encouragement and support of Hanoi. North Vietnam had, in fact, founded the Pathet Lao organization, trained, armed, and developed it, and provided troops to assist its military operations. Souphanouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao, was married to a Vietnamese Communist party official, and had spent much of his life in Vietnam. (80) Field reports from Laos suggested that the attacks at and around Nam Tha in May 1962, had been led by North Vietnamese soldiers. (81)

The DRV's overriding interests in Laos were maintenance of a nonbelligerent government on its western border and continued, unhindered ability to utilize the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trails into South Vietnam, which ran through the jungles of eastern Laos and constituted the principal supply route to the Communist insurgents in the South. The eruption of the Laotian civil war in December 1960 had allowed North Vietnam to make major advances toward both of these goals. During the December 1960-May 1961 fighting before the cease-fire, the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao had been able to gain complete military control of eastern Laos, with its key points of access to South Vietnam.

By September 1961, all parties to the Lactian problem had agreed that a neutralist coalition government under Souvanna would succeed the former pro-American regime of Phoumi and Boun Oum. The Geneva negotiations during the last half of 1961 had resulted in technical compromises between the Communist and non-Communist delegates, which did not pose any serious challenge to these gains. The conference representatives had agreed that all foreign military personnel were to be withdrawn from Laos, and that Lactian territory was not to be used as a corridor for aggression against other states (such as South Vietnam), but the authority and resources given to the International Control Commission to supervise and enforce these agreements were completely inadequate to prevent any discreet use of eastern Laos by North Vietnam. (82)

In late 1961 and early 1962, however, Phoumi showed signs of revitalizing the Royal Lao Army and reneging on his October 1961 pledge at Ban Hin Heup to join in a neutralist-dominated coalition government. His refusal to relinquish to Souvanna control of the policy forces and of the Royal Lao Army, his massing of troops at Nam Tha, his military probes beyond the Nam Tha garrison, and his resistance to U.S. economic and political pressure all signaled challenges to the desirable status quo in Laos that the DRV has established in 1961 by force of arms. Furthermore, the Communists could not wholly discount the possibility that U.S. policy was shifting back to the offensive. In late March 1962, the Communists made the decision to apply new military pressure on Phoumi at Nam Tha, but to avoid a serious escalation of the war. As the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao explained privately, their strategy was "to aim at a vital and politically sensitive section of the front," "to destroy as much of enemy forces and material as possible," "to retain a local character." The action was timed for the last days of the May dry season to preclude counterattack. The main objective was to force the rightists back to the coalition negotiations on terms favorable to the Pathet Lao. (83).

The attack on Nam Tha had succeeded beyond the expectations of the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, and had aroused some discussion among the Communists as to whether or not their forces should push to the Mekong River, but American intervention in Thailand on behalf of a cease-fire and resumed tripartite talks provided whatever additional incentive was needed to induce the Communists to settle for their initial objective of obtaining a coalition government including Communist representation. (84)

Cooperation promised to enhance North Vietnam's goals of influence both in Laos and South Vietnam. During the 1961-1962 cease-fire, the DRV actively pursued a series of bilateral agreements with Souvanna Phouma's government in northern Laos that legitimated its increased involvement in the country: agreements on broadcasting (June 7), foreign training grants (July 13), commercial relations (July 13), exchange of payments (July 13), economic assistance (December 15), construction of roads (March 10), and Lao students in North Vietnam (March 10).(85) The North Vietnamese as well as the Pathet Lao were convinced that a neutral coalition government merely represented the first step toward eventual Communist control, but achieved it through less provocative political means. (86) With the preliminary Geneva agreements as background, compliance with U.S. operational objectives promised to obtain removal of American and other SEATO personnel from Laos, while allowing the DRV to proceed with quiet use of the Ho Chi Minh trails. Negotiated neutrality would establish an important precedent in Southeast Asia, and Hanoi hoped to extend that precedent to future talks on the status of South Vietnam. (87) On the other hand, the DRV had much to lose by provoking U.S. intervention. Recognition of this prospect was reflected in the carefully controlled strategy designed for the Nam Tha assault. Escalation in Laos would strain relations with the USSR and the PRC, and would divert energy from the more immediate and important goal of communizing South Vietnam. At its most extreme, U.S. intervention might threaten the physical safety of North Vietnam itself.

The Laotian neutralists and Communists were not primary targets of the administration's military signaling after the capture of Nam Tha, because the Kennedy administration had concluded that any sustained Pathet Lao-neutralist offensive against the numerically superior Royal Lao Army was unlikely without active military leadership and material support from the USSR, North Vietnam, and China. The perception that the military strategy of the indigenous Laotian forces was determined by decisions reached in Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi had been strongly reinforced by Kennedy's 1961 success in arranging a Laotian cease-fire through direct diplomatic and military pressure on the USSR and by Khrushchev's subsequent confidential promise to guarantee Communist compliance with any neutralization agreements signed at Geneva. (88)

The fourth major target of American military signaling was the Thai government of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat. As previously noted, Thailand's paramount security concern since the Communist victory in China had been the possible expansion of communism into the Mekong River valley of Lacs and externally encouraged subversion among the Thai-Lao and Vietnamese living in northeastern Thailand near the Laotian border. Thailand's military alliance with the United States within SEATO had been the keystone of its strategy for combating these threats since 1954. While the Thai government was dismayed in 1961 by Kennedy's refusal to intervene militarily on behalf of the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime in Laos, it was strongly reassured in

the spring of 1962 by the Rusk-Thanat communiqué promising U.S. defense of Thailand without regard for action taken by other SEATO members.

The U.S. increase of military forces in Thailand was designed to reassure Sarit of the reliability of recent American security pledges, but there is no evidence to indicate that the Thai government sought such a dramatic gesture. Kennedy's decision on May 12 to deploy servicemen to Thailand was strictly a unilateral initiative of the U.S. government, which necessitated a last-minute, pro forma agreement by Marshall Sarit to a "Thai request" for such an American landing.(89) With 1,000 U.S. infantrymen already in Thailand as a result of SEATO's recent "Air Cobra" exercises, and with another 1,000 U.S. military personnel present in Thailand with the Army Corps of Engineers and Military Assistance Advisory Group, Sarit apparently felt little need for further reassurance as to the American commitment to his nation's defense. While Thai officials were alarmed at the possibility of increased subversion in the northeast as a result of recent Communist gains in Laos, they did not consider the stationing of U.S. combat troops in Thailand directly germane to this problem.

Bangkok's increased confidence in the reliability of the American defense commitment to Thailand had been indicated during the days before the fall of Nam Tha. In late April, at the urging of Harriman, Sarit had taken the important step of publicly throwing his influence behind a coalition government for Laos. Abandoning his prior position that a coalition under Souvanna Phouma would mean eventual Communist control of Laos, Sarit officially announced on April 25—only hours before Laotian Premier Boun Oum's arrival in Bangkok—that a coalition should now be acceptable to all Lao parties:

The United States has confirmed that it is the best solution...
The United States must have considered all reasons and circumstances before reaching such a decision... If bad results follow this later... the United States will not deny its responsibility and might step in to solve the situation in time. (90)

After the loss of Nam Tha, which futher convinced the Thai government that the Lao Army could not resist the Communists in serious fighting, Sarit brought pressure on his cousin Phoumi to drop his objections to participation in the proposed neutralist coalition. (91)

Despite Thailand's generally favorable reaction to the U.S. show of force, the Kennedy administration's desire to encourage multilateral participation proved to be an element of friction between Washington and Bangkok. The United States had long preferred the broadest possible military and political front in response to Asian security problems, but Thailand—after SEATO's failure to intervene in Laos in the spring of 1961—wished to dissociate American action from SEATO for fear that SEATO's chronic disunity might hinder U.S. response to some future threat to

Thailand, or even provide a pretext for Washington's refusal to honor its pledges. It was with considerable reluctance, therefore, and only after five days of public and private pressure from American officials, that Sarit formally requested on May 21 the token military forces offered by Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. (92)

Third Party Behavior

Phoumi Nosavan had hoped that the defeat of his forces at Nam Tha and exaggerated claims of Communist advances would result in direct intervention by the United States, but the military debacle had the opposite effect, eliminating any remaining U.S. desire to support its ineffectual client. (93) Under the combined pressure of military defeat, continued economic and political pressure from the Kennedy administration, and a clear signal that U.S. troops in Thailand would not assist the Lao Army, Phoumi capitulated to U.S. demands that he join the proposed Laotian coalition government on terms dictated by Souvanna Phouma.

Signs of Phoumi's new flexibility had emerged, in fact, before the defeat at Nam Tha. On May 3, three days before the battle, Souvanna Phouma was informed in Paris by American Ambassador to France, James Cavin, that Phoumi was now ready to resume coalition negotiations without insisting on keeping the defense and interior portfolios. (94) After their military defeat and the new ultimatums from Washington, Phoumi and Boun Oum cabled Souvanna in Paris on May 14 to indicate their willingness, "under certain conditions," to accept a coalition in which the key interior and defense ministries would be given to neutralists. (95) While in Taiwan on May 15, Phoumi and Boun Oum publicly stated that they were willing to turn government control over to Souvanna, if he could "prove he is not working for the Communists."(96) The support this shift in attitude gave to U.S. objectives was evident the next day, when Souphanouvong notified the International Control Commission that he was willing to reopen negotiations with the rightists and Souvanna Phouma. (97) On May 17, in response to a cable from Souvanna in Paris stating his willingness to return to Laos but "without conditions" alluded to by Phoumi and Boun Oum, the rightists reiterated their request for Souvanna's return and dropped all mention of prior "conditions" for participation in a coalition government (98) On June 8, at the first full exchange of views among the three factions, Phoumi agreed to cede the portfolios of defense and interior as well as foreign affairs to Souvanna. The last major obstacle was cleared for formal signing of a coalition agreement on June 12.(99)

The United Kingdom, as a long-suffering advocate of Laotian neutralization and as cochairman of the permanent Geneva Conference, functioned as an important supportive and sympathetic American ally after Kennedy's shift to the need for U.S. disengagement from the political and military quagmire of Laos. The May 1961 cease-fire and reconvening of the Geneva Conference had originated from a joint U.K.-U.S. proposal presented to the USSR.(100) The confidential Pushkin Agreement of September 1961 had called for British responsibility for ensuring Western compliance with any international provisions negotiated at Geneva.(101)

The United Kingdom had long been more resistant than the United States to being drawn into a Laotian war--even if this required turning a blind eye to North Vietnamese use of the Laotian corridor--but the potential new threat to Thailand posed by the fighting in May 1962 cast a new perspective on the problem for the United Kingdom, just as it did for the United States. As later recounted by then Prime Minister Harold MacMillan,

These threats to Thailand introduced a new complication and one in which the British Government was much more closely involved.

The defeat of the Laotian Government's forces at Nam Tha caused great alarm in Thailand. The way seemed to be open to an invasion by the Pathet Lao and their Communist supporters. Thailand, as a loyal member of the SEATO alliance, was entitled to support in case of need.(102)

In response to the U.S. request on May 16 for allied solidarity, Macmillan not only offered Thailand a token force of British jet fighters, but also recruited participation by other SEATO members as well.

I immediately informed both [Australian Prime Minister] Menzies and [New Zealand Prime Minister] Holyoake that if we received a formal request for help we would send a squadron of Hunters. Menzies replied very properly that Australia would be ready to send jets to Thailand if the Thais made a request, but he was most anxious that any action should be taken in the name of SEATO and the obligations under that threaty, even if some SEATO powers made no contribution. Holyoake made a similar reply. He was willing to send a small force of 'jungle troops, transport freighters and perhaps a frigate.' He added, with his usual good sense: 'We appreciate that the objective is to show as many flags as possible in Thailand.'(103)

When Sarit finally requested SEATO forces on May 21, these British, Australian, and New Zealand symbols of collective defense were dispatched to Thailand.

With the breakdown of the Laotian cease-fire and the apparent threat to Thailand, MacMillan rediscovered the urgency of a successful diplomatic resolution to the protracted war. "I felt much more anxious to press on with the Geneva Conference," he later recalled.(104) On May 9, only three days after the fall of Nam Tha, London's Chief Geneva negotiator and High Commissioner for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, arrived in Laos. Meeting with top officials of the Pathet Lao and the neutralists, he underscored

the necessity of reestablishing the cease-fire, but at the same time relayed the message that Phoumi Nosavan now seemed ready to return to the negotiating table without insisting on the defense and interior portfolios. MacDonald also informed the leftists and neutralists that the United States promised to increase its pressure on Laos and Thailand to settle the war peacefully. The Pathet Lao informed MacDonald that there could be no return of the territory taken in recent fighting, but that coalition talks could resume if Phoumi demonstrated a sincere desire to negotiate. This information was relayed to the United States, and within a few days, Washington decided to drop its initial demand for return to the status quo ante in Laos.(105)

Simultaneously, at the major power level, the United Kingdom reinforced U.S. efforts to enlist Soviet support for moving the participants back to the bargaining table. On May 8, in the first Western communication to the USSR regarding Nam Tha, the British and American ambassadors in Moscow met jointly with Foreign Minister Gromyko to stress their governments' concern for restabilizing the cease-fire. (106) The landing of U.S. troops in Thailand on May 15 was viewed by the MacMillan government as a logical complement to its own continuing search for a diplomatic solution. In prepared statements to Parliament that same day, the British Foreign Secretary and Lord Privy Seal stressed the British hope that the USSR would use its influence privately to restore the cease-fire in Laos, and the British Foreign office emphasized the government's support for the U.S. troop landings. (107) With the signing of the three-faction coalition agreement in Laos on June 12, Khrushchev cabled MacMillan: "I wish to express my satisfaction that the collaboration of the Governments of the USSR and Great Britain as the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference has played its own useful role in clearing the paths towards a peaceful solution of the Laos question."(108)

Outcomes

The Kennedy administration's immediate operational objectives were achieved after the defeat of the Laotian Army at Nam Tha. A cease-fire was reestablished, the long sought three-faction coaltion government was created, and a fourteen-nation agreement on the permanent neutrality of Laos was formally ratified at Geneva on July 23, 1962. With respect to the specific targets of U.S. military signaling during this period, we have already noted the close conformity between actual Soviet behavior and that desired by the Kennedy administration. The USSR both publicly and privately reaffirmed its year-long support for a neutral coalition regime in Laos. Khrushchev publicly—and we can surmise privately—warned his fellow Communists against the dangers of provoking the United States to direct military intervention in Laos. In a note to Kennedy published on June 12, Khrushchev announced his complete satisfaction with the Laotian coalition agreement of that same day and his intended support during the coming months for the implementation of Laotian neutrality:

The formation of a coalition Government of national unity of Laos opens the way toward completing in the near future the work done at the Geneva conference toward a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem and giving life to the agreements worked out at that conference, which constitute a good basis for the development of Laos as a neutral and independent state.

I will avail myself of the occasion to express satisfaction over the fact that the mutual understanding we achieved meeting in Vienna last June on the support of neutral and independent Laos begins to be translated into life.(109)

On July 23, the USSR initialed at Geneva the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which pledged each of its fourteen signatories to:

- 1. Do nothing to impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of Laos.
- 2. Refrain from direct or indirect interference in Laotian internal affairs.
- 3. Refrain from bringing Laos into a military alliance.
- 4. Respect Lactian wishes not to recognize the protection of any military alliance, including SEATO.
- 5. Refrain from introducing into Laos any military personnel.
- 6. Refrain from establishing in Laos any foreign military bases or strongpoints.
- 7. Refrain from using Lactian territory for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The behavior of the People's Republic of China after the fall of Nam
The was also compatible with Kennedy's operational objectives. Reversing their
behavior during the spring of 1961, when the Chinese openly encouraged the
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese to pursue their military superiority, Chinese
leaders eschewed any such offensive rhetoric and instead confined themselves
to warning the United States of the hazards of intervening in Laos. In an
official Chinese statement issued the day after formation of the Laotian
coalition government, Peking argued:

The development of the situation in Laos in the past year and more is convincing demonstration that the domestic aspect of the Laotian question can be settled reasonably only through peaceful consultations among the three political forces in Laos, and that no outside interference or attempts to impose one's will on others can succeed. (110)

On June 14, the <u>Peking Daily</u> printed an editorial stating that the new coalition government "will pave the way for completion of the work of the enlarged Geneva Conference and the realization of peace, independence and neutrality for Laos."(111) On July 23, China initialed the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos at Geneva.

In the days immediately after the fall of Nam Tha, North Vietnam's behavior also supported Kennedy's short-term operational objectives. No major military battles occurred within Laos after May 6, although a few minor skirmishes took place on May 27 in northwest and southern Laos. In a private conversation with Souvanna Phouma in Hanoi on June 16, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong stated that his government was "interested in easing Souvanna Phouma's tasks and would comply with any demands by the Laotian government."(112) The only exception would be, he implied, use of the infiltration routes through Laos into South Vietnam, which he candidly admitted the DRV employed for moving "contacts and cadrés, not military units." Even this matter could be resolved, Pham Van Dong argued, with resolution of the Vietnam problem in the manner envisioned by the original 1954 Geneva accords.(113) On July 23, Hanoi joined the thirteen other Geneva participants in ratifying the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The responses of the principal parties involved in Laos in the final days before the Geneva accords have historical significance beyond peaceful resolution of a minor military incident. U.S. actions represented in microcosm the general Kennedy administration response to the Communist threat in Southeast Asia: continued disengagement, with minimized costs, from the weak and relatively defenseless country of Laos, with simultaneous establishment of new and harder battlelines in the stronger nations of Thailand and South Vietnam. In May 1961, after reluctantly foregoing a military intervention in Laos to rescue the inept, pro-American regime of Phoumi and Boun Oum, Kennedy countered with a broad new commitment against further Communist gains in South Vietnam. In what the Pentagon Papers described as post-Laotian crisis reassurance of U.S. allies, on May 11, 1961, the White House secretly ordered 500 American military advisers to South Vietnam, a campaign of clandestine warfare against the North by CIA-trained South Vietnamese agents, and a doubling of U.S. military assistance to Vietnam. (114) While continuing with Laotian disengagement in spring 1962 through attempts to coerce the Lactian rightists into a coalition government, the administration mollified the troubled Thai government with the Rusk-Thanat communique. With U.S. perception of threats to both the face-saving Lactian disengagement and the new security pledges to Thailand resulting from Nam Tha's capture, the temporary dispatch of 5,000 U.S. servicemen to Thailand became another episode in a series of similar retrenchments.

The events of May and June were particularly fateful for American-North Vietnamese relations. The apparent Soviet assistance in urging the North Vietnamese to halt military operations reinforced in the minds of American decisionmakers the conviction that the USSR could be induced and had the power to influence Hanoi to call off military operations elsewhere, including

South Vietnam. This conviction had first emerged in the American perception of Southeast Asia in May 1961, when the USSR had helped by urging North Vietnam to accept the initial Lactian cease-fire. In drawing this conclusion, the Kennedy administration—as well as two succeeding American administrations—would badly underestimate North Vietnam's freedom of maneuver. Then, too, this misguided conviction failed to give adequate weight to the great psychological importance of South Vietnam to Hanoi or the convictions the North Vietnamese themselves would draw from their relations with the USSR. "This Soviet pressure, which was later viewed as a source of shame by the proud Vietnamese, made Hanoi less rather than more likely to let its actions be influenced by the Russians again." (115)

In fact, North Vietnam's conclusions on the utility of military operations in pursuit of political objectives, as drawn from the Lactian experience, most closely approximated those of China. From Peking's point of view, the last months before the Geneva accords constituted additional evidence that nothing was ever achieved at the conference table without struggle on the battlefield. Only when the U.S. "imperialists" and their Lactian "reactionaries" had suffered military defeat were they forced to accept the Geneva agreements.(116) China's conclusions did not, however, foreshadow any increased desire to become directly involved in the military events in Southeast Asia or any decreased wariness about military confrontation with the United States. In succeeding years, as in 1962, China remained satisfied with its indirect influence through Hanoi.

The events of May and June 1962, had more peaceful implications for future relations with the USSR. For Khrushchev, resolution of the Laos dilemma represented both the fruits of negotiations with the United States dating from spring 1961, and a major victory for his strategy of peaceful coexistence in a world of nuclear weapons. Hope for similar peaceful outcomes was voiced in his June 13 note to Kennedy:

The example of Laos indicates that provided there is desire to resolve difficult international problems on the basis of cooperation with mutual account of the interests of all sides, such cooperation bears its fruit.

At the same time, the results achieved in the settlement of the Laotian problem strengthen the conviction that success in solving other international problems which now divide states and create tension in the world can be achieved on the same road as well.

As to the Soviet Government, it has always adhered, as it does now, to this line, which in present conditions is the only correct policy in international affairs according with the interests of peace.(117)

In spite of the October missile crisis-set in motion by Soviet decisions made in March-the events in Laos were symbolic of both improving relations

between the USSR and the United States and the growing ideological rift between Soviet peaceful revolution and Chinese armed struggle. In compliance with the Geneva accords, the USSR withdrew from Laos the 500 military technicians it had had there since early 1961. During the following years, and despite renewed Laotian warfare that led to the covert reintroduction of U.S. forces, the USSR scrupulously adhered to the Geneva agreements and maintained proper diplomatic relations with the U.S.-supported government of Souvanna Phouma.(118)

The impact of the U.S. troop landings was perhaps greatest on American-Thai relations. As an action justified in terms of the March 1962 Rusk-Thanat communiqué, the response both reinforced the credibility of U.S. pledges and, more significantly, provided a major boost to the creeping U.S. commitment to Thailand. Despite the gradual withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Thailand between July and November, the military relationship between the two nations had been altered. As American Ambassador Young later described the situation, "the United States, in agreement with the Government of Thailand, made arrangements to leave all the necessary combat and logistical equipment ready in Thailand for another deployment."(119) When fighting broke out in Laos in May 1963, and again in May 1964, the United States moved its Seventh Fleet into the South China Sea and seriously considered combat deployments to Thailand. (120) By 1965, the American commitment had progressed to include a confidential U.S.-Thai Contingency Plan for U.S. defense of Thailand against military invasion, despite the absence of any congressionally ratified bilateral defense treaty between the two nations. (121)

The increasing U.S. commitment to the defense of Thailand and the escalating Vietnam War eventually led the Johnson administration to abandon Kennedy's distinction between the military defense of Thailand and direct U.S. defense of non-Communist Laos. By June 1964, the Johnson administration had embraced Thailand's preference for a policy of full participation in the Laotian fighting. The United States began a secret air war over Laos conducted from Thai airfields, and reintroduced U.S. and Thai army personnel into the Royal Lao Army. By 1969, the cost to the United States of participation in the secret war in Laos had reached an annual \$500 million, and Thailand had 5,000 "volunteers" on Laotian soil.(122)

The dispatch of U.S. combat troops to Thailand in May 1962, constituted an interesting benchmark in the accumulation of Presidential war powers in Southeast Asia. In April 1961, when faced with the decision of whether or not to commit U.S. troops into Laos as a means of deterring further fighting, Kennedy had consulted congressional leaders from both political parties at some length.(123) In May 1962, however, when faced with a comparable choice of whether or not to send combat troops to Thailand, with the decision of their becoming involved in fighting, Kennedy reached his decision without congressional consultation.(124) On the day the troops landed in Thailand, the President briefed congressional leaders on the decision he had taken three days earlier. It is equally noteworthy that this unilateral exercise of war power did not prompt a single negative statement by a member of Congress on presidential

usurpation of authority, to judge from the Congressional Record or principal metropolitan newspapers.

The landing of U.S. troops in Thailand had a marginal but positive influence on both public and congressional attitudes toward Kennedy. In a random survey of 200 Americans, the <u>Wall Street Journal</u> found Kennedy's action had "overwhelming support." At the same time, the newspaper found that

many feel the stand in Thailand against the Communists must not be extended into neighboring Laos, which is considered less defensible. And even people in favor of some action in Laos generally concede there is no point in trying to recover the areas currently controlled by the Reds.

About 20 percent of the more than 200 people interviewed were vague about the issues involved in the crisis.(125)

Support for Kennedy's neutralization policy and his attempt to avoid direct U.S. intervention in Laos held firm within Congress after the fall of Nam Tha. Floor criticism was confined to the more conservative members of the Republican party, and their complaints faded quickly after U.S. troops moved into Thailand. But the movement of U.S. combat troops in and out of Thailand had little lasting political influence. Its impact on the congressional elections of 1962 was soon swamped by the more emotional and important issue of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

In retrospect, it now seems clear that a Kennedy decision not to move U.S. troops to Thailand would have had little effect on the outcome of the military incident in Laos or the signing of the Geneva accords. North Vietnam, China, and the USSR--each for its own reasons--at least temporarily supported a political settlement of this international problem. Thailand would not have been noticeably dismayed by U.S. failure to dispatch combat forces. The Sarit regime had not sought such military action; recent diplomatic reassurances combined with the 2,000 American soldiers already in Thailand constituted ample evidence of the U.S. defensive commitment. Nor did Thailand perceive the direct relevance of U.S. combat to its most pressing concern of Communist insurgency. It now seems evident that the absence of a bold military response would not have posed a domestic political threat to the Kennedy administration either. The partisan impact of Laos turned on Kennedy's ability to prevent a total and highly visible military conquest by the Pathet Lao-Vietnamese forces. Because of the Communist nations' commitment to a neutral coalition government, the partisan threat was in fact a chimera. Kennedy had paid his political price in 1961 when he openly redirected U.S. policy toward Lactian neutrality. By May 1962, as the Wall Street Journal survey indicated, the American public had become highly sophisticated in distinguishing between the advisability of defending Theiland rather than Laos.

In retrospect, it does not seem likely that introduction of U.S. combat forces into the Mekong River valley of Laos--the maximum military response seriously contemplated by Kennedy -- would have materially altered the eventual outcome of the incident. As the State Department had calculated in May 1962. Communist forces in Laos and reserves in North Vietnam and China would have attacked U.S. forces only in response to a clear attempt to recapture territory already lost. (126) Introduction of U.S. troops might have complicated quick formation of a Laotian coalition regime -- because of heightened suspicions of the U.S. by the Communist nations and/or renewed stubbornness on the part of the Laotian rightists -- but the prevailing international unanimity as to the wisdom of temporary neutralization made probable an eventual political settlement short of war. Had the introduction of U.S. troops into Lacs permanently prevented completion of the Geneva accords, the likely effect would have been to accelerate the movement toward the de facto partition of the country that emerged in 1963 when the coalition government collapsed. U.S. military action in Laos short of combat with Communist soldiers would not have had an appreciable effect on American-Thai relations or on Kennedy's partisan fortunes beyond that which occurred as a result of the actual introduction of U.S. combat forces in Thailand.

Evaluation

Despite the apparent success of the movement of U.S. troops into Thailand in May 1962—the reestablishment of the cease-fire, the formation of a neutralist-led coalition government, and the eventual ratification of the Geneva accords on Laos—a careful analysis of the events indicates that the use of American armed forces had little influence on the outcome of the incident. Before the attack by Communist forces on General Phoumi Nosavan's troops at Nam Tha, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Pathet Lao officials had agreed to a highly limited military strategy designed to reactivate the long-stalled coalition negotiations. The limited nature of the Communists' objective is manifest in their failure to pursue further military action after the fall of Nam Tha and before the landing of U.S. troops in Thailand—that is, between May 6 and May 15. This unexpected opportunity did prove enticing for the Pathet Lao leaders, who had most to gain from toppling the Boun Oum-Phoumi regime.

In Vientiane six months later, Scuphanouvong revealed that a difference of opinion had existed within the NIHS Central Committee as to whether the Pathet Lao should press all the way to the Mekong after the collapse of Phoumist resistence.(127)

But it is also clear that any such decision in favor of a larger military campaign would have stimulated significant counterpressure from the USSR and possibly China and North Vietnam, all of which were both publicly and privately committed—at least temporarily—to the neutralization solution.

Phoumi's new flexibility on the terms of coalition government was not the result of American military action. By early May 1962, V.S. political and economic pressures against Vientiane were on the verge of success. As previously noted, three days <u>before</u> the fall of Nam Tha, the United States informed Souvanna Phouma that Phoumi was ready to drop his insistence on control of the defense and interior ministries. Whatever political intransigence Phoumi still retained on May 3 was quickly swept away three days later by the ignominious defeat of his soldiers at Nam Tha. Communist armed forces—not American combat troops—provided the final leverage needed to crush the rightists. In fact, a principal concern during U.S. troop landings in Thailand was the possibility that Phoumi might find in this action grounds for <u>reasserting</u> his independence from U.S. policy. U.S. military action was in this respect a <u>threat to</u>, rather than a support for, the complex political formula required to accomplish Kennedy's operational objectives.

In sum, Kennedy's ability to nudge the Laotian war toward a temporary solution acceptable to the United States can be ascribed to political, military, and economic action taken <u>before</u> May 15, and not to the actual landing of American combat troops in neighboring Thailand. Available evidence does not suggest that this U.S. military action endangered the successful conclusion of the Geneva accords in July 1962, but the danger remained that U.S. officials found proof of the utility of a particular military action where, in fact, none existed.

In the light of the concerns and interests that appear to have been salient for Kennedy during the May 1962 episode, the policymaking process by which the president reached his decision appears to have been oddly incomplete. During the days preceding the decision of May 12, no serious consultations were held with the Thai government to determine if Sarit desired such a show of force or if he considered it germane to the credibility of recent U.S. defense pledges. The available hard military intelligence did not imply the need for such action. As Hilsman himself notes, U.S. intelligence from Laos showed "no further troop movement" in the days after Nam Tha, despite Vientiane's exaggerated claims to the contrary. (128) Whatever Kennedy's personal concern about domestic political sentiment, he chose to consult only with Eisenhower--who privately recommended a strong military signal -- rather than to conduct a more comprehensive canvass of prevailing political opinion. In the end, the decision to land U.S. troops hinged heavily on the strongly advocated Harriman-Hilsman calculation--which now appears to have been in error-that "unless the United States responded promptly and effectively, the Communist side would be encouraged to step up their military effort."(129)

If the utility of U.S. military action in May 1962 can be strongly questioned, the broader intent of this armed response deserves higher praise. Kennedy was cognizant—probably more so than any of his principal advisers—of the limited utility of any show of force and the possible concessions that he might be forced to make to achieve his operational objectives. Even if

Communist forces had continued to advance in the weeks after Nam Tha, it is unlikely that Kennedy would have ordered U.S intervention until the capital of Vientiane was directly threatened. In March 1961, Kennedy had confided this fact to Arthur Schlesinger and Walter Lippman. (130) Kennedy's extreme care on May 15 to commit the United States only to the defense of Thailand reflected his determination to avoid inflexible obligations to the defense of Laos. Military action was to be employed—as it had been by the Communists—only to reactivate stalled negotiations, even if this required additional military losses.

Kennedy's overriding objective in Laos remained, as it had been since May 1961, a negotiated neutralist coalition -- whatever its uncertain affiliation and effectiveness -- which would permit the United States an honorable retreat from a strategically weak position. In 1961, some optimistic administration officials had thought of neutralization as an effective means of denying North Vietnam use of the Ho Chi Minh trails into the South. By May 1962, Kennedy and his principal advisers were much more realistic. Shortly before the October 7, 1962, deadline for foreign withdrawal of troops from Laos, when the International Control Commission had counted only forty departing North Vietnamese, Harriman told Kennedy that matters were going "just about as unsatisfactorily as we expected."(131) By 1962, Kennedy had retained few illusions about the likely costs of political compromise over Laos. When the tripartite coalition government disintegrated in 1963, leaving Souvanna Phouma's neutralists as well as Phoumi Nosavan's rightists allied with the United States, the outcome represented an unexpected victory for Kennedy's neutralization strategy, which helped to stabilize the military balance in Laos until 1969.(132)

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

In 1947, the Asian subcontinent, which now consists of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, was partitioned into the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan. Pakistan comprised the territory of West Pakistan, on the north-western border of India, and the separate territory of East Pakistan, located 1,000 miles to the east and encircled by eastern India. The division into states had been made on the basis of divergent religious and cultural nationalities, with both East and West Pakistan ruled by Muslims, and India by Hindus.

Since 1947, the two nations have waged three major wars against each other. In 1947 and again in 1965, fighting occurred over control of the state of Kashmir, which lies between northwestern India and West Pakistan. When Kashmir's Hindu maharaja ceded authority over his predominantly Muslim nation to India in 1947, Pakistan and India went to war. The fighting ended with Kashmir temporarily partitioned along a fire line supervised by UN forces. In 1965, a second inconclusive war for Kashmir occurred.(133)

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 concerned principally the territory of East Pakistan -- now independent Bangladesh. Political tension had existed between East and West Pakistan since 1947. West Pakistan had a history of firm control by a traditional Muslim plutocracy. Political and social events in East Pakistan were increasingly influenced by the Bengalispeaking Muslim middle class of professionals and merchants. The Bengalis of East Pakistan increasingly saw themselves as the victims of economic exploitation by the West, the traditional seat of political authority. Trade between the two was one-sided, the East typically supplying raw and semiprocessed materials to the West, while repurchasing finished products. Legal restrictions on the foreign purchase of competitive finished products and an overvalued national currency contributed to the East's large trade deficit with the West. What foreign exchange was earned from Eastern exports was centrally managed in the Western capital of Islamabad and used largely to finance foreign imports to West Pakistan. These factors, coupled with the West's superior geography, climate, and educational system, led to a widening economic gap between the two regions. In 1960, the per capita income of West Pakistan was 32 percent higher than that of the East; by 1970, the West's per capita income stood 61 percent higher.(134) By 1970, the fragile political and religious ties between the Bengali-dominated East and Punjabi-dominated West were rapidly disintegrating.

The national elections held in December 1970, caused the decisive break between the two regions. In March 1969, after months of domestic agitation against the decade-old military dictatorship of General Ayub Khan, a military coup brought to power General Yahya Khan, who promised eventual civilian rule and a more equitable social order. In the December 1970 national assembly elections, the Awami League party, headed by Bengali nationalist leader Sheikh Mujib Rahman, unexpectedly won all but two of the East's allotted seats. The Awami League's platform included political autonomy for the East within a highly decentralized Pakistani federal structure. The election results thus constituted a political disaster for both Yahya Kahn and Ali Bhutto, leader of the West's majority Pakistan People's party. Bhutto persuaded Yahya to postpone temporarily the National Assembly, which was scheduled to convene in March. Mujib responded with a general strike and a campaign of civil disobedience in the East. Amidst political wrangling over the date and location for convening the National Assembly, Pakistan troops were secretly airlifted to the East. By March 25, when Yahya announced that the opening of the assembly was indefinitely postponed, some 80,000 progovernment armed forces were in the East.

On the evening of March 25, after a day of bloody military battles between Bengali nationalists and West Pakistani units, Sheikh Mujib was arrested for treason. While Bengali liberation radios proclaimed the new independent state of Bangladesh, Yahya Khan ordered the forcible reimposition of political order in the East. Despite international protests by India, the USSR, and other nations about widespread West Pakistani atrocities against the Bengalis, by mid-April formal military resistance within East Pakistan had been temporarily suppressed. The nucleus of a large Bengali guerrilla

army, however, had safely crossed into neighboring India. In Calcutta, capital of the Indian state of West Bengal, the escaped deputy leader of the Awami League established a provisional government-in-exile for Bangladesh.(135)

From March to December 1971, the Pakistani civil war was marked by the deaths of some one million East Pakistani civilians and increasing Bengali guerrilla warfare against the occupying troops from the West. As the death toll mounted, some 10 million Bengalis fled for safety to the Indian states bordering East Pakistan. This massive influx of refugees placed a severe financial burden on India-despite international relief assistance-and increased India's stakes in the outcome of the civil war. New Delhi provided increasing economic and military assistance to the Mukti Bahini, the Bangladesh freedom fighters, operating from Indian soil. In October, Pakistani armed forces moved up to the India-East Pakistan borders in an effort to control infiltration by the Mukti Bahini. In response, India concentrated regular military forces in strength in the frontier zones along the East Pakistan-India borden. By November, border confrontations--mortering and shelling, tank engagements, and jet aircraft duels--between Pakistani and Indian troops along the eastern border had become frequent. (136)

In the months before the war, both India and Pakistan attempted to consolidate their international support. On August 9, India officially concluded a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the USSR. Late in October, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began a six-netion tour of Europe and the United States designed to communicate the gravity and urgency of the refugee problem and to demonstrate that the new Indo-Soviet treaty had not altered India's professed international neutrality. Simultaneously, Ali Bhutto led a senior delegation of Pakistani leaders to Peking to obtain an increased commitment from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to Pakistan in the event of war with India. At the United Nations, Pakistan pressed for the establishment of an international peacekeeping force along the India-East Pakistan border as a means of protecting East Pakistan, but the USSR blocked such efforts within the Security Council.

On December 3, in an apparent attempt to defend the beleaguered East through offsetting territorial gains in the West or by inducing the great powers to impose peace along the Banladesh border to obviate a full-scale international war, Pakistan launched a major air and ground offensive on Indian military forces stationed along the West Pakistan-India border. In response, India quickly settled for a defensive military strategy in the West, but a decisive, liberating military offensive against Pakistani units in the East. On December 5, the United States began attempts to obtain a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council; the USSR twice vetoed such proposals. India extended diplomatic recognition to the new, independent state of Bangladesh on December 6; Pakistan immediately terminated diplomatic relations with India. On December 8, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces to their own sides of the border, but Yahya Khan's hopes that the great powers would collectively intervene to stop the war did not materialize.

Late on December 10, in a move designed to signal U.S. resistance to any Indian military offensive against West Pakistan, the United States dispatched a ten-ship naval task force from the Seventh Fleet off South Vietnam toward the Bay of Bengal. This late military action by U.S. armed forces proved counterproductive. By December 15, when the task force reached the Bay of Bengal, India had already eliminated Pakistani military resistance in the East, established and air and sea blockade isolating East Pakistan, and unilaterally chosen to confine its attention in the West to the long-disputed territory of Kashmir. The effects of U.S. military action were to prompt precautionary military countermeasures by India, intensify Indian animosity toward the United States, increase Indian-Russian diplomatic and military cooperation, and encourage Pakistani leaders to delay the transfer of power in the East to Bengali nationalists.

After thirteen days of fighting in Bangladesh, the Pakistani army surrendered on December 16. On December 17, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a unilateral cease-fire along the stalemated West Pakistan front. Gandhi's order was reciprocated that same day by Pakistani President Yahya Khan.

In January 1972, the United States withdrew its naval task force from the Indian Ocean. The United States recognized the new state of Bangladesh on April 4, 1972, but American diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on India during the December 1971 war left U.S. relations with India tense and difficult during the years that followed.(137)

U.S. Behavior

The behavior of the U.S. government during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war was dictated by both the very personal concerns of President Richard M. Nixon and the broader strategic threat to the United States posed by the possible disintegration of the nation of Pakistan. U.S. favoritism toward Pakistan before and during the December war was to some extent an extension of Nixon's own affective relationships with the warring nations. His antipathy toward India dated from the Eisenhower administration's negative appraisal of India's international neutrality in the cold war and from Nixon's indifferent receptions in that country while vice president. During the 1960 presidential campaign, the Indian press had endorsed the candidacy of John Kennedy. On a private trip to India soon after his narrow loss to Kennedy, Nixon felt insulted by the meager attention given him by the Indian government. His relations with Prime Minister Gandhi had always been cool. When Nixon met briefly with Gandhi on his 1967 global tour, the Indian prime minister could "scarcely conceal her boredom with her visitor."(138) Visiting New York, in October 1970, for the United Nations' twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, Gandhi declined Nixon's invitation to dinner at the White House with scant explanation. During her state visit to Washington in November 1971, a month before the war, Gandhi contributed to an already

tense atmosphere by refusing Nixon's request to pull back Indian troops from the East Pakistan border. She then criticized administration policy on the Bengali refugees at a White House reception to which Nixon had invited several of his vocal congressional opponents. (139)

Nixon's coolness toward India was a marked contrast to his warm feelings for Pakistan. He, more than any other senior member of the Eisenhower administration, had advocated U.S. arms assistance to Pakistan in 1954. On his private visits to Pakistan after his 1960 election defeat and again in 1967, he was accorded lavish and friendly welcomes. Meeting Pakistani President Yahya Khan in August 1969, Nixon asked Yahya to serve as a "courier" between Washington and Peking, to explore the Chinese leaders reactions to Nixon's tentative moves to improve Sino-American relations. Yahya's successful service as the White House's secret channel to Peking between August 1969 and July 1971, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stopped in Pakistan on his way to China, steadily increased Nixon's appraisal of and debt to him. In Washington on October 25, 1970, Nixon observed to Yahya that "nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me." (140).

China's diplomatic alignment with Pakistan and against India -- dating from the 1962 Chinese-Indian border war--provided Nixon additional personal incentive for favoring Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani war. The President's opening toward China was crucial both to his vision of a new, more complex international balance of power orchestrated from Washington and to his domestic political claim to superiority as an international statesman. During the months after Nixon's July 15 announcement that he would make his historic first visit to Peking, the administration devoted extraordinary efforts to avoiding any possible barriers to successful completion of the trip. Provocative U.S. intelligence operations were suspended. Kissinger returned to Peking during the week of October 20-26 to resolve remaining technical details. On October 25, with Kissinger still in Peking, the U.S. government stood aloof while the United Nations evicted Taiwan from its seat in the UN General Assembly. Only five days before the full-scale outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war, the New China News Agency officially announced agreement to February 21 as the date for Nixon's arrival in China. When the war broke out on the subcontinent on December 3, it logically followed that the administration would be heavily influenced by its desire to avoid any last-minute strain in relations with China--suggesting a U.S. policy favoring China's ally Pakistan.(141)

The personal attitudes aroused by the combatants and the war's sensitive relationship to the coming China visit made Nixon take extra care to be sure that his subordinates were clear as to the general direction he wished U.S. policy to take. As assistant to the President for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger informed the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on December 3, the day war began,

I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. (142)

The Indo-Pakistani War, however, engaged fundamental strategic interests of the U.S. government transcending Nixon's attitudes toward the combatants or his rapprochement with the PRC, and these fundamental concerns became increasingly important to all senior officials—Nixon and Kissinger included—when India seemed assured a quick victory in the East. By December, the White House had already conceded India's and the Mukti Bahini's success in Bangladesh; as Kissinger noted at the WSAG meeting on December 4, "Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan."(143) But at the next WSAG meeting on December 6, the Nixon-Kissinger fear of an even more profound shift in the world balance of power was evident. If it achieved a military victory in the East, the White House wondered, would India shift its forces from East to West, assume the offensive, and seize large portions of West Pakistan from its traditional rival? According to Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger

believed that if Pakistan were to disintegrate under Indian economic and military pressure, then India would completely dominate the subcontinent, Soviet influence would skyrocket, the strategic balance would be disrupted, China would become alarmed, and a major war. involving the big powers, could erupt. (144)

At the WSAG meeting on December 6, Kissinger alerted the departmental officers to the fact that "it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated."(145) At the next meeting of WSAG on December 8, Kissinger articulated the White House strategic perception:

If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces [in the West] we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. (146)

In the light of the White House's affective, political, and strategic stakes in the viability of an autonomous Pakistan, the administration quickly adopted as its principal objective a policy of deterring India from taking offensive military action against West Pakistan. This approach encountered minor opposition from other senior U.S. officials. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and East Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco was frank in questioning the necessity for U.S. deterrence. At the important WSAG session on December 8, Sisco tactfully parried Kissinger's contention that India might be attempting "to force the disintegration of Pakistan." According to minutes of the session,

Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that [Indian] Foreign Minister Singh told [American] Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it might also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory. (147)

But Sisco found little overt support for his doubts among other senior officials. Only Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard reinforced Sisco, and then on the basis of the likely effectiveness of the Nixon-Kissinger deterrence policy, rather than on the more fundamental issue of India's true intentions.

Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.(148)

Outside of Washington, the major critic of U.S. involvement on the side of Pakistan was, to no one's surprise, American Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating. Throughout the war, in a stream of cables to Washington, Keating urged a policy of "genuine neutrality" and reported that U.S. covert favoritism was "having no appreciable effect on Yahya and was confusing the Indians."(149) But Keating's efforts were partially offset by comparably empassioned pro-Pakistani appraisals forwarded to Washington by the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland.

In general, however, the principal actions of the U.S. government during the war were dictated by Nixon and Kissinger. During the months preceding November, most senior State Department officials had been preoccupied by the seemingly more important issues east and west of the subcontinent. Sisco and his bureau personnel had themselves been largely absorbed with Secretary of State William P. Rogers' attempt to carve out a role as a constructive mediator in the explosive Middle East. Planning within the National Security Council (NSC) system had been dominated by the negotiated withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the diplomatic breakthrough with China. When the December war broke out, decisionmaking was quickly centralized at the top of the NSC system, where Nixon and Kissinger were able to dominate discussion and options. The continuous series of WSAG meetings "served as a mechanism both to legitimize the 'tilt' policy formulated by Nixon and Kissinger and to ensure White House policy was understood by those officials responsible for implementing various manifestations of the tilt."(150)

Before, and to a lesser extent during, the fourteen-day December war, Congressional and public opinion narrowed the magnitude of executive discretion--particularly with respect to U.S. policy as formally declared. Since 1967, because of the constant tension between India and Pakistan, an official American embargo had been imposed on the shipment of all "lethal" military equipment to Pakistan. Although the Nixon administration announced termination of the limited U.S. military assistance program to Pakistan in April 1971, \$35 million of "nonlethal" military assistance already contracted for, and the cash sale of such "nonlethal" items as trucks, transport aircraft, communications equipment, and ammunition to Pakistan continued until Congressional pressure in early November forced the administration to revoke these

export licenses. Congress registered similar disapproval of Pakistan's bloody civil war in July, when the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted against the 1972 appropriations for development aid to Pakistan.(151)

Domestic political pressure on the Nixon administration may have slowed down open diplomatic support for Pakistan against India until the December war, but it did not deter covert administration favoritism toward Islamabad. According to Joan Hochman, Nixon himself privately announced his "tilt" policy to the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) at a meeting in mid-September.(152) Once full-scale conventional warfare began on December 3, the administration abandoned its pretense of neutrality and the pro-India sentiment of Congress and the public had little impact on the private manifestations of the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt."

From December 3 onward, the Nixon administration explicitly communicated its general conclusion that India was principally responsible for the war, and that the United States intended to deter any Indian military action against West Pakistan. On December 4, as Marvin and Bernard Kalb recount,

State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey summoned the Saturday morning contingent of reporters into his second-floow office. Sisco, looking uncomfortable, stalked into the room, carrying his White House instructions from Kissinger. "India bears the major responsibility" he charged, "for the broader hostilities which have ensued."(153)

At the United Nations on December 5 and 6, U.S. Ambassador George Bush sponsored cease-fire resolutions calling for the withdrawal of all troops to their own sides of the border. These resolutions effectively favored the retreating Pakistanis. Bush let it be known to reporters that the U.S. government considered India clearly "the major aggressor."(154) In response to public criticism of the Nixon administration's anti-India statements, Kissinger convened a press background briefing on December 7 to elaborate on White House policy. Kissinger disclaimed any anti-India bias, but at the same time made it clear that the administration considered India's military attack on East Pakistan unnecessary, asserting "we believe that what started as a tragedy in East Bengal is now becoming an attempt to dismember a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations."(155)

Nixon's and Kissinger's fears of India's military intentions in West Pakistan were given fuel on December 8 with the report by CIA Director Richard Helms:

Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a UN call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad [Pakistani-controlled] Kashmir. It is reported that, prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities. (156) The next day, according to Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger twice summoned Indian Ambassador L.K. Jha to the White House, displayed the CIA intelligence report on Gandhi's intentions, and demanded that India reconsider this action. (157) Meanwhile, Under Secretary of State John Irwin cabled the American Embassy in India: "In view of intelligence reports spelling out Indian military objectives in West Pakistan, we do not want in any way to ease Indian Government concerns re help Pakistan might receive from outside sources." (158)

At the United Nations on December 12, U.S. Ambassador Bush presented a letter to the President of the Security Council that argued: "With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a member-State of the United Nations." During Security Council debate, Bush called for "a clear and unequivocal assurance" that India does not intend to annex Pakistan territory and "change the status quo in Kashmir." (159).

That same day, December 12, Nixon and Kissinger chose to broaden their deterrence communications to include the USSR. As they flew to the Azores for a summit meeting with French President Georges Pompidou, they instructed Jacob Beam, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry that Nixon would have to reconsider his scheduled visit to Moscow if the USSR allowed India to carve up West Pakistan. On the return flight from the Azores on December 14, with the war still raging and no word from the Soviet foreign ministry, Kissinger confidentially informed the travelling pool of White House reporters that if the USSR did not restrain India within a few days, "the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship might well be reexamined." The importance of the statement led The Washington Post to ignore Kissinger's usual anonymity and to name him directly as the source of the ultimatum. (160)

Parallelling the administration's increasingly specific and threatening verbal communications during the war was a carefully tailored escalation of U.S. economic and military sanctions designed to give both credibility and potency to the punishment implied in the oral communications. On December 1, in the light of the increasing number of military incidents along the East Pakistani borders, the Nixon administration announced cancellation of export licenses for \$2 million in arms bound for India and a freeze on all future licenses for arms to India. (161) When full-scale war broke out on December 3, the United States escalated its economic sanctions. That day Nixon ordered suspension of all pending development loans for India and suspension of \$72 million in Public Law 480 credit assistance. (162) Three days later, Charles Bray, a State Department official, announced the suspension of \$87.6 million in development loans to India, stating that the United States "was not going to make a short-term contribution to the Indian economy to make easier for the Indian government to sustain its military efforts." (163) At the December WSAG session, Kissinger inquired "what the next turn of the screw might be" in the light of India's potential military

threat to the West. Maurice Williams, deputy administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID) and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard explained the difficulties associated with canceling foreign assistance already committed through irrevocable letters of credit to U.S. suppliers. Kissinger instead ordered AID to exclude from the coming fiscal year budget any requests for assistance from India.(164)

These decisions involved significant sums, but the total impact on the \$64 billion Indian economy was predictably small. One is forced to conclude that Nixon and Kissinger were attempting to signal the possibility of more severe economic and military sanctions if India continued its military offensive, rather than trying actually to cripple the Indian economic base. Not suspended during the war were \$30 million in U.S. project aid loans to India for specific purposes and \$105 million in commodity import assistance. Moreover, at the international financial institutions during December and January, American representatives did not interfere with the normal extension of new loans and credit to India.(165)

Following the administration's policy of progressive escalation of threats, Kissinger inquired at the WSAG meeting on December 6 and 8 into the legality of authorizing Jordan or Saudia Arabia to transfer previously supplied American weapons to Pakistan. The congressional ban on direct transfer of lethal weapons precluded any deliveries of replacement arms from the United States. Although State Department spokesman U. Alexis Johnson referred to such action as a "token" gesture unlikely to narrow substantially the Pakistani defense gap, it is clear that Kissinger had in mind the demonstrative impact of such outside involvements. Acting under Kissinger's orders, Under Secretary of State John Irwin sent cables to the American embassies in India, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Pakistan instructing that

we do not want in any way to ease Government of India's concerns regarding help Pakistan might receive from outside sources. Consequently, embassy should henceforth give GOI no repeat no assurances regarding third country transfers. (166)

When, in response to Yahya Khan's pleas, Jordan's King Hussein privately asked the administration to agree to the transfer of eight Jordanian F-104 jets to Pakistan, Nixon ignored the consensus of the WSAG members and secretly authorized Jordan's transfer of ten American-supplied planes to Pakistan. (167) Libya chose to send American-supplied F-5 jets to Pakistan as a show of Islamic solidarity without requesting U.S. approval. (168)

From thoughts about American arms assistance—to the extent that it was politically viable—Nixon and Kissinger soon progressed to thoughts about a direct demonstration of American arms. During the last days of November, as fighting escalated in East Pakistan, the U.S. Defense Department had expanded the operational zone of the Seventh Fleet to include the Bay of Bengal. When word arrived in Washington on December 8 that the Indian Cabinet was discussing a possible military offensive against West Pakistan,

Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on 10 December to assemble in Malacca Strait a United States task force, spearheaded by the aircraft carrier <u>Enterprise</u>, the Navy's most powerful ship. (169)

The four Soviet ships already in the Bay of Bengal were overshadowed by U.S. Task Force 74 of the Seventh Fleet, assembled off Singapore. It consisted of the Enterprise, the world's largest attack carrier, with seventy-five nuclear-armed fighter-bombers on board; the amphibious assault carrier Tripoli carrying a Marine battalion-landing team of 2,000 troops and twenty-five assault helicopters; three guided-missile escorts, the King, Decatur, and Parsons; four gun destroyers, the Bausell, Orleck, McKean, and Anderson; and a nuclear attack submarine. (170) Countries along the intended route of the task force were informed in advance of the ships' movements, so word of the implied American threat reached New Delhi as early as December 11.(171) During the night of December 13-14, Task Force 74 went through the Strait of Malacca. On December 15, the U.S. combat ships entered the Bay of Bengal. Washington announced that day that the task force might help evacuate Pakistani forces from the East after a cease-fire. Despite the official end of the Indo-Pakistani War on December 17, Task Force 74 remained in the Indian Ocean until January 1972, when its ships retired to their original stations off Vietnam and at Subic Bay in the Philippines. (172)

Target Behavior

U.S. behavior during the December war was directed toward the three targets of India, the USSR, and China, with India the principal target of U.S. action. While the war against Pakistan found India firmly united behind the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Congress party--as indicated by the party's sweep of the national elections in March 1971--Gandhi was under considerable domestic pressure to give direct economic and military assistance to the Bangladesh independence movement. The international dispute over East Pakistan had engaged a number of major Indian interests. Pakistan's weakened condition presented India with the opportunity to establish itself as the sole power on the Asian subcontinent and the chance to recoup national prestige lost at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. The fighting also posed major threats. Pakistan's diplomatic alignment with China meant that any war risked renewed fighting with China. During the year, India's relations with the United States had deteriorated as word leaked of continuing U.S. shipments of nonlethal military equipment to Pakistan, and as the Nixon administration steadily improved relations with India's adversary, China. Faced with the possibility of a war with Pakistan that would put India against the combined opposition of the United States and China, New Delhi felt compelled to seek countersupport from the USSR. The rapid consummation of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, only three weeks after Nixon's July 15 announcement of his forthcoming trip to Cairo, was a major step in this direction. But this counterbalancing strategy also threatened India with the possible loss of international neutrality and flexibility by hardening its alliance with the USSR (173)

The most pressing problem of the war was that of the East Pakistani refugees, and the solution of this matter governed India's behavior before and during the December war. Between late March and early December, an estimated 9.5 million Bengali refugees crossed into India to escape the genocidal fighting. By late 1971, the financial burden on India of providing refugee assistance had reached \$3 million a day. Only part of that cost was offset by international relief contributions.(174)

Even more worrisome to the government in New Delhi, however, was the mounting potential for violence in India. The Indian state of West Bengal, to which most of the refugees had fled, was a Muslim-dominated state, politically and economically unstable in the best of times. During 1971, West Bengali Muslims grew increasingly resentful that the East Pakistani refugees, many of them Hindus, received better food, shelter, clothing, and medical care than did the native Indians themselves. Gandhi was aware of the growing potential for violence, and assured the West Bengalis that she had "no intention of , allowing them [the refugees] to settle here; neither have we any intention of asking them to go back merely to be butchered."(175) To avoid either of these undesirable alternatives, however, required a resolution of the East Pakistani civil war on terms favorable to the Bengali nationalists. By the time the government in Islamabad ordered the military attack in the West, the Indian government was strongly motivated, as well as militarily prepared, to impose a quick solution to the Bangladesh problem that would permit refugee resettlement. War with Pakistan provided the necessary opportunity.

The Nixon administration's vigorous campaign at the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of opposing forces during the war's first days alerted the Indian government to the U.S. objective of preventing "forceful dismemberment" of a longtime ally. India registered its perception of this objective in several fashions. On December 6, Indian Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul summoned American Ambassador Keating to inform him of India's "shock and surprise" at the stand the United States was taking in the United Nations. (176) Two days later, a senior Indian official rejected Kissinger's claim that India's military action had undercut promising opportunities for a political resolution of the East Pakistani problem, and described U.S. proposals for a political settlement as "neither new nor realistic." (177) The fact that U.S. policy was widely known was indicated by a demonstration on December 7 outside the American embassy by thirty members of the Indian Parliament protesting U.S. attempts to arrange a cease-fire through the UN Security Council. (178)

When the Nixon administration shifted its attention toward the more feasible objective of deterring major Indian military action against West Pakistan, the Indian government quickly sought to signal that it had no desire to destroy the sovereignty of West Pakistan. At a Washington news conference on December 3, the Indian ambassador to the United States told reporters that India wanted "neither Pakistani territory or people."(179) In response to Kissinger's assertion at the WSAG session on December 8 that an Indian attack on Pakistani forces in Azad Kashmir (the Pakistani state of

Kashmir) would be equivalent to "a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan," Assistant Secretary Sisco reminded Kissinger that "Foreign Minister Singh told Ambessador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory." (180)

The Nixon administration continued to push for unequivocal assurances of West Pakistani sovereignty, and the Indigan government sought to provide these. At a massive public rally on December 12, Prime Minister Candhi said in words meant for Washington:

We are not facing this grave danger... because we want to occupy somebody's territory or we want to destroy some nation. We have never wanted this. We have never wanted any nation, including our neighbor, to be destroyed.... We are not fighting to occupy any country's territory or to destroy it. I repeat this because propaganda of this kind is being spread in the world to discreditus. (181)

At the United Nations that same day, in response to Ambassador Bush's demand for "a clear and unequivocal assurance that India does not intend to annex Pakistan territory and change the status quo in Kashmir," Indian Ambassador Swaran Singh replied that "India has no territorial ambitions in Bangladesh or in West Pakistan."(182) Other major states, such as the United Kingdom and France, were persuaded by the veracity of Indian assurances despite their knowledge of U.S. intelligence. India's last attempt to mitigate the Vhite House's suspicion of its intentions came on December 15. In a personal letter to Nixon sent on December 15 and released to the public the next day, Candhi wrote: "We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangladesh. We do not want territory of West Pakistan."(183) On December 15, the day Gandhi's letter arrived in Washington, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey told the press that India still had not replied to a U.S. request for assurances that it would not move on West Pakistan after defeating the Pakistanis in the East.(184)

On December 11, the Indian government learned of the White House's decision the previous day to organize a naval task force for possible use in the Bay of Bengal. The extension of the Seventh Fleet's operational zone to the Indian Ocean the previous week had alerted New Delhi to possible initiatives by U.S. naval forces. News of the organization and tentative destination of Task Force 74 appears to have reached India via other governments in the region that Washington had informed of the pending U.S. force movement.(185) New Delhi obtained confirmation of U.S. naval activities on December 12 through intercepted Pakistani communications as well as from news reports arriving from Southeast Asia. In a story dated December 12, the New York Times reported from Saigon that the Enterprise and several escort ships had left Vietnamese waters on December 10 for the Strait of Malacca to await final instructions there before proceeding up the Bay of Bengal.(186)

The Indian government may have learned quickly of the organization and destination of Task Force 74, but it found it extremely difficult to interpret

the purpose of the naval force, or credibly to link its mission to Nixon's objective of deterring military action against West Pakistan. For some four days, Indian defense officials pondered the likely purpose of the U.S. task force; apparently they never reached a definitive conclusion. Instead, the Indian government chose to take precautionary military measures against those probable American actions it considered most threatening. It quickly discarded the Defense Department's formal explanation, made both in Saigon and by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in Washington, that Task Force 74 was part of contingency planning for the evacuation of some 47 Americans who voluntarily remained in Dacca after the British Air Force evacuated 114 U.S. nationals on December 12.(187) The Indian government considered it improbable that the United States would not consult India before sending into the war zone a powerful armada including a nuclear powered and armed aircraft carrier, for the sole purpose of evacuating fewer than fifty Americans. (188) The idea that the naval task force intended forcibly to break the Indian blockade of East Pakistan-either to link U.S. Marines with Pakistani troops or to escort Pakistani reinforcements to the East--was also quickly rejected on the grounds that this would risk war with the Soviet ships in or near the Bay of Bengal. It seemed to Indian government officials that Nixon did not have enough political support in the United States for a presidential war against India. (189) They felt that the task force might be intended merely to divert Indian naval and air attention away from the Pakistanis, but they thought the best response to this contingency was to disregard the American ships and to increase military efforts toward a quick conclusion of the war. (190)

The most plausible military mission for the U.S. task force, in the official Indian view, was to evacuate Pakistani troops to the West before the fall of Bangladesh. The presence of the American amphibious assault carrier Tripoli, with its helicopters and Marine battalion, seemed to imply such a mission. Indian intelligence in Washington and Dacca reported discussions and preparations for evacuation. On December 15, the Pentagon officially stated that the U.S. task force might help to evacuate Pakistani troops after a cease-fire. Indian military planners expected the evacuation to be carried out either by a U.S. helicopter airlift of the Pakistani officer corps to the American flotilla or by a more massive troop evacuation on numerous small vessels from East Pakistani harbors under the protective umbrella of Task Force 74. Either possibility was cause for grave concern, for it would place India in the position of having to initiate military action against nonbelligerent American forces. To prevent any such peaceful evacuation, the Indian Air Force was quickly ordered to destroy all ships in East Pakistani harbors, to keep all East. Pakistani airports under constant attack to deter possible helicopter landings, and to make preparations to sink any Pakistani troop ships attempting to link up with the U.S. task force. By December 15, New Delhi was convinced that these operations would make it impossible for the U.S. troops to link up with Pakistani troops unless American forces first initiated military action against the Indian Air Force and Navy -- an action they felt the United States was unlikely to take because of the political and military risks involved. When Bangladesh fell on December 16, a large number of Indian leaders and citizens

were convinced that the American task force would in fact have attempted an evacuation of Pakistani troops to the West if India had not taken preventive military countermeasures and if East Pakistani resistance had not collapsed so quickly. (191)

Few Indian officials seem to have given serious thought during the war to the possibility of a link between the movement of U.S. naval forces and the principal Nixon-Kissinger objective of impressing New Delhi with the dangers of any major military action against West Pakistan. While gunboat diplomacy was temporarily considered as a possible motive for U.S. naval action, the target of this threat was seen not as Indian action in the West, but as ongoing Indian advances in the East. And in the light of India's existing commitment in the East and its imminent military victory, this misapprehension of U.S. intent merely stimulated increased defiance on the part of Indian officials. (192) In fact, East Pakistan's hopeless military position convinced New Delhi that evacuation, and no gunboat diplomacy, was the true motive behind U.S. naval action. The Indian government's confusion was wholly understandable. Washington's official explanations of the task force emphasized evacuation operations in the East rather than deterrence in the West. The Indian government thought it had made it clear to the Nixon administration in numerous authoritative communications that it did not entertain major ambitions in the West. In this respect, the Indian government drew the important distinction between offensive military action designed to consolidate control over the long-disputed territory of Kashmir, versus offensive action designed to undermine the sovereignty of West Pakistan. The Indian government assumed that the Nixon administration perceived and appreciated this distinction. Finally, the movement of Task Force 74 seemed potentially relevant to events in East Pakistan, but geographically remote to events in the West. From the Bay of Bengal, U.S. naval air power was a full 1,300 miles from the Western battle front. (193)

In the end, Gandhi and her advisers chose to stop short of her contemplated goal of retaking some or all of Azad Kashmir. While this action conformed to the objective of the Nixon administration, the available evidence suggests that India's motives in not attacking Azad Kashmir were unrelated to the activities of the U.S. naval task force. According to Chopra's detailed analysis of the Indo-Pakistani War,

The political advantages of an immediate and unilateral cease-fire, partly conceived in terms of prestige, were weighed against the military advantages of inflicting further attrition on the enemy and capturing some crucial territorial point. Within a few hours Mrs. Gandhi consulted senior cabinet colleagues, the three Chiefs of Staff, and leaders of the main Opposition parties in Parliament. [Foreign Secretary] Swaran Singh, who was still in New York, was consulted over the telephone. In varying degrees nearly all of them preferred the political advantage, Swaran Singh most of all because, he said, such a gesture would put India's critics in the wrong and the effect of the adverse vote in the UN would be greatly diluted. The Soviet Union had the same preference. . . . its preference was for an immediate cease-fire because of the isolation in which it was placed at the UN by the vote in the General Assembly.(194)

Furthermore, India was not interested in pressing its luck with the People's Republic of China, which had begun troop movements along India's northern border and had issued two sharp warnings to New Delhi on the morning of December 16. But Gandhi's call for a cease-fire in the West was unrelated to the military threat the United States attempted to convey through its naval operations in the Bay of Bengal. Military counteraction by both India and the USSR soon offset some of the coercive impact of Task Force 74, and most concerned parties felt the threat of U.S. intervention on the subcontinent lacked credibility. What effective deterrence the United States was able to exercise against the Indian government was grounded not in military threats but in the international political isolation that attached to India and the USSR as a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

A secondary target of U.S. deterrence strategy during the fourteen-day war was the USSR, India's principal ally during the last months of 1971. Because of the Sino-Soviet rift and the strategic location of India and Pakistan on China's southern border, the USSR had pursued closer ties with both subcontinent powers simultaneously since the mid-1960s. In 1966, Moscow played an important role as mediator between the two countries, sponsoring the meetings at Tashkent that concluded the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. At the World Congress of Communist parties in Spetember 1969, Communist Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had proposed an "Asian collective security system," which most leaders took to be a Soviet attempt to line up India, Pakistan, and other Asian nations against China. (195)

The beginning of the Pakistani civil war in March 1972 found the USSR still pursuing its good neighbor policy with both Pakistan and India, and during the next months Moscow tried to avoid taking sides in the dispute over East Pakistan. From April through July, Moscow made several amicable signals toward Pakistan: a Soviet agreement to double imports of Pakistani leather, a Soviet commitment to construct a Pakistani steel mill, continued Soviet economic aid, and private Soviet communications implying that Moscow saw the civil war as an "internal affair."(196) At the same time, in deference to India's sentiments, the USSR strongly urged Pakistan to find a quick political solution to the civil war "in the interest of preserving peace in the area"—possibly through direct negotiations with Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League, as demanded by India.(197) Although the USSR discontinued its shipments of arms to Pakistan in 1970, it maintained substantial deliveries of arms to India throughout 1971.

The USSR was nudged from neutrality in the dispute during the summer of 1971 by Pakistan's active cultivation of Chinese support against India and by Nixon's dramatic breakthrough in relations with China. Pakistan's efforts to gain a public commitment of Chinese military action against India in the event of an Indian attack on East Pakistan and China's willingness to lend both political and material support to Pakistan steadily eroded the Soviet incentive to remain neutral. In addition, Nixon's July 15 announcement of his

China trip opened the door for possible collaboration between China and the United States in support of the two nations' mutually prefered client, Pakistan. In August, when alarmed Indian officials approached the USSR for offsetting support, Moscow saw advantages in strengthening its political relationship with New Delhi. On August 9, a twenty-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in both capitals. Article IX of the Treaty stipulated:

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assitance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries. (198)

The treaty did not, however, mean complete Soviet commitment to India's position on East Pakistan. In private conversations with Indian officials, Soviet officials tirelessly advocated military nonintervention in the civil war.(199) Soviet support for Indian military action was impossible because of Moscow's simultaneous courtship of the Islamic states of the Middle East. The "Islamic Republic of Pakistan," with the world's largest Muslim population, The "Islamic Republic of Pakistan," with the world's largest Muslim population was fully supported in its dispute with India by the Arab (Muslim) states of the Middle East. Nor was the USSR eager to harm its improving relations with the United States, in the light of their mutual interests in strategic arms control, a Berlin treaty, and expanded economic relations. On October 12. with the USSR anxious to counter improving relations between China and the United States, Nixon announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow in the latter part of May 1972. Given this array of international interests, the most that Moscow was able to concede to the Indian government in regard to the Pakistani civil war was India's right to adopt unilaterally whatever means it deemed necessary to relieve the political and financial pressure placed on it by fighting. Meanwhile, from August 9 on, the USSR would provide through its UN Security Council membership an effective shield against imposition by the United Nations of a political settlement to the civil war that was unsatisfactory to India. (200)

The USSR did not become a major target of U.S. signaling until the last days of the Indo-Pakistani war, when Nixon and Kissinger concluded that India intended to attack West Pakistan and that direct American leverage against Gandhi's government was insufficient to prevent this. Before December 13, Moscov had received at least two noteworthy indications of the Nixon administration's desire to induce the USSR to "restrain" India from military action. In November, Nixon had sent a personal letter to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin urging superpower restraint in the escalating crisis. Then, on December 7, in a background press briefing, Kissinger said in response to questions about the diplomatic impact of Soviet support for India:

We believe that the basis of a peaceful evolution with the Soviet Union requires that both countries exercise great restraint in the many crisis areas around the world and that they both subordinate short-term advantages to the long-term interests of peace.

The attempt to achieve unilateral advantage sooner or later will lead to an escalation of tensions, which must jeopardize the prospects of relaxation. We hope that the Soviet Union will use its undoubted influence to approach problems in the subcontinent in the same spirit and not to jeopardize the very hopeful evolution that has started by a short-term approach. But we are still waiting to see. We have no judgment yet.(201)

Not until December 13, when U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam carried to the Soviet foreign ministry the Nixon-Kissinger message that the President's trip to Moscow might be jeopardized by India's "dismemberment" of West Pakistan, did the U.S. government make clear the overriding objective of U.S. diplomatic and military pressure. (Beam's mission was preceded on December 12 by Ambassador Bush's demand at the UN that India publicly declare that it had no territorial ambitions in West Pakistan and Kashmir). After December 13, Moscow received several reiterations of U.S. objectives. With the collapse of East Pakistan at hand, Kissinger privately informed the White House press pool on December 14--with an eye to signaling Moscow--that

the U.S. is definitely looking to the Soviets to become a restraining influence in the next few days. But if the Russians continue to deliberately encourage military actions, a new look might have to be taken at the President's summitry plans. (202)

Although White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler that same evening officially denied speculation that the United States was considering concellation of the Moscow summit, he did confirm that this might occur under a "highly hypothetical altuation:"

If the Soviets continued to support Indian military action and the Indians should move into West Pakistan, this could very well affect future relations with the Soviet Union. But we have no reason to suspect this will occur. We have every expectation the fighting will stop in South Asia.(203)

By December 13, the Soviet leaders were generally aware of the Nixon administration's primary objective. On the day Beam carried the Nixon-Kissinger message to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet Ambassador to India Nikolay Pegov informed the Indian government that, in the USSR's estimation, "the movement of the Seventh Fleet is an effort by the U.S. to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan, and at the same time boost the morale of the Pakistani forces." (204) Although Moscow's evaluation

of U.S. objectives was less ominous than New Delhi's less accurate surmise that Task Force 74 was assembled to evacuate Pakistani troops, Pegov made it clear that the USSR was interested in preventing escalation in the West. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Soviet ambassador advised New Delhi on December 13 that

India should try to occupy Bangladesh in the quickest possible time and that it should then accept a cease-fire . . . that India has achieved a marvelous military victory, Pakistan is no longer a military force, and it is therefore unnecessary for India to launch an offensive into West Pakistan to crush a military machine that no longer exists. (205)

According to Marvin and Bernard Kalb, after the war Kissinger took this and other U.S. intelligence as proof

that the warning from the plane [by Nixon and Kissinger on December 12] had compelled the Russians to lean on India, and that the cease-fire was a result of this pressure. By claiming that he had "saved" West Pakistan, Kissinger could assert that he had rescued an ally of the United States and a friend of China, and that his new "leverage" magic had worked to advance American interests on the subcontinent; the balance, however tenuous, had been preserved, and Moscow had been taught still one more lesson about global responsibility. (206)

Kissinger's analysis assumes that the Indian cease-fire was motivated by Soviet pressure, rather than by the other Indian diplomatic and military interests indicated above. The available data suggest that Kissinger was mistaken. Several days before the end of the war, the U.S. military attaché in Nepal reported that conversations with Indian officials convinced him that after victory in the East, Indian forces would withdraw to their prewar positions in the West, provided Pakistan did the same.(207) Even while warning on December 8 of a possible Indian offensive in the West, the CIA reported that the "Indian Government hopes that all major fighting will be over by the end of December 1971," which would certainly have been impossible if India had entertained any major military objectives in the West.(208) Indian scholar Pran Chopra argues, based on extensive interviews with senior Indian officials, that by the time the USSR made known its preference for a cease-fire in West Pakistan Gandhi and her advisers had already reached a similar position largely independent of Soviet opinion.(209)

Whether or not the USSR brought effective pressure on New Delhi to forego an offensive in the West, it is important to emphasize that Soviet and Indian support for a cease-fire was not the result of U.S. military pressure generated by Task Force 74. When they first received word of Task Force 74 on December 11, Moscow and New Delhi decided to exchange high-level diplomatic missions as a sign of mutual support under the terms of Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. On December 11, D.P. Dhar, Chairman of India's foreign policy planning committee left for Moscow, while Soviet First Deputy

Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov left with a five-member delegation for Delhi.(210) CIA intelligence reports from New Delhi indicate that U.S. military pressure on Moscow was ineffective. According to the CIA, Soviet Ambassador Pegov informed Indian officials on December 13:

Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene.

Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene. (211)

Pegov's claim was backed by action. When the war broke out, the USSR had a minesweeper and a destroyer in the Indian Ocean nearing end of their routine six-month tour, as well as a conventional attack submarine and a tank landing ship. When an additional Soviet destroyer and minesweeper arrived in the Indian Ocean on December 5 for routine relief of duty, Moscow decided to maintain all six ships in the war zone. On December 7, two additional Soviet combat ships were dispatched from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean: a cruiser armed with surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SSM) and a submarine armed with anti-ship missiles. (212) Formation of U.S. Task Force 74 on December 10 did little to deter the USSR from further military action; U.S. behavior, in fact, seems to have had the effect of escalating Soviet actions. On December 13, as Pegov was informing the Indian government of the USSR'; pledge to prevent intervention by the Seventh Fleet, a second Soviet anti-carrier task force--a cruiser armed with SSMs, a destroyer, a submarine armed with SSMs, and and attack submarine -- was organized at Vladivostok and dispatched toward the Bay of Bengal (213)

Whatever Soviet pressure was applied to India appears to have been motivated by considerations other than fear of .U.S. military action. As Chopra indicates, the USSR's preference for Indian acceptance of a cease-fire in West Pakistan was heavily influenced by the political "isolation in which it was placed at the UN by the vote in the General Assembly."(214) Two vetoes cast by the USSR on December 5 were required to prevent Security Council passage of a binding resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all troops to their own sides of the border. On December 7, with frustration running high at the inability of the United Nations to act, the UN General Assembly—acting under the "Uniting for Peace" procedures for the sixth time in its institutional history—overwhelmingly approved (104 to 11) an Argentine resolution calling for a cease-fire and troop pull-back. On December 13, with India still advancing, the United States reintroduced a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council, forcing the USSR to cast its third blocking veto.

This solitary defense of India against the tide of international sentiment proved particularly embarrassing to Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East. The Arab states brought heavy diplomatic pressure on Moscow to modify its UN position, not only because of Pakistan's Islamic culture, but also because

Soviet opposition to the UN-mandated withdrawal of Indian troops seemed to weaken a similar 1967 UN resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands.(215) The USSR hoped to avoid the prolonged rupture in political relations with Pakistan that was likely to follow from its acquiescence to an Indian attack on West Pakistan. Moscow still hoped for close relations with both subcontinent powers at the expense of China; its month-long delay in recognizing the independent state of Bangladesh underscored its eagerness to avoid a full diplomatic break with Pakistan. The military threats that might have influenced the USSR to counsel Indian restraint did not originate from the United States, but from the People's Republic of China. Although Moscow did not expect China to intervene because of events in Bangladesh, an attack on West Pakistan—the only nation friendly with the PRC on its vulnerable western border—would seriously have risked Chinese intervention.

The PRC was apparently also a target of U.S. behavior during the December 1971 war, although concrete evidence of this is admittedly limited. Kissinger's trips to China in July and October and the announcement on November 29 of Nixon's arrival in Peking on February 21 make it difficult to imagine that latent concern over last-minute complications did not give the White House added incentive for signaling its full support for the two nations' common client, Pakistan. Henry Brandon, a well-informed White House correspondent, has gone so far as to argue that

perhaps more than anything it was the new relationship with China that influenced the President and Dr. Kissinger. It gave them a vested interest in maintaining the integrity of Pakistan, allied with a desire to show Peking that cooperation with the United States can have its advantages. (216)

The WSAG documents make no reference to administration concern over relations with China, but sensitivity to China's position can be detected in Kissinger's December 14 background briefing of White House reporters: "Asked what the Soviet motive is in its behavior on the India-Pak war, Kissinger said it is apparently to humiliate China-to show the world that China cannot prevent what is happening in Pakistan." (217) Kissinger indicated that Nixon shared this evaluation. (218)

The primary Chinese interests engaged by the Indo-Pakistani War were the desire to deny any major expansion of Soviet power in southern Asia and the needs to preserve Pakistan as a viable buffer and a partial counterbalance to India's growing power. The official conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on August 9 increased China's concern over encirclement from the north and south by the USSR and India. Peking saw the erosion of Pakistani strength on the subcontinent as a further tightening of the circle.

During 1971, China provided Pakistan with extensive diplomatic, economic, and military assistance in its growing dispute with India, but like the USSR,

China remained wary of making any firm military commitment to its subcontinent client over war issue. In a letter of April 13 that governed PRC policy throughout 1971, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai wrote President Yahya Khan:

should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence. (219)

Chou's commitment failed to refer to Chinese defense of Pakistan's "unity"—a term that came to be viewed as synonymous with East Pakistan—nor did it mention direct armed support. Despite Pakistani pressure, the PRC refused to increase its public commitment during succeeding months. In India, Chinese behavior was interpreted to mean continued material support from the PRC for Pakistan's efforts in the East, but direct Chinese military support only if Pakistan's very existence was threatened in the West. (220)

No direct evidence emerged during the war of China's appraisal of U.S. operational objectives or use of military forces. During this period, the official Chinese media were filled with belligerent attacks on Soviet and Indian "social imperialism" in Pakistan and on the two nations' refusal to accept the UN General Assembly resolution for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. It may be possible to infer, from the absence of official Chinese comment on U.S. policy in the subcontinent during these two weeks, a generally favorable reaction in China to the U.S. position favoring Pakistan. In fact, from December 3 through December 17, the only official Chinese reference to U.S. action was a statement that the UN Security Council session on December 13 had been convened at the request of American representative Bush to consider a U.S. cease-fire proposal.(221) An additional indication of a generally favorable Chinese response to U.S. policy might be Peking's announcement on December 13 of the release of CIA spy Richard Fecteau and U.S. citizen Mary Harbert and the reduction of the life sentence of CIA spy John Downey.(222)

Although the meager evidence available suggests that Peking viewed Washington's pro-Pakistan policy favorably, there is also some later indication that China did not fully endorse the U.S. military signaling in the Bay of Bengal, particularly when subsequent events suggested that the U.S. naval presence would not be temporary. On December 29, in an article entitled "Sovietandary U.S. Step Up Expansion, Aggression in the Indian Ocean," the New China News Agency also took the opportunity to criticize the presence of U.S. naval power in the Indian Ocean:

When the Indian aggressor troops, armed with Soviet weapons, were pressing toward Dacca, U.S. imperialism in contention with social-imperialism for hegemony over the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, made a show of force to the Soviet Union and India by dispatching an aircraft carrier and some other warships of its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. . . . Soviet revisionism recently accused U.S. imperialism of pursuing a "gunboat policy," declaring that "the Indian Ocean is not an American lake." But at the same time it regards the Indian Ocean as a "Soviet lake" and frantically pursues a social-imperialist "gunboat policy" by dispatching its own task force there to contend with U.S. imperialism for domination over the Indian Ocean.

The aggression and expansion in the Indian Ocean by Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism has long aroused the strong discontent and opposition of the medium-sized and small countries in Asia and Africa. (223)

Chinese criticism intensified when the Defense Department announced on January 6 that Task Force 74 would temporarily remain in the Indian Ocean to counter the Soviet naval presence and that U.S. naval operations would be expanded in the region. In a January 14 article on the "U.S.-Soviet Scramble for Hegemony in South Asian Subcontinent and Indian Ocean," Peking Review warned:

As our great leader Chairman Mao teaches us, "The imperialist wolves must remember that gone for ever are the days when they could rule the fate of mankind at will and could do whatever they liked with the Asian and African countries." The affairs of the South Asian subcontinent can only be handled by the peoples of the area. No domination or carving up of the area by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will be tolerated.(224)

Peking was thus not as enthusiastic about the arrival of U.S. troops as the White House might have anticipated.

During the second week of the Indo-Pakistani War, with China's own concern over Indian-Soviet intentions in West Pakistan increasing, Peking chose to make its own veiled show of force-apparently without intentional coordination with U.S. military moves to the south. Evidence of Chinese military preparations was first reported in Washington on December 10. Interpreting Chinese radio transmissions gathered by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, the CIA stated:

On 8 and 9 December, an air net terminal for Tibet and West China was noted passing hourly aviation surface reports to Peking for 11 Chinese civil weather stations along routes and areas adjacent to the border of India. . . . The continued passing of weather data for these locations is considered unusual and may indicate some form of alert posture. (225)

The CIA also noted that "war preparation" efforts had been observed in Tibet during the past months, and that the 157th Infantry Regiment of Yatung, Tibet, had just recalled its personnel to carry out an "urgent mission." (226) Later that night, the U.S. military attaché in Nepal cabled from Katmandu that "the Indian high command had some sort of information that military action was increasing in Tibet" and that "both the USSR and India embassies have a growing: concern that PRC might intervene."(227) During the next two days, both Indian and American intelligence intercepted high-level Pakistani communications informing Eastern military commanders not to accept a cease-fire in the light of imminent military assistance "from the north and the south." In New Delhi on December 13, official Indian spokesmen informed the press that Chinese troop movements of unknown size had begun at two points along the mountainous northern border. (228) On December 16, China increased the military tension both by formally protesting to the Indian government an alleged crossing of the China-Sikkim boundary by Indian soldiers and by issuing a major government statement calling "absolutely impermissible" India's desire "not only to swallow up East Pakistan, but also to destroy Pakistan as a whole."(229) Later that day, before diplomatic and military escalation could proceed, Gandhi announced a unilateral cease-fire in the East and a cease-fire in the West for the following morning.

Third Party Behavior

Pakistani President Yahya Khan did have a major role in the outcome of the Indo-Pakistani War, but he was not an intentional target of U.S. military signaling during the fourteen days of fighting. Yahya became president of Pakistan in March 1969, when he led a military coup against long-time dictator Ayub Khan. He centralized civilian and military authority under his leadership to an unprecedented degree, proclaiming himself not only president but also commander-in-chief, chief martial law administrator, minister of defense, and minister of foreign affairs. (230) After the disastrous national assembly elections in December 1970, Yahya further centralized authority by dissolving his Cabinet. According to the former Pakistani communications minister, by this action Yahya became

completely dependent upon bureaucrats and generals who provided only those reports and assessments that were pleasing to the ears of their boss. Yahya, like Ayub before him, demonstrated the military dictator's paucity of sources for honest, independent, and accurate advice. This lack of good advice was largely responsible for Yahya's incredible errors during the crisis, and for the immense suffering that resulted. (231)

Yahya was representative of the interlocking commercial-military-bureaucratic elite that had dominated Pakistani political affairs sinc? 1947. The members of that elite were the principal beneficiaries of the inequities between West and East Pakistan and had an overwhelming incentive for maintaining the Pakistani status quo.(232) Like most Westerners, Yahya and his military backers underrated the determination of the traditionally less martial Bengalis. He also underestimated the legitimacy of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as spokesman for Bengali aspirations. With regard to India, Yahya allowed himself to see the crisis as a personal test of strength with New Delhi's female prime minister and as a holy war against Hindus. "If that woman thinks she can cow me down," he told a visiting Chinese delegation, "I refuse to take it. If she wants a war, I'll fight her!"(233) After Yahya's poorly organized air strike against Indian forces in the West on December 3, The Pakistan Times proclaimed: "Plainly Islam is the issue between India and Pakistan. Only those qualify to fight the battle of Pakistan who are prepared to fight the battle of Islam. . . . For us there is no choice but to fight, if need be to the last man."(234)

American-Pakistani relations reached a low ebb in late 1965, when the Johnson administration suspended military and economic assistance to Pakistan and India during the Kashmir war. Relations gradually improved as the United States resumed its economic assistance and modified the arms embargo to permit sale of spare parts and non-lethal supplies. During Nixon's presidency, ties continued to improve, largely because of changing U.S. policy toward China. On his summer tour of Asia in 1969, Nixon stopped briefly in Pakistan. He privately told Yahya of his determination to open a diplomatic dialogue

with China, and asked him to be his conduit to Peking. When the two presidents met again in October 1970, Nixon asked Yahya Khan to inform the Chinese leaders of Washington's desire to open direct American-Chinese talks "at a high level." From December 1970 until July 1971, Yahya served as middleman in a secret exchange of presidential notes between Washington and Peking that culminated in Kissinger's secret visit to China during a three-day "visit" to Pakistan.(235) Yahya Khan remained convinced throughout 1971 that his role as liaison between them ensured that Peking and Washington would bail him out of any international problem into which he stumbled. When Pakistan's former communications minister asked Yahya in September 1971 about the growing crisis with India, he was assured that "both Chinese and Americans will help us, how could they forget our services in the last two years." This happy delusion persisted when war began.(236)

Yahya's diplomatic strategy rested on the assumption that the great powers and the United Nations would intervene to prevent or halt a dangerous subcontinent war from spiraling out of control. This might be accomplished by setting up a UN Observer Group similar to the one that had supervised the Kashmir truce line since 1949. Yahya's assumption gained support early in the war, when the United States and China sponsored UN resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel to their own sides of the border. But the UN role quickly fell afoul of a series of Soviet vetoes in the Security Council. At that point, the Pakistani governmen, made a direct appeal for unilateral intervention by its allies. On December 9, a "ranking Foreign Ministry official" in Islamabad "called on the world at large, particularly the big powers, to take appropriate action against what he charged was 'naked and barbarous aggression' by India," according to the New York Times correspondent in Pakistan. (237)

Yahya saw as the first signs of an affirmative response to his call for help the creation of Task Force 74 on December 10 and rumors of Chinese troop movements along India's northern border. Yahya's optimistic interpretation of U.S. intentions may have been the result not only of his services for the White House, but also of misleading information from his close friend, U.S. Ambassador Joseph Farland. (238) Whatever the primary explanation, American and Chinese military maneuvers gave Yahya the reinforcement he needed to cling to his great power strategy. On December 10, Pakistani military commanders in the East requested authorization from Islamabad for a transfer of power to the clearly victorious Bengalis. But the next day, acting on its conviction about American and Chinese intentions, Islamabad radioed its Eastern commanders that there would be no cease-fire. That evening a government spokesman explained to newsmen that "Pakistan has evoked understandings and agreements with other countries to meet the situation created by India's naked aggression." (239)

Unrealistic expectations of a saving intervention lingered for several more days. According to Pakistani Prime Minister Nurual Amin, "even a day before admitting the loss of East Pakistan, Yahya Khan assured me that our forces were in control and were expecting a Chinese intervention and the American Seventh Fleet any moment." (240) Presidential reassurances such as

these affected the expectations of other West Pakistanis. On December 13, Pakistani news services misleadingly reported that "President Nixon yesterday sent to the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, a categorical warning raising the possibility of direct American intervention in the Indo-Pakistan conflict."(241) On the morning of December 17, twelve hours after official surrender in the East, Rawalpindi's leading newspaper plaintively asked if there was still a chance of military help from the United States Seventh Fleet and from China.(242) These false hopes postponed by several days-possibly as many as five--the official surrender of Pakistani forces in the East.

A second unexpected effect of Task Force 74 on Pakistani attitudes after the war was resentment of the misleading U.S. military signals. The depth and duration of such resentment are impossible to judge, but it is clear that the U.S. military action only diminished the gratitude the United States had won among Pakistanis during the first week of the crisis by its vigorous attacks on India in the United Nations. (243) Informed Pakistani opinion, like that in India, found it difficult to decipher the White House's objectives for Task Force 74. Writing in <u>Pakistan Horizon</u> immediately after the war, a senior professor at Karachi University could only conclude:

The purpose of the diversion of the naval vessels was not too clear. Was it to pressurise [sic] India into agreeing to a cease-fire in West Pakistan, or was it to impress upon the Soviet Union that its presence in the Indian Ocean would not be allowed by the United States to go unchallenged? (244)

During the December war, neither India nor the USSR accepted U.S. attempts to impose a cease-fire and troop withdrawal in East Pakistan. The gravity and urgency of the Bengali refugee problem and the domestic commitment to liberation ruled out compliance by India, and the USSR was unwilling to risk its political capital with India for the sake of marginally improved relations with the White House. The subsequent and more realistic U.S. objective of deterring a major Indian military offensive against West Pakistan met with greater success. Despite India's early inclination to step up operations in West Pakistan after victory in the East--if only to strengthen its hold on Kashmir--it undertook no major operations in the West after the cease-fire in the East on December 16. (Even then, India occupied more than 2,500 square miles of West Pakistani territory before December 17; this land was returned under the Simla agreements of July 1972). This second administration objective was aided by the USSR, which made known to the Indian government its strong preference for a cease-fire in West Pakistan after Indian liberation of the East. To the extent that U.S. behavior was guided by the objective of protecting its fledgling relationship with China, one must conclude that Chinese behavior conformed to that desired by Nixon. Nixon's trip to China proceeded

without incident and officially inaugurated a new era of diplomatic cooperation between the two nations.

The permanent effects of the Indo-Pakistani War on U.S. external relations are clearly visible only in the instance of the relationship with India. The formation of the impoverished and unstable state of Bangladesh proved to be of little significance to the security of the United States. No major U.S. alliance system was materially altered by the war. Pakistan had effectively withdrawn from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1965, when the Johnson administration refused to deliver aid during the Kashmir war; its official withdrawal from SEATO in November 1972 merely formalized the status quo. As the WSAG concluded during the December war, the United States had no legal obligation to protect East Pakistan from India under the charter of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In the light of recent political pressures from the USSR, however, Pakistan has demonstrated some renewed interest in closer relations with Iran, Turkey, and the United States within the CENTO alliance structure. (245)

The Indo-Pakistani War did not have a lasting effect on U.S. bilateral relations with the USSR or China. Compared with strategic arms, economic relations, Vietnam, the Middle East, or Taiwan, policy toward the Asiar subcontinent was of marginal importance to U.S. relations with Moscow and Peking. This might not have been the case if the USSR had been able to exploit militarily the events of December 1971 after the war. But in the end. India proved unwilling to abandon its military nonalignment to r∈pay Soviet military and diplomatic help. The USSR has been unable to transform its Indo-Soviet Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty into the first link in the formal Asian collective security system -- the Russion SEATO--long championed by Brezhnev. (246) Despite Moscow's urging, New Delhi has refused to grant rights for naval bases for Soviet ships. And India has continued to join with other littoral states of Asia in pressing for creation of an Indian Ocean "zone of peace," which would exclude American and Soviet naval power. (247) The USSR has also been unable to obtain a military toehold in Bangladesh. Moscow has, in fact, lost influence recently as a result of the military coup removing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the increasing political and military tension between Bangladesh and India. (248)

Although U.S. relations with the USSR and China were not significantly influenced by the Indo-Pakistani war, U.S. relations with India were. While the Nixon administration's "tilt" was not the beginning of deteriorating relations with India, its behavior during the 1971 war greatly accelerated the downward spiral.

The vigorous and open White House support for Pakistan came as a profound shock to New Delhi, and triggered anti-U.S. sentiment throughout India. Indian hostility has since been directed not only at the U.S. government--its foreign policy, diplomats, AID, CIA, and Peace Corps--but also at American scholars, businessmen, journalists, students, and tourists. (249) Strong official criticism of Washington's decision in February 1975 to lift its ten-year embargo

on the sale of lethal arms to the subcontinent can be traced in part to New Delhi's continuing sensitivity to the events of 1971. India's opposition to U.S. plans for expanded naval facilities on the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia is reinforced by memories of American gunboat diplomacy during the December war.

The relevance of the 1971 war to American relations with Pakistan lies in the basic continuity of U.S. policy since that time. Salvaging what it could from defeat, the Nixon administration chose to demonstrate its continued concern for the security and well-being of new Pakistan be selling nonlethal military supplies and extending economic assistance. Simultaneously, it attempted to mitigate the adverse impact of this assistance on U.S. relations with India. The decision in February 1975 to resume the cash sale of lethal arms to Pakistan, over India's protests, indicated a similar willingness by the Ford administration to aid Pakistan militarily, at some cost to relations with India. With Islamabad still unwilling to accept the status quo in Kashmir, and with the USSR and China siding with India and Pakistan respectively on the issue, the potential remains for another awkward U.S. choice among subcontinent combatants.

While the foreign impact of the administration's behavior was mixed, the domestic effects were uniformly negative. A Louis Harris survey found the American public disapproved of Nixon's handling of the crisis by a two-to-one margin. (250) It seems evident that this negative evaluation was caused by behavior contrary to the public's self-image--that is, by official support of a brutal military regime against the world's most populous democracy. The administration's conduct did not, however, have a major impact on Nixon's position within the Republic party, his chances for reelection in 1972, or the success of other political candidates. Despite widespread public opposition to the White House's policy or the subcontinent, by the time of the election, the subject was unimportant in comparison with Nixon's most popular stands on Vietnam. China, the USSR, and arms control.

The most profound domestic effect of the administration's behavior was on its relations with the Washington political community. Both Nixon's and Kissinger's credibility with Congress and the news media were adversely affected by the contradictions between the White House's professed neutrality in the war and the anti-Indian tenor of its public actions and confidential deliberations. The inconsistencies reinforced earlier suspicions caused by White House claims of a total embargo on arms for Pakistan and later discoveries of continuing pipeline deliveries. The numerous leaks from press conferences and secret documents during and immediately after the crisis also indicated the adverse impact on legitimate confidentiality that accompanied Nixon's attempts to exclude Congress and the bureaucracy from effective participation in policymaking. The longer-term impact of the White House exclusiveness practiced during the Indo-Pakistani War and other occasions would be felt in the War Powers Act and the Congressional attempt to impeach Nixon.

A decision by the Nixon administration not to deploy Task Force 74 into the Bay of Bengal would have favorably affected U.S. international interests, but it would not have altered the domestic political consequences of administration policy. Much of the anti-U.S. backlash in India during and after the war resulted from the White House's heavy-handed attempt to intimidate the Indian government by displaying naval force. The absence of U.S. military power would have done much to reduce the visibility of U.S. opposition to Indian policy, and would have complicated the Soviet attempt to portray itself as New Delhi's indispensable protector. There is no strong evidence to suggest that India would have made major acquisitions in West Pakistan in the absence of U.S. forces. The crucial deterrents appear to have been international political pressure and the possibility of Chinese military involvement. An additional factor may have been the obvious problems associated with assimilating millions of embittered Pakistani Muslims. Future U.S. relations with China or Pakistan would not have been much affected by the absence of Task Force 74; both nations considered the flexing of U.S. naval power in the Indian Ocean to have been a mixed blessing at best. The adverse domestic consequences of the White House policy had little to do with the deployment of naval power, however. The hostile reactions of the general public, Congress, and the news media grew out of disagreement with the administration's pro-Pakistan foreign policy and the deceptive packaging of that policy to minimize public opposition. Strong disagreement with the administration's policy was evident long before the creation of Task Force 74.

Only the most massive military intervention by the United States could have significantly altered the tide of events in the Indo-Pakistani War. The outcome in East Pakistan owed as much to local political dynamics and the military efforts of the Mukti Bahini as it did to the external power of the Indian government given so much credit by the Nixon administration. Once full-scale war was launched on December 3, the U.S. capacity for military deterrence was eliminated. An attempt by Prime Minister Gandhi to reverse the war decision would have threatened her regime's existence. With military resistance in the East eliminated in ten days of fighting, the United States was confronted with a fait accompli reversible only through military strength beyond the capacity of U.S. forces in Asia. U.S. intervention would have required military action against Soviet naval forces; it would have abruptly ended superpower cooperation on numerous issues more vital than the disposition of the subcontinent. The dependence of the new American-Chinese relationship on Peking's assumption of a diminishing U.S. military presence in Asia meant that U.S. intervention on the subcontinent -- even in support of China as an allymight well have ended the Washington-Peking dialogue. Most important, both India and the USSR had correctly calculated that the post-Vietnam redefinition of U.S. interests and ability to influence foreign events, combined with the general war weariness of the American public, precluded any sustained U.S. military action on the Asian subcontinent.

Evaluation

As we have indicated, although both India and the USSR decided against a major Indian offensive aimed at West Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that this conformity with the U.S. objective was a result of the deployment of U.S. nava forces. The Indian government failed to perceive a link between U.S. Naval operations in the Bay of Bengal and the President's determination to deter military action in the West; instead, New Delhi chose to interpret the American action as an attempt to evacuate Pakistani forces from East Pakistan. India's decision not to launch a major offensive in the West was dictated by its political isolation at the United Nations, its fear of Chinese intervention, and, apparently, diplomatic pressure from the USSR. A similar conclusion must be drawn with respect to Soviet behavior. Although it is clear that the USSR advised Gandhi against an attack on West Pakistan, this advice was not motivated by the arrival of U.S. naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. Moscow's principal concern was the impact such a war might have on its other interests -- with the Arab states, with the United States, with the international community generally. The USSR dismissed the possibility of U.S. military intervention on the subcontinent. Finally, U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China continued to improve after the Indo-Pakistani War. but there is no evidence that the U.S. naval presence contributed to this trend. The vociferous U.S. condemnation of India at the United Nations, in tacit coordination with the PRC, was more than sufficient to demonstrate U.S. support for the line China favored. With even Peking hesitant to back Islamabad's genocidal war against the Bengalis, there is no reason to believe that China took the deployment of U.S. forces as a test of good faith. In fact, the U.S. task force appears to have interjected a minor note of discord into U.S .-Chinese relations because of Peking's backing for the Third World movement to create an Indian Ocean zone of peace barring superpower naval forces.

The deployment of U.S. forces did stimulate hostile political and military responses by India and the USSR antithetical to Washington's desire for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces in the East. Learning of the formation of Task Force 74, the Indian government quickly invoked the defensive provisions of the new Indo-Soviet Treaty through the exchange of high-level diplomatic missions. Gandhi's public speeches adopted the new message that India would not be intimidated by outside powers. The Indian Air Force began destroying the East Pakistani ships and airfields that would be needed to evecuate personne to the approaching U.S. task force. The net effect of Task Force 74 was to drive India closer to the USSR, arouse anti-American passions, and prompt effective military countermeasures, without securing for Washington any additional leverage over the direction of events in East Pakistan.

The appearance of U.S. naval forces did nothing to induce greater Soviet cooperation on the war in the East, but it did present Moscow with a low-risk opportunity for a psychological victory over Washington. Calculating that there was a negligible chance of actual U.S. intervention, the USSR responded to word of Task Force 74 with assurances of protection to New Delhi and with a large-scale

naval deployment, which put twenty-six Soviet ships into the Indian Ocean by December 31. The final collapse of Pakistani resistance in the East, with both Soviet and American naval forces looking on from the Bay of Bengal, conveyed the illusion of Soviet deterrence of American intervention, and also suggested a lack of resolve on the part of the more powerful American task force. This imagery was given strength by the U.S. failure to communicate intelligibly to India and other parties the relationship it intended between Task Force 74 and events in the West.

The unintended impact of U.S. military action on Pakistan has been noted; the creation of Task Force 74, in combination with similar military preparations by China, gave the desperate Yahya Khan the misleading impression of imminent allied intercession. The effect was to postpone by several days Islamabad's acceptance of a cease-fire in the East. Moreover, the false hopes engendered by American and Chinese preparations heightened many Pakistanis' disappointment in the United States and China when the external help promised by Yahya Khan failed to materialize at the conclusion of the war.

Even within the context of the Nixon-Kissinger value system, little merit can be found in the deployment of U.S. naval forces during the Indo-Pakistani War. The attempt at coercion through the threat of military punishment was doomed to failure, because the conditions requisite to such a strategy were absent. First, while Task Force 74 contained substantial gross military capability, the exact nature and positioning of this capability made it of little relevance to the war. By December 14, when Task Force 74 was c'idered through the Straits and into the Bay of Bengal, the fighting in the East was effectively over. Only a massive introduction of American ground troops could have reversed the outcome. Yet as Chopra informs us, "The Indian navy estimated that the American force had a limited capacity for sustained action on land. . "(251) The threat was appropriately downgraded. While the rough stalemate in the West made the introduction of naval air power from Task Force 74 potentially germane, its location in the Bay of Bengal, some 1,300 miles from the Western battle front, made the actual use of this power impossible. In general, the United States did not have effective and usable military options on the subcontinent because of the neture and positioning of its forces. Second, if the effectiveness of the U.S. threat was in doubt, its redibility was even more dubious. The imbalance between the very limited U . interests on the subcontinent and the very high cost of U.S. intervention was simply too great to support a credible threat of force. This widespread perception was fully reinforced by the absence of a public or private statement from Nixon, Kissinger, or Rogers threatening the introduction of U.S. military power. Thirdly, the war weariness and pro-Indian sentiment of the American public made domestic political support inadequate for a credible threat of intervention against India. Chopra indicates that the Indian cabinet drew the appropriate conclusion: "The Prime Minister and her senior-most advisers ruled out the . . . possibility on the basis that a lame duck President would not dare risk a mainland war with India on an issue on which he carried an even smaller proportion of visible domestic support than he did on Viet Nam."(252)

In general, the contextual pattern of the crisis was unsuited for inducing in the minds of Indian and Soviet officials a fear of unacceptable military escalation by the United States. In the absence of the required conditions, the Nixon administration's military choice was not so much the one identified by Packard as "either doing something effective or doing nothing," as it was of doing something ineffective or doing nothing. Apparently this lack of leverage was recognized to a degree by the White House. "We realized full well," states Nixon's 1972 Foreign Policy Report, "that there were objective limits to what the United States could do. South Asia was a region in which we had no preeminent position of influence." (253) Despite this, and somewhat mysteriously, the White House made the militarily ineffectual choice.

The lack of wisdom manifest in the U.S. force movement is compounded by the recognition that the White House's own objectives were full achievable without the resort to counterproductive military threats. Nixon's desire to maintain good working relations with Pakistan and China was amply serviced and provided for during the first week of the war through highly visible diplomatic and economic sanctions taken by the U.S. government against India. Although early U.S. intelligence, suggesting Gandhi's consideration of a major offensive in the West, might have suggested precautionary formation of Task Force 74, the administration's decision on December 14 to send the Task Force through the Straits required systematic denial of the numerous Indian assurances of December 12 and 13 that it no longer planned significant military action in the West, whatever its previous inclination.

Of values Nixon and Kissinger chose to discount in their use of military power, none was more obvious than the negligible importance they assigned to U.S.-Indian relations. Instead, they gave paramount importance to strategic relationships with China and the USSR, in line with the new five-power world balance of power--United States, USSR, China, Japan, and Western Europe-they envisioned. By assuming this perspective, the White House downgraded the local causes of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and, more importantly, overestimated the role outside powers could play in the regional dispute.

The Nixon-Kissinger procrustean attempt to impose a five-power world on subcontinent events may go far toward explaining some of the administration's miscalculations: its overestimation of its power to induce Yahya Khan into a peaceful solution of the civil war, and, therefore, its indignation at Gandhi's invasion; its exaggeration of the USSR's leverage over India in the midst of war; its miscalculation of its own ability to intimidate India through a show of force. In the end, the administration's great-power hubris proved to be self-defeating, forcing it into a costly and belated recognition of the strength and independence of India. As Gandhi observed after the war, "A great power must take into account the existence not only of countries with comparable power, but of the multitude of others who are no longer willing to be pawns on a global chessboard." (254)

Comparison

A comparison of the Laotian and Indo-Pakistani wars reveals some caveats and lessons regarding the deployment of American armed forces to obtain diplomatic bargaining power. During both wars, the latent belief of U.S. officials in a great power political order led them to overestimate Moscow's control over the military actions of its allies. The eventual breakdown of the Laotian cease-fire at Nam Tha resulted from limited Soviet control over its clients' military strategy; those military restrictions Moscow was able to impose during 1961-62 were purchased at the price of diminished control over subsequent strategy in Vietnam. That Khrushchev also overrated Soviet control over the fighting is implied by his apparently sincere but never fulfilled promise to ensure Communist compliance with the neutralization accords. In 1971, the Nixon administration overestimated Soviet control over Indian military strategy. This judgment resulted in shock at New Delhi's offensive (despite numerous intelligence warnings) and a presumption that continued fighting meant Moscow was encouraging the war, rather than using what Kissinger described as its "undoubted influence" to stop it. In fact, Moscow's acquiescence in New Delhi's planning -- in a fashion similar to its behavior with regard to Laos--reflected a more realistic appraisal of its limited leverage on such a vital Indian problem.

Washington's inclination to overestimate the leverage other great powers have over local warfare is ironic in the light of numerous examples, including the Laotian and Indo-Pakistani wars, of uncontrolled military action by American clients. Both Phoumi Nosavan's massing of troops at Nam Tha and Yahya Khan's air strike against India on December 3 were contrary to U.S. policy. The uncontrollable behavior of allies confounds seriously the problem of tailoring a suitable U.S. response to a military attack against a client regime. The deployment of U.S. forces may be inaccurately seen by a client as nonverbal approval of its political and military strategy, prompting false hopes, which seriously hinder a compromise settlement to the fighting. The Nixon administration appears to have been unaware of this possibility in December 1971, and made little effort to communicate to Pakistan the limited nature of the mission of Task Force 74. Because of its stormy relations with the Laotian rightists and the Thai government, the Kennedy administration was more alert to possible miscommunication in May 1962, but its ability to restrain the rightists after Nam Tha may have resulted from their loss of independent military capability and the previous months of U.S. economic sanctions, which conditioned them to expect little help from Washington. Similar conditions did not exist when Pakistan learned of Task Force 74, and are unlikely to exist often between the United States and an ally. The possibility of inappropriate client response is a chronic problem in the deployment of American armed forces.

While Kennedy's dispatch of troops to Thailand proved unnecessary to his neutralization objective, this military action did not have the adverse impact on U.S. credibility and prestige, nor did it cause the hazardous military

escalation by the opposing side, that occurred as a result of Nixon's show of naval force. A comparison of the two cases highlights some of the general factors that dictated this difference in outcomes. First, although Kennedy's modest neutralization objective was clear to all parties to the Laotian war, because of both the protracted international negotiations and Kennedy's own public statements in May 1962, the Nixon administration's shifting objectives during the Indo-Pakistani war gave credence to claims that the White House had failed in its attempts to prevent an Indian victory in the East or to evacuate Pakistani troops before the fall of Bangladesh. Second, while Kennedy's troop deployment to Thailand seemed compatible with his professed objective of achieving a neutralization of Laos that preserved Thailand's essential security interests, the Nixon administration's deployment of naval forces into the Bay of Bengal seemed at variance with its public and private emphasis on deterring an Indian offensive in the West. This apparent contradiction between means and ends further reinforced the belief that the United States had suffered a military defeat in the East. Third, while U.S. combat forces in Thailand constituted a potent and usable instrument via-à-vis 35,000 modestly trained and equipped neutralist and Communist forces in Laos, Task Force 74 appeared unsuited for resisting the massive Indian and Bengali armies in the East, except through resort to its unusable nuclear weapons. Finally, the credibility of any American use of force was markedly different in the two instances. In 1962, the U.S. commitments to Laos and Thailand were visibly cemented by American military advisers, military aid, and formal treaty pledges. The general public supported military resistance to a Communist victory in Southeast Asia. In 1971, neither active military cooperation nor relevant treaties committed the United States to Pakistan's defense. A war-weary Congress and public sided with India on the Bangladesh issue.

While a comparison of the two cases suggests real differences in the skill with which Kennedy and Nixon deployed forces for deterrence purposes, it is important to emphasize that the differences in outcome were equally influenced by background factors over which Kennedy and Nixon had little control. The Nixon administration's attempt, through domestic deception, to compensate for the absence of conditions favoring successful use of force only compounded the political losses that it predictably suffered. Only through a sober contextual analysis of the relevant domestic and international forces can policymakers expect to distinguish successfully those instances in which armed forces have bargaining utility from those more numerous situations in which the deployment of military power is counterproductive.

Finally, our two cases suggest that the impact of military signaling on the successful resolution of international conflict is typically less decisive than the impact of undramatic political and economic forces. The prevailing constellation of Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese and Laotian interests, all blended and mirrored in the pre-crisis draft of the Geneva accords, left little chance for major escalation in Laos after Nam Tha, except through military overreaction by the Kennedy administration or the Thai government. In 1971, the absence of internal political and economic pressures on New Delhi compelling military action in the West, diplomatic pressures against such an offensive, and the

obvious political and economic problems of assimilating Pakistani territory were more important than military threats in deterring an Indian offensive in the West. It is understandable that a tendency exists, among senior U.S. officials, toward post-crisis emphasis on the contribution to peace made by military action. Few political executives can be expected to have both the intellectual detachment and the political courage to state publicly that the risks of escalation associated with U.S. military deployment were assumed unnecessarily. A critical appraisal of the self-serving accounts is an important function of the professional analyst.

- 1. This survey of the Laotian historical context, 1962, draws heavily on a similar introduction found in an earlier case study by this author, "The Laos Crisis, 1960-61," published in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 36-85. Among the standard works on post-World War II Laotian history and U.S. foreign policy toward Laos are: Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (Praeger, 1964); Hugh Toye, Laos (Oxford University Press, 1968); Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere (Beacon Press, 1972); Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos (Associated University Presses, 1973); Marek Thee, Notes of a Witness (Vintage Books, 1973).
- 2. Hall and others, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 37-39.
- 3. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
- 4. Ibid., pp. 48-63.
- 5. Ibid., pp. 58-74; Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 175-84; Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, pp. 252-253.
- 6. Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 225-53.
- 7. Ibid., pp. 254-335.
- 8. For one American policymaker's perception of this relationship, see Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Dell, 1967), pp. 73-74, 105.
- 9. New York Times, May 6, 1962.
- 10. Ibid.
- 11. T. D. Allman, "Big Brother is Watching," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 9, 1969), p. 124.
- 12. For a thorough history of the growth of American-Thai cooperation, see Donald E. Neuchterlein, <u>Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia</u> (Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 93-257.
- 13. Ibid., pp. 224-36.
- 14. New York Times, January 6, 1961; Life, March 21, 1961, pp. 22-23.
- Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Fawcett World Library, 1967),
 pp. 310, 315-16; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 147-49.
- 16. New York Times, January 4, 1961; Harold MacMillan, At The End of the Day (Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 237-41.

- 17. Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (Atheneum, 1963), pp. 76-77; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (Bantam Books, 1966), p. 726.
- 18. Neuchterlein, Thailand and The Struggle for Southeast Agia, pp. 170, 200, 227; New York Times, February 14, 1962.
- 19. New York Times, February 15, 1962.
- 20. New York Times, May 11, 1962.
- 21. The most thorough account of the Eisenhower administration's response in late 1960 to the deteriorating Laotian civil war is Stevenson, The End of Nowhere, pp. 121-28. On Kennedy's use of force in March 1961, see Hall and others, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 58-67.
- 22. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 142-51.
- 23. Acquiescence in these administration objectives had been painfully achieved within the security bureaucracy during the preceding months. For details, see Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 129-70.
- 24. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 143-44.
- 25. New York Times, May 9, 1962, and May 14, 1962.
- 26. New York Times, May 10, 1962, and May 16, 1962.
- 27. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 378.
- 28. New York Times, July 1, 1962, and August 9, 1962.
- 29. New York Times, May 13, 1962.
- 30. New York Times, May 15, 1962.
- 31. New York Times, May 16, 1962.
- 32. New York Times, May 16, 1962.
- 33. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, pp. 261-62.
- 34. New York Times, May 22, 1962.
- 35. New York Times, May 18, 1962, May 21, 1962, and May 23, 1962.
- 36. The arrival of 5,000 U.S. servicemen, rather than the 4,000 originally authorized by Kennedy, resulted from deployment in Thailand of 2,800 Marines rather than the 1,800 initially projected. Whether Kennedy was

- apprised of this disparity cannot be determined. For published references to the presence of 2,800 Marines in Thailand, see New York Times, July 28, 1962, August 19, 1962.
- 37. For a description of the work of the U.S. Army Engineers in Thailand in 1962, see Ernest L. Hardin, Jr., "Road-Building in Thailand,"

 Army Information Digest (November 1962), pp. 28-31. Seven years later, in the context of congressional debate over the extent of the U.S. defense commitment to Thailand, the past and current American ambassadors to Thailand erroneously stated that the Kennedy administration had deployed 10,000 ground and air force personnel to Thailand in spring 1962. See United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, part 3, 91 Cong. 1 sess. (1970), pp. 614-15, 646, 874: (Cited hereafter as Thailand Hearings.)
- 38. New York Times, May 14, 1962.
- 39. New York Times, May 15, 1962; Stevenson, End of Nowhere, p. 175.
- 40. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 146; New York Times, May 13, 1962.
- 41. New York Times, May 16, 1962.
- 42. New York Times, May 18, 1962.
- 43. New York Times, May 19, 1962.
- 44. New York Times, May 24, 1962, and May 25, 1962.
- 45. New York Times, May 30, 1962, and June 1, 1962.
- 46. Stevenson, End of Nowhere, p. 173; Jeseph Alsop, "Mad Matter's Tea Party,"
 New York Herald Tribune, April 23, 1962.
- 47. New York Times, May 13, 1962.
- 48. Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 266n-67n.
- 49. New York Times, May 26, 1962.
- 50. New York Times, May 28, 1962.
- 51. Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 239.
- 52. Ibid., p. 251.
- 53. Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1961, p. 999.

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- 54. Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 165-66.
- 55. Hall and others, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 44.
- 56. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 130-31.
- 57. Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 240-43, 248.
- 58. Ibid., p. 251.
- 59. New York Times, May 14, 1962.
- 60. Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 239.
- 61. Christian Science Monitor, May 16, 1962.
- 62. New York Times, May 18, 1962.
- 63. New York Times, May 19, 1962.
- 64. New York Times, May 21, 1962.
- 65. New York Times, May 26, 1962.
- 66. New York Times, May 16, 1962.
- 67. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom of Loas, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, part 2, 91 Cong. 1 sess. (1970), p. 419. (Cited as Laos Hearings.)
- 68. Chae-Jin Lee, Communist China's Policy Toward Laos: A Case Study, 1954-1967 (Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970), pp. 42-71.
- 69. Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 249-50; New York Times, May 5, 1962, and May 27, 1962.
- Peking Review, February 23, 1962, May 4, 1962, May 18, 1962, June 8, 1962, June 15, 1962.
- 71. Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 244-45.
- 72. Lee, Communist China's Policy Toward Laos, pp. 72-96; Kenneth T. Young,
 Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 248-49.
- 73. New York Times, May 19, 1962.
- 74. Peking Review, May 25, 1962.

- 75. Lee, Communist China's Policy Toward Laos, p. 88.
- 76. New York Times, January 14, 1962.
- 77. Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 250.
- 78. New York Times, May 19, 1962.
- 79. Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 250n.
- 80. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, (M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 93.
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- The seeming inappropriateness of U.S. military action to the administration's primary diplomatic interest appears in part to have been the result of the limited military options served up to the White House by Navy planners. Classified documents held by Jack Anderson indicate that the U.S. Navy was primarily interested in demonstrating its capability to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean since Britain's announced withdrawal "east of Suez," and was only marginally attuned to the administration's objective of deterring a land and air offensive by India against West Pakistan. Thus, the Navy's "Outline Plan for Show of Force Operations in the Pakistan-India Area" called for shadowing Soviet and Indian ships in the Ban of Bengal, but forecast no projection of naval power into the Arabian Sea off West Pakistan, because of the absence of Soviet operations in the area. Nixon approved the Navy's operational plan for Task Force 74 with only minor alterations. For details, see Anderson, Anderson Papers, pp. 319-23.
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Chapter X

CASE STUDIES: LEBANON 1958 AND JORDAN 1970

By William B. Quandt

On several occasions since the Second World War, the United States has been involved in acute crises in the Middle East. As a global superpower with particularly strong interests in that region, the United States has rarely been indifferent to the dangers of conflict between the Arabs and Israelis and among the Arab states themselves. Twice the United States has reacted to regional conflicts with particularly strong displays of military force, in Lebanon in 1958 and in Jordan in 1970.

In the studies that follow, particular attention will be paid to the relationship between force and diplomacy. Several important themes emerge from a careful comparison of these two crises. It is worth noting them before examining the cases in more detail:

- -- In both the Lebanese and Jordanian crises, U.S. decisionmakers were more concerned by the global dimensions of the conflicts than by their regional implications. In particular, the President was attentive to the role the USSR perceived for itself in the region. In Lebanon, however, once U.S. military force was introduced, a diplomatic effort was launched that was closely attuned to the local situation. In Jordan, where U.S. forces played a less direct role, and where no diplomatic contacts were made with the local adversary forces, the U.S.-Soviet aspect of the conflict remained paramount.
- -- Despite the emphasis on the global nature of the crises, U.S. policies were most successful in terms of the limited regional objectives that were sought. Order was restored to Lebanon, King Hussein remained in power, American lives were protected. The more grandiose goals, such as checking the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East, remained elusive.
- -- U.S. actions in both crises were aimed at influencing both adversaries and friends. Ironically, it appears in both cases that the friends were more influenced by U.S. policies than the adversaries.
- -- In Lebanon, the use of force preceded the resort to diplomacy. In Jordan, diplomacy and the threat to use force went hand in hand; and force had a much greater role in signaling intentions than in Lebanon.

- -- The Lebanese Civil War was not dealt with primarily as an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By contrast, the Jordanian crisis was intimately related to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, and thus, in the view of President Nixon, to the danger of superpower confrontation. In both cases, however, the fear of general war was present.
- -- In both crises, the initial U.S. objectives were remarkably similar: to protect American lives and to help friendly governments remain in power. The turning point in each case came as a result of unanticipated external events: the coup in Iraq on July 14, 1958, and the Syrian intervention in Jordan on September 18-19, 1970.
- -- In both cases, U.S. restraint and control over the use of force were essential to the successful outcomes. A greater reliance on force would almost certainly have been counterproductive.
- -- The lessons learned by U.S. policymakers from the two cases were dramatically different. In the case of Lebanon, U.S. intervention was followed by a scrapping of the Eisenhower Doctrine and an opening toward Egypt. Following the Jordanian crisis, by contrast, Nixon seemed more convinced than ever that a U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance against the USSR and its clients was the key to maintaining regional stability.

An analysis of these two dramatic crises raises questions about the role of U.S. military forces in the Middle East. In pursuit of its interests, the United States has long maintained a significant capability for armed intervention in this region. The Sixth Fleet, normally with two aircraft carriers at its disposal, has been the visible mainstay of the U.S. military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division and units in Europe have been available for intervention. Only in Lebanon in 1958, however, have U.S. forces been ordered to intervene in the Middle East.

The United States has generally chosen to remain militarily uninvolved in purely inter-Arab disputes. Only when the Soviet or Arab-Israeli dimensions of inter-Arab rivalries become involved has the U.S. response been particularly strong, as in 1958 and 1970. On the whole, this has probably been a wise policy, since the United States has little ability to influence inter-Arab politics directly. In the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76, the United States has sensibly refrained from military intervention. It is hard to see how U.S. military power could have been usefully employed in such a conflict, other than for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens.

The Sixth Fleet, as well as other U.S. military capabilities, is not easily related to U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. Part of its value is symbolic, a tangible sign of U.S. power. But if that were all, it would hardly justify the considerable expense of maintaining two aircraft carriers and numerous other ships in the Mediterranean. The strategic purposes of these forces, of course, may justify their presence, quite apart from regional objectives, although this seems unlikely.

The ostensible reason for their existence is their regional peacekeeping function. Of the regional tasks assigned to the Sixth Fleet, two have stood out in recent years. One has been to deter Soviet military intervention in the Middle East; the other has been to protect Israel. There is some reason to doubt whether the fleet has accomplished either of these objectives particularly well. Soviet military involvement in Egypt grew from 1967 to 1972, despite the presence of the Sixth Fleet. In 1967 and 1973, Arab countries were not deterred from making threats against Israel. Nonetheless, the Sixth Fleet has been useful in such crisis situations as Lebanon in 1958 and Jordan in 1970, primarily because of its use as a signal of U.S. intentions. As a fighting force, the Sixth Fleet is basically an unknown quantity, and it is difficult to justify its specific composition on military grounds alone. The presence of one or two carrier task forces in the Mediterranean does not seem to make much difference in normal times. In a crisis, additional force is needed to make military action credible in any case.

One is tempted to conclude that the military forces that the United States has maintained in the eastern Mediterranean have played only a limited role in the pursuit of U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. The USSR has taken them seriously, but probably more as a tripwire that could activate NATO than in their own right. The local parties have certainly taken note of them, but not to the point of sacrificing their own objectives or moderating their own behavior. Israel has not viewed them as a substitute for its own strength.

The Jordanian crisis, and to a lesser degree the Lebanese landings of 1958, raise other troubling questions. What would have happened if the United States had become involved in actual hostilities? Would U.S. forces have done well against determined opponents? Can airpower alone, or even in combination with a small number of ground troops, deal with likely regional military contingencies of the future? Middle East armies of the 1970s, are, after all, large, well-equipped, and experienced.

If the prospects for effective U.S. military intervention in the Middle East seem dim, the likelihood is much greater that regional U.S. forces, linked to a strong global military posture, will effectively deter large-scale Soviet military interventions in the Arab-Israeli area. In both crises examined here, the USSR behaved circumspectly. It recognized that the United States had serious commitments at stake and was determined to act if necessary. The presence of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean in 1970 did little to change this reality.

Given the nuclear stalemate and the continuing superpower rivalry in the Middle East, there are likely to be occasions in the future on which force and diplomacy will again be involved on behalf of U.S. interests. Force may be a useful adjunct to diplomacy, but it cannot substitute for it. Nor can a regional show of force dramatically alter the U.S.-USSR strategic balance. If there is a lesson to be learned from these cases, it is that Middle East crises must be dealt with in regional, not just global terms. Successful diplomacy, even more than successful military operations, requires a knowledge of the local terrain. This was eventually recognized in Lebanon

in 1958, but was ignored in Jordan in 1970. As a result, U.S. policy after September 1970 remained stuck in an inflexible mold, whereas after 1958 it was responsive to new regional trends.

U.S. Intervention in the Lebanon Crisis, 1958

On July 15, 1758, U.S. Marines waded ashore on the beaches of Lebanon in what has proved to be a unique example of direct military intervention by the United States in the Middle East. Within weeks, 14,000 U.S. troops were deployed in Lebanon, and other military units elsewhere in the world had been mobilized for action in the Middle East. By October, however, the crisis was over, and all U.S. forces were withdrawn. There had been few hostilities and virtually no casualties. In retrospect, many observers wondered about the wisdom of the U.S. use of force in Lebanon. What were the motives that lay behind President Dwight Eisenhower's decision? Who were the targets of the action? And in the light of subsequent developments, was the action justifiable?

Historical Background

The decision to land U.S. troops in Lebanon was the result of a particular view of the world, and especially of the Middle East, that existed in Washington circles in mid-1958, combined with a crisis produced by a coup d'etat against the pro-Western regime in Iraq on July 14. A few years earlier or a few years later, the United States might have reacted quite differently, but in 1958, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser seemed a menacing force in the Middle East, a force that, consciously or unconsciously, was serving Soviet objectives at the expense of the West.

The emergence of Nasserism in the Arab world can be traced to 1955 and 1956, especially to the abortive British-French-Israeli military campaign against Egypt. Nasser's prestige among Arabs soared after the Suez crisis, while pro-British and pro-Western regimes came under mounting nationalist and radical pressures. Having helped ensure the failure of the Suez venture, the United States stepped into the perceived vacuum by announcing, early in 1957, that it would provide aid, including the use of military force, to any Middle Eastern state threatened by international Communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as this policy came to be known, reflected the widespread U.S. concern with instability and growing Soviet influence in the Middle East, a concern that had been dramatically intensified by the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955.

Of all the states in the Arab world, only Lebanon enthusiastically endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine. At least its president, Camille Chamoun, and his conservative Christian supporters dis. Other Lebanese, especially the Muslims, resented such close alignment with the West, preferring that

Lebanon align itself with the forces of Arab nationalism as represented.

by Nasser. Lebanon's complex communal structure, with a population composed of numerous Christian and Muslim sects, served to translate the debate over Lebanon's foreign policy orientation into a serious domestic political crisis.

Since independence, Lebanese domestic political life has revolved around delicate sectarian balances, which have provided established political families with a share of power and access to considerable wealth. The National Pact of 1943 enshrined the principle that the president of Lebanon would always be a Meronite Christian; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shii Muslim; and other important posts were also to be distributed on a sectarian basis. In the Chamber of Deputies, the ratio of Christians to Muslims was to be maintained at six to five, thus ensuring Christian predominance within the system, despite demographic changes that eventually produced a Muslim majority.

By 1958, Lebanese political life was factionalized along several lines. President Chamoun was widely believed by rival establishment politicians, both Muslim and Christian, to have been responsible for trying to destroy their power bases in the 1957 elections and through administrative reforms promulgated in March 1958. Saeb Salam, Rashid Karami, and Kamal Jumblatt were particularly outspoken in their opposition, and all became active in leading the insurgents after the May 8 incident that sparked serious fighting throughout much of Lebanon. The Maronite Patriarch and Christian leaders such as Hamid Frangiah also opposed Chamoun. On ideological grounds, Arab nationalists and Baathists rejected Chamoun's pro-Western inclinations; on socioeconomic grounds, many poor, rural Lebanese resented the liberal, urban-oriented policies of the regime. On the whole, the insurgents found their strongest backing among the rural poor, the alienated intelligentsia, and rival traditional leaders.

Chamoun's support came from some conservative Arabs in Christian areas of Mount Lebanon, some figures in the business and banking community, and some middle class, secular intellectuals. While lacking a strong mass base, Chamoun was able to count on the support of the two best organized political parties in Lebanon, the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS) and the Kataeb of Pierre Gemayel. Most of Chamoun's support thus came from comparatively well-off Christian groups and businessmen in urban areas. (1)

Elsewhere in the Middle East in 1957, tensions were also rising. In Jordan, the traditionally pro-British monarchy was under pressure from Arab nationalist sentiment, particularly strong among the Palestinians, to align Jordan more closely with Nasser's Egypt. The king, fearing for his throne, decided to move against the nationalists in the spring and successfully restored his authority. The United States had played a part by maneuvering the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as a visible symbol of U.S. support for the king. The situation in Jordan remained under control, but plots and counterplots kept tensions high.

It was Syria, however, more than Jordan, where radical nationalism, and perhaps even Communism, seemed to some observers to be on the verge

of political success in 1957. Syria had never been the model of a stable moderate polity, but in 1957 the trend toward radicalism and violence appeared to be particularly pronounced. The United States, in collaboration with Iraq, Turkey, and perhaps others, was actively trying to forestall a radical or Communist takeover in Syria, but these plans were unmasked by the Syrians in the late summer, serving to heighten the sense of crisis in the region. (2)

Meanwhile, in Lebanon, parliamentary elections were held in 1957, yielding results that were highly unfavorable to the left and the Arab nationalists generally. Accusations of electoral fraud were widespread, and the already serious communal and political strains in Lebanon were further exacerbated.

In the light of these developments, the United States and the United Kingdom began, in November 1957, to develop contingency plans for military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in the event of an actual or imminent coup d'etat in either country. The United States could rely primarily on the Sixth Fleet, and the British could draw on forces stationed on Cyprus. In the following months, U.S.-British military planning proceeded. By mid-1958, both parties were prepared to act in the Middle East if the decision were made to do so.

Events Leading to Crisis

On February 1, 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR), with Nasser as president of the new entity. The initiative for the merger of the two states had come from Syria, but the effect in the United States and the United Kingdom was to cause anxiety about Nasserism sweeping the Middle East. And behind Nasser, it was suspected, stood the USSR.

Within Lebenon, the creation of the UAR added to the conflict that had been developing for several months. Compounding the problem, President Chamoum let it be known that he might seek a constitutional amendment allowing him to serve a second six-year term when his mandate expired in September.

On May 8, violence erupted in the wake of the assassination of an anti-Chamoun journalist. Three days later Chamoun informed U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock, that he might ask for outside help. On May 13, as the Lebanese president accused the UAR of interfering in Lebanese internal affairs by supplying weapons to the insurgents, in Washington Eisenhower met with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other advisers to decide upon a response to Chamoun's query as to "what our actions would be if he were to request our assistance." (3)

The next day, McClintock was authorized to tell Chamoun that the United States was prepared, upon request from the Lebanese president and government, to send forces to protect Lebanon in its military program to defend its

independence. Before sending troops, however, the United States would expect Lebanon to file a complaint against external interference in the United Nations and to marshall the support of some other Arab country. Finally, the United States made it clear that troops would not be sent to keep Chamoun in office after the completion of his constitutionally sanctioned term expired in the fall. (4)

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Verbal support for Lebanon was also forthcoming from Washington. On May 17, it was stated that U.S. troops might be sent to Lebanon if they were requested. A few days later, on May 20, Dulles asserted that the Eisenhower Doctrine was applicable to the situation in Lebanon even if Communism was not behind the troubles. Two days later, U.S. and British military teams met in Cyprus to discuss contingency plans. (5)

As violence in Lebanon continued to spread, transport aircraft were sent from the United States to Germany for the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from Beirut. Army units in Europe were also placed on a higher state of readiness. In early July, units of the Sixth Fleet moved closer to the Lebanese coast, and Dulles announced that the United States reserved the right to intervene in Lebanon under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

While the crisis in Lebanon alone had brought the United States to the brink of intervention, it was the news that reached Washington early on July 14, that the monarchy had been overthrown in Iraq, that tipped the scales in favor of the use of force. That morning, President Eisenhower, with virtually no dissent from his advisors, decided to respond to President Chamoun's urgent request for aid by ordering U.S. troops into Lebanon.

U.S. Behavior in the Crisis

President Eisenhower, by all accounts, had few doubts that his decision to send troops was a wise one. In his memoirs, he acknowledged the risks of alienating the Arab world and of "general war with the Soviet Union," but concluded that to do nothing would be worse. (6)

Eisenhower and Dulles were clearly concerned with Nesser's growing influence and with Communism. The events in Lebanon, and more dramatically in Iraq, evoked the fear that Western influence would be eliminated from a strategically vital area of the world.

Domestic politics must also have been on the President's mind. The Suez crisis of October-November 1956 and subsequent developments in the Middle East had alienated some sectors of American opinion. Congressional elections were looming in the fall. Eisenhower may well have felt that decisive action in the new crisis developing in Lebanon would help restore his own prestige and also help his party in the congressional elections. While domestic politics have rarely been mentioned by participants in these events, it would be surprising if they were absent from the President's considerations.

At a meeting at the State Department early on July 14, before the President's decision to intervene, John Foster Dulles, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Nathan D. Twining, and CIA Director Allen Dulles, along with a number of other senior advisers, agreed that if the United States did nothing:

1. Nasser would take over the whole area;

specified in the contract of the state of th

 The United States would lose influence not only in the Arab States of the Middle East but in the area generally, and our bases throughout the area would be in jeopardy;

3. The dependability of the United States commitments for assistance in the event of need would be brought into question throughout the world. (7)

These general concerns led to a predisposition to "do something" to be in a position to influence events in the area after the Iraqi coup. The President had apparently felt frustrated by earlier instances when the United States had not been able to act effectively to counter what he believed to be Communist provocations. Perhaps the experience in Syria in 1957, when covert U.S. intervention had failed, was on his mind. According to Eisenhower, his feelings as early as May 1958, when President Chamoun had tentatively asked for help, were:

Against similar provocations in the past the United States had for one reason or another often been unable to lend a hand. But here was one case where it appeared, if the Lebanese government should call upon us for help, we might move firmly and in full accord with the local government and the principles of the United Nations. (9)

Oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict were no doubt on the minds of some Washington policymakers as they planned the response to Chamoun's call for help, but there is little evidence that these interests were much discussed. The British were more preoccupied with oil, and urged this concern upon Eisenhower, but the U.S. posture was guarded. The idea of promoting a counterrevolution in Iraq, while appealing to some U.S. policymakers such as General Twining, never seems to have been taken very seriously by Eisenhower, although plans were advanced to protect Kuwait from Iraqi aggression. Nor is there evidence that the United States acted in Lebanon primarily to forestall a trend that might have culminated in full-scale Arab-Israeli war. (10) In fact, Eisenhower on several occasions in the first days of the crisis reportedly considered the merits of "unleashing" Israel against Nasser, and General Twining seriously proposed that Israel should seize the West Bank of Jordan as part of an area-wide counteroffensive that would include British intervention in Iraq and Turkish intervention in Syria. (11) Needless to say, such thoughts were not translated into policy, but the fact that they were considered suggests that prevention of an Arab-Israeli war was not seen as the priority concern for the Eisenhower administration.

Operational Objectives

If the broad concerns behind U.S. policy in the Lebanon crisis can be comparatively easily discerned, what of the more concrete operational objectives? What did the United States hope to accomplish through its military deployments and its diplomacy?

Eisenhower's decision to use force in the Lebanon crisis was meant to influence both adversaries and friends. Principal among the adversaries was the USSR. U.S. action was designed, among other things, to deter the USSR from exploiting for its advantage a volatile situation growing out of the events in Iraq and Lebanon. Eisenhower and Dulles judged that the USSR would not react militarily, although others such as Twining and some State Department officials were considerably less sanguine. Even the pessimists, however, felt that "we should face the risk now [of general war] as well as any time. . . " (12)

Apart from the hope that U.S. military action would prevent the USSR from gaining ground in the Middle East, an objective that was formulated in particularly vague terms, the more concrete goals involved Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. In Lebanon, the United States hoped to ensure that the shock waves of the Iraqi revolution would not exacerbate the tensions that had engulfed the country in civil war during the preceding months.

The objective sought by Eisenhower in Lebanon, then, was a relatively limited one—to prevent dissident forces, backed by the UAR, from overthrowing the legal government and endangering American lives. Most U.S. officials seem to have endorsed this policy, although the U.S. ambassador in Beirut was opposed to the landing of the troops, and subsequently went to considerable lengths to ensure that they did not inadvertently clash with the Lebanese Army under the command of General Fuad Chehab. (13)

It has been argued by some observers that the real objective of the U.S. forces in Lebanon was to stage a counterrevolution in Iraq. (14) The coup in Iraq was, indeed, the critical event leading to U.S. intervention, and there were some in the U.S. government who contemplated a major operation throughout the Middle East that would simultaneously deal with the anti-Western regimes in the UAR and Iraq, relying on some mixture of U.S., British, Israeli, and even Turkish forces to do the job. The British were also proponents of broad action to protect the Western position in the area, but were unwilling to act alone. (15) Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had been in Washington during June to discuss the situation in the Middle East, and when the Iraqi revolution occurred, he immediately sought Washington's views. To his obvious dismay, Washington was prepared only to send troops into Lebanon, and he was urged to hold his own forces in reserve. (16) It was only a few days later that the United States promised support for British forces to intervene in Jordan at King Hussein's request. By then, the hope of restoring a friendly regime in Baghdad had faded, but the British continued to show concern with Iraqi designs on Kuwait, a fear that came to be taken seriously in Washington as well.

While it is impossible to be certain that Eisenhower did not envisage the use of force to overthrow the new Iraqi regime, it seems more likely that, in the wake of the July 14 revolution, he wanted to have some forces in the area in case events took an unexpected turn. After all, the new regime was an enigma. Was it Nasserist, or possibly even Communist? Could it hold onto power, or would some other faction of the army try to seize control? If a group of pro-Western officers were to call for help, how should the United States respond? What if the new Iraqi regime were to try to annex Kuwait? It seems fair to assume that Eisenhower wanted to be in a position to deal with such contingencies if they should arise. Thus, a minimum U.S. force in Lebanon and a British force in Jordan, plus other U.S. deployments elsewhere in the world, would provide the capability that might be needed if the situation in the area were to take an unexpected dangerous turn. In the event, of course, nothing of the sort outlined here happened, and Robert Murphy, the deputy under secretary of state. was even sent to Baghdad to reassure the new rulers there that the United States was not plotting against them.

In brief, the use of force by the United States in the Lebanon crisis was related to a set of generally defined objectives as well as several specific goals involving Lebanon and British policy in Jordan. In summary, these can be portrayed in the following manner:

General objectives:

- 1. Prevent the spread of instability (Nasserism, Communism) to the remaining pro-Western Arab regimes of Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
- 2. Deter Soviet adventurism in the area.

Control of the Contro

- 3. Develop the capability to act in or against Iraq should circumstances require.
- 4. Enhance U.S. credibility as an ally and as a superpower.

Specific objectives:

- 1. Stabilize the situation in and around Beirut, by the use of force if necessary. (Control airport, protect presidency.)
- 2. Evacuate and protect U.S. citizens if necessary.
- 3. Coordinate a response with the British and limit the scope of their action to Jordan.

Patterns of Communication

To convey these operational objectives to the intended targets of U.S. actions during the crisis, a variety of means was employed. Prior

to the crisis, the goal of preventing the spread of Communism and of supporting pro-Western regimes had been enshrined in the Eisenhower Doctrine and had been periodically repeated by Dulles. Once the crisis entered its new phase on July 14, however, a restatement of purposes was necessary. Eisenhower concentrated first on the British allies to ensure that their response would be consistent with U.S. plans to act unilaterally in Lebanon. Eisenhower reportedly talked to Macmillan by telephone in the morning, Washington time, July 14, although the content of that communication is unknown. (17) Later that afternoon, after giving the order to land troops the next day in Lebanon. Eisenhower again called Macmillan to inform him of his decision. Macmillan stressed that the issue was not Lebanon alone, but rather that it involved broader developments in the area and that some action in Jordan was also essential. (18) Eisenhower suggested that the United Kingdom hold its forces in Cyprus in reserve for the time being. According to Eisenhower, Macmillan wanted his assurance that "we were in this together, all the way. This I gave him with the understanding that I could take action only one phase at a time." (19) Two days later, Macmillan sent Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to Washington, where he found the U.S. attitude "improving." (20) In talks with Lloyd, Dulles promised "moral and logistical support" for the British operation in Jordan, and agreed to work to get Israeli permission for overflights. (21)

Eisenhower was aware of the need to defend his policy before U.S. and international opinion. On July 14, he met with congressional leaders, among whom several were critical of the decision and questioned the assumption that Nasser was a tool of the Communists. As troops were disembarking in Lebanon on July 15, Eisenhower released a statement at the White House which stressed that the purpose of the military operation was to defend Lebanon's independence and integrity. (22) A similar message was sent to Congress, and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge made the same point at the United Nations, where a meeting of the Security Council had been called for July 15. Finally, Eisenhower gave a public address to the nation that same evening.

In his speech, Eisenhower referred to such precedents as the civil war in Greece in 1947, the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the fall of China to the Communists in 1949, and Communist threats in Korea and Indochina beginning in 1950. The implication was that Communism lay behind the events in Lebanon as well. Nonetheless, Eisenhower did indicate the limited scope of U.S. action, emphasizing that he hoped rapid UN action to protect Lebanon's independence would "permit the early withdrawal of United States forces." Nothing was said of broad concerns with Iraq, oil, or the Arab-Israeli conflict. For public purposes, this was a Lebanese crisis, behind which Communism's malign influence could be detected. In brief, public statements did little to clarify specific U.S. objectives, serving rather to justify the operation in terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Perhaps the most important means of clarifying U.S. objectives to the key actors in the crisis was through Robert Murphy's diplomatic mission to the area. At Dulles's suggestion, Eisenhower agreed to send Murphy to Lebanon, where he arrived on July 19. Murphy quickly concluded that Communism had nothing to do with the crisis in Lebanon, and in talks with various

Lebanese leaders helped to work out the elements of the political compromise that resulted in General Chehab's election to the presidency on July 31. (23) Shortly thereafter, U.S. troop strength in Lebanon was reduced.

In addition to his diplomatic efforts in Lebanon, Murphy also traveled to Baghdad and Cairo to reassure Iraq's new ruler, Abd al-Karim Qasim, that U.S. troops in Lebanon were not aimed at Iraq-and to reestablish contact with Nasser, whose intentions in the area were of continuing concern to Washington. The net effect of the Murphy mission was to scale down the scope of U.S. objectives to the restoration of order and political stability in Lebanon. The more grandiose anti-Communist, anti-Nasser, and anti-Iraq goals faded into the background as the worst fears of policymakers proved to be unfounded. The landings of U.S. troops may have had a calming effect on the area, and, having served that purpose at the outset, they became less relevant to subsequent events than Murphy's diplomatic efforts. From the initial pursuit of vague, global objectives, the United States increasingly limited its goals to ensuring an orderly transition to a new regime acceptable to Nasser and to the majority of Lebanese. Unlike Eisenhower's public statements, which tended to obscure the goals of U.S. action in Lebanon, Murphy's talks in Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt appear to have helped clarify and set limits on the military operations.

Military Operations

In mid-May, shortly after President Chamoum had accused the UAR of intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs and had queried the U.S. on its attitude in the event that a request for military assistance were forthcoming, Eisenhower authorized a number of steps that prepared the way for later military action. First, the Marine contingent of the Sixth Fleet was doubled in strength to over 3,500 men. Second, arms were sent to Lebanon by air and sea. Third, transport aircraft were sent to Germany in the event that U.S. citizens had to be evacuated from the Middle East. Twenty-two Army units in Europe were also placed on alert. All of these actions in May had no visible impact on the crisis, and it was not until July 14 that a second series of moves was ordered, this time including the landing of troops in Lebanon.

As soon as the news of the Iraqi coup reached Washington, Eisenhower met with his diplomatic and military advisors and ordered a worldwide military alert of U.S. forces. Strategic Air Command planes were prepared for takeoff if necessary. The Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers Essex, Saratoga, and Wasp, was ordered to move toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Joint Chiefs Chairman Twining was ordered to implement the plan for landing U.S. troops in Lebanon the next day. (24)

On the afternoon of July 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Marine regiment, consisting of 1,700 men, landed on the beaches of Lebanon. U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock, who disapproved of the landing, was worried that the

Lebanese Army might oppose the Marines by force. There were, in fact, elements in the Lebanese armed forces that apparently favored resisting the U.S. landing. General Chehab had tried to keep the army out of the civil war, and now was confronted with an external threat as well. Ambassador McClintock recognized the danger, and rushed to the point of debarkation, where he managed to convince Chehab to restrain his forces. The Lebanese Army then escorted the Marines to designated areas. U.S. forces were thereafter deployed with utmost care to avoid unintended clashes. (25)

The next day, July 16, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment landed, with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment arriving on the 18th. Two Army battle groups in Germany, the 187th Airborne and 503rd Airborne, were on call and could arrive in the area within twelve hours. In addition, tactical aircraft were flown to Turkey, and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced.

General Twining also recommended the deployment of Air Force tankers into forward positions, as well as an increased level of readiness for the Strategic Air Command. According to Eisenhower, Twining advised him that these moves would be visible and might cause some misinterpretation of U.S. intentions, to which the President responded by ordering the moves precisely to underscore U.S. "readiness and determination without implying any threat of aggression." (26)

Other military preparations were considered as well, such as the movement overseas of two full divisions. But shipping was short, and Eisenhower decided not to charter additional vessels. Instead, he merely ordered Twining to keep a roster of available shipping. Part of the 82nd Airborne Division, however, was held ready for quick airlift to Europe. (27)

Finally, and presumably in response to British urgings, Eisenhower approved a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for a seaborne movement of a Marine Corps regimental combat team then stationed on Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. There, in Eisenhower's view, it could help deter an Iraqi move into Kuwait or help protect other friendly governments. Twining was ordered to "be prepared to employ, subject to [Eisenhower's] approval, whatever means might become necessary to prevent any unfriendly forces from moving into Kuwait." (28) It seems clear that Eisenhower was referring to the possible use of nuclear weapons, an issue that was discussed several times during the crisis.

Despite pressure from Macmillan, Eisenhower decided against sending U.S. troops into Jordan. He did, however, agree to help the United Kingdom with logistics and supply problems. This involved airlifting some equipment and supplies from Lebanon to Jordan, and Eisenhower even contemplated resupplying British forces from the U.S. air bases at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, however, withheld permission for such an operation, which would not, apparently, have deterred Eisenhower from using them in an emergency. (29)

At peak strength, the U.S. military presence in Lebanon consisted of more than 14,000 troops, about 8,000 army and 6,000 marines. The Sixth Fleet, with nearly 70 ships and 40,000 men, played a key role in support of the landing. Marines and Army paratroopers were airlifted from the United States and West Germany, and support aircraft were flown from bases in the United States. (30)

As the crisis eased, U.S. troops began their withdrawal in mid-August. The last U.S. troops left Lebanon on October 28. No combat had occurred involving the Lebanese Army, and only one U.S. fatality was registered, the result of a sniper bullet.

The Relationship of Force to Objectives

The use of force was primarily intended to stabilize the volatile situation in Lebanon, and to a large degree it was successful in doing so. U.S. troops were available to help the legitimate government maintain order if necessary, but their mere presence had a calming effect, and virtually no hostile encounters occurred. The U.S. ambassador in Beirut worked closely with Lebanese Army Commander Chehab to avoid unintended confrontations, and after the first few days the danger of hostilities was on the wane. Thus, one of the President's immediate objectives was accomplished rapidly, although the smooth transition from the Chamoun regime to that of Chehab required the diplomatic skills of Robert Murphy as much as the presence of 14,000 U.S. soldiers.

A second objective was to ensure stability in Jordan, but without the use of U.S. troops. To achieve this goal, Eisenhower was obliged to coordinate carefully with Macmillan, restraining the British from envisioning a major combined operation in the Middle East, while facilitating the more limited task of moving British forces into Jordan and keeping them adequately supplied. As part of this package, the United States apparently agreed to help look after British oil interests, especially in Kuwait. To fulfill the conditions of this agreement, the United States transferred to the Middle East some forces from Okinawa. It seems unlikely that the new regime in Iraq was contemplating an attack on Kuwait at that time, but the movement of forces to the Persian Gulf was as much intended to reassure the British as to deter Qasim. The net effect of these U.S. military moves was to guarantee that the British acted in Jordan on the same pattern as the Americans in Lebanon. While Macmillan was less than overjoyed with the scope of the operations, he unable to move independently, and thus British policy fell into line with that chosen by Eisenhower. Once again, Eisenhower succeeded in achieving or of his specific objectives.

beyond the reach of U.S. and British policy. How the use and achieve such goals, short of mounting coups d'etat in Damascus, and Damascus, was a bit of a mystery. While the regimes in Beirut

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON CRISIS

Date Military Moves

Diplomatic Moves

Events in Lebanon

International Reaction

May 11

May 8

May 12

May 13

appeal from Chamoun.

U.S. Navy announces that Ambassador McClintoc informs Chamoun that

being doubled.
U.S. supplies anti-riot equipment to Lebanon.

in Mediterranean is

May 14

U.S. & UK start "routine" maneuvers in central Mediterranean.

Anti-Chamoun journalist assassinated, Violence erupts in Tripoli. Chamoun informs Ambas-sador McClintock he might ask for help from U.S.

Disorders spread to Beirut. Anti-U.S. demonstrations. More disturbances.
Lebanon accuses UAR of
"massive intervention."
Sends protest note.

Dulles and other advis-

ers to decide on re-

Eisenhower meets with

Ambassador McClintock informs Chamoum that U.S. would be prepared in some circumstances to send troops to Lebanon. Explicit conditions spelled out. Troops would not be sent to keep Chamoum in office.

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Mail tary Moves	Diplomatic Moves	EVELICE LIL LEGEROLI	דוותבן וומינדותים שבמי מדמוו
18 Globemaster planes flown from Donaldson Air Base, South Carolina, to West Germany for pos- sible evacuation of U.S. citizens. Another 22 on alert.	State Dept. announces that consideration would be given to Chamoun call for troops.		Tass statement that U.S. or other intervention could have serious consequences for peace in the Middle East.
NATO mayal exercise switched to eastern Med- iterranean so U.S. and British ships can be available for possible evacuation operation.			
	Masser confers with U.S. Ambassador Hare on Leba- nese crisis. Dulles says Eisenhower Doctrine is applicable to Leba- non.		The second secon
U.SBritish military teams in Cyprus to dis- cuss contingency plans.		Lebanon asks for urgent meeting of UN Security Council; charges UAR interference.	
			UN Security Council be- gins debate on Lebanon.
		Heavy fighting in Beirut.	
		Hammarskjöld in Beirut.	x -
		Heavy fighting in Tripoli.	16

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON CRISIS

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Military Moves

Diplomatic Moves

Events in Lebanon

Hammarskjöld says there is no evidence to war-

rant charge of UAR intervention.

International Reaction

July 14

to Lebanese coast (early Sixth Fleet moves closer July).

emergency meeting of UN Eisenhower calls for Eisenhower receives Lebtroops, orders military alert. SAC planes preanese request for

Coup in Iraq; pro-Western monarchy overthrown.

> NSC meeting; Eisenhower decides to send troops. Security Council pared for takeoff, Sixth toward eastern Mediter-Fleet ordered to move

Macmillan twice by tele-phone; suggests UK hold forces in reserve. Eisenhower talks to

plement plan for landing Iwining ordered to imtroops.

ranean.

Macmillan orders 6,000 British troops to prepere for movements to Middle East.

Marine regiment disem-2nd battalion of 2nd barks, Lebanon.

July 15

"improved readiness po-U.S. naval, air, and sitions" to support Marines.

resolution in UN to end infiltration of illegal Amb. Lodge presents U.S. arms and personnel.

McClintock negotiates with General Chenab.

U.S. informs NATO allies of move as marines land.

Eisenhower addresses nation.

Meeting of UN Security Council, International Reaction

Events in Lebanon

Diplomatic Moves

Military Moves

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Div. on call in Germany.

S2nd Airborne held ready

for airlift to Europe.

Dulles who promises "moral and logistic

support" for British operation in Jordan.

commendation for seaborne movement of Marines from

disenhower approves rec-

Lloyd-Dulles confer. British paratroopers land in Jordan. Old naws.

. land in Jordan.
U.S. jets from Sixth
Fleet cover British
landings.

U.S. paratroopers airlifted from W. Germany to Adana, Turkey. lst Battalion of 8th Marine regiment lands.

Ambassador Hare calls on Ali Sabri to ensure that UAR fully understands why U.S. acted as it did.

U.S. warns UAR any attack on its military units could have "grave consequences."

Nasser in Moscow discusses U.S. intervention.
Khrushchev decides to stage maneuvers on Turkish border.

Nasser arrives in Demascus. Attacks occupations of Lebanon. Large scale anti-U.S. and anti-British demonstrations in Moscow.

x-18

cussion of U.S.-British military actions. Says July 28 is too early for start of conference.

Eisenhower tells Khrusnchev U.S. will not limit conference to dis-

July 24

July 25

Council framework, says it should begin July 28.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON CRISIS

International Reaction	Khrushchev proposes summit meeting to Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Nehru.		NATO council meeting. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion says recent events in Middle East increase "danger of	Israel s endirclement of President Nasser."	Macmillan proposes that summit conference be held in NY at special meeting of UN Security Council.	Khrushchev letters to Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, accepts pro- posals for summit cor- ference within Security
Intern	Khrushc mit mee hower, Gaulle,		NATO co Israeli David B recent East in	Preside	Macmilla summit c held in meting Council.	Khrusho Eisenbo de Gaul posals ference
Events in Lebanon		e e				
Diplomatic Moves		Lloyd returns to London.			Elsenhower replies to Khrushchev's letter, suggests heads-of- government meeting best held through UN.	
Military Moves	More Marines, 1,700 paratroopers land in Lebanon.		Copies of leaflets explaining U.S. landing signed by Elsenhower dropped over Lebanon by U.S. planes.	1st Marine Division alerted for move to Middle East.		U.S. aircraft demon- strate over Lebanon in "salute to people."
Date	July 19	July 20	July 21		3mJy 22	July 23

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON CRISIS

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Events in Lebanon	
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Military Moves	More U.S. forces reported heading towns
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Murphy

Elsenhower of delaying tactics on conference.

Khrushchev accuses

July 28

July 30

July 31

July 29

Elsenhower and Macmillan Chenab elected propose summit meeting President.

to be held August 12
(letters to Khrushchev).

UN Observer Force makes
2nd report; finds no
evidence of infiltration
from UAR.

Khrushchev withdraws support for summit conference after visit to Peking.

Aug 5

Anglo-American airlift over Israel ceases.

1,800 more troops and tank battalion land,

Aug 2

3,000 more on way.

U.S. lands 2,200 more

troops. Total now 13,300.

and Amman were able to achieve a degree of stability and strength thanks to U.S. and British support, the forces of radical nationalism remained strong in the Arab world and were essentially unaffected by the Lebanon crisis and the U.S. reaction to it. Measured by the maximum objective of thwarting Nasserism, Eisenhower's decisions were not a success, and shortly after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in October, the Eisenhower Doctrine was effectively put on ice and a new policy of attempted rapprochement with Nasser was initiated.

Reflecting on the crisis, Eisenhower certainly felt that the use of force had been justified in terms of the limited objectives sought. In his memoirs, Eisenhower termed the operation "highly satisfactory," crediting it with the achievement of a peaceful resolution of the Lebanese internal conflict. (31)

. . . one additional benefit to the West, intangible and unpublicized but nevertheless important, came out of the affair. This was a definite change in Nasser's attitude toward the United States. . In our action and the Kremlin's cautious reaction he found much food for thought, it would appear. Presumably he concluded that he could not depend completely on Russia to help him in any Middle East struggle, and he certainly had his complacency as to America's helplessness completely shattered. (32)

From Eisenhower's perspective, it seems clear, a major achievement of the Lebanon operation was the demonstration that the United States was capable of acting decisively, a lesson that he apparently thought was particularly important to convey to the USSR and to the nonaligned countries in mid-1958.

The Impact on Domestic Lebanese Politics

The U.S. intervention in Lebanon stimulated a search for a political solution to the crisis. A successor to Chamoun had to be found who was acceptable to the Arab nationalists as well as the Christian community. Ceneral Fund Chehab, head of the army, quickly emerged as a man capable of attracting broad support. He had the advantage of being relatively nonpartisan, not tied to the traditional establishment, and sufficiently neutralist in his ideology to be tolerated by the Nasserists. He was easily chosen as president on July 31. He subsequently named one of the prominent leaders of the insurgents, Rashid Karami, as prime minister.

Under Chehab's presidency, Lebanon recovered quickly from its civil war; a strong executive emerged, and Lebanon once again began to develop rapidly. But underlying social and economic problems were not resolved; the rigidities of the sectarian-based political system were not eliminated; and under the weak leadership of the 1960s, strains began to appear.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, external pressures on Lebanon mounted, leading to a severe crisis in 1969 over the issue of the Palestinian presence

in Lebanon. In subsequent years, tensions remained acute, and Lebanese political life began to polarize along a complex sectarian and class-based line. By 1975, civil war had once again engulfed Lebanon, resulting in the Syrian military intervention of early 1976. Unlike the 1958 civil war, however, neither major power showed an interest in intervening militarily. The 1958 crisis had done little to help solve Lebanon's internal problems, and perhaps that realization served as a note of caution for outside powers when the much more bloody and prolonged civil war began in 1975.

Egyptian Reactions

Egypt's President Nasser was clearly one of the primary targets of the U.S. policy adopted in January 1957 and implemented in Lebanon in July 1958. It is thus worth investigating how he reacted to the landing of U.S. forces.

At the time of the Lebanon crisis, Nasser was at the peak of his career as an Arab nationalist leader. After the Suez war in 1956, his status in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world had grown. Radical nationalists in numerous Arab countries looked to him for inspiration and support. The Syrian Baath party went so far as to plead for political union with Egypt. This request led to the creation of the UAR early in 1958.

Nasser had ambivalent feelings toward the United States. From 1952 to 1954, he was on close terms with U.S. officials and was viewed in Washington as a promising moderate Arab leader. The conclusion of an arms deal with the USSR in 1955, however, had cooled the relationship between Cairo and Washington considerably, and the Dulles-Eisenhower decision to withdraw the offer to finance the Aswan High Dam in mid-1956 was a further blow to the chances of maintaining friendly ties. Eisenhower's stand against the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt in October 1956 created a momentary sense of gratitude on the part of Nasser, but the subsequent development of the Eisenhower Doctrine, so clearly aimed at "containing" Nasserism, undid what little goodwill existed toward the United States in Cairo. By 1958, Nasser was deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions in the area. A conspirator by background, and distrustful by nature, Nasser saw the United States actively working against him throughout the Arab world.

Although Nesser was an advocate of Arab unity, he had entered the union with Syria only reluctantly. There was no indication that he hoped to add Lebanon to the UAR, although he clearly did oppose the strongly pro-American policies of President Chamoun. When incipient civil war broke out in Lebanon in May, Nasser no doubt helped to provide arms and money to his supporters.

Nonetheless, Nasser did not seem to want a full-scale test of strength in Lebanon. In June, Nasser surprised Eisenhower by not objecting to the dispatch of UN observer teams to Lebanon. This was followed by a direct

bid from Nasser to the United States offering to use his influence to end the crisis in Lebanon. The conditions that he posed were that Chemoun finish his term in office; that he be succeeded by General Chehab; and that the rebels be offered amnesty. Eisenhower notes that these were "not wholly unreasonable" conditions. (33) In fact, they later became the basis for the U.S.-sponsored settlement of the crisis.

Nasser learned of the coup in Iraq and of the U.S. decision to send troops to Lebanon while on a visit to Yugoslavia. After some hesitation, he decided to fly to Moscow for consultations with the Soviet leadership. He seemed particularly fearful that the United States might use Turkey to invade Syria, now the northern region of the UAR. In 1957, when a similar danger had existed, the USSR had staged troop maneuvers on the Turkish border and warned Turkey not to intervene in Syria. At a minimum, Nasser must have hoped for a repeat of this performance. By the time Nasser left Moscow, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had promised to maneuver twenty-four divisions on the Turkish frontier, although he reportedly warned Nasser that "It is only a maneuver." (34)

In addition to securing a minimal degree of Soviet support, Nasser also directed that Egyptian arms be sent to the new regime in Iraq. Preventing a counterrevolution in Baghdad was clearly high on his agenda.

While Nasser was apparently concerned when he first learned of the U.S. use of force that his interests and influence in the Arab world were the target of the operation, he soon realized that the U.S. objective was essentially limited to Lebanon and was not incompatible with his own goals there. He was able to confirm this through his talks with Robert Murphy, and by fall of 1958 he saw that U.S. troops were not planning to remain in Lebanon indefinitely. Subsequently, even in moments of great anger at the United States, Nasser did not list the Lebanon landings as one of the U.S. crimes against the Arab world. By 1959, in fact, he was talking to Washington again about aid, while publicly quarreling with Khrushchev and Qasim.

Perhaps Eisenhower was correct: Nasser was impressed both by the U.S. ability to act and by the restraint that characterized the operation and the subsequent diplomacy. In this sense, Nasser may have been influenced by the U.S. resort to force, although it would be hard to point to any specific action that Nasser did or did not take as a direct result of the U.S. military action in Lebanon. Certainly Nasser was not deterred from seizing control of Lebanon, since that was not high on his list of priorities, although some of his followers in Lebanon moderated their behavior once U.S. forces intervened.

The Soviet Reaction

The USSR, in a general way, was the second principal target of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

were both confident that the USSR would not react militarily to the U.S. action in Lebanon, "particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operations," as Eisenhower was later to write. (35)

Since early 1955, the Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev in particular, had embarked upon a policy of weakening Western influence in the Middle East by offering arms to "anti-imperialist" regimes. Egypt was the key to this strategy. The most important Soviet objective was to undermine the military posture of the United States in the Middle East, and for this the USSR was prepared to cooperate with regimes that were decidely non-Communist in their internal makeup. Nasserism, with its anti-Western overtures, and its goals of removing foreign bases from Arab soil, suited the Soviet objective nicely. The USSR did not have to do much but supply military and economic aid.

The overthrow of the pro-British regime in Baghdad--the only Arab regime that had agreed to join a pro-Western defense pact--was precisely the kind of development that the USSR welcomed. When Nasser arrived in Moscow on July 17, he found Khrushchev "terribly excited," according to Mohammed Heikal, who was present at the meeting. (36) But he also gave the impression that "he was finding it difficult to formulate a policy because events were moving so quickly and so dangerously." (37)

For several hours, Nasser and Khrushchev discussed U.S. intentions. According to Egyptian sources, Khrushchev thought that the Americans had lost their senses. Nasser pressed for Soviet assurances in the event that the United States staged a major counteroffensive in the Arab world, leading Khrushchev to reply, according to Heikal, "Frankly, we are not ready for confrontation. We are not ready for World War III." Khrushchev even refused to issue an ultimatum, settling instead for a policy of staging maneuvers on the Turkish border. (38)

On the diplomatic front, the USSR strongly opposed the U.S. and British actions in the United Nations, but failed to achieve any results. On July 20, Khrushchev suggested to Eisenhower a summit meeting, a proposal that was refused. This led to a long, and largely ritualistic, exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Khrushchev over the next several weeks. (39) All of this was superceded by a UN General Assembly debate in August, which ended with a call for UN measures that would lead to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

From the little that is known about Soviet behavior in the Lebanon crisis, it appears that Eisenhower was generally correct in his assessment of the probable Soviet reaction to a show of force by the United States. If part of the objective of the exercise was to demonstrate that the United States had both the will and the capability to act in pursuit of its interests, the point seems to have gotten through to Khrushchev. As such, it was one among many of the tests of strength between the superpowers in secondary regions that characterized the cold war. In this instance, the United States seemed to have the upper hand.

The British Role

As is typically the case, when the United States resorts to the threat or actual use of force, part of the exercise is intended to influence friends. In this case, the United Kingdom was very much on Eisenhower's mind during the first few days of the crisis. For at least eight months, British and U.S. military teams had been working on plans for intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. A joint operation had clearly been envisioned. Yet, when the moment of truth came, British and U.S. objectives were not entirely congruent. Part of the U.S. effort thus became to persuade the British to act within a relatively limited framework, rather than to stand saide entirely or to aim for a major restoration of Western influence in the Arab world.

Macmillan had traveled to Washington in early June to talk about the Middle East situation. He was particularly anxious that U.S. and British policies be closely coordinated. The lessons of Suez weighed heavily on him. Thus, it was with some embarrassment that he learned from Eisenhower on July 14 that the decision had been made in Washington to respond favorably to Chamoun's request for intervention, but that it preferred to act alone. Macmillan chided Eisenhower, perhaps not so gently, with the suggestion that he was "doing a Suez on me." (40)

Subsequent contacts revealed that Dulles was hesitant about British intervention in Jordan. Macmillan did not want to go in, then be abandoned by the United States. To avoid misunderstandings, Macmillan sent Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Washington on July 16, where he extracted a promise of support for British intervention in Jordan in response to King Hussein's request. He must also have received assurances that the United States would not be indifferent to an Iraqi move against Kuwait. Thus, while refusing to help the British restore their position in Iraq, Eisenhower was prepared to limit the damage to British interests elsewhere and to assist in the British deployments to Jordan. The British were less than enthusiastic at the degree of cooperation they received from their superpower ally, but had no alternative but to play by Eisenhower's rules. As often seems to be the case, it is easier to influence friends than adversaries. More than Nasser or the Soviet leaders, the British were directly affected by the decisions made in Washington. They were told in no uncertain terms that the U.S. objectives were limited, a message that soon reached the ostensible targets of the action as well--namely, Nasser and Khrushchev.

Outcomes of the Crisis

A balanced assessment of U.S. behavior in the Lebanon crisis is made difficult by the suspicion that the outcome might have been much the same if the United States had done nothing. Even Eisenhower expressed some doubts on this score. (41)

It is impossible to pinpoint specific actions taken by Nasser, the Soviet leaders, or the Iraqis that related directly to the U.S. intervention and that decisively affected the outcome of the crisis. Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the intervention as inconsequential. Within Lebanon, a volatile situation was brought under control after the arrival of U.S. forces. Robert Murphy was able to help negotiate a successful resolution of the crisis, not only because of his personal skills, but also because he could use the presence of U.S. forces as a lever against both Chamoun and the rebels. Thus, at least within Lebanon, the U.S. action had the intended effects. By restoring stability in Lebanon at a very tense moment in the Arab world, the United States may have helped forestall a chain reaction that might have led to the downfall of the monarchy in Jordan, seizure of the West Bank of Jordan by Israel, and even a general Arab-Israeli conflict. While it is a matter of speculation that any of this would have happened if order had not been restored in Lebanon, the above sequence of events is not implausible and would have engaged important U.S. interests.

In the five years following the Lebanon crisis, the Middle East remained an area of instability, but U.S. interests and those of U.S. friends and allies were not seriously affected. Inter-Arab tensions increased, but the Arab-Israeli dispute remained under control. The UAR was dissolved when Syria seceded from it in September 1961, and Qasim was overthrown in a coup in February 1963. Chehab brought a period of order to Lebanon, but fundamental issues that had sparked the 1958 crisis remained unsolved, and led to later outbursts of violence.

In terms of global politics, the Lebanon crisis did not have long-lasting consequences. It was not a turning point in the cold war. Soviet leaders did not change their behavior in any significant way because of U.S. behavior in Lebanon, although they may well have concluded that a naval capability in the Mediterranean would be a useful asset. The USSR began to acquire such a capability in the mid-1960s.

In its relations with Nasser, the United States seems to have learned something from the Lebanon crisis. From 1959 on, U.S. policymakers no longer saw Nasser as an appendage of Moscow, nor were they quite so fearful of Nasser taking over the Middle East. A PL-480 aid program for Egypt was instituted, and for several years relations seemed to be improving. U.S. relations with Syria were not directly affected, since Syria was at the time part of the UAR.

The Lebanon crisis did not become a major controversy within the United States. It neither helped Eisenhower politically nor hurt him in any measureable way. The costs had not been great, there were virtually no casualties, and the outcome was somewhat difficult for American public opinion to comprehend. At least nothing drastic had occurred. The crisis was soon forgotten.

Had Eisenhower decided not to use force at all, he might well have paid a more serious price domestically, although much would have depended

on the outcome of the crisis. The British, Lebanese, and Jordanian leaders would all have been deeply disappointed by a U.S. decision not to act. Many Americans would have seen in such behavior a confirmation of their doubts about Eisenhower's leadership abilities. In the post-Sputnik atmosphere that prevailed, Eisenhower's unwillingness to meet what was widely viewed as a Communist challenge would have been politically dangerous.

If significantly more force had been used instead, resulting in actual combat, or intervention in other areas, the reaction in the Arab world would have been sharply negative. The key to the success of the Lebanon operation was the restraint with which force was actually used. This helped to create an image of responsibility, and when the United States agreed to a political solution in Lebanon acceptable to Nasser, it also earned a reputation for impartiality in inter-Arab affairs. All of this would have been lost by a greater use of force.

Had the United States followed the British lead, or the more extreme recommendation of some U.S. military leaders, an Arab-Israeli war might well have resulted, the USSR might have brought heavy pressure to bear on Turkey, and pro-Western regimes in the Arab world would have been badly discredited. Given the prevailing military doctrines of the time, a more extensive military operation might even have engaged the United States in the tactical use of nuclear weapons. As it was, nuclear-capable equipment was introduced into Lebanon, although presumably without nuclear warheads, and General Twining was given orders to meet Iraqi aggression against Kuwait with any means necessary.

Finally, a more extensive military involvement in Lebanon would have done little to bring stability to that country. Clashes between Lebanese and U.S. troops would have reduced the possibility of Murphy helping to negotiate a settlement in which the Lebanese army commander emerged as the compromise candidate for president. Instead, the United States would have become engaged in a civil war on behalf of the incumbent regime, thereby polarizing the Lebanese crisis even farther. Knowingly or not, Eisenhower struck the right balance between no action and overreaction, thus protecting both his domestic flank and his ability to influence events in Lebanon toward a constructive outcome.

Evaluation

The commitment of U.S. troops to Lebanon, combined with the diplomatic efforts of Robert Murphy, had precisely the effects within Lebanon that Eisenhower and Dulles hoped. But the key to success lay in the restraint with which the operation was conducted. Had hostilities occurred between U.S. and Lebanese forces, the U.S. mediating role would have been seriously jeopardized. It was at least in part luck that prevented any clashes from occurring in the first few days.

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While it is impossible to know what might have happened in Lebanon if the U.S. troops had not arrived, there is every reason to believe that the authority of the Chamoun regime would have been eroded farther and a peaceful transfer of power would have been complicated. Continuing turmoil in Lebanon could have contributed to instability elsewhere, such as in Jordan.

If the United States had not acted as it did in Lebanon, the United Kingdom would have been unwilling, and probably unable, to intervene in Jordan. The British presence there no doubt helped to strengthen the somewhat shaky regime of King Hussein. Had Hussein been overthrown or assassinated, a distinct possibility given the atmosphere in the region following the Iraqi coup, Israel would probably have seized the West Bank of Jordan. A full-scale Arab-Israeli conflict could not then have been far off. Given this danger, the U.S. reluctance to join Britain in the Jordan operation is somewhat surprising. In any event, the key to British action lay in Washington, and a major consequence of the U.S. decision to intervene in Lebanon was that the United Kingdom agreed to mount a parallel operation in Jordan. At the same time, the U.S. commitment to limited goals served also to constrain the scope of British intervention and to rule out the possibility of counterrevolution in Iraq.

From Eisenhower's perspective, considering the domestic and international pressures he faced, the policy of intervention in Lebanon was a wise one. He was able to appear decisive, yet not reckless. He combined the use of force with effective diplomacy. The outcome was generally successful, the costs were modest, and the consequences on the whole were favorable to U.S. interests.

Yet there is something unsettling about a decision to commit U.S. forces that is based on such shaky premises as those that underlay the Lebanon landings. The driving force behind the decision was a desire to stop the spread of Communism and Nasserism, but the U.S. action was incapable of achieving such nebulous purposes. It was able to help restore order in Lebanon; U.S. diplomacy was able to help mediate the Lebanese internal conflict; the United States was able to assist the United Kingdom in providing aid to King Hussein. These were reasonable, legitimate objectives. Viewed dispassionately, they also contributed to the stability of the Arab-Israeli balance. And yet these were not the terms in which the issue of intervention was discussed. Instead, a much more ambitious set of goals was initially articulated, and only after the decision had been made to commit U.S. forces were the objectives of the operation consciously scaled down, in part to counter British pressures to expand the scope of intervention.

On the whole, the Lebanon decision is most admirable in its contribution to upholding U.S. national interests when examined in terms of its results; when the premises that lay behind the decision are examined closely, one can only feel that there was a large element of chance that contributed to the positive outcome. For example, during the first few days after the decision, there were several occasions at which top decisionmakers

discussed the merits of "unleashing" Turkey and Israel as part of an area-wide counteroffensive. Similarly, the use of nuclear weapons was considered, particularly with reference to any Iraqi moves against Kuwait. Nuclearcapable howitzers were even landed in Lebanon, although this does not necessarily imply that their use was ever contemplated. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to imagine, given the perceptions that prevailed at the time in Washington, that the initial U.S. commitment to the use of force could have escalated rapidly had any of a number of developments occurred. If the Lebanese Army had resisted the Americans with force, if a pro-Western faction in the Iraqi military had requested aid, if rebellion had broken out in Jordan, if the regimes in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had been threatened, then the likelihood of deeper U.S. military involvement would have been very great, precisely because the limited nature of U.S. goals was not well articulated in the first few days of the crisis. With time, Eisenhower, and perhaps even Dulles, did come to appreciate that neither Nasserism nor Communism was the issue that they were confronting, and the Murphy mission was a sensible outcome of the recognition that diplomacy offered the hope of a solution, whereas force would merely help to stabilize the Lebanese situation without resolving the conflict.

While the use of force in Lebanon in 1958 can be justified in terms of U.S. national interests, the caveat must be borne in mind that the premises of action as publicly and privately stated by Eisenhower and Dulles at the time were not consistent with a restrained use of force. The intervention proved to be a success in terms of the limited goals sought in Lebanon, but there was considerable danger that the more nebulous purposes that lay behind the action could have led to an expanded commitment that probably would have been counterproductive in terms of U.S. interests. The lesson seems to be that the use of force unaccompanied by a clear understanding of objectives runs the danger of unintended escalation. Fortunately, in the case of the Lebanese crisis, circumstances did not develop in such a way that an open-ended commitment to the use of force was ever made. One is left with the strong feeling, however, that it was circumstances more than self-restraint that helped ensure that the use of force in Lebanon during the first few crucial days remained limited in scope and objectives. Thus it was possible to establish at an early date a balance between force and diplomacy, and between the abstract goals that had led to the commitment to use force and the concrete realities of the Lebanese situation.

U.S. Policy in the Jordanian Crisis. September 1970

During Richard M. Nixon's first term as President of the United States, the Middle East was a region of continuing preoccupation for policymakers. The President referred to the area as a "powder keg," and likened it to the Balkans before 1914. At issue was not only the persistent conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, but also the U.S.-Soviet relationship, since both sides were increasingly involved on opposite sides of the major regional disputes. Nixon's fear was that a crisis in the Middle East could

lead to superpower confrontation; his hope, until early 1970, had been that Moscow would cooperate in working for a compromise peace settlement. In September 1970, with the outbreak of civil war in Jordan, the fear became a virtual reality, and the hope faded into the background.

Regional and International Developments

The outcome of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 set the stage for the Jordanian crisis of September 1970. Israel had scored a brilliant military victory, but had been unable to turn battlefield success into political settlement with the Arabs. Instead, the Arab position insisted on an Israeli commitment to withdraw from the newly occupied territories—Sinai, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and the West Bank—as a precondition for any form of peace agreement. The result was a standoff, which left Israel in control of the territories and the Arabs unreconciled to the new status quo.

Two new factors, however, ensured that the de facto situation would not remain quiet for long. First was the emergence of a militant and increasingly popular Palestinian guerrilla movement committed to the goal of freeing Palestine from Zionist control by means of armed struggle. The fedaveen, as they were called in Arabic, had become such a major political force in the Arab world by mid-1968 that Egypt's President Nasser was obliged to offer them firm support or risk undermining even farther his sagging prestige. Despite its popularity, however, the fedaveen movement remained faction-ridden and relatively unsuccessful on the battlefield. (42)

By 1969, the Israelis were able to prevent most <u>fedaveen</u> efforts to cross the cease-fire lines from Jordan and Lebanon, and within the West Bank and Gaza, the <u>fedaveen</u> found it extremely difficult to maintain a political infrastructure, let alone to carry out military operations. As a result, the <u>fedaveen</u> increasingly concentrated in Jordan, and to a lesser degree in Lebanon, where the regimes were reluctant or unable to move against them. By mid-1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the umbrella organization linking most of the <u>fedaveen</u> factions, constituted something of a state within a state in Jordan.

The second major development after 1967 was the growth of Soviet involvement in Egypt and Syria. Initially, the USSR had concentrated on rebuilding the shattered defenses of its two key clients in the Middle East, a task that was essentially completed by the end of 1968. In March 1969, President Nasser began a "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal, which gradually escalated in intensity and scope as the Israelis responded with "deep penetration bombing," using newly supplied Phantom jets, toward the end of the year. Egypt was coming under substantial military pressure, and finally in January 1970, Nasser made a secret trip to Moscow to ask for an acceleration of Soviet aid, particularly in the form of air defense equipment and Soviet combat personnel. The USSR responded positively,

and shortly thereafter began deliveries of a sophisticated air defense system. In April, Soviet fighter pilots were noted for the first time helping defend Egyptian airspace. This represented a quantum jump over previous levels of Soviet involvement in the conflict, and greatly raised the risk of superpower confrontation.

In response to the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East, the Nixon administration had initiated early in 1969 a series of talks, the most important of which were with the USSR, designed to produce a joint proposal for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nixon and Kissinger at the time were interested in the possibility of establishing "linkages" among various issues that were being negotiated with the USSR--strategic arms limitations and Vietnam in particular -- and they hoped that the USSR would prove cooperative in the Middle East. By fall of 1969, the USSR had managed to extract some concessions from Nasser on the nature of a peace agreement with Israel: now Soviet leaders were asking Nixon to commit the United States to the principle of full withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war. After considerable debate in Washington, a draft of a joint U.S.-Soviet proposal for an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was handed to the USSR in late October 1969. It contained the principles of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Egyptian commitment to peace. On December 9, Secretary of State William Rogers publicly revealed the essence of the proposal, henceforth dubbed the "Rogers Plan," but two weeks later the USSR officially rejected it, primarily because of Nasser's unwillingness to acquiesce in its terms. The Israelis had also rejected the plan, so U.S. diplomacy came to a sudden halt. Nixon and Kissinger, who had harbored some misgivings all along about the State Department's handling of the talks with the USSR, were particularly angry at Moscow for its uncooperative stance. A harder line, directed from the White House, began to appear, while the State Department tried to find some way to pick up the pieces of its failed diplomatic effort.

Toward Confrontation in Jordan

It was the next Rogers initiative that precipitated the Jordan crisis. During May, June, and July, tension rose rapidly in the Middle East, with the USSR engaging in combat operations over Egypt and the <u>fedaveen</u> threatening the stability of the regime in Jordan. In response to the continuing deterioration of the regional situation, Rogers proposed in mid-June a simple formula for a cease-fire and the beginning of talks on a settlement. After more than a month of delays, the parties to the conflict agreed to the proposal. Finally, on August 7, the fighting stopped, as a standstill cease-fire went into effect. The State Department was elated.

Within hours of the cease-fire, however, new problems arose. First, the Israelis were angry at the United States for the way in which the cease-fire was announced. Then they charged that the Egyptians were violating the standstill provisions, a point that the United States was initially unable to confirm. Second, the Palestinians violently attacked the cease-fire,

seeing it as a prelude to their own extinction as a fighting force in Jordan. Nasser ordered the closing of the Palestinians' broadcasting facilities in Cairo, and King Hussein began to make clear his intentions to restore law and order in his shaky kingdom.

By late August, the United States had confirmed that Egypt had technically violated the terms of the cease-fire by completing construction of surface-to-air missile sites within the Suez Canal Zone, and by rotating some missiles from active to inactive sites. Nixon and Kissinger felt the USSR was partly responsible for the violations, and this very much colored their subsequent perceptions of regional developments.

Meanwhile, the <u>fedaveen</u>, badly divided and very much on the defensive, met in Amman to decide on a course of action. The militant groups called for a new regime in Jordan, while others were reluctant to make a final break with Nasser and to risk confrontation with the well-armed Jordanian military. The debate was settled in early September when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four international airliners.* One was flown to Cairo, where it was destroyed on the ground after its passengers had been evacuated. Three others were flown to a desert airstrip in Jordan where the passengers were held hostage by the PFLP. Among the passengers were many Europeans and Americans. An international crisis had begun.

Civil War

The simmering crisis in Jordan exploded on September 15, when King Hussein appointed a new government with responsibility to restore order. Two days later, the Jordanian Army went into action, concentrating initially on driving the <u>fedaveen</u> from Amman. The PFLP had by now released all but fifty-four hostages and had destroyed the three aircraft, but the efforts to exchange the hostages for <u>fedaveen</u> held by European governments was meeting with little success. Henceforth, the PFLP took a back seat as the larger <u>fedaveen</u> groups assumed the burden of staving off the onslaught of the Jordanian Army. Within days, the <u>fedaveen</u> were being driven north by the army. On the night of September 18-19, the first indications were received that tanks from Syria, painted with the colors of the Palestine Liberation Army, had entered the fighting in the north. The following evening, the Syrians launched a full-scale armored intervention with elements of two divisions.

The aid from Syria reversed the course of the battle, and on September 21 the important town of Irbid fell to the Palestinians and Syrians. King Hussein appealed for outside help, and the United States and Israel quickly worked

An unsuccessful attempt to hijack one other sirliner was led by Leila Khaled of the PFLP.

out a plan for intervention if the situation in Jordan were to deteriorate further. The next day, the Jordanian Air Force went into action without encountering any opposition from the Syrian Air Force, and Syrian tanks were withdrawn by September 23. On September 25, a cease-fire went into effect, in part because of the efforts of President Nasser. The Egyptian president, however, was not in good health. On September 28, having convened a gathering of Arab heads of state to resolve the Jordanian civil war, he suffered a heart attack and died, bringing to an end an era in Middle East history.

The Jordanian conflict was particularly dangerous because of the threat of outside intervention. The Iraqis had forces in Jordan, but they never entered the fray. The Israelis nearly did, but the success of Hussein's own army on September 22 made the Israeli involvement unnecessary. The United States went to the brink of encouraging Israeli intervention, but held back once the Syrians began to withdraw. On balance, the crisis ended well for the United States, Jordan, and Israel. But the role played by the intricate maneuvers of U.S. and Israeli forces in obtaining this outcome is still obscure.

The Actors and Their Objectives

The key actors in the drama that unfolded in September 1970 were the fedaveen, the Jordanian government, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the United States, and the USSR. Each had a different stake in the crisis and each saw it in terms of distinctive goals.

The Fedaveen

For the <u>fedaveen</u>, the minimal objective was survival as a viable political force. This meant retaining a foothold in Jordan, the country with the largest concentration of Palestinians. Different factions within the PLO had other goals as well. The PFLP, which had instigated the crisis, was thoroughly opposed to the idea of a political settlement with Israel, and was seeking to sabotage the recent Rogers initiative. In addition, PFLP fortunes had been on the wane since the previous June, and the group was anxious to demonstrate the bankruptcy of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat's more conciliatory policies. Arafat himself was struggling to maintain his position of leadership at the head of a badly fractionated movement. He could not afford to let the PFLP appear as the sole defender of the Palestinian cause, and yet he doubtless feared that his cadres in Fatah would pay the highest price in the event of a showdown with the Jordanian Army. If it came to a show of force, Fatah would not stand aside, but some outside help would be needed.

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King Hussein had tolerated the Palestinian fedaveen presence in Jordan longer than some of his advisers -- especially Wasfi Tal, Zaid Rifai, and Zaid Ben Shakir--had thought wise. The August cease-fire provided Hussein the chance. to reestablish his authority without alienating his key Arab ally, President Nasser. Both Jordan and Egypt, for different reasons, favored the pursuit of a political settlement. Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians were adamantly opposed to such a course. To avoid total isolation, then, Hussein needed Nasser. Even more, however, he needed the loyalty of his armed forces, largely of Bedouin origins in the upper ranks and intensely anti-fedaveen. There were rumors of dissatisfaction in the army with the king's unwillingness to defend his regime against the threats of the guerrillas. But Hussein, mindful of the need for Nasser's support, could not risk initiating hostilities against the fedaveen. The PFLP hijacking altered the situation, however, and provided Hussein with the opportunity to move to reestablish his authority without breaking with Nasser. After all, the PFLP action had been just as much aimed at Nasser as at Hussein. By bringing the Palestinians under control, Hussein would be serving both his own narrow regime interests and those of the Arab "moderates" who were favorable to a political settlement with Israel.

Syria

Syrian objectives during the crisis reflected an underlying division within the regime. In power in Damascus since February 1966, the left wing of the Baath party was split into civilian and military factions. The civilians were self-professed Marxists, or at least leftists, and tended to follow a militant policy toward Israel. President Nureddin al-Atasi and Salah Jadid, head of the Baath party, represented this group. They did not hold Nasser in high regard; they were barely on speaking terms with the rival Baath leaders in Baghdad; and they took pride in their sponsorship of the fedaveen. One significant fedaveen group, Saiqa, was directly under their control. The military wing of the party, by contrast, was less ideological, more skeptical of the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare against Israel, and determined not to be drawn into a disastrous military operation because of the extreme policies of the civilians. Air Force Commander Hafiz al-Asad and Army General Mustafa Tlas were key actors in this group.

Both Syrian factions probably hoped that, whatever else happened, the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan would not all be driven into Syria, which would have placed strains on the regime and would inevitably have drawn it into unwanted conflicts with Israel. Although Syria was already host to nearly 200,000 Palestinians, fedaveen within the country were kept under strict control, and military operations from Syrian territory against Israel were proscribed. An influx of armed fedaveen fleeing Jordan could only add to the regime's problems. Apart from this area of agreement, however, the two groups could not be expected to work closely together. In fact, each was doubtless

watching for mistakes or weaknesses on the part of its rival. The Jordanian crisis provided opportunities to score points at one another's expense. The rather confusing and tentative nature of Syrian involvement in the crisis can only be understood against this background of internal political division.

Iraq

The Iraqi government was less intimately involved in the crisis, although it stridently opposed the cease-fire and was militantly anti-Nasser. The Iraqi press and radio attacked the regimes in Damascus and Amman, as well as Cairo, but the major preoccupation of the Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr government of Iraq was the consolidation of its recently acquired power and the festering Kurdish insurrection, aided by Iran, in the north. Approximately 20,000 Iraqi troops, however, were stationed in Jordan, and the regime announced in August that one of its missions was to defend the Palestinians against all plots. (43) When confronted with a full division of the Jordanian Army, however, the Iraqi forces refrained from any direct involvement in the fighting.

Israel

The Israeli government was very clear in its objectives during the crisis. First, it was determined to prevent the <u>fedaveen</u> from seizing power in Amman. Second, the crisis provided an opportunity to heal a year-long breach with the United States by demonstrating the compatibility of the aims of the two countries. Israel had long been anxious to show that it could be a strategic asset to the United States, not just a charity case. Third, the Israelis were determined not to allow Syrian or Iraqi troops to overthrow King Hussein. The Israeli leadership by far preferred Hussein among the Arab leaders, and they were committed to helping him remain in place. A shift in the balance of power in the Arab world at that particular moment could have serious consequences.

Egypt

President Nasser was more uneasy about his country's objectives in the crisis. Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers proposal for a cease-fire had helped set the stage for the showdown in Jordan, and Nasser was now being denounced by his long-time protégés, the Palestinians, for encouraging and supporting his former antagonist, King Hussein. Nasser now needed Hussein, and thus was not prepared to offer full backing for the militant Palestinians. At the same time, he was not willing to stand idly by if Hussein went too far. At another time, if the option of a political settlement were to fail, he might once again find the <u>fedaveen</u> useful to his strategy. The preferred outcome from his standpoint would be a restoration of Hussein's authority without a complete defeat for the <u>fedaveen</u>.

The United States

In Washington, Nixon and Kissinger saw the crisis on several levels. The most serious aspect, in their view, was the threat of indirect Soviet intervention to disrupt the prospects of reaching a political settlement in the area. Even since the Soviet rejection of the Rogers Plan in December 1969, the President had been suspicious that the Soviet leaders were trying to create tensions in the area as a way of undermining U.S. influence. The record was not one to inspire confidence: massive arms shipments to Nasser early in the year; the provision of combat pilots; and apparent complicity in Egyptian violations of the August cease-fire. While the Soviet leaders had obviously not precipitated the Jordan crisis, at the White House it was feared that they might try to profit from it. Compounding these suspicions was the fact that, early in September, U.S. intelligence sources had discovered that the USSR was constructing a submarine base in Cuba. (44)

Washington officials were also concerned by the regional aspects of the crisis. Nixon was strongly anti-fedayeen, seeing them as a disruptive, terrorist force that played into the hands of the USSR. He was anxious to see their trouble-making potential ended. More to the point, the administration wanted to keep King Hussein, a good friend of the United States, in power. Nixon and his adviser for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, felt that it was important for the United States to support its friends in need, especially those who were capable and willing to stand up and fight. This, after all, was what the Nixon Doctrine was all about. Besides, Nixon liked Hussein. He saw him as tough, courageous, and moderate on the Arab-Israeli issue. If there was ever to be a peace settlement, Hussein was expected to play a major part in helping to resolve the ticklish Palestinian problem. Finally, the administration was haunted by the scenario of another full-scale Middle East war if Hussein were to fall. In that contingency, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel might all move to seize parts of Jordan. Egypt could be drawn in, with Soviet involvement not far behind. The United States would then face the prospect of intervention to protect Israel and its interests in the Arabian Peninsula on very unfavorable terms.

The third level of concern for the United States was the fate of the U.S. citizens who were held hostage by the PFLP. This was a serious issue, and contingencies for going to their rescue were considered throughout the crisis. Some scenarious envisaged a limited use of force to rescue the hostages and to evacuate Americans from Jordan, with the added benefit of providing some tangible aid to Hussein in the process. The danger, of course, was that the hostages might be killed by their captors if force were used to rescue them. Nor was it known exactly where they were being held after September 12.

The USSR

The Soviet objectives are most difficult to discern. The Soviet leaders certainly hoped to maintain their credibility as good friends of the Arabs,

especially of Syria and Egypt. As such, they were not particularly worried by King Hussein's difficulties. At the same time, they did not want a full-scale confrontation with the United States. The crisis presented them with serious dangers and relatively few opportunities. How they would choose among their various goals would be determined by events on the ground and by the response of the United States. Moscow was not strongly committed to any particular outcome, provided its primary interests in Cairo and Damascus were not affected.

U.S. Behavior in the Crisis

U.S. policy during the Jordan crisis was very much the product of the perceptions of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. In their view, the time had come to demonstrate U.S. resolve and determination to the leadership in Moscow. To some degree this was related to recent Soviet behavior in the Middle East, but Soviet behavior elsewhere was also of concern. Jordan provided an opportunity to make the point with the USSR that détente and negotiations did not provide a license to fish in troubled waters. Nor was the United States incapable of defending its interests elsewhere because of the continuing crisis in Vietnam. (It should be recalled that the situation in Southeast Asia had been a major preoccupation during the early part of the year, with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the subsequent U.S. military intervention in Cambodia.) The message that the United States was able and willing to stand up to the USSR was no doubt also meant to impress the Chinese leadership in Peking, with whom indirect contacts were underway to develop a relationship founded on the mounting anti-Soviet sentiments of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues.

In addition, the President had several bureaucratic-domestic concerns in mind as he dealt with the crisis. 1970 was a year for congressional elections, and no administration wants to face elections while engaged in a public quarrel with the Israelis. Up until mid-1970, the State Department had guided the conduct of Middle East policy, culminating in the August cease-fire and the subsequent crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Nixon and Kissinger were angry at the bureaucracy's handling of the Israeli relationship, and by September they were asserting White House control over policy toward the Middle East. It was clear that Nixon, sensitive to his domestic political base, would not gratuitously offend the Israelis. In fact, the crisis might provide an opportunity for cementing the U.S.-Israeli relationship, with both strategic and political dividends.

Operational Objectives

The operational objectives of the President shifted once the Syrian military intervention began. Up until that time, the objectives were primarily to obtain the release of the hostages held by the PFLP, then to ensure that King Hussein would remain in power once fighting had broken out. In addition, the President was hoping to deter military intervention by Iraqi and Syrian forces

by hinting that the United States might itself intervene in such circumstances. Finally, the United States was most anxious to deter direct Soviet intervention in the conflict.

Once the Syrians had intervened, on September 18-19, the operational objectives shifted. The first priority was to enlist Soviet support to persuade the Syrians to withdraw. The second goal was-to develop a credible military option in the event that King Hussein's regime was threatened. This required close consultations with the Jordanians and the Israelis.

Within the administration there was virtual unanimity over these objectives. Earlier there had been a few voices that had referred to the king as a "wasting asset." But this was no longer a prevailing view. The new U.S. ambassador to Jordan, L. Dean Brown, for example, actively supported the goal of aiding the king. The State Department, while only marginally involved in the formulation of policy in the crisis, saw the need to preserve the possibility of a peace settlement. (45) The military was skeptical that the United States could project adequate power, especially ground forces, into the area in the event of a full-scale crisis, but did not oppose the thrust of the President's policy. The negotiations with the Israelia, which might have proved divisive, were handled almost entirely by Kissinger, and thus the rest of the bureaucracy was not in a position to object. On balance, then, the administration appeared united, purposeful, and clear-headed about its goals. The USSR and Syria had no reason to hope for divided councils in Washington or the constraining influence of public or congressional opinion.

Communication Patterns

Nixon and Kissinger went to considerable lengths to ensure that the USSR, and to a lesser degree Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians, understood U.S. objectives and what the consequences of their actions would be. The most explicit threat of U.S. military intervention in the event of Syrian or Iraqi involvement in the Jordanian conflict came on September 17. President Nixon was visiting the Midwest at the time. He had spoken in Kansas City the previous day, and had denounced the <u>fedayeen</u>. While passing through Chicago, he gave an "off-the-record" interview to editors of the <u>Chicago Sun-Times</u>, the gist of which appeared later that day in print. (46) In essence, Nixon was quoted as saying that he would be inclined to order U.S. troops into Jordan if either Syria or Iraq intervened in the fighting that was just breaking out. In addition, he reportedly said that it would not be such a bad thing for the USSR to believe that the United States was capable of "irrational action."

After Syrian tanks entered the fray, Kissinger, Rogers, and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco were all used as channels of communication to the USSR. Their tone was tough and the message was simple: Call off your friends, or the consequences will be nasty. On September 20, Rogers warned the Syrians to end their "invasion" of Jordan. (47) Nixon sent one official message through the State Department to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, then relied on less direct means to drive home the point. (48) Sisco stressed

the danger of Israeli interventions to the Soviet Chargé in Washington. (49) The President explicitly decided against calling a UN Security Council meeting. U.S. military moves were designed to reinforce the basic message. Finally, on September 22, Kissinger deliberately attended a reception at the Egyptian Interests Section, where he sought out the ranking Soviet diplomat, Yuli Vorontsov, to tell him cryptically that the United States expected the Soviet leaders to persuade their friends to withdraw quickly. "Your friends started this. It's up to you to get them to stop." (50)

At no time during the crisis did the United States try to communicate directly with the Syrians, Iraqis, or Palestinians. The state of political relations did not hold out much promise of success in any event, but, more importantly, the administration was treating the crisis primarily on the U.S.-Soviet plane. With the Jordanians, however, communications were frequent, primarily passing through the newly arrived Ambassador Brown, and King Hussein and his closest advisers, especially Zaid Rifai. This was primarily an information channel, available to learn how the battle was going and how the Jordanians assessed their needs. It was not heavily used to try to influence Jordanian behavior, except by way of telling the king what the United States and Israel were planning.

Detailed and complex negotiations did take place between Israel and the United States. The U.S. goal was to ensure that Israel would not act on its own in ways that would complicate the situation, while none-theless preparing for a controlled use of force if a contingency should arise in which Israeli action was needed to save King Hussein. This required fine tuning, since Hussein obviously did not want Israel to appear as his rescuer if any other alternative could be found. Nor did he want Israeli ground troops pouring into northern Jordan. Thus, the United States had to reassure the Israelis that U.S. aid would be forthcoming if Israel did act, while at the same time ensuring that any Israeli move would be carefully coordinated with King Hussein.

These negotiations with Israel took place in several channels. In the early phase of the crisis, on September 18, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir happened to be in Washington to see Nixon about aid. Joint intervention in Jordan was reportedly not discussed at that point, since the Syrians had not yet entered the fighting in force. A few days later, however, at the peak of the crisis, on September 20, Prime Minister Meir and Ambassador Itzhak Rabin were in New York. Kissinger reached them by phone for preliminary discussions of joint planning, then spent much of the day of September 21 with Rabin to work out details. Rabin provided the main channel of communication thereafter to the Israeli leadership, and Kissinger monopolized the talks on the U.S. side. The meetings were private, and their contents have never been fully revealed. (51) In essence, however, it appears that agreement was reached late on September 21 that Israel would be prepared to intervene in Jordan by air and ground if Hussein's position were to deteriorate farther. The United States promised to deter Soviet intervention against Israel and to provide assistance if Egypt attacked. These contingency arrangements were subject to review and to King Hussein's approval. Jordan had made clear its objection to Israeli ground forces

entering northern Jordan, although Israeli air strikes and a diversionary armored thrust into Syria would have been acceptable. As it turned out, however, the following day the Jordanian Air Force went into action and did quite well. By September 23, Syrian tanks were being withdrawn, and the United States was telling the Israelis not to move.

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The crisis came to a close without direct intervention by Israel or the United States, but it was a near thing. Had the communications between the two, and with King Hussein, been less well managed, it is not difficult to imagine the Israelis acting in ways that would have complicated Hussein's position and greatly expanded the conflict. The U.S. role was indispensable, both as coordinator of Israeli and Jordanian moves, and as guarantor that Israeli security would not be jeopardized if military action were undertaken against the Syrians. Private and very restricted means of communications were used in fulfillment of these roles, in contrast to the obvious public messages intended for the USSR and its friends.

The subtlety and nuance of the objectives sought from Israel and Jordan required utmost secrecy of communications; the effort to deter Syria and the USSR, and to convince Moscow to pressure the Syrians, required a blunter, more public message, backed up by the movement of forces and a few private communications. On balance, however, Nixon did not go to great lengths to communicate with the Soviet leaders, and certainly not with the Syrians or Palestinians. The hotline was not used during the crisis.

Military Moves

Throughout the Jordanian crisis, President Nixon paid careful attention to the preparation and movement of U.S. military forces. Military force was viewed as an important adjunct to diplomacy, and thus most military moves were publicized, either through Defense Department announcements or leaks to the press.

In addition to the "signaling" aspect of military moves, U.S. forces were being prepared for several possible contingencies. At the lowest end of the spectrum of force, evacuation of U.S. citizens might require a limited intervention. Paratroopers would try to secure Amman airport, then transport aircraft would land to evacuate U.S. citizens. An effort might also be made to rescue the hostages, if they could be located. A variant of this option included a small show of force to bolster King Hussein.

Once Syrian armed forces entered the battle, other contingencies were considered. Air strikes from the carriers of the Sixth Fleet against Syrian tanks were a possibility. The option of land-based airstrikes, using British bases in Cyprus, was also discussed, but was discarded as less effective than carrier-based air strikes. Finally, some consideration was given to the introduction of ground forces into Jordan, although this option was not viewed with much enthusiasm by the Pentagon.

The difficulty of organizing a substantial U.S. strike force against the Syrians led to consideration of the Israeli alternative. Israel could

assemble ground and air forces to move into Jordan or Syria on short notice. The Israelis wanted assurances from the United States, however, that if Egypt or the USSR were to respond to an Israeli military move, the United States would intervene if necessary. Thus, the United States had to be prepared to counter any Soviet military moves—which did not seem very likely—and to protect Israel against any Egyptian attack. It is not known if any specific plans were ever drawn up for these contingencies.

The sequence of military moves by the United States reflected the evolution of the crisis in Jordan. From an initial concern with freeing the hostages held by the PFLP and evacuating Americans, the emphasis shifted after September 18 to countering the Syrian intervention, and then to providing a deterrent against Soviet or Egyptian military involvement.

In the first phase, the President ordered six C-130 transport aircraft to Incirlik, Turkey, on September 10. These might be used for evacuation from Jordan. The 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina was also placed on "semi-alert" status. The following day, twenty-five F-4 Phantom jets were flown to Incirlik from Europe, along with four more C-130s. The F-4s would be available to escort the C-130s into Jordan. Also on September 11, some ships of the Sixth Fleet were reported en route to an undisclosed location. These moves were all noted in the press over the next several days, prompting the <u>fedaveen</u> to warn that the United States was planning to intervene militarily in Jordan. The official statements from the White House, however, stressed the routine, precautionary nature of these steps, linking them to possible evacuation. (52)

The next phase of the crisis began on September 15, when King Hussein informed the United States and the United Kingdom that he intended to move against the fedaveen the following day. The Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) met that evening to consider evacuation and the "question of outside intervention to support the King." (53) The decision was made during the WSAG meeting to order the aircraft carrier Saratoga to proceed from the western to the eastern Mediterranean, where it would join the carrier <u>Independence</u> east of Cyprus. An airborne battalion in West Germany was also placed on "semi-alert," and additional C-130s were ordered to Turkey. These steps became known publicly on September 17, when the Defense Department announced them, along with the early departure from Norfolk of a helicopter carrier, the Guam, with a Marine Battalion Landing Team on board, and several other amphibious ships to join the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird placed these moves in the context of possible evacuation; the State Department. when queried, would not rule out armed intervention if necessary to save American lives.

That evening, September 17, the WSAG recommended that a third carrier, the JFK, proceed from the Atlantic to the eastern Mediterranean. In Chicago earlier in the day, the President had stated off the record that he would be inclined to intervene in Jordan if Syria or Iraq sent in troops. On September 18, the Defense Department made further announcements of fleet movements and the dispatch of C-130s to Europe and Turkey.

When news reached Washington late on September 19 that a large armed force from Syria had entered Jordan, the President immediately raised the alert status of the 82nd Airborne Division and the airborne battalion of the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany. The Sixth Fleet was ordered to move farther east. The following day, the Independence was reported off the Lebanon-Israel coast; the Saratoga was still en route to join the Independence. Reports on the status of the Guam and the airborne units in Germany were also made public.

As the crisis reached its peak on September 21, news of the movement of the carrier JFK was released, and a plane from the Sixth Fleet flew to Tel Aviv, reportedly to discuss target coordination. No effort was made to disguise these moves. (54) By this time, Nixon wanted to make sure that the USSR recognized the danger of the situation caused by the Syrian intervention. Within forty-eight hours the crisis was virtually over, as the Syrian armed forces withdrew. No other military maneuvers were made, although President Nixon did visit the carrier Saratoga, as prearranged, on September 27, as part of an effort to symbolize U.S. power and interests in the Mediterranean.

In brief, military and diplomatic moves were closely coordinated in Washington, and were designed to meet different aspects of the unfolding crisis. The following table highlights the relationship between political and military decisions and regional developments.

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	Soviet Reaction									X-43
	Soviet					1.				
of the Jordan Crisis	Regional Developments			Palestinian <u>fedaveen</u> warn of U.S. plans to intervene in Jordan.		Fedaveen blow up hi- jacked airliner in Jor- dan; release some hos- tages. Of remaining 54, 38 are American.			Hussein informs UK and U.S. that he will form military government and	
tical and Military Developments of the Jordan Crisis	U.S. Diplometic/Political			White House terms oth Fleet moves "routine precautions in such a situation for		Rogers announces resumption of economic aid to Israel and increase in military aid.	Rogers meets with Nixon to discuss U.S. hostages in Jordan.	THE PERSON OF TH	Mixon plans to visit Europe and Sixth Fleet on Sept. 27.	WSAG met for two hours to discuss evacuation and "question of outside inter- vention to support the King."
Politic	U.S. Military Moves	82nd Airborne Division on "semi-elert" status.	6 C-130s ordered to Incirlik, Turkey.	25 F-4 fighters ordered to Incirlik, along with h more C-130s.	Ships of 6th Fleet reported leaving port.	Sept. 12			Carrier Saratoga ordered to Eastern Mediterrane-an. Airborne units in	alert. More C-130s to Turkey.
	3	Sept. 10		Sept. 11		26 FF . 12	Sept. 13	Sept. 14	Sept. 15	

Political and Military Developments of the Jordan Crisis

U.S. Military Moves Date

U.S. Diplomatic/Political

Regional Developments

Soviet Reactions

Sept. 16

State University on "law "Palestinian guerrillas. Vixon speech at Kansas and order"--denounces

artial law declared in Jordan. Prime Minister fighting begins between Meir leaves Israel for Mashington on "private visit." Hussein names military covernment. Sporadic army and fedaveen.

Heavy fighting begins in Amman at 5 AM.

2 AM that Jorden has gone on offensive. Defense Secretary Laird says U.S. is ready to evacuate Americans from Jordan "if necessary." State Department will not Kissinger informs Nixon at rule out intervention. to East Mediterranean ordered from Atlantic briefs on naval move-Carrier JEK Defense Department

ents.

Sept. 17

ISAG meets in evening.

tors on Jordan crisis: Fa-Iraq intervenes. Reported in Sun-Times in late Nixon briefs Chicago edivors intervention to protect Hussein if Syria or dition.

responsible for safety of Ziegler holds fedaveen American hostages.

Kissinger contacts Rabin and Meir in New York on Hussein appeal for help.

Political and Military Developments of the Jordan Crisis

Regional Developments	PFLP warns of U.S. intervention. First reports of Syrian tanks crossing into Jordan.	Full-scale Syrian intervention during might of Sept. 19-20. Nasser
U.S. Diplomatic/Political	Prime Minister Meir meets President Nixon on aid and Jordan crisis. Ziegler denies that U.S. has decided one way or an- other on intervention. Kissinger informs Nixon at Camp David of Vorontsov	streint. Nixon skeptical. Laird sees no need for U.S. intervention unless situation deteriorates.
U.S. Military Moves	Defense Department announces further navel moves and additional G-130s to Europe and Turkey. Plans to evacuate up to 450 are revealed.	Miron reises elert sta- twe of Schi Airborne and units in West Germany.
Pate	8 44. 18	Sept. 19

ing to restrain Syrians; denies Soviet involve-

ment.

Charge Vorontsov tells Sisco that USSR is try-

Tass statement viewed an

warning to Syria and Iraq. (Gwertzman, New York Times.)

e-fire. Nasser

Jordan. Joins President

Masser in calling for

USSR warns of any out-

Soviet Reactions

side intervention in

ceasefire. Tass refers to British and U.S.

military moves.

Laird sees no need for U.S. intervention unless situation deteriorates.	Full-scale Syrvention during Sept. 19-20.
Rogers calls on Syria to halt "invasion" of Jordan.	King Hussein o
Mixon orders State Dept. to send "sternest note" ever to USSR. Delivered by Sisco to Vorontsov in morning. Sisco warns that Israel may move against Surfa.	Irbid falls to Palestinian fo

6th Fleet ordered farther east.

Sept. 20

salls for quarter.

Syrian-

rces.

Developments of the Jordan Crisis

Sept. 21

Date

Meir returns to Israel, arriving in afternoon. Arab leaders meet in Cairo on Jordan crisis. Kuwait ends subsidy to Jordan. Jordanian forces falling back toward Amman. Jordanian Air Force goes into action. Syrian intervention is slowed. Jordanian troops advance toward Syrian border. All Syrian tanks withdrew by noon.

Sept. 25

Sept. 24

Sept. 23

Ironically, during all of the maneuvers and hints that the United States might intervene in the crisis, the key policymakers in Washington were acutely aware of the limited military capability at their disposal. In particular, substantial ground forces needed to enter Jordan and to rescue the hostages were not available on short notice. Air power from the Sixth Fleet could be called upon, but even that capability was not overwhelming and was no match for what Israel could produce. When it became clear that Israel was prepared to lend its weight to the U.S. effort to shore up Hussein's throne, the offer was welcomed. Since Israel desired a guarantee against Soviet intervention, the Sixth Fleet could be used as a visible symbol of such a guarantee. Its value lay less in its fighting capability than its "tripwire" function.

While U.S. force was judged to be important as the crisis unfolded, senior U.S. decisionmakers were uneasy about the actual use of force. U.S. military maneuvers were designed primarily to convey signals to the USSR. There was little desire, particularly on the part of the military, to intervene directly in the fighting. The more serious the crisis became, the more valuable the option of Israeli intervention seemed. If the Syrian Air Force had intervened, it would have been Israel, not the United States, that would have reacted militarily. Nixon and Kissinger felt that it was the combination of U.S. and Israeli military power that played a major part in resolving the crisis. Unilateral U.S. action appeared increasingly undesirable as its consequences were examined. The Israeli option helped protect the United States from having its bluff exposed as a rather empty one. (55) Ultimately, both the United States and Israel were relieved when King Hussein, with his own forces, was able to handle the Syrian threat and restore order within Jordan.

The Soviet Response

The primary thrust of U.S. policy during the crisis was directed at the USSR. Syria and Iraq may have been seen at the outset as important targets of Washington's coercive diplomacy, but Moscow was the channel through which pressure was to be brought to bear on the Soviet-supported regimes in Damascus and Baghdad.

Although the USSR has not revealed much about its role in the Jordanian crisis, it did not seem to feel that any major Soviet interests were at stake. Washington's view that the USSR was intimately involved in the Syrian intervention is certainly an exaggeration. Soviet relations with the Palestinians at the time were not particularly close. Egypt's President Nasser was still the primary Soviet client in the Arab world, and Nasser was moving slowly toward a political settlement, in conformity with professed Soviet desires. The Jordan crisis was an embarrassment to Nasser and, it would appear, to the USSR as well. Clearly the Soviet leaders would not wring their hands over King Hussein's overthrow by the Palestinians, but this was not a Soviet priority, and the risks of such a move must have been obvious.

A primary Soviet objective as the crisis deepened appeared to be the prevention of U.S. or Israeli military intervention. The method chosen was not saber rattling, but rather an effort to convey an image of moderation to Washington.

The USSR clearly took the threat of U.S. intervention seriously. Presumably it was Nixon's veiled threat, coupled with strong diplomatic messages, that underscored the seriousness of the U.S. stance. Moscow's first official reaction to the crisis came on September 19, when Tass warned against "foreign armed intervention" in the crisis. (%) The next day, at the peak of the conflict, Radio Moscow warned against U.S. military intervention. (57) In its private diplomacy with Washington, however, the USSR denied any responsibility for the Syrian intervention and claimed to be working for an end to the fighting.

As early as September 18, the USSR had reportedly sent Nixon a moderate message that it would not intervene and that it would restrain Syria. (58) This theme was repeated on September 21 in a message to Nixon, along with efforts by Vorontsov to ensure that the United States would not unleash Israel. Some evidence was beginning to accumulate by then in Washington that the USSR was trying to persuade the Syrians to back down. It was known that the Soviet ambassador in Damascus had talked to Syrian leaders. On September 22, a State Department spokesman said, "We were told that the Soviet Government is in touch with the Syrian Government." The next evening, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny confirmed this in a speech. (59)

Once the crisis was over, the USSR made a minor show of force by sending several ships into the Mediterranean to reinforce the Soviet squadron. But during the crisis, the Soviet squadron had not interfered with the Sixth Fleet's movements, limiting itself instead to a monitoring role. On the propaganda level, the USSR portrayed its part in the conflict as that of dampening the crisis, helping to end the fratricide in Jordan, and thus forestalling U.S. intervention. Nasser's efforts to obtain a cease-fire were praised, and it seemed clear that the USSR was not anxious to be identified with the Palestinian or Syrian policy of unseating Hussein.

The key to Soviet behavior appears to be that the stakes for Moscow in the crisis did not seem to be very great. Thus, it did not take much of a combined U.S.-Israeli threat to make the crisis seem unduly risky. There is little doubt that Moscow appreciated that the United States and Israel did perceive major interests as being involved, and thus their threats could not be easily dismissed. Since the USSR had not committed its prestige to the success of the Syrian, let alone the Palestinian, adventure, it suffered no humiliation in adopting a policy of restraint. If the United States or Israel had actually committed forces, or if Nasser had been actively involved in support of the Syrians, then the USSR would have been placed in a more dangerous position and might have reacted more aggressively. But as long as the issue remained localized and involved primarily Jordan and the Palestinians, there was no reason for the USSR to risk confrontation with the United States. In a sense, then, it was comparatively easy for

the United States to convince the USSR to adopt a restrained position in the crisis. Even without threats of U.S. intervention, the USSR was not particularly anxious to fish in these particular troubled waters. It was a case of the wrong crisis at the wrong time over the wrong issue. The USSR had not provoked the crisis, it had not encouraged Syria to send troops into Jordan, and its best friend in the area, President Nasser, was placed in an extremely awkward position by the conflict. (60) All in all, the USSR must have felt the United States was deliberately overreacting by placing a large share of the blame on it.

The Regional Participants

The United States treated the Jordan crisis as a superpower test of wills. But there was a genuine, and probably more critical, regional dimension to the crisis in which Jordan, Syria, the Palestinians, Egypt, and Israel were the main actors. The United States had little apparent influence on the behavior of the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Egyptians. In each case, it seems as if U.S. objectives were probably understood well enough, but the more immediate source of pressure was Jordan or Israel. Those latter two actors did, however, tailor their behavior in important respects to what they perceived to be U.S. intentions and objectives.

Jordan

The Jordanians, and King Hussein in particular, were confident of their ability to deal with the Palestinian guerrillas and with the Iraqi division stationed in Jordan. When it came to Syria, however, Hussein was anxious to find help wherever it might be available. If it came to an allout war, Syria might very well prevail because of its great advantage in armor and air power. Although Jordan and Israel had developed a discreet relationship based on mutual interests after 1967, it was not sufficiently strong, nor was Hussein so foolhardy, to appeal directly to Israel for help against Syria. Thus, the United States came to play a crucial role in coordinating Hussein's requests for aid and Israel's preparations to act.

Hussein's main fear was that the disguised and tentative Syrian intervention would become a blatant invasion aimed at occupying Amman. In the first days, however, the Syrian Air Force had not intervened, nor was Damascus irreversibly committed to the battle. The useful fiction remained that the tanks from Syria were those of the Palestine Liberation Army. Syria could still back down without dishonor. But if Hussein were to commit his own air force, how would the Syrians react? And what would he do if Syrian tanks approached the outskirts of Amman? Before acting on his own, Hussein sought answers from the United States on whether it would intervene, or whether Israel might act, if the Syrians did not back down. Once reassured that U.S.-Israeli aid would be forthcoming in extremia, Hussein committed

his air force on September 22, and by early morning the next day the Syrians had withdrawn. To some immeasurable degree, Hussein's willingness to take the risk of using his air force was probably facilitated by the knowledge that the United States and Israel would respond to any successful Syrian counterattack. Insofar as this contributed to Hussein's self-confidence, it played a major role in the resolution of the crisis. (61)

Israel

Israel was also attentive to U.S. preferences in preparing itself to deal with the Jordanian crisis. Even if Nixon and Kissinger had been indifferent to Hussein's fate, Israel might well have tried to deter a full-scale Syrian invasion. The Israelis held several trump cards. First, their air force was without doubt the most effective in the Middle East. It could quickly and surgically go into action, either in Jordan itself or within Syria. Second, Israel had mobilized nearly 400 tanks in the Golan Heights. A diversionary armored strike toward Damascus would have forced the Syrians to consider withdrawal of their forces in Jordan. Third, the Israelis could easily cross the Jordan River and confront Syrian tanks in the area north of Irbid. At the same time, they could clean out pockets of guerrillas who used the border area for attacks upon Israel.

The Israelis, if left to their own devices, would probably have opted for the combination of air power and intervention into northern Jordan. For King Hussein, however, this was an unattractive alternative, since he would then face the problem of either openly conspiring with the Israelis or of finding himself confronted with their unwelcome and perhaps unyielding presence within his territory once the fighting stopped. Air support was one thing, but any Israeli ground action, in his view, should be confined to Syrian territory.

The important role of the United States was, through consultation with Israel and Jordan, to ensure that Israel would not move at the wrong time or in the wrong manner from Hussein's point of view. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to provide some guarantees to the Israelis that their security would not be gravely endangered if Israel agreed to act in accord with Jordanian and U.S. requests. In particular, direct action against Syria might raise the risk of Soviet reaction, or might even bring Egypt into the conflict. Israel's willingness to play a role, but to do so with restraint and concern for King Hussein's wishes, was largely due to this U.S. guarantee, backed by the visible military power of the Sixth Fleet.

Other Arab Actors

It would seem, from this overview, that the U.S. threats to intervene and the corresponding military maneuvers were most influential with respect

to partners sharing the same goals. Hussein was probably emboldened to take risky actions, and the Israelis were persuaded to adopt a delicate and potentially dangerous position toward Syria. Curiously, the Syrians, Iraqis, Palestinians, and Egyptians showed few signs of having taken the U.S. moves nearly as seriously. In each case, they either had their hands full with more immediate problems, and the U.S. threats made little difference, or they were already divided in their objectives and were easily persuaded to end the crisis short of actions that would draw Israel or the United States into the fray.

The Syrian decision to withdraw its tanks from Jordan was no doubt based on several factors. U.S. and Jordanian officials both gave priority to the performance of the Jordanian armed forces, then to the threat of Israeli and U.S. intervention, and finally to Soviet pressure. The only addition to this list that seems required is the fact of internal political divisions between the Jadid and Asad factions in Syria.

Outcomes

On balance, the Jordanian crisis was resolved successfully from the U.S. point of view. The primary regional objective was to keep Hussein in power, thus averting a broadening of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and one means to this end was pressure on the USSR to restrain the Syrians. While the substance of Soviet-Syrian contacts remains unknown, the USSR apparently did act to restrain the Syrians at the crucial moment. One suspects that it was not a particularly difficult task, because of the factional divisions in Dammascus, nor was it, in all likelihood, the decisive element in the Syrian decision to withdraw.

U.S.-Israeli Relations

A number of direct consequences can be traced to the outcome of the Jordanian crisis. Most dramatically, U.S. relations with Israel and Jordan were greatly strengthened. Levels of economic and military aid increased substantially to both countries. Israel was increasingly seen by the U.S. government as a useful stabilizing factor in the area, at least until the unanticipated outbreak of war in 1973. As Israel became stronger after 1970, and the Palestinian guerrillas faded from the scene, the status quo seemed to stabilize. Complacency set in. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat essentially decided to go to war in October 1973 to upset this "no war, no peace" situation. That he was able to do so testifies to the degree to which the Israelis had let their guard down in the years following the 1970 Jordanian crisis.

Superpower Relations

Relations between the United States and the USSR were not decisively influenced by the Jordanian crisis per se. The demonstration of U.S. firmness, if anything, probably did make it easier to develop the bases of détente with the USSR in the next two years. By itself, however, the Jordanian crisis was not vital to the overall relationship. Its consequences for the Soviet position in the Middle East are also hard to assess. Within two years of the crisis, Sadat had asked them to leave Egypt. A year later, in 1973, they were actively helping Egypt and Syria in a war against Israel. Five years after the crisis, Egyptian-Soviet relations had reached a low point. But little of this could be traced directly to the Jordanian crisis.

China was more than a marginal consideration to the United States during the crisis. The decision to develop a new relationship with China had already been made in Washington. It would clearly depend for success on the Chinese belief that the United States was capable of standing up to Soviet pressures. A weak United States would not attract much attention in Peking. Thus, one possible benefit of the strong U.S. stance in September 1970 was to convince the Chinese that a relationship with the United States would pay dividends. The Chinese posture during the crisis itself was enigmatic. Their revolutionary support of the Palestinians was tempered by advice against the resort to terrorism and warnings of the dangers of factionalism within the PLO.

The PLO and Syria

The most enduring losses after the Jordanian crisis were suffered by the PLO and the Jadid faction in Syria. The PLO was completely expelled from its remaining bases in Jordan in July 1971, moved underground for a period, then resurfaced in Lebanon and Syria. It remained a political force of consequence in the area, but its military potential and its autonomy were greatly reduced. As for the Jadid faction in Syria, it was ousted in a coup d'etat in November 1970 led by General Hafiz al-Asad. The new regime has been noticeably more moderate, and has succeeded in bringing a degree of political stability to Syria in the years since the Jordanian crisis.

Jordan

King Hussein was able to restore his full authority in Jordan, but at the price of becoming the pariah of the Arab world. In the months following the crisis, his new prime minister, Wasfi Tal, completed tha task of removing the fedayeen from Jordan altogether. In retaliation, the fedayeen assassinated him in November 1971 in Cairo, depriving Jordán of the talents of its most effective prime minister in recent history. Two years later, however, Jordan sent forces to Syria to help the Asad regime during the October war against Israel.

U.S. Policymaking

The only other consequence of note that can be traced to the Jordanian crisis involved the status of Nixon and Kissinger in the foreign policymaking establishment of the United States. The successful outcome of the crisis no doubt redounded to Nixon's advantage and helped to lay the basis for his claims of foreign policy expertise. Following the Jordanian crisis, Nixon was able to show progress in relations with both China and the USSR, culminating in his trips to both countries in 1972. Those coups de theatre helped to soften the continuing public disenchantment over policy in Southeast Asia. The Jordanian crisis can thus be seen as one of the early steps in establishing the foreign policy record that helped Nixon to win reelection in November 1972.

President Nixon and Kissinger saw the outcome of the Jordanian crisis as a clear victory for the United States. Since Israel had played a key role in the development of the contingency plan for intervention, the U.S.-Israeli relationship was greatly strengthened, not so much from gratitude as from the belief that a strong Israel would be a strategic asset to the United States. As the Soviet position in the Middle East began to unravel in 1971 and 1972, Washington officials were confirmed in their belief that the U.S.-Israeli "alliance" had strategic significance. As in the Israeli case, this contributed to an insensitivity to the dangers of the status quo and an inattentiveness to the signs of war in 1973. The surprise of October 1973 would probably not have occurred but for the mood created in September 1970.

The Jordanian crisis brought Kissinger onto the scene of Middle East politics. After September 1970, the State Department did not recapture control over policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict until Kissinger became secretary of state in September 1973. Bureaucratically, this was an important development. It helped to ensure the failure of the State Department diplomatic initiative on reopening the Suez Canal in 1971. That failure, in turn, contributed to the Egyptian-Syrian conviction that the only alternative open was the use of force. In brief, 1970 helped lead to 1973 through several different channels.

Hypothetical Outcomes: More or less Reliance on Force

The one actor that the United States hoped most to impress in September 1970, the USSR, appears to have been least affected by the crisis. The suspicion is hard to resist that one reason for this was that the USSR never was as involved in the crisis as the United States had assumed. If that is true, the U.S.-Israeli "victory" was partly an invention, and the real credit belongs to King Hussein and his armed forces. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know exactly what role the U.S.-Israeli threats played in the resolution of the crisis, but it is quite plausible that the outcome

would not have been dramatically different even if the United States had been more restrained or if the U.S. military presence in the eastern Mediterranean had been less substantial.

Had the President decided not to threaten the use of force in September 1970, it is possible that the Syrian intervention might have continued longer, tempting Israel to retaliate. A full-scale Arab-Israeli war in September 1970 might then have resulted, although its outcome might have been more favorable to Israel than was the case in October 1973. Equally likely, however, some combination of Jordanian and Israeli power might have brought about essentially the same outcome, even without the backstopping role of the United States. In that event, little would have changed, apart from the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It probably would not have grown quite so quickly; Israel would have therefore been more on her guard against the hostility of Syria and Egypt. But the danger of another round of war would have remained. On balance, U.S. relations with Moscow and Peking might have proceeded more slowly in the following year, but they probably would have reached about the same point by 1972.

A significantly greater use of force by the United States in September 1970 would have been, in all likelihood, counterproductive. It would have badly damaged U.S.-Arab relations across the board, just as the energy crisis was beginning to emerge. It would have provoked the Soviet leaders and worried the Europeans, without really reassuring the Chinese about U.S. reliability as a partner. Recklessness rather than responsibility would have been the label attached to the Nixon foreign policy. Worst of all, the actual use of force might have had an embarrassing result. With its best efforts, the United States might not have been able to turn the tide of events as effectively as Jordan and Israel. An ineffective use of force--some 200 combat air sorties a day from the Sixth Fleet would have been the maximum effort--might have weakened the credibility that U.S. force could be effective in the future crises. Domestically, Nixon would probably have lost public support if he had pursued a more militant policy. The balance struck in September 1970 was just about all that public opinion would have found easy to accept. The virtue of the Nixon policy was that it looked tough, but at the same time controlled. Above all, it seemed to succeed without involving the United States in another war. Dulles would have called it a fine example of "brinkmanship." The actual use of force would have been considerably more divisive.

Evaluation

U.S. policy in the Jordanian crisis can be judged a limited success in terms of its stated objectives. To some degree, U.S. power did no doubt contribute to the willingness of the USSR to restrain Syria, insofar as that was an important aspect of the crisis. But it was certainly Jordanian and Israeli power that made the greatest impression on the Syrians, not the U.S. threats of the Soviet pleas for restraint. At best, the U.S. military contribution to the outcome of the crisis was modest.

Insofar as the U.S. played a key role, it was primarily through its diplomacy, not through its military posturing. Obviously, force and diplomacy do go hand in hand, and the United States was able to deal effectively with King Hussein and with the Israelis because of its overall strength, not just in the Mediterranean, but worldwide. But the real contribution depended on subtlety, not brute power, especially in urging King Hussein to rely on his own forces first and in negotiating with the Israelis to make their power available in a restrained, yet responsive, manner. The United States was partly instrumental in bringing Jordan and Israel to make use of their power, and this certainly did influence the outcome. To some degree, the two countries would have acted similarly without the United States, but the essential coordination and sense for timing and nuance would have been missing. The United States was an important middleman between Jordan and Israel. A weak United States would have had less credibility in that role than one that was putting some of its own power on the line in visible and convincing ways.

On balance, U.S. behavior during the crisis was consistent with the national interest, as broadly understood at the time, and it was certainly in tune with the President's desire to convey a firm image to the Soviet leaders. As such, the policy adopted can be defended, and its consequences were on the whole advantageous to the United States, at least in the short run. But the crisis does raise serious questions about the willingness or ability of top decisionmakers to appreciate the local dimensions of a crisis. By concentrating almost exclusively on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, Nixon and Kissinger let themselves be manipulated by the local parties. Israel was able to portray itself as a bulwark against Soviet power; Hussein emerged as a key to stability in the Arab world. The concerns of Egypt, Syria, and especially the Palestinians were lost in the euphoria of having stood down the USSR. This suited Israel and Jordan well enough, but it led the United States to turn a blind eye toward the mounting frustrations of the status quo for the leaders in Damascus and Cairo. Only the October 1973 war was capable of shaking the U.S. and Israeli leaderships out of their complacency and self-congratulation borne of September 1970. That was an unnecessarily high price to pay.

In short, the U.S. use of force and diplomacy in the September crisis was probably wise, but it rested on somewhat shaky premises, at least insofar as the Middle East was concerned. The administration chose to treat the Jordanian crisis as a test of superpower wills, primarily for global reasons. At that level of abstraction, U.S. policy succeeded in making a useful point with the Moscow leadership. But having decided to treat what was essentially a regional crisis as if it were a global one, the administration continued to view the region in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations. Caught in a perceptual trap largely of its own making, it failed to respond to regional trends that ultimately resulted in a war of much greater consequence than that of September 1970.

Footnotes

- 1. Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (Random House, 1968), pp. 110-16.
- Patrick Seale, <u>The Struggle for Syria</u> (Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 291-96, gives some evidence of a U.S. plot in August 1957.
- 3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961, (Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 266; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1962), pp. 65-69.
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign</u>
 Policy: Theory and Practice, (Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 344.
- 6. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 274.
- 7. Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting re Iraq" (July 14, 1958), Department of State, SECRET (declassified 1975).
- 8. Malcolm Kerr, "The Lebanese Civil War," in Evan Luard, ed., <u>The International Regulation of Civil Wars</u> (New York University Press, 1972), p. 78.
- 9. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 266.
- 10. Kerr, "Lebanese Civil War," p. 79-80, provides the most cogent argument that intervention in Lebanon was intended to prevent a chain reaction that could have ended in Arab-Israeli war.
- 11. Interviews with ranking U.S. officials involved in the Lebanon decision.
- 12. Loy Henderson, in "Meeting re Iraq."
- 13. See the account in Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (Harper, 1959), chaps. 1-3.
- 14. Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero, (Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 775, argues that counterrevolution in Iraq was seriously considered. He bases this conclusion on the size of the U.S. force in Lebanon, which he gives as 114,000, relying on the misprint in Eisenhower's memoirs, White House Years, p. 286, where the figure of 114,357 is given. The correct figure is 14,357.
- Harold Macmillan, <u>Riding the Storm. 1956-1959</u> (Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 506 ff.
- 16. Ibid., p. 512.

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- 17. Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest (Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 363.
- 18. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 512.
- 19. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 273.
- 20. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 515.
- 21. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 279. Eisenhower refused to commit U.S. forces to Jordan, but promised to help ensure the success of the British operations if they got into trouble.
- 22. Ibid., p. 274.
- 23. Robert Murphy. Diplomat Among Warriors (Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 450.
- 24. Culter, No Time for Rest, p. 364.
- 25. Kerr, "Lebanese Civil War," p. 79-80, argues that the key to the success of the intervention was the avoidance of violence. The troops, by their mere presence, had a calming effect, and the subsequent deployment of troops away from rebel-held areas helped to avoid hostile encounters. See McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," and Colonel H. A. Hadd, "Orders Firm but Flexible," <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u> (October 1962), for details on operational problems of the landing and disputes over the chain of command.
- 26. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 276. In his memoirs, Neither Liberty Nor Safety (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 64-65, General Nathan Twining takes a very hawkish view of the Lebanon crisis, arguing that the State Department "backpaddled" by ordering U.S. troops not to go into Lebanon with nuclear-tipped rockets. On page 148, he claims that the Soviet bluff to "take over Lebanon was called" by U.S. military action in the crisis.
- 27. Ibid., p. 276.
- 28. Ibid., p. 278, emphasis in original.
- 29. Ibid., p. 280.
- 30. Lt. Col. M. M. Bodron, U.S. Army, "U.S. Intervention in Lebanon--1958," Military Review (February 1976).

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- 31. Ibid., pp. 288-89.
- 32. Ibid., p. 290.
- 33. Ibid., p. 268.

- 34. Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Doubleday and Co., 1973), p. 135.
- 35. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 266.
- 36. Heikal, The Cairo Documents, p. 132.
- 37. Ibid., p. 132.
- 38. Ibid., p. 133-34.
- 39. Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 283-85.
- 40. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 512.
- 41. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 289.
- 42. On the Palestinian movement, see William B. Quandt and others, <u>The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism</u> (University of California Press, 1973).
- 43. For example, on August 17, 1970, after a meeting between Arafat and the Iraqi leadership, Baghdad Radio announced that ". . . Iraq has placed her forces on the eastern front at the disposal of the resistance movement." In early September, the theme was repeated several times, as Iraqi military leaders paid visits to their troops in Jordan.
- 44. The Soviet dimension of the crisis stands out in Nixon's retrospective analysis of the situation he faced in September 1970:

If Syria had attacked Jordan successfully, Israel would have pounced. Then the Russians would have moved, and we would have had a confrontation. We had to give assurances that the Israelis would not move; and assurances to King Hussein to stand firm. That gave the Russians pause. Then the Syrians pulled back.

Quoted from Frank van der Linden, <u>Nixon's Quest for Peace</u> (Robert B. Luce, 1972), p. 85.

- 45. Secretary Rogers was much less prone than Nixon and Kissinger to see the USSR as deeply involved in the Jordanian crisis. He reportedly recommended a joint U.S.-Soviet initiative to end the fighting. Marvin and Bernard Kelb, <u>Kissinger</u> (Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 202.
- 46. Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 1970; New York Times, September 19, 1970. The President was also worried about the hostages, according to Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler: "The President asked me to point out to you and to have it clearly understood that the holding of United States citizens is deplorable and that those who hold them will be held directly and completely responsible for their safety." New York Times, September 18, 1970.

47. The essence of the Rogers statement was as follows:

We have been informed that tank forces have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved toward Ramtha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armor is resisting this invasion. We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan and we urge all other concerned governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

New York Times, September 21, 1970.

- 48. On September 20, Nixon told Rogers to send Moscow the "sternest note" ever on the Syrian intervention. Sisco delivered this message to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Yuli Vorontsov, that morning, and Rogers met with the Soviet diplomat that evening to emphasize the urgency of the situation.
- 49. Kalb, Kissinger, p. 201.
- 50. The Vorontsov encounter is described by Kalb, <u>Kissinger</u>, p. 207, and Henry Brandon, <u>The Retreat of American Power</u> (Doubleday, 1972), p. 137.
- 51. Kalb, Kissinger, pp. 203-06; New York Times, October 8, 1970.
- 52. Ronald Ziegler statement to press, September 11, 1970.
- 53. New York Times, September 17, 1970.
- 54. The plane's mission was deliberately leaked to the press. Van der Linden, Nixon's Quest for Peace, chap. 5.
- 55. Given enough time, the United States could have sent a sizable fighting force to Jordan. But the pace of events on the ground required rapid action, measured in hours, not in days. While U.S. airpower could react quickly, it would have taken much longer for ground troops to reach the area. It was here that Israel had a great advantage.
- 56. The Tass statement included the following:

It is believed in the Soviet Union that foreign armed intervention in the events in Jordan would aggravate the conflict, hamper the Arab liberation struggle for liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression, for a lasting peace with justice in the Middle East, for restoration of their violated rights and national interests.

After warning of the moves of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the statement went on to say:

Other reports indicate that plans for military intervention in the conflict in Jordan are being hatched by definite circles in certain countries. Such a development would aggravate the situation in the Middle East and would not only endanger the independence of Jordan and other Arab countries, but would essentially complicate the international situation as well.

The <u>New York Times</u>, September 20, 1970, carried an article by its Moscow correspondent interpreting this as a warning to Syria and Iraq.

- 57. See Abraham Becker and others, The Economics and Politics of the Middle East, (American Elsevier, 1975), pp. 93-97.
- 58. Brandon, Retreat of American Power, chap. 5.
- "In its appeals made recently to a number of states -- both those belonging 59. and those not belonging to the area--the Soviet Union stressed the inadmissability of external interference in Jordan, under whatever pretext whatsoever." Tass later elaborated on this statement with a foreign ministry statement to the effect that contacts had been made in Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Cairo, expressing "the firm conviction that everything should be done to end as soon as possible the fratricidal fighting in Jordan." New York Times, September 24, 1970. The author, in an interview with a high-ranking Jordanian official, was told that the Jordanians learned after the crisis that the USSR did try to restrain the Syrians and urged them to withdraw their forces. Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (Quadrangle Books, 1975), pp. 98-100, states that the USSR passed on to Nasser the contents of the U.S. message of September 20 and urged "utmost restraint" on the Egyptians because of the dangerous international situation.
- 60. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 1971), chap. 7.
- 61. Some of those who worked closely with Hussein during this period have stressed in interviews with the author that, even without U.S. assurances, the king, under strong pressure from the army and from his key adviser, Wasfi Tal, would have ordered the counterattack. Tal, who was related by marriage to Syrian General Tlas, seemed confident that the Syrian Air Force would not intervene, according to one source.

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Chapter XI

CASE STUDIES: INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1961-1966

By Jerome N. Slater

From 1961 through 1966, U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic represented the most massive, sustained intervention in the internal affairs of a Latin American state by the United States since the period of U.S. imperialism in the early twentieth century. Washington used a wide variety of the instruments of power and influence available to it, including multilateral diplomacy and political pressure, economic rewards and sanctions, and, most important, threats of and the actual use of military force, to shape the internal politics of the Dominican Republic. U.S. policy during this period was designed to achieve three major objectives. In the order of their probable priority, they were: (1) to prevent the establishment of a radical, Castroite regime in the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the Trujillo era; (2) to establish in the Dominican Republic a stable, democratic, moderately progressive, but strongly anti-Communist regime that would serve as the model -- the "showcase for democracy" -- for the kind of political system the Alliance for Progress was designed to encourage through out Latin America; and (3) to set the precedent and create the machinery for collective inter-American action against dictatorships in general, but which might later be used specifically against the Castro regime in Cuba.

To understand the context of the events during the period 1961-66, it must be recalled that the Dominican Republic has been closely tied to the United States ever since the U.S. military interventions of 1905 and 1916, in which U.S. Marines had been used to enforce the general U.S. policy of preempting potential European intervention in unstable Caribbean states. After the 1916 intervention, the United States occupied the Dominican Republic for eight years, not departing until it had created a centralized Dominican army and placed it under the control of a young army officer, Rafael Trujillo, Sr., thought by his Marine supporters to be a reliable, pro-American leader who would support stable, democratic government. Trujillo, however, used his power to establish one of the most murderously effective feudal dictatorships in recent Latin American history. Despite its initial disappointment, the United States maintained close and friendly relations with Trujillo, typifying the general marriage of convenience between the United States and rightist Latin American dictatorships, who were assured of U.S. support as long as they repressed their local Communists and supported U.S. foreign policies. (1) For nearly thirty years, no one more fervently adhered to U.S. policies than Trujillo. Toward the end of the 1950s, however, U.S. attitudes toward his regime began to shift, partially because of domestic anger at Trujillo's efforts to silence his critics even in the United States (e.g., the disappearance of Dominican exile Jesus de Galindex, an instructor at Columbia University), partially as a result of growing Latin American bitterness at Washington's support of repressive regimes. The most fundamental reason for this shift in attitude was that the victory of Fidel Castro over Fulgencio Batista in Cuba seemed to demonstrate that support of the right might no longer be the best way to avoid radicalism in Latin America, but might rather be fostering it.

Moreover, toward the end of 1959, for the first time since he had come to power, Trujillo's grip on the country began to slip. A number of clandestine opposition groups were formed, and the political situation suddenly became fluid. The general environment in the Dominican Republic, in fact, seemed to be uncomfortably similar to that in Cuba in the last days of Batista, and the Eisenhower administration became seriously concerned that a sudden collapse of Trujillo's rule could lead to chaos and the emergence of a second Castro. "Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is _____," was the implicit assumption, and Washington wanted to ensure that it could help fill in the blank. As a result, the United States began to cast about for a way to get rid of Trujillo and, at the same time, to ensure a responsible successor.

Initially, the primary vehicle for U.S. strategy was the collective break in diplomatic relations and the economic sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS). This occurred in 1960, after Trujillo attempted to arrange the assassination of President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, one of the most outspoken anti-Trujillo leaders in Latin America. Going beyond the OAS call for all member states to end shipments of petroleum and trucks to the Dominican Republic, the United States also cut back imports of Dominican sugar, the primary source of export earnings for the Trujillo regime. Moreover, it is now known that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked actively with dissident groups in the Dominican Republic plotting against Trujillo's life, and clandestinely shipped small arms to some of these groups. (2)

Ousting the Trujillos, 1961

On May 31, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated, leaving a shattered, leader-less, demoralized society. The primary concern of the U.S. government was to ensure that a new Castro did not emerge from the chaos, and also—but a distinctly secondary goal—to use the opportunity to press for the establishment of democracy in the Dominican Republic. The framework and priority of U.S. objectives was succinctly summarized in John F. Kennedy's oft-quoted remark: "There are three possibilities . . . in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third." (3)

Within a few days of the assassination, the Kennedy administration reinforced the Carribean "ready force" that had remained in the general vicinity of Cuba and/or the Dominican Republic since 1959. Within days, the United States placed in the area as a "routine training exercise" a major naval force, including three aircraft carriers (Intrepid, Shangri-La, and Randolph), five support ships, and numerous surface combatants, as well as the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade of approximately 5,000 men. Already in the area was a Marine Battalion Landing Team aboard the helicopter carrier Boxer, and it was accompanied by other amphibious ships. (4) According to New York Times reports at the time, the military moves were designed both as a precaution, in case American citizens had to be evacuated, and as a show of force to back forthcoming U.S. diplomatic efforts to influence the internal Dominican situation. It has also been suggested that these moves might have

been part of a contingency plan to intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic to forestall a Castro takeover. (5)

Within hours after the assassination, the Trujillo family had moved to crush all internal opposition to their total domination over the country. Josquin Balaguer, who had been closely tied to the Trujillo family for decades, had been serving as nominal president since August 1960, and he remained in office; Rafael ("Ramfis") Trujillo, Jr., was named to head the armed forces, and his uncles, Hector and Arizmendi Trujillo, remained as key figures behind the scenes, controlling substantial private armies. (6)

Aside from Balaguer and the Trujillo family, the other major actors on the Dominican political scene who were the targets of U.S. military displays and diplomatic maneuvers were:

- 1. The regular Dominican armed forces, the primary source of political power in the country. Within the military, the key figures were Brigadier General Pedro Rodrigues Echevarria, commander of the Santiago military base, and Fernando A. Sanchez, chief of staff of the Air Force. Their objectives in the aftermath of the assassination are not clear, but it seems reasonable to assume they were primarily concerned to maintain or perhaps expand their own personal power. Rodriguez Echevarria seems to have sided with Balaguer, and as a result he soon emerged—if only briefly— as the dominant figure.
- 2. The Union Civica Nacional (UCN), a conservative, middle-class, but anti-Trujillo opposition party that came out into the open after the assassination. The UCN was headed by Viriato Fiallo.
- 3. Juan Bosch, who had been in exile for decades and returned to the Dominican Republic to form the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), initially a party of the democratic left, to compete with the UCN after the hoped-for collapse of the Trujillistas.

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, the Kennedy administration had two immediate objectives: to maintain order and to liberalize the Balaguer/Ramfis regime. The ultimate objective was to create a stable, democratic, anti-Communist government. The maintenance of order was considered crucial because, in the short run, the chances of a Communist takeover would increase if chaos and a breakdown of police and army control followed the assassination. In the last year or so of his rule, Trujillo had retaliated against the U.S. sanctions by allowing increased Communist activity in the Dominican Republic, and a Castroite group called the Fourteenth of June Movement was active in the working class areas of Santo Domingo. In the long run, the U.S. government felt that the minimization of Communist influence depended upon the creation of a democratic regime, capable of meeting the legitimate demands and grievances of a people oppressed for thirty years by a savage totalitarian regime.

The objectives of order and democracy might have been compatible in the long run but there was considerable tension between them in the short run. The requirements of a policy that sought to maximize order would have demanded unstinting U.S. support of Balaguer, the Trujillos, and their supporters in the police and military, for they were probably capable of suppressing Communist (and, of course, all other dissident) activities by

brute force. On the other hand, a policy that sought to maximize the chances for democracy would have required immediate and severe U.S. pressures to break the power of the military, force out Balaguer and the Trujillos, and to hold free elections.

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Faced with this dilemma, the Kennedy administration split the difference. From the evidence now available, it cannot be ascertained whether this was the conscious decision of a united administration aware of the risks of emphasizing one element to the exclusion of the other, or whether it was in fact more in the nature of a nondecision, and merely the result of differing opinions within the U.S. government. There were apparently several areas of disagreement. (7) First, there were differences between those who wished to emphasize order and those who stressed establishing a democracy. The former were generally more disposed than the latter to view Balaguer favorably; this was not necessarily the case, however, for a second area of disagreement was whether Balaguer sincerely intended to liberalize the Dominican government, as he was promising, or whether his real objective was to preserve the status quo behind a meaningless facade of "reforms." Finally, there was uncertainty over whether Balaguer, whatever his intention, had the leadership capabilities and the power base to control either the extreme left or the extreme right.

In the context of these various disagreements or uncertainties, the Kennedy administration initially chose to back Balaguer, Ramfis, and the armed forces, while at the same time attempting to induce them to liberalize the worst features of the Trujillo era and prepare for democratic elections. As Kennedy put it: "Balaguer . . . [is] our only tool. . . . The anticommunist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy." (8)

The primary instruments of U.S. policy were the economic leverage provided by the OAS sanctions and the reduction of U.S. sugar imports, backed by a show of military force. Responding to U.S. recommendations, the OAS agreed to maintain the economic sanctions until there was substantial evidence of progress toward democracy; meanwhile, the U.S. Navy Caribbean "ready squadron," consisting of the U.S. carrier Boxer, several amphibious vessels, and a Marine battalion of about 1,200 men remained in Dominican waters. (9)

The Crisis of November 1961

In the ensuing months, the Balaguer regime took some small steps toward liberalization. At the end of the summer, it requested the OAS to end the embargo and the United States to resume its sugar purchases. In early September, the OAS sent a committee to the Dominican Republic to reevaluate the situation. Balaguer and Ramfis promised the OAS group that they would continue the reform process and open negotiations with opposition leaders to form a coalition government. But the UCN and the PRD both urged the OAS and the United States to continue the sanctions, arguing that the reforms had been a sham and that the existing regime was nothing more than a continuation of Trujilloism. Apparently convinced by this argument, the OAS decided to maintain the sanctions and the

Kennedy administration resolved to continue the sugar embargo and increase diplomatic pressures on Balaguer and Ramfis to reach an agreement with the opposition. A turning point in the hesitant movement toward democracy was apparently reached in mid-November, when most of the Trujillo family, although not Ramfis, bowed to the pressures and left the country. In response to this and to other indications of progress, on November 14, the United States proposed in the OAS a partial lifting of the economic sanctions. (10)

On November 16, however, Hector and Arismendi Trujillo--the "wicked uncles"--returned to the Dominican Republic to attempt to block the liberalization process and restore the family dictatorship. If they had succeeded, of course, all the efforts of the U.S. government for the previous two years would have gone for nought. As a result, the Kennedy administration decided to do whatever might be necessary, including ordering an armed intervention, to block the reestablishment of Trujilloism. In reaching this decision, the administration undoubtedly was influenced not only by a general commitment toward democracy, but by concern that a new Trujillo dictatorship might resume the flirtation with Castro and the USSR that Trujillo, Sr., had pursued during his last year in power. (11)

Finally, on November 18, Ramfis Trujillo became convinced that his best course of action was to resign and leave the country. Washington now sought to force the wicked uncles also to leave, and thus to end the Trujillo family's control of the Dominican Republic. The U.S. government was also eager to prevent one of the family's henchmen--General Fernando Sanchez--from seizing power. The Kennedy administration communicated its intention to the Trujillos and Sanchez explicitly through U.S. officials in the country and through a series of diplomatic and military actions. The military threat left the crucial Dominican figures with no doubt that they had little choice but to comply.

On November 16, within hours after it became known that the Trujillos had returned to the Dominican Republic, the United States asked for an urgent meeting of the OAS Council in Washington, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Robert Woodward asked that action on the previous U.S. request for a partial lifting of the sanctions be delayed. The next day, Secretary of State Dean Rusk held a news conference in which he warned that the United States would not "remain idle" if the Trujillos returned and tried to "reassert dictatorial domination." (12)

Rosk's speech was couched in general terms, but administration sources told reporters from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and other leading newspapers that the U.S. government had definitely decided it would forcibly intervene if necessary to prevent the restoration of Trujilloism. (13) These leaks, prominently featured in leading American newspapers, could hardly have escaped the attention of the Dominicans.

To back up these threats of force, a large U.S. naval task force, consisting of the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt, the helicopter carrier Valley Forge, and other amphibious ships with 1,800 Marines on board, the cruiser Little Rock (Flagship of the U.S. 2nd Fleet), twelve destroyers, and a number of landing craft appeared off the Dominican coast on November 19. They were just outside the three-mile limit, but in

plain sight of Santo Domingo. On the same day, jet fighters from the Roosevelt streaked along the Dominican coastline in a display calculated to awe and intimidate the Trujillos and the Dominican military. (14)

Meanwhile, the head of the U.S. consulate in Santo Domingo, John C. Hill, and a special representative of President Kennedy, Arturo Morales, met with the Trujillos and Sanchez and bluntly told them that U.S. military power would, if necessary, be used to force the formation of a provisional government headed by Balaguer. The previous evening, moreover, the U.S. military liaison, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Simmons, had met with Rodriguez Echevarria to ascertain that Rodriguez supported the U.S. military actions. Other commanders, who were not so close to U.S. officials, were warned not to support the Trujillos.

All of the Dominican targets received the message. While the exact details of the mixture of threats and promises made by U.S. officials are not known, it is reasonable to assume that all the Dominican targets recognized that their continued political power, status, wealth--perhaps even their lives--depended upon U.S. support, or at least the absence of direct U.S. opposition. In any case, the desired action was forthcoming. On the evening of November 19, while the jets continued their fly-bys, and Spanish language broadcasts from the offshore ships warned the Dominicans that the Marines were prepared to come ashore, Balaguer made a speech on the national radio station urging "all Dominicans, military and civilian, to unite behind the legitimate power and avoid the danger that menaces our sovereignty." (16) At about the same time, Dominican planes under the control of Rodriguez Echevarria bombed the San Isidro Air Base outside Santo Domingo, where Ramfis and other Trujillist generals, including Fernando Sanchez, had been massing troops. With the game clearly up, Ramfis, the wicked uncles, and Sanchez fled the country on November 20, and the plot collapsed.

Aftermath of the Crisis

In the next two months, the U.S. government stepped up its pressures for further democratization in the Dominican Republic. It backed its diplomatic efforts with the economic sanctions still in force and the continuing presence of the U.S. fleet off the coast. On several occasions, administration sources publicly stated that the U.S. Navy would remain in Dominican waters until the situation was "fully clarified," or as long as there was a danger of "political disintegration." (17) The major focus of administration efforts was to protect Balaguer from potential threats from either the extreme right or left until he was able to broaden his government to include the moderate democratic opposition and prepare for elections. In fact, however, Balaguer himself clearly wanted to hold on to power, and became a major obstacle to meaningful democratization. Finally, faced with pressure from the United States and growing domestic opposition, including a successful general strike supported by Fiallo and Bosch, Balaguer agreed to resign. He was replaced by a seven-man council of state, dominated by the UCN, which pledged to hold elections at the end of 1962.

A final military effort to block this process, this time led by Rodriguez Echevarria and very probably backed by Balaguer, collapsed when the United States moved the <u>Little Rock</u> and the Second Caribbean Amphibious Ready Squadron and Landing Force closer in to shore off Santo Domingo, and Hill informed Rodriguez that the U.S. government was prepared to treat him as it had the wicked uncles. (18)

In late January, the fleet was withdrawn, the OAS sanctions were lifted, and the United States resumed its sugar purchases, although U.S. representatives in the Dominican Republic continued to use their influence to back the council of state and to ensure that the elections would be fair. (19) Among the instruments of U.S. influence were several U.S. naval ship visitations to Santo Domingo and ostentatious ceremonies and dinners aboard them for council of state leaders. Whether the United States would actually have been willing to use force in the event of a threatened coup was another matter. Presidential Emissary and later Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John B. Martin writes that he was "privately" convinced that the United States would "absolutely not permit a Castro/Communist takeover," that he was "almost as certain" force would be used to prevent a new Trujillo coup, but that he "was far less certain" that action would be taken against a rightist coup. (20) However, no coups were attempted, and in December 1962, Bosch defeated Fiallo in the elections, presided over and in effect guaranteed by the U.S. Embassy.

The Role of the OAS

During the course of the crisis, the OAS had been dominated by the United States and had acted, in effect, as an instrument of U.S. policy. As such, it gave U.S. actions at least the color of a collective enterprise, and thus helped reduce possible nationalistic, anti-American reactions in Latin America and in the Dominican Republic itself. Moreover, by making the U.S. economic pressures part of the official peace-keeping functions of an international organization, the OAS gave the Dominican opposition leaders—whose strategy was to bring to bear a maximum of external as well as internal pressures on the Balaguer regime—a degree of manuever that nationalistic pride might otherwise have denied them. It was one thing for the Dominicans—Bosch, Fiallo, and others—to plead repeatedly to the OAS to maintain sanctions against their own nation and against the wishes of their government, but it might have been quite another if they had been forced to communicate their appeals directly to the United States without the OAS screen.

Outcomes

The activist U.S. policy in 1961-62 and the subsequent course of events in the Dominican Republic illustrate both the benefits and the limitations of the political use of military force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the short run, U.S. policy was remarkably successful. As a direct result of its combined economic leverage and military threats, the U.S. government was able to induce all the major

Dominican actors to conform to its objectives. Moreoever, there were no external costs to the U.S. actions; on the contrary, the Trujillo regime had been in such bad odor around the world that U.S. policies, even including the military threats and deployments, had enhanced the image of the Kennedy administration in the Dominican Republic, in the United States, and throughout Latin America. The appearance of the U.S. Navy off the coast led to mass demonstrations of popular approval in the streets of Santo Domingo; Juan Bosch enthusiastically praised the action; and in the United Nations, the Dominican Foreign Minister, responding to a Cuban attempt to have the United States labeled an aggressor, replied: "Blessed be the moment when the American fleet came to Dominican waters." (21) In the United States, the actions of the Kennedy administration aroused little widespread or sustained popular attention, but were widely praised on the editorial pages as wisely conceived and brilliantly executed. (22) Throughout Latin America, the widespread hatred of Trujillo outweighed the traditional antipathy toward U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of hemispheric states, so most Latin American governments either supported the U.S. actions or tacitly acquiesced in them.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the show of force and the accompanying threats to use it if necessary were crucial to the achievement of U.S. objectives during the November and January crises. The economic pressures undoubtedly helped, but even though the Trujillistas (including Balaguer and Rodriguez) understood full well that those pressures would continue if they attempted to reassert their rule, they were apparently prepared to ignore them ruthlessly, for in each case coups were averted or reversed only after the military displays.

Whatever the undoubted immediate success of U.S. policies, however, subsequent developments in the Dominican Republic cast considerable doubt on their longer-term success. Though the Bosch government was democratically elected and began a broad program of social and economic reform, the U.S. government soon became disenchanted with it, and the Kennedy administration did not repeat its earlier threats and military displays to deter the military coup against Bosch of September 1963. It was clear, then, that in the long run the creation of a stable and democratic political system in the Dominican Republic depended on internal conditions that were only partially subject to U.S. influence. Still, the destruction of the brutal totalitarianism of Trujillo in 1961-62 was no small accomplishment. During this period, the requirements of the national interest and more universalist values had happily coincided. Although the United States had prevented a return to Trujillism not so much from devotion to democracy per se as from fear of Communism, the results were a clear gain for the Dominican people and for humanity, as well as for U.S. policy.

Evaluation

The ouster of the Trujillos in November 1961 also suggests some more general lessons about the relationship between the use of force and the achievement of objectives by U.S. policymakers. First, the United States was able in this incident to exercise complete strategic

control. Aside from certain other Latin dictators, the Trujillos had no external political allies. Even more important, especially with regard to the U.S. decision to use forces, the Trujillos could expect to receive no material support from any quarter, and the United States could act with complete military confidence.

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This was also true, of course, in June immediately after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo. But then the administration did not act explicitly to oust Trujillo's heirs—that is, the administration did not then commit itself to the objective it espoused in November. When it did so commit itself, Washington allowed no doubt as to what would constitute an acceptable outcome. In short, it issued an ultimatum. Moreover, communications with the principal targets in the Dominican Republic were unobstructed.

At the same time, within the Dominican Republic, the targets had no ideological commitments. Pragmatic, and interested primarily in their personal well being, the Trujillos and their immediate supporters were persuadable. Indeed, Ramfis, who was the most influencial in the group, probably lost the stomach to resist the U.S. demands even before force was used.

The Trujillos also had no support within their own country. While there was no popular movement to oust them violently from power, neither was there any die-hard support for them. Aside from the vast apathetic majority, those who were politically active and both the business and social elites were wholly in favor of having the Trujillos leave the country. Furthermore, there was no nationalist sentiment against "Yankee intervention."

Finally, the Trujillos did not even control the armed forces. Aside from those officers who straddled the fence, effective military power, small as it may have been, was more in the hands of General Rodrigues Echevarria than anyone else. His support of the U.S. action pulled the rug from under the Trujillos. Thus, the earlier cultivation of Rodrigues Echevarria proved of great value.

If the United States had undertaken decisive action against the Trujillos in June 1961, it might have encountered greater difficulty. At that time there was no overt opposition within the Dominican Republic, and the Trujillos held much firmer control over the military, nothwithstanding the participation of a number of military men in the assassination plot. The outcomes would probably have been the same, but the dangers would have been greater.

Considering Washington's goals, an even greater use of force—such as an actual intervention, of the sort that occurred in Lebanon in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965, would have had no greater value. Both the Trujillos and Rodrigues Echevarria might not have believed that the United States was really committed to its objectives had they not seen a major military force offshore, however. They also might not have believed it had they seen only a few surface combatants. The plain sight of marines and aircraft carriers, however, was surely something different.

In this context, the military force, placed clearly in sight, seemed convincingly threatening; coupled with a verbal ultimatum, it became anything but a bluff. As in poker, once a "call" was demanded, the Trujillos' only alternative to folding was a futile and inconsequential resistance. Being the pragmatists that they were, they folded.

The ability to set in motion the events that occurred between the decision to oust the Trujillos and the inauguration of Juan Bosch did not prove that the United States could effect a radical change of regime no matter how much it might have wished to. In the end, Bosch was completely dependent on the United States. Washington did not take any military action to prevent the coup against him; even more important, the more Washington soured on Bosch, the more certain the coup became. Bosch would not have been so dependent had the military been gutted and rebuilt. This could only have been accomplished by force or the direct threat of force from U.S. military power. The Dominican military might have collapsed without violent resistance, but U.S. troops would almost certainly have had to be landed in the Dominican Republic.

The 1965 Crisis

Juan Bosch took office in early 1963, amid high hopes in both the Dominican Republic and the United States that solid progress had been made toward the reestablishment of democracy. There was no doubt that the Kennedy administration initially gave its strong—even enthusiastic support to the Bosch government; it promised the Dominican Republic substantial economic support under the Alliance for Progress, and gave Bosch the grand treatment in Washington just before he entered office. (23)

The glow faded very quickly, however. The U.S. government, advised by Ambassador Martin, became increasingly disenchanted with Bosch's nationalism; his determination to engage in substantial social reform measures, which alienated Dominican businessmen, landowners, and the Catholic Church; and, most important, his refusal to crack down on radical groups. In a matter of months, Martin had completely soured on Bosch, considering him at best ineffective and, at worst, possibly even a "deep-cover Communist." U.S. economic assistance programs to the Dominican Republic were soon cut back, and these and other indications of U.S. coolness toward Bosch encouraged plotting against them among the rightist and the military. Finally, in late September -- only seven months after taking office-Bosch was overthrown and sent into exile by a military coup led by Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the key San Isidro Air Base outside Santo Domingo. The rationale for the coup, predictably enough, was that Bosch was delivering the country to the Communists. Martin did not really agree with this assessment, despite his own misgivings about Bosch, and he tried hard to prevent the coup, but his insistence on the Communist threat had helped to legitimize the plots against Bosch and undercut U.S. efforts to persuade the military to stay out of politics.

The coup was greeted in Washington with distaste, but the disillusion with Bosch discouraged any effective action to reverse it. In the last frantic hours before the coup, Martin asked to have an aircraft carrier sent to Dominican waters to make the kind of show of force that had earlier

proven so effective. The State Department sharply refused, however, and warned Martin not to commit the United States in his moves to save Bosch. Not only would military force not be used or even threatened, but there would be no repeat of the heavy economic pressures of the previous few years. To be sure, diplomatic relations were suspended and economic and military aid were temporarily cut off in an effort to induce the new junta to hold free elections. In the ensuing weeks, however, the State Department progressively softened its pressures, especially when the junta began to warn that U.S. attitudes were encouraging "Castroite revolutionaries." Finally, in mid-December 1963, with a handful of the inevitable "guerrillas" in the hills and a piece of paper from the junta promising "free elections" in a year and a half, the United States capitulated. It reestablished diplomatic relations, restored economic assistance, and replaced Martin with a new ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, a conservative foreign service officer. Bennett quickly established warm ties with the head of the junta, Donald Reid Cabral, a wealthy businessman. Among Americans, Reid was fondly known as "Donny" Reid, and considered a safe, sound, pro-American force for stability. Among Dominicans, however, Reid was frequently referred to as "El Americano;" some even considered him an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

By early 1965, the Reid government was in deep trouble. Whatever chance it might have had to gain popular support had been lost because of Reid's lack of personal charisma and authoritarian methods, and because of the government's stiff austerity program, which had created high unemployment and widespread discontent. Immediately after the 1963 coup, public reaction had seemed apathetic, but a year later there had been a substantial spread, especially among students, intellectuals, and professionals, in sentiment for a return to constitutional government in general and to Juan Bosch in particular. In late January 1965, the PRD and its main rival on the moderate left, the PRSC (Social Christians), had met with Bosch at his exile home in Puerto Rico and had formally agreed to work together to reestablish the constitutional government; the agreement became publicly known in the Dominican Republic and was widely approved. Meanwhile, most ominously, the armed forces, the government's last bastion of power, were becoming disgruntled by Reid's efforts to stamp out military corruption and to remove some of the most venal of the remaining Trujillists.

The final straw was Reid's increasingly obvious intention to cancel the elections scheduled for the fall of 1965 or to rig them to maintain himself in power. By early spring, it had become evident that a major blowup was imminent; a few weeks before the revolution, Bennett had warned the State Department that "Little foxes, some of them red, are chewing at the grapes." (24)

The uprising of April 1965 began not so much as a revolution but as a military coup designed at first simply to bring down the Reid government. In the early morning of Saturday, April 24, two Army barracks, under the leadership of a small group of young colonels and acting in concert with PRD leaders, seized and imprisoned the army chief of staff and declared themselves in revolt against the government. Within a few hours, a number of other officers had joined the uprising and taken their units with them, swelling the ranks of the "constitutionalists," as they called themselves, to about 1,000-1,500 men.

The original participants in the coup were a rather mixed bag, not all of them simply pro-Boschists or democratic idealists. Many, among them the initiators of the insurrection on April 24, had indeed opposed the 1963 coup, were ashamed of the military's Trujillist heritage, and had established close contacts with Bosch. Others, however, had rather doubtful qualifications as revolutionary heroes. Some were pro-Balaguer Trujillists who had been plotting on their own; they had joined the movement because they assumed its aim was not the direct return of Bosch to the presidency, but the holding of new elections, in which they believed Balaguer stood a good chance of winning. Many of the leading figures had entirely disreputable records, having been Nazi SS officers, foreign legionnaires, and shock troops from Trujillo's personal commando unit. (25) Colonel Francisco Caamaño, soon to emerge as the leading military figure in the constitutionalist camp, was the son of a Trujillo general known as "The Butcher" because of his enthusiastic services to "El Jefe," and Caamaño himself had served as the head of a hated police riot squad that was anti-Bosch and specialized in breaking up leftist desonstrations. Perhaps such men were simply opportunists and adventurers; perhaps, as seems more persuasive in the case of Caamano himself, they were seeking atonement for their past lives.

Whatever the motives of the initial participants, the uprising quickly gained widespread popular support. Two events helped transform the military coup into a populist uprising: First, PRD leaders seized Radio Santo Domingo and urged the populace to take to the streets in support of the movement; second, late Saturday and early Sunday morning, constitutionalist officers passed out arms to thousands of civilians (whether this was planned or spontaneous is not yet known) to broaden the base of the movement and counter any possible reaction from the bulk of the armed forces. Until that point, the civilians working with the constitutionalists were mostly middle-class, college-educated students, lawyers, engineers, technicians, and young businessmen, frustrated by a system in which they had no purpose and no meaningful future. The distribution of arms, however, brought large sectors of the urban lower class into the ranks (estimates range from 2,500 to 10,000 armed combatientescombatants), giving the movement something of a mase base, as well as providing most of the actual armed fighting men.

By Sunday morning, the military had ignored Reid's orders to crush the uprising. Reid resigned and went into hiding. Because of Reid's widespread unpopularity and the still unclear nature and ultimate purpose of the insurrection, the regular military leadership was at first unwilling to take decisive action. By Sunday afternoon, however, the situation had begun to change. The constitutionalists named a close associate of Bosch as provisional president to remain in office only until Bosch could return and reassure the presidency. Meanwhile, jubilant crowds surged through the streets of Santo Domingo all day Sunday, chanting for Bosch's return. Thus, there could no longer be much doubt that a victory of the revolution would return Bosch to power and short-circuit the promised elections, in which Balaguer would also participate. The regular military detested Bosch, fearing, undoubtedly correctly, that a triumphant Bosch, backed by the defecting constitutionalist military and what amounted to a wellarmed civilian militia, would probably seek to destroy their power and position in the Dominican Republic. As a result, by late Sunday afternoon, substantial military opposition to the movement developed, led by (now

General) Wessin y Wessin at the San Isidro Air Base.

On Sunday afternoon, planes from San Isidro attacked the National Palace and other constitutionalist positions in Santo Domingo, and armored units from San Isidro and other nearby military bases entered the city. In the next two days, it appeared that the revolution was doomed, as the constitutionalists were under heavy attack by apparently superior forces in Santo Domingo, and the revolution had failed to spread to the countryside or any other important city. By Tuesday afternoon, however, the tide had somehow turned. The "loyalist" tanks were bottled up in the narrow streets of the working class sections of Santo Domingo, and either destroyed or captured intact by the constitutionalists. Outside the city, the remainder of Wessin's forces refused to enter the fray, and many began to desert. By the next day, the remnants of the regular military forces had been mopped up, and the revolutionaries turned their attention to the police stations inside the city. Post after post fell to the constitutionalists, whose armaments swelled as they captured new armories. By Wednesday night, April 28, the military and police inside Santo Domingo had completely collapsed, and the constitutionalists were about to go on the offensive and attack San Isidro itself, now defended by probably no more than several thousand demoralized troops.

U.S. Behavior

The overriding U.S. concern during the Dominican revolution was, as in the earlier Dominican crisis, to avert at all costs a second Cuba. There were at least four separate reasons behind this policy.

- (1) A second radically anti-American regime in the Caribbean would be another blow at the historical concern with maintaining a general position of predominance throughout the Central America/Caribbean area, a posture first given expression in the Monroe Doctrine and considered an axiomatic objective of U.S. foreign policy ever since.
- (2) In the more specific circumstances of the Cold War, policy-makers feared that another Communist or Castroite regime in the Caribbean would undermine U.S. prestige and credibility around the world, present the USSR with another possible site for military bases or even missile launchers close to U.S. borders, and psychologically undercut U.S. efforts in Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson was reported to have said, "What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?" (26)
- (3) It was widely believed that no administration, and especially not a Democratic one, could survive in office if it failed to prevent a new Castro in this hemisphere. Johnson remarked: "When I do what I am about to do, there'll be a lot of people in this hemisphere I can't live with, but if I don't do it, there'll be a lot of people in this country I can't live with." (27)
- (4) Finally, there were a number of indications that government officials even at lower levels feared for their careers if they could have been charged with "losing the Dominican Republic," (28) just as a whole generation of China specialists was wiped out after Mao's victory, and to a lesser but still substantial degree, Cuban specialists found their careers aborted after Castro's victory in Cuba.

Thus, before the 1965 crisis, there was an overwhelming predisposition throughout the U.S. government to err on the "safe" side--to move hard and fast whenever there was even a small possibility of a new Castroite regime in the Caribbean.

No wonder, then, that from the very outset of the revolution the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo expressed its concern at indications of Communist support of the constitutionalist uprising. As a result, the State Department quickly instructed the embassy to use its influence with still-uncommitted Dominican military officials to encourage them to resist. Working through its military attachés, the embassy did urgently press the military chiefs to unite and "do everything possible to prevent a Communist takeover." It may very well be that their efforts proved decisive with those commanders who were still wavering. In Santiago, for example, the Dominican Republic's second largest city, the importunings of the U.S. consul barely averted the defection of an important army base and the passing out of arms to thousands of pro-Bosch civilians; the visit of a U.S. military attaché to the provincial army garrison at La Vega apparently helped convince the commander to remain loyal to the Reid government. (29) There is no doubt that U.S. officials had advance notice of and approved the decision of Wessin and other military commanders to attack the constitutionalists on Sunday afternoon.

At the same time that the U.S. Embassy was encouraging the use of force against the constitutionalists, it was rejecting entreaties by PRD leaders and constitutionalist military officials to use its good offices to help negotiate a cease-fire. Since the U.S. government wanted the uprising defeated, and until at least Tuesday night believed that the military would prevail, it saw no reason to intercede. On the contrary, one U.S. official brutally told the constitutionalists, "if I had Wessin's power, I would use it too." Ambassador Bennett later advised PRD leaders that the only thing he would do for them was advise them to surrender. (30)

During the first few days of the revolution, the Johnson administration had been reluctant to become directly involved in military assistance to the loyalist forces, let alone to land U.S. forces. On several occasions Bennett had told Wessin and other Dominican military leaders not to expect any armed U.S. assistance; the State Department even denied temporarily a request from Ambassador Bennett that Wessin's forces be provided with fifty walkie-talkie sets. By Tuesday, April 27, the fourth day of the revolution, Washington was becoming worried that the military might not, after all, prevail, and the 82nd Airborne Divison was placed on alert for possible intervention. (31) The next day, in response to increasingly pessimistic reports from the U.S. Embassy, Rusk told Bennett that the United States did not want to intervene "unless the outcome is in doubt." Several hours later, Bennett sent his famous (or infamous) "critical" cable, saying that the military and police were on the verge of defeat at the hands of "Castro-type elements," and recommending the immediate landing of U.S. troops. All twelve embassy political and military officers concurred in the recommendation, and Thomas Mann later claimed that "all those in our Government who had full access to official information agreed with the decision." (32) (Aside from the President himself, of course, the key Washington officials apparently were Kennedy M. Crockett, Chief of the State Department's Bureau of Caribbean Affairs; Under-Secretaries

of State George Ball and Thomas Mann; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; and White House National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy.)

There is no doubt at all that the U.S. intervention was motivated from the outset by fear of a Communist takeover. The official explanation at the time was that the intervention was undertaken solely to save American lives endangered by the fighting. To a very limited degree, this factor might have played some role in the decision, for it was certainly true that the potential for serious danger to American and other foreign citizens was considerable. It was also true that Bennett had reported (inaccurately, as it later developed) several attacks on Americans. But the evidence is overwhelming that fear of Communism was uppermost in the minds of both the embassy personnel and administration officials in Washington. In any case, of course, U.S. troops were in fact deployed in a manner designed to prevent a constitutionalist victory, and then remained in the Dominican Republic for nearly seventeen months thereafter.

On the other hand, it is not accurate (as Theodore Draper and others have argued) that the United States intervened to prevent a Boschist victory per se. It was certainly true that most U.S. officials had only contempt for Bosch and would not have been happy to see him back in office, but that was not the reason for the intervention. On the contrary, the United States made no move even to interrupt Bosch's communications with PRD leaders from his home in San Juan nor did they attempt to prevent him from returning to take command of the constitutionalist forces. Bosch's decision to remain in San Juan was his own, and he was later severely criticized for it in the Dominican Republic. Washington was concerned about the Communists or Castroites in the revolutionary movement, not the Boschists. The State Department felt that even if Bosch were restored to the presidency, his alleged weakness and incompetence would ensure that the Communists would quickly outmaneuver him and take over the government.

It is clear that Washington's fears of a Communist or Castroite victory in the Dominican Republic were genuine and were the primary reason for the U.S. intervention; but how justifiable were those fears in fact? Much of the early commentary on the Dominican intervention was based on the assumption that the Johnson administration had hysterically overreacted to an all but nonexistent danger. In good part, this assessment was a result of the remarkably inept justification of the administration's actions. The primary pieces of "evidence" presented to skeptical newsmen were hastily compiled lists of some fifty-three, fifty-eight, or seventy-five "Communists" said to be in the Dominican Republic and active among the constitutionalists. The presence of such a trivial number of Communists would hardly demonstrate a Red Peril; in fact, the reporters were soon able to show that not everyone on the list was a Communist, and that many of the genuine Communists were dead, in jail, or outside the country. Small wender, then, that many observers concluded that the whole affair was a hoax or a cover-up for other motives, such as hostility to even non-Communist change in the Dominican Republic.

The fact that the administration was inept in making its case does not mean that there was no case to be made. Almost all serious observers in the Dominican Republic during the revolution, including many who were highly critical of the U.S. intervention, agreed that there was indeed

some possibility of a Communist or Castroite victory. The Johnson administration's decision to intervene had not been based merely on the presence of a few Communists in the constitutionalist camp, but on what appeared to be a widespread pattern of ominous events, especially the evidence of a substantial Communist role in the arming, training, and leadership of the commando units in the constitutionalist zone, who soon outnumbered the original military participants by almost four to one. (33) How much of an eventual threat these militant and well-armed guerrilla units may have posed is certainly debatable, but in the context of revolution, near-anarchy, shattered and discredited political institutions, and a tradition of political violence, it was not unreasonable to take the matter seriously.

Still, to the extent that any group was dominant in what was in good part a spontaneous, unstructured uprising, it was clearly the moderate left PRD leadership and the anti-Communist constitutionalist military led by Caamaño. Moreover, the Johnson administration's half-hearted attempts to link the revolution to internal Communism, or even just to Cuba, were patently false. While some of the guerrilla leaders probably had received training in Cuba, all but a tiny handful of the constitutionalists were Dominican, and no evidence has ever been presented linking any Communist country to the planning, organization, or direction of the movement, before, during, or after the initial uprising.

In short, the only intellectually respectable question is whether there was a major threat of indigenous Communists or extremists gaining control of a chaotic situation and successfully imposing a Castroite government. Even granting the inherent uncertainties, the balance of evidence suggests that such an outcome was unlikely. Before the revolution, the Dominican Communists and Castroites had little popular support; (34) the radical groups were excluded from participation in the planning of the initial pre-Bosch military coup and were by their own admission unprepared for the uprising and unable to lead it; (35) and, most crucially, the Communists had no mass base or even the rudiments of a network in the countryside (unlike, say, the Chinese Communists or the NLF in South Vietnam), nor did they have any charismatic leaders with the great prestige and widespread popular appeal of a Castro or a Ho Chi Minh.

Thus, even assuming that the United States was somehow justified in intervening to abort an indigenous Latin American Communist revolution (a point I shall take up in my conclusion), its intervention in the Dominican Republic was at the very least highly premature.

On the evening of April 28, American troops began landing in the Dominican Republic, the first direct military intervention by the United States in a Latin American country in nearly fifty years. The military moves had four immediate objectives: to shore up the remnants of the regular Dominican armed forces and prevent their complete disintegration; to prevent any further military advances by the constitutionalists, especially a projected drive toward San Isidro; to contain the revolution itself in Santa Domingo and prevent it from spreading to the countryside; and to set the stage for either a direct military attack on the constitutionalists or for an imposed military stalemate before a negotiated political settlement.

For several weeks after the initial troop landings, the U.S. government remained undecided, both because of internal disagreements in Washington and changing circumstances inside and out of the Dominican Republic, as to whether it should crush the constitutionalists allitarilyeither by the direct use of U.S. troops or by indirect support of the reconstituted and rearmed Dominican military forces-or to settle for some kind of political compromise. There was no doubt that the government leaned in the early days after the intervention toward a military solution. On the morning of April 29, Ambassador Bennett was told by the State Department that the President had not yet authorized the use of U.S. troops in offensive actions against the constitutionalists, but that U.S. officers should be used "to help San Isidro develop operational plans to take the rebel stronghold downtown." (36) While this cable was going out, however, the OAS Council was meeting in emergency session to discuss the crisis. On the afternoon of April 29, it unanimously voted to seek a cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. The United States supported the call for a cease-fire, probably in part because of the political costs of opposing it, but also because the regular Dominican military was in much greater need of a respite than the constitutionalists.

As a result of the cease-fire, Bennett received new instructions from the State Department on April 30: discussions with San Isidro about immediate military action against the constitutionalists were to be shelved, and the Dominican military leaders were to be informed that the conflict was now entering a political phase. Despite this initial U.S. support for the cease-fire, there were numerous indications that military action later was far from ruled out. For example, at the same San Isidro meeting at which Bennett informed the Dominican commanders that they had to accept a cease-fire because U.S. troops would not be used in offensive action against the constitutionalists, the generals were also told that the cease-fire would give them a chance to regroup and prepare themselves for possible action later against the constitutionalists; in the meantime, U.S. military officers would continue working with the generals to help them plan tactics for an attack. The cease-fire, in short, was apparently viewed at first as a holding action, pending further developments in the Dominican Republic and a buildup of U.S. forces and the Dominican military.

Although the truce was precariously maintained in the next few days, pressures continued to build for a frontal attack on the constitutionalists by U.S. forces. The U.S. military, under the command of General Bruce Palmer, wanted nothing more than to be allowed to "clean up" the constitutionalist zone. General Palmer, like most of the other U.S. military men involved in the intervention, initially took a very hard line on the use of force, chafing at the constraints the Johnson administration placed on him and pressing for a "military solution." Later, however, especially under the guidance of Ellsworth Bunker, his views moderated considerably.

Whatever the personal views of the American military men, they remained under strict political control throughout the intervention and subsequent occupation. At the same time, Ambassador Bennett, who had earlier indicated his misgivings about the cease-fire and the prospect of negotiations, repeatedly complained to Washington that the cease-fire was protecting the constitutionalists from the rejuvenated military and was giving them an unwarranted political advantage, allowing them to consolidate their strength and improve their bargaining position. There are indications

that Thomas Mann shared these views, and urged President Johnson to authorize direct military action. On the morning of April 30, former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was asked by Johnson to go to Santo Domingo to open a channel of communications with the constitutionalists; at the same time, though, he received the impression that he had possibly no more than a day or two to prevent "another Hungary," a U.S. slaughter of the constitutionalists. (37)

Gradually, the possibility of military action faded into the background. By the end of May, a definite decision had been reached to seek a negotiated political settlement and to avoid not only direct military action against the main body of the constitutionalist. (in mid-May, the United States had allowed Dominican troops to attack a constitutionalist sector of Santo Domingo), but less oppressive measures as well, including a blockade of food and water or the termination of electrical power to sectors controlled by the constitutionalists. The decision to seek a negotiated settlement did not preclude the use of force for self-defense, which on occasion may have been rather broadly defined. A number of factors seem to have been involved in this decision. It was clear that Johnson was reluctant to authorize the direct use of U.S. troops unless it was absolutely "necessary," (38) and there is some evidence that McGeorge Bundy, and later Ellsworth Bunker, steadfastly opposed the use of U.S. troops. There is no doubt that the OAS involvement in the situation was also an important restraining factor.

Whatever the initial reasons for U.S. support for a cease-fire negotiated by the OAS, once in effect it took on a life of its own. Even when it later became clear that the constitutionalists were the primary beneficiaries of the cease-fire, the United States could not blatantly violate it without enormous political costs, particularly in light of the frequent public warnings from the OAS Council (meeting in nearly continuous session in the first weeks of the crisis) and from Latin American political leaders against U.S. support for, or acquiescence in, military action. Moreover, within a few days, the United Nations had also become involved, and the presence in the Dominican Republic of a UN mission that was clearly sympathetic to the constitutionalists was an additional constraint. Still another factor was the military estimate that a direct attack on the densely populated, well-defended constitutionalist stronghold would result in extremely extensive damage and in high casualties among noninvolved residents as well as among the U.S. and constitutionalist forces. The consequence of that would inevitably be domestic and international revulsion at what would surely have been widely seen, as Martin correctly predicted, as a Hungarian-type action. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the successful deployment of U.S. troops across the middle of Santo Domingo had bottled up the rebels in a small part of Santo Domingo and sealed them off from the rest of the country, thus easing U.S. fears that a failure to take harsh action might lead to a new Vietnam. With a Communist takeover now impossible, the United States could afford to seek a political solution, especially since it would obviously have considerable control over the kind of solution that eventually emerged.

The Military Deployment

The first American troops to land on Dominican soil were 500 Marines brought in by helicopter on April 28. They came from U.S. Naval Task Group 44, stationed a few miles off the coast of Santo Domingo. The force included the helicopter carrier Boxer and the following other amphibious assault and support ships: Rankin, Raleigh, Ft. Snelling, Wood County, and Ruckankin. (39) The Marines landed on the grounds of the Hotel Embajador, the major Dominican hotel, which had been designated as the departure point for Americans and other foreigners wishing to be taken out of the country. Soon after this, military transport planes began an around-the-clock airlift, ferrying in two battalions (6,500 men) of the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the San Isidro Air Base, still controlled by Wessin's troops. In the next forty-eight hours, the paratroopers moved out from San Isidro and advanced along the road to Santo Domingo, eleven miles away. They met no resistance and took up positions at the Duarte Bridge, which spans the Ozama River and is the principal route from Santo Domingo to the east. They also took up positions all along the eastern bank of the Ozama River, directly across from the main constitutionalist sector of Santo Domingo. By April 30, 1,700 Marines and 2,500 soldiers were in the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military buildup in and around the Dominican Republic continued. On May 1, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5,500 men) was deployed into San Isidro from Camp Lejeune. By May 2, the offshore naval force had been reinforced by a second helicopter carrier (the USS Okinawa) and the cruiser Newport News, including additional elements of the 2nd Marine Division. On May 3, a Marine detachment from the Newport News landed in Santo Domingo. (40)

By May 2, the initial purposes of the intervention had been accomplished: the collapsing Dominican armed forces had been shored up, a constitutionalist offensive against San Isidro had been prevented, and foreign nationals had been evacuated from the country. Troops and heavy armor continued to pour into San Isidro, their purpose now to prevent the spread of the revolution to the countryside and to surround the constitutionalist forces with vastly superior armed might. On May 3, the paratroopers moved across the Duarte Bridge into Santo Domingo, establishing an armed corridor through the middle of the city and linking up with the Marines at the Embajador, on the western edge of the city. This maneuver was ostensibly a response to an OAS request that a neutral "international security zone" be established in the city to enforce the cease-fire and protect remaining foreigners, but its more important purposes were to divide the constitutionalist zone, and to cut off the main body of the rebel fighters from their access to the countryside, bottling them up in a small downtown area with their backs to the sea. The overwhelming power of the U.S. forces ensured that there was little resistance from the constitutionalists. By the time the U.S. buildup was completed on May 9, there were 23,000 U.S. troops in the country (the remaining seven battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived on May 8),

with massive amounts of heavy armor. An additional 3,300 Marines and a 35-ship task force were stationed offshore. The task force included two aircraft carriers and numerous surface combatants—a force almost half as large as the one then engaged in a full-scale war in Vietnam. (41) With the Vietnam situation very much in mind, the Johnson administration was taking no chances: The massive show of force was designed to avert new trouble through an awesome demonstration of power or, at worst, to prepare for a nationwide occupation.

While the constitutionalists were being surrounded in Santo Domingo, American forces moved into the countryside, though much less ostentatiously. A number of small U.S. teams, in particular Special Forces units in civilian clothes, were stationed throughout the countryside to establish a U.S. presence, survey economic needs, report on local political conditions, and, most important, establish liaison with local policy and military units.

With the situation so well in hand, the United States began to reduce its forces in the Dominican Republic by the end of May. By mid-June, in fact, all of the Marines had been withdrawn, and by mid-November the principal U.S. military unit remaining in the country was a brigade of the 82nd Airborne. The U.S. military presence remained dominant, however, throughout the negotiating period that followed the major fighting and intervention and the tenure of the provisional government that was established thereafter.

The Negotiating Phase

With the Dominican military saved, the constitutionalists surrounded, and the rest of the country quiet, the United States shifted its attention to efforts to gain a political solution, though both threats and the actual use of military force were still to play a significant role in support of the Johnson administration's political objectives.

The immediate U.S. objective in the ensuing negotiations was to establish a temporary Dominican government, either a coalition made up of moderate, non-Communist constitutionalists and representatives of more conservative groups supporting the military, or a "Third Force," excluding all participants on either side of the recent fighting. After this projected government was formed and had established its authority throughout the country, new elections for a permanent government would be held. The Johnson administration seemed genuinely committed to free elections, though with some qualifications. First, it was doubtful that the United States would have supported new elections if the government thought there was any chance that the Communists might win; in fact, however, there was no such chance. Second, and perhaps more significant, several high-level officials have privately conceded that the U.S. decision to press for genuinely free elections was at least in part influenced by secret CIA-sponsored polls taken shortly before the revolution, which showed that Balaguer, rather than Bosch or an even more radical Dominican political figure, would be likely

to win. On the other hand, other U.S. government officials minimize the importance of this consideration, noting that the polls were not considered decisive, that the revolution and the U.S. intervention might well have changed the political context, that it was not certain that Balaguer would actually be willing to run, and that in any case the United States remained firmly committed to free elections even when it appeared that Bosch was more likely to win them. In the longer run, the Johnson administration sought the establishment of a stable democratic political system in the Dominican Republic, progressive but firmly anti-Communist, backed by strong but reformed, professionalized armed forces under firm civilian control.

The Dominican Targets of U.S. Behavior

Before describing the major Dominican actors and their political stakes in the crisis, we should take note of the over-all character of Dominican politics. According to all specialists on Dominican politics (especially Howard Wiarda and Abraham Lowenthal), political behavior in the Dominican Republic tends to be non-ideological, non-programmatic, unstructured and uninstitutionalized, with individuals rather than "parties" dominating, and motivation best understood in terms of individual opportunism and personal ambition rather than genuine differences over public policy. Thus, according to Lowenthal, Dominican politics are marked by a constantly shifting pattern of alliances and cliques, a battle of the "outs versus the ins," disguised, to be sure, as party or ideological conflict, but bearing little genuine resemblance to the superficially similar political structures of more politically developed societies. (42) This view tends to exaggerate the purely opportunistic character of Dominican politics and, by implication, also exaggerates the ideological or programmatic character of the politics of the industrialized societies, but there is clearly something to it and the reader should bear it in mind in the ensuing pages.

There were five major actors, or groups of actors, in the 1965 crisis.

1. The regular Dominican armed forces. As noted earlier, for nearly the entire history of the republic, the military have been the main source of political power, especially when they were united or, as in the Trujillo era, dominated by a single caudillo (leader). After Trujillo's assassination, they divided into a number of factions under the almost feudalistic control of individual generals. The main concern of most of the Dominican generals was to maintain their privileged position in Dominican society so they could continue to enjoy the power and plunder that went along with it. A few, to be sure, seemed to stand for something—for example, some of the younger officers who defected to the constitutionalists because of genuine democratic ideals and a desire to cleanse their own profession of its brutality and corruption, and, on the other hand, a few genuinely fanatic anti-Communists, particularly Wessin y Wessin. Most of the others, however, were cautious opportunists, whose behavior was a function of their latest estimate of the prevailing political winds.

2. Of this group, one of the most unprincipled was Antonio Imbert. Imbert had been an important figure in Dominican politics since 1961 for three major reasons: (1) he was one of the two survivors of the original group of sixteen or so who planned the successful assassination of Trujillo (in fact, it was said, Imbert was the man who had actually fired the mortal shots); (2) he had a fairly substantial private army to support him; and (3) far from least, John Bartlow Martin had always been fascinated by him and frequently acted to maximize Imbert's political power. Imbert was a power-seeker pure and simple. He was part of Trujillo's retinue for years, rising to become governor of Puerto Plata in 1948; later, however, there was a family feud with Trujillo, and Imbert's brother died in one of Trujillo's prisons. It was generally agreed that personal revenge rather than principle accounted for Imbert's role in the assassination, and Imbert maneuvered for political power afterwards. He was not a career military man, but had been appointed a general in the army after the assassination and been assigned troops to protect him against the revenge of the Trujillists. He later became chief of police under the Reid government and augmented his private army to a force of some 2,000 men.

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- 3. Juan Bosch, the symbolic leader of the revolution. Because Bosch remained in San Juan until six months after the crisis, however, it is unclear how much direct influence he actually exercised.
- 4. The constitutionalists, comprising three different groups: (a) A group of civilian PRD supporters of Bosch, headed by Antonio Guzman, a wealthy but liberal landowner who was minister of agriculture in Bosch's short-lived government. Guzman and other PRD leaders were the most politically sophisticated of the constitutionalists and did most of the negotiating with U.S. representatives. (b) The constitutionalist military leaders, headed by Caamano. They willingly deferred to the PRD leaders once the actual negotiating had begun, and on several occasions emphasized that they would abide by any solution reached between the United States and the PRD. (c) The radical political leaders of the Castroite 14th of June movement and two small Communist parties. Their power rested primarily on their (perhaps shaky) control of many of the tougher street fighters or commandos; but whatever their initial power, it faded in the face of the overwhelming U.S. military superiority and the more moderate positions of the PRD and regular constitutionalist military leaders.
- 5. A shifting group of "Third Force" Dominican business and political leaders, to whom the United States turned when negotiations for a provisional government between the rightists and the constitutionalists broke down. The leading figure in this group came to be Héctor García-Godoy, also a wealthy landowner, but one who had ties to both Bosch and Balaguer, as foreign minister under the Bosch government and later as a vice-president of Balaguer's Partido Reformista. Basically a moderate progressive, whose political and social philosophy was not very different from that of the general democratic left of Latin America (from which Bosch himself had originally derived his inspiration), he initially had broad support from the Balagueristas, the moderate sectors of the PRD, and the independents.

Somehow a political solution had to be negotiated that would be to some degree acceptable to the Johnson administration, the Latin American members of the OAS "Ad Hoc Committee," the constitutionalists, the Dominican military, and key elites within Dominican society. At a slightly farther remove, but still exerting a general influence and setting the outermost boundaries of the ultimate solution were U.S. domestic opinion, the OAS as a whole, Latin American opinion, and world opinion as expressed through the United Nations.

The ensuing negotiations represent a classic case of what Alexander George and his associates have called "coercive diplomacy," understood to mean the use of both rewards and sanctions to achieve limited political objectives. (43) Coercive diplomacy is distinguished from pure diplomacy in that the use of force may be explicitly threatened if negotiations should break down, or they may be implicit from the structure of the situation; it is distinguished from pure coercion by its use of bargaining, compromise, and rewards. The carrot and stick are employed alternatively and selectively to affect the target's resolve; however, the target's own interests (as Thomas Schelling has pointed out) (44) must be sufficiently accommodated to avoid resolute resistance. All of these elements were clearly present in the Dominican situation.

There is no doubt that the use of coercive diplomacy was a conscious strategy of the United States government, employed on behalf of specific, well-defined objectives. There was also, however, considerable vacillation and internal division within the government, over both objectives and the degree of force that should be employed on their behalf. The most systematic research on the policy-making process within the U.S. government during the Dominican crisis has been done by Abraham Lowenthal, who concludes that "the evidence now available does not permit confident statements about the perceptions and perspectives of many of the relevant actors; differences among presidential advisers in Washington are particularly hard to define, for instance, and evidence about the president's own views and actions is still fragmentary and uncertain." (45) It is reasonably clear, however, that there were substantial internal differences about the degree to which the United States should employ force simply to impose its will on recalcitrant Dominicans during at least three phases of the crisis: (1) in the first week or so after the landing of U.S. forces, when the U.S. military commander in the Dominican Republic, Ambassador Bennett, and, probably, Thomas Mann in Washington were urging the destruction of the constitutionalists; (2) during the May-June negotiations over the formation of a government to be headed by Antonio Guzmán, in which the leading American negotiator, McGeorge Bundy, apparently tried but failed to stop U.S. support for a military offensive by Imbert's forces against part of the constitutionalist forces: (3) and during the summer negotiations that finally eventuated in the formation of the García-Godoy provisional government, in which Ellsworth Bunker successfully resisted State Department suggestion, for further military pressures on the constitutionalists.

Allowing for these internal differences and/or vacillations, however, within several weeks after the military intervention, an over-all U.S.

strategy did emerge: to impose a firm military stalemate, to demonstrate to extremists on both sides of the Dominican crisis that they could not achieve their maximum objectives—the destruction of their opponents—and, after the logic of the situation had fully registered, to negotiate a compromise political settlement, but one that fully satisfied the primary U.S. objective, the avoidance of a Communist or radical Dominican government. These objectives were communicated quite specifically and explicitly to all the major Dominican actors, and U.S. words were frequently backed by a variety of actions that made the messages both unmistakable and irresistable. During the course of the negotiations the United States did not hesitate to remind the Dominicans, through words and actions, of its ability to impose a military solution if either side became too recalcitrant. Beyond its overwhelming military power, the United States had other important sources of leverage.

- 1. Washington sent a succession of high-level diplomats to the Dominican Republic. Within a few days after the troops had landed, Ambassador Bennett and the U.S. Embassy were effectively replaced by prestigious and powerful presidential emissaries: first, John Bartlow Martin, then McGeorge Bundy (accompanied by Thomas Mann and Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense), and finally Ellsworth Bunker. The Dominicans were well aware that the U.S. negotiators had direct access to President Johnson, and this lent additional weight to their diplomatic efforts.
- 2. The United States carried out a massive propaganda campaign in the Dominican Republic on behalf of its objectives. The country was flooded with experts on "psychological warfare" from the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency covertly set up and controlled radio stations and newspapers behind an "OAS" or apparently independent "Dominican" facade, U.S. Army communications units jammed constitutionalist radio stations, and leaflets were airdropped throughout the countryside. In sum, a wide variety of both open and covert propaganda efforts were employed to back the U.S. position and to discredit Dominican groups opposed to it. (46)
- 3. Finally, the U.S. government had considerable economic leverage, particularly over the "loyalist" forces led by Imbert: For several months during the summer of 1965, the salaries of the entire Dominican public sector, including those of the police and armed forces, came either directly from the U.S. government or from the Dominican Central Bank, which was physically under the military control of the United States.

The first step in the U.S. negotiating strategy was to set up a Dominican government that could serve as a provisional source of some Dominican authority pending new elections and could act as a counterbalance—however artificial—to the constitutionalists, enabling the United States to press for a "middle solution." The task of setting up this stopgap government was assigned to John Bartlow Martin, who, to the surprise and dismay of a good many Dominican specialists in the State Department and at the embassy, turned to Antonio Imbert, whose known opportunism, predilection

for power, and widespread unpopularity in the Dominican Republic made him a most peculiar choice. Moreover, Martin ignored his instructions to make it clear that the new government would be only provisional and would not receive diplomatic recognition from the United States. Instead, Martin promised Imbert a blank check and recognition within twenty-four hours! Predictably enough, Imbert immediately set out to form a military dictatorship and to destroy the constitutionalists and any other opposition, imprisoning, torturing, and even murdering hundreds of Dominicans. Lyndon Johnson was furious—"I'm not going down in history as the man responsible for putting another Trujillo in power"—and within a few weeks, McGeorge Bundy was sent to Santo Domingo to try to undo the damage and restore the situation to one from which a genuine compromise could be reached. (47)

Bundy's negotiating strategy was to attempt to separate the moderate constitutionalists from the more radical groups, and the bulk of the Dominican military from the Trujillists, extreme rightists, and followers of Imbert. The Imbert regime in and of itself was not considered a serious problem, for it had little popular support in the Dominican Republic, only the unenthusiastic support of most of the military leaders, it had a bad press around the world, and it was heavily dependent on U.S. political and economic support. To the constitutionalists, Bundy offered the removal of the Imbert regime in favor of a provisional government, headed by PRD leader Antonio Guzmán, that would oust Wessin and other Trujillist military holdovers, end terrorism, and rule by genuinely democratic methods until free elections could be held. To the Dominican military, Bundy offered firm U.S. assurances that they would not be destroyed by a Bosch or Boschist government, and that all Communists or Castroites would be exiled or interred in concentration camps. When negotiations bogged down, largely because of Guzmán's principled refusal to exile constitutionalist and Castroite leaders, the United States used more forceful persuasion: U.S. troops allowed Imbert's forces to cross their lines and brutally attack the northern sector of the constitutionalist zone, which had been separated from the main body of the constitutionalists when the United States established its armed corridor through the center of the city. The evidence is mixed on whether the United States participated in or provided direct support to the attack. At the time, a number of newspapers and television men reported that U.S. troops did join in the fighting. (48) This, however, was angrily denied by U.S. officials, even in unofficial statements long after the affair. Moreover, at the height of the fighting, the embassy reassured Washington, in response to an urgent State Department request for a report on the matter, that the newspaper stories were manifestly false. There were several lower-level unauthorized actions and mistakes, the embassy admitted, but it reiterated that U.S. forces were still under strict orders not to allow the movement of any armed groups through their lines. On the other hand, it is also true that earlier in May, U.S. generals were instructed to explain to Dominican military commanders that the projected corridor through the city would help free loyalist forces to take the offensive; they were further ordered to help their Dominican counterparts to draw up plans for attacking the constitutionalists, with the rebel forces north of

the corridor specifically suggested as the first target. Thus, whatever the exact degree of U.S. involvement, the record leaves little doubt that Washington at a minimum acquiesced in the Imbert attack, in the hope of eliminating the constitutionalist channel to the countryside, increasing the pressures on the constitutionalists in the negotiating process, and reopening the important industrial area in the northern sector of the city. There is evidence that Bundy himself opposed the attack, or at least the obvious U.S. acquiescence in it, and sought to have it stopped, but Mann and other hard-liners were apparently more persuasive to Johnson.

After several days of massive destruction, the northern sector was completely under the control of the military. The tactic proved only partially successful. While it did contribute to softening the resistance of many of the constitutionalists to any compromise settlement, and demonstrated to them that their very existence depended on U.S. policy, it did not change Guzmán's mind about deportation. Even more important, it only stiffened the resistance of the armed forces to the establishment of a government they felt would be dominated by Juan Bosch. In fact, with U.S. and other foreign newspapers angrily attacking the Johnson administration's cold-blooded support of Imbert's brutality, and with the regular military now backing Imbert's insistence on a complete "clean-up" of the remaining constitutionalist zone, the United States was forced to turn the stick in the other direction. Washington firmly informed Imbert and the military that the United States would allow no further military actions against the constitutionalists; just to make sure, U.S. tanks were placed across the runways at San Isidro, and half the U.S. artillery emplacements surrounding the constitutionalist zone were turned around to face the regular military. (49) As Imbert realized that his own hopes to retain power depended on firm U.S. support, he was forced to give up plans for further military action. Still, the negotiations broke down, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but apparently centered on growing doubts within the U.S. government that a Guzmán regime--particularly one that adamantly refused to undertake the draconian control of radicals that Washington considered essential -- would be sufficiently "reliable." Bundy was replaced by Ellsworth Bunker, under very general instructions to seek a middle-of-the-road provisional government, one not associated with the constitutionalists, the rightists, or the existing Imbert regime.

Though there continued to be internal differences within the U.S. government, especially over matters of tactics in the continuing negotiating deadlock, Bunker quickly established himself as the dominant U.S. figure on the Dominican question. On a number of occasions, differences between Bunker and the U.S. Embassy, the State Department, or the U.S. military command in the Dominican Republic had to be taken to the White House, and Bunker's position invariably prevailed. When it became clear to other U.S. officials that Bunker had the personal confidence of and direct access to Johnson, and did not hesitate to make use of it, his predominance was accepted as a fact of life, and the internal conflicts diminished.

The two major initial conflicts, primarily between Bunker and the

U.S. military, but also to a degree between Bunker and the State Department, were (1) whether the constitutionalists were to be accepted on at least an equal plane with the Dominican military and the Imbert junta, as a contending party whose demands had to be genuinely accommodated in any effective settlement, and (2) the degree to which the threat of force against the constitutionalists was to be kept alive as a means of negotiating leverage against them. On both issues, Bunker took the more liberal posture, and his views prevailed. If anything, the views of the moderate constitutionalists were taken more seriously than those of the Dominican military and certainly those of the Imbert regime, and Bunker firmly refused to allow any further military displays against the constitutionalists. There was one possible exception to this policy, though it is quite ambiguous. In mid-June, after persistent sniper fire against their lines, U.S. troops advanced into the constitutionalist zone, occupying about another fifty square blocks and killing sixty-seven constitutionalists or bystanders. The evidence generally suggests that this was not a deliberate political tactic, but simply a massive military overreaction by local U.S. commanders to minor constitutionalist provocations. It was not unnoticed in Washington, however, that the constitutionalist negotiating posture softened somewhat after the attack.

The negotiations continued stalemated for some months, with no further U.S. military actions or threats. From time to time the State Department would almost wistfully inquire of Bunker if there was "a possibility of a constitutionalist ceasefire violation to which the U.S. dominated IAPF [Inter-American Peace Force] could react to and take additional blocks in the rebel area," (50) but Bunker stood firm. As a matter of fact, Bunker's major effort initially was simply to convince Imbert and the military that the United States was firmly committed to a negotiated settlement and that it would allow no further military actions against the constitutionalists. This message was communicated repeatedly to the Dominican military, both verbally, through the public statements of U.S. officials and private warnings, and by U.S. actions—the blocking of Dominican airfields and the symbolic reversing of U.S. artillery positions, as well as the seizure of all major oil depots by U.S. forces to deny fuel to Dominican military aircraft and tanks.

By the end of the summer of 1965, Bunker's tactics, described by himself as "patience with persuasion and pressure," had paid off: Extremists on both sides had been isolated, the U.S.-created fait accompli was acknowledged, and Héctor García-Godoy-who was acceptable to Bunker, the moderate constitutionalists, and, more reluctantly, the bulk of the military-had emerged as the most likely head of the provisional government. Imbert remained adament, but he was no problem; when all the pieces of the overall settlement had fallen into place, the U.S. simply announced that there would be no further "OAS" assistance to the Dominican Republic until the García-Godoy government took office. This aid paid for nearly the entire budget of the Imbert regime, including the salaries of the police and the military, and other sources of potential revenue, particularly the Dominican Central Bank, had been taken over by IAPF units, so Imbert was left with no choice but to resign.

The García-Godoy Government

García-Godoy took office on September 3, 1965, committed to hold genuinely free elections within nine months and to rule by democratic methods until then. The U.S. government fully supported these objectives, and had even modified its initial insistence-on harsh measures against the constitutionalists when García-Godoy proved no less adamant than Guzmán had been: not only would there be no deportation or internment of radical groups, but the 14th of June movement would even be allowed to participate in the electoral process. The shift in the U.S. position was a result not only of García-Godoy's insistence on the issue, but also of Washington's confidence that García-Godoy (unlike Guzmán) had both the will and the leadership ability to prevent any outright Communist grab for power. Even more fundamentally, by the end of the summer it was clear that the combination of U.S. military power and the relative lack of Dominican popular support of radicalism of any kind made the specter of a "Communist takeover" a wholly unrealistic one, even to the most cautious and ideologically oriented U.S. policymakers.

The real problem for the García-Godoy government during the ensuing months--particularly when it became clear that both he and Bunker were genuinely committed to free elections, which Juan Bosch might win--was not the left but the right. From the inception of the García-Godoy government, Bunker very clearly and explicitly committed the United States to its full support, including the use of the IAPF to prevent a coup. But public statements of U.S. intentions and even stronger private warnings to the Dominican military were not sufficient, for on a number of occasions in the next six months, force had to be threatened or actually deployed to prevent both rightist coups and threatened massacres of the constitutionalists.

- 1. One of García-Godoy's first major actions was to fire Wessin and break up his private tank force at the San Isidro Air base. Both García-Godoy and Bunker agreed that Wessin would have to go because of his known proclivities for military coups and the widespread hatred of him among Dominicans since he had ordered the bombardment and strafing of Santo Domingo during the revolution. In response to García-Godoy's order on September 5 removing him from the head of the San Isidro unit, Wessin mobilized his tanks and began moving toward Santo Domingo. But Bunker ordered the IAPF to block Wessin's advance, and Wessin was then personally escorted to a U.S. military plane by high-ranking U.S. army officers and flown to Miami to occupy a newly created Dominican "consulate" there.
- 2. In mid-October, García-Godoy learned of a pending plan by the military to send forces into the constitutionalist zone, ostensibly to search for weapons. When the military refused to obey his order to desist, García-Godoy (with Caamaño's private acquiescence) asked Bunker to send IAPF forces into the zone for general peacekeeping purposes. Bunker complied, and, at the same time, the United States ostentatiously landed sixteen new tanks near Santo Domingo.
 - 3. In mid-November, García-Godoy and the U.S. Embassy learned of a

rightist plot (apparently involving Antonio Imbert) to seize the city of Santiago, proclaim a new government, and attempt to rally Dominican military support behind it. At García-Godoy's request, an IAPF unit flew to Santiago to occupy the airport and other key points. At the same time, Bunker issued a warning that any attempt to overthrow the government would be in clear defiance of OAS efforts to restore democracy in the Dominican Republic. In the face of this show of force, the Santiago police and military units refused to cooperate with the conspirators, and the plot collapsed.

- 4. In mid-December, an IAPF unit was flown into Santiago to rescue Caamaño and about 100 other constitutionalists, who were beseiged in a hotel by local police and military units. The IAPF group interposed itself between the two forces, obtained a cease-fire, and transported the constitutionalists back to their base outside Santo Domingo, itself under heavy guard by the IAPF.
- 5. The most serious challenge to the García-Godoy government came in early January 1966, when García-Godoy announced on nationwide radio that he was sending Caamaño and other major constitutionalist leaders and the three leading regular military commanders out of the country, in the interests of order and reconciliation. The announcement triggered an open rebellion of the military. On January 6, army units seized the government radio and television stations and began a roundup of "Communists" in all parts of the country. With the García-Godoy government in imminent danger of being overthrown, Bunker ordered the IAPF to protect the National Palace and to force the army units out of the radio and television stations. To avoid an open clash with the IAPF -- actually U.S. troops known to be under the direct political control of Bunker-the armed forces backed down. The military chiefs, however, still refused adamantly to give up their offices. In the ensuing weeks, a general strike protesting military defiance paralyzed Santo Domingo, and García-Godoy spoke of resigning if he could not bring the military under control. In response, Bunker had the Navy move the Caribbean Ready Squadron (the naval presence had earlier been reduced to this regular area force) closer to shore, and promised García-Godoy that the IAPF would comply with a request to remove physically the military chiefs, as Wessin had been removed several months earlier. In view of Bunker's firmness and visible U.S. military deployments, the Dominican military chiefs ended their defiance and left the country, replaced by men García-Godoy considered amenable to democratic civilian control.

In a more fundamental sense, however, the basic reform of the Dominican military that had been an initial U.S. objective after the intervention was never undertaken. Although there was no doubt that the United States was genuinely interested in helping create an apolitical, professionalized armed force, it gave higher priority to preserving the military as a bastion of anti-Communism. To push hard on reform in the aftermath of the revolution, U.S. officials feared, might so disrupt and demoralize the military that they would lose their remaining effectiveness and leave the door open to radicalism. In principle, there was no essential inconsistency between fundamental reform and basic preservation, but in practice there was, as the presumed exigencies of one crisis after another led cautious U.S. officials to postpone serious efforts to restructure the armed forces until some future time when the situation would be more propitious. During

the summer of 1965, priority had been given to winning military assent for a political settlement, so Bunker was unwilling to take any actions that might antagonize the armed forces. During the García-Godoy government, though the worst of the remaining Trujillist military were weeded out, the continuing civilian-military crisis seemed to preclude more farreaching measures, so the reforms would have to wait until after the elections. Once Balaguer was in office and U.S. troops were withdrawn, however, the United States lost most of its leverage (and, probably, much of its interest) in the matter. Many of the Trujillist military men were actually brought back into active service by Balaguer. Although there has been little published about the Balaguer government, it seems apparent that there have been few fundamental changes in any aspects of Dominican society, least of all in the armed forces.

The Elections and the U.S. Withdrawal

In June 1966, Joaquin Balaguer defeated Juan Bosch by a surprisingly large margin in what most observers, even many who were initially skeptical, consider to have been genuinely free elections. While there is no doubt that the Johnson administration was very happy with the outcome, there has been no evidence that it covertly interfered with the electoral process or helped Balaguer in any way. It remains an established fact that only persistent and sustained U.S. pressures, including the threat of military force, ensured that the elections were held at all. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that the Dominican vote for Balaguer might have been substantially influenced by the very fact of the U.S. intervention and the known U.S. distate for Bosch. A vote for Balaguer under these circumstances might have been seen as a vote for stability, the easing of domestic conflict, and the end of foreign military intervention.

The electoral campaign began in effect when Juan Bosch returned to the country at the end of September 1965. His return was bitterly opposed by the military, but they were overruled by García-Godoy and Bunker. On September 25, Bosch made a triumphal entry into Santo Domingo, his route from the airport heavily guarded by the same U.S. military units (now down to two brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division) that five months earlier had been landed to block an uprising intended to return him to office.

During the ensuing months, Bunker and the new U.S. ambassador, John C. Crimmins, a liberal career foreign service officer, went to considerable lengths to convince Bosch, the Dominican military, and even the U.S. civilian and military officers in the country that the Johnson administration was really committed to free elections. By April 1966, many of the key conservative State Department and embassy officials who had favored the initial intervention had been replaced by liberals: Crimmins had replaced Bennett, Mann resigned soon after it became clear that he was regularly losing out in policy conflict with Bunker, and Crockett was replaced by C. Allen Stewart, a former ambassador to Venesuela during the Betancourt regime,

and a strong supporter of the democratic left in Latin America. In early March 1966, very explicit written directions were given to the IAPF and all U.S. Embassy, AID, and CIA personnel, reiterating that the United States was neutral, and directing all concerned to avoid any actions or statements contrary to that policy or that might be interpreted as expressing even an unofficial U.S. preference for a Balaguer victory. At the same time, Crimmins and Bunker met repeatedly with Dominican political figures, in particular with Bosch and, on the other side, the military and other Dominican rightists, in an effort to make it "crystal clear" (as a State Department cable to the embassy put it) that the United States would use all its influence to ensure a genuinely free electoral process.

Obviously, even genuinely free elections would have been rendered absurd if Bosch had been elected only to have been overthrown by a new military coup shortly thereafter. A good part of the U.S. diplomatic effort, therefore, was also directed toward convincing both Bosch and his enemies that the United States was fully prepared to work with Bosch if he should win, provide his government with substantial economic assistance, and most important of all, keep the IAPF in the country at Bosch's request for a considerable period to deter any attempts to overthrow him. Naturally, such support would not be unconditional; Bosch would have to keep the Communists under control and refrain from trying to destroy the military or even replacing its top commanders with constitutionalist military leaders. There were a number of indications, however, that Bosch intended to follow cautious, non-provocative policies.

On the eve of the elections, which most State Department and embassy officials expected would be won by Bosch, the State Department cabled the embassy that Bunker and Crimmins should reiterate to all major Dominican actors that the United States expected García-Godoy to use force if necessary to uphold the results of the elections if they should be violently challenged from either the left or the right. The LAPF would be employed if the Dominican military joined in any anti-Bosch action. The next morning, Bunker responded to the State Department's cable:

It is my impression that the Dominican armed forces are now aware of our firm intention to support Bosch if he wins. Appropriate officers of the Embassy have been under instructions to make this clear to both military and civilians who might be tempted to take action against Bosch. Should he be elected, we will intensify efforts to get this message across and persuade the armed forces they have no other course but to accept the will of the people. (51)

With Balaguer's victory quietly accepted by all important Dominican sectors, the withdrawal of the U.S. and Latin American troops in the IAPF was begun. An agreement between Bunker, Balaguer, and García-Godoy established that the withdrawal would be gradual, taking about three months, if all went well. The least important troops would leave first, and the withdrawal

could be slowed down if a new major crisis should warrant such action in the eyes of both the Dominican and U.S. governments. The country remained relatively peaceful, and the last U.S. forces departed on schedule in September 1966, thus ending the most sustained political use of military force by the United States in the twentieth century.

The Role of the OAS and the UN

As in the 1961 crisis, the United States was able to act in the Dominican Republic through the OAS and thus obtain perhaps a marginal degree of collective legitimization for actions that were, in all essentials, unilateral in fact. The original military intervention, of course, was not authorized by the inter-American organization, but OAS units were involved in the subsequent negotiation process, and Latin American contingents were added to U.S. forces later to form the Inter-American Peace Force.

It is difficult to be sure what real difference, if any, the involvement of the OAS had on the course of events in the Dominican Republic. As discussed earlier, it is plausible that the initial OAS call for a cease-fire in the Dominican Republic and the subsequent arrival of an OAS negotiating committee and OAS Secretary-General José Mora in the country played a role in inhibiting U.S. military action against the constitutionalists, though there were other factors also. Later, the negotiations for the García-Godoy government and the use of the IAPF to support his regime were held formally under the auspices of a three-man Ad Hoc Committee of the OAS, consisting of Ellsworth Bunker and representatives from Brazil and El Salvador. There are some observers who believe that the Latin Americans on the committee played a useful complementary role to Bunker in the negotiations and may have had some impact on U.S. policy, but no one doubts that Bunker was by far the dominant figure and that his power stemmed from his unofficial role as a presidential emissary, rather than his official one as U.S. representative to the OAS. Finally, the IAPF, though formally commanded by a Brazilian general, was completely dominated by the United States. The force consisted of about 11,000 U.S. troops, 1,100 Brazilians, and token contributions of several hundred soldiers from Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. To the extent that there was a significant international component to the IAPF, it actually hindered rather than helped to reach a settlement, for the Brazilian commander was a rather primitive rightwinger, who openly favored the Dominican military and dragged his heels on several occasions when the Ad Hoc Committee asked the IAPF to cooperate with the García-Godoy government. 'However, the real commander of the IAPF was General Bruce Palmer, in command of the U.S. forces, and he was left in no doubt that his real orders came from Ellsworth Bunker, who was fully prepared on several occasions to order U.S. troops to act independently in support of U.S. policy if the Brazilian had not finally cooperated.

The overall role of the OAS in the Dominican crisis, then, was at best peripheral to that of the United States. The United States did make several unsuccessful efforts to get some of the more important relatively

liberal Latin American states, in particular Venezuela and Mexico, to play a greater role. In part, then, the marginality of OAS participation reflected the unwillingness of most states in the hemisphere to become involved in the crisis, inhibited as they were by the tradition of nonintervention, by domestic opposition, and by a reluctance to be associated with actions that might turn out to be disastrous. But even somewhat greater participation by other Latin American countries would not have altered the fact of U.S. domination very much, for the Johnson administration was clearly not going to accept much dilution of its control over the main lines of its policies.

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Similarly, the marginal involvement of the United Nations in the crisis probably had at most only a slight effect on the overall outcome. The Dominican situation was brought before the Security Council on May 1, by the USSR. The United States initially sought to exclude any UN role, resorting to its traditional argument that the involvement of the OAS made UN action unnecessary. But when it became clear that there was little sympathy with this ploy, even among a number of Latin American states who in the past had supported it, the United States reluctantly acceded to the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary General to report on the situation. Secretary General U Thant appointed as that representative José Mayobre, a former high official in Betancourt's government in Venezuela. By all accounts, Mayobre was forceful, highly intelligent, and sympathetic to the PRD group among the constitutionalists. It is clear that he did not limit his role to reporting, but established close contacts with the constitutionalists and worked vigorously behind the scenes to help bring about a political settlement acceptable to the democratic left. After considerable initial resentment at Mayobre, U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic came to admire him. They even found him useful as a channel of communications with the constitutionalists. Similarly, García-Godoy also worked closely with Mayobre because of his access to Bosch and the constitutionalists. Nevertheless, other channels of communication were available, and it is overwhelmingly likely that the structure of the situation would have caused the same outcome without Mayobre. All in all, then, it is doubtful that the Dominican crisis would have resolved itself very differently without OAS or UN involvement.

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Conclusions

In 1961 and 1965 the United States used military displays and military deployments on behalf of the overriding political objective of its Latin American policy—to avoid a new Castroite regime in the Caribbean. In assessing such political uses of military force, (51, 52) we may ask three critical questions:

- 1. Was the use of U.S. armed force <u>necessary</u> to achieve U.S. objectives, in the sense that nonmilitary instruments were unavailable or had been exhausted?
 - 2. Was the use of armed force successful?
- 3. Was the use of armed force <u>justified</u>, both in terms of morality and in terms of the relative costs and benefits to overall U.S. foreign policy in the longer term?

I have already sought to answer these questions with regard to the 1961 case, and I need here reiterate only the main conclusions: The military pressures on Dominican political leaders after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo were necessary to get rid of the Trujillo family and to induce a new regime to undertake political reform; they were successful in the short term, though over the longer run political reform depended far more on internal circumstances in the Dominican Republic than on U.S. actions; and they were both morally and politically justified.

The 1965 case is considerably more complicated. We can answer the three questions only by first posing some others: How much can the United States afford to risk on a Communist victory in another Latin American or Caribbean country; how much risk was there, in fact, in the Dominican revolution of 1965; and did the United States exhaust all reasonable alternatives before it turned to the use of force?

Let us begin with the last two questions. It is my view that the intervention was a mistake, even within the framework of the established No Second Cuba policy. Not that the fear of a successful Communist revolution in the Dominican Republic was a figment of the Johnson administration's fevered imagination, for (as I have earlier sought to demonstrate) by April 28 there was indeed some risk that Communist or Castroite forces might emerge victorious from an uncontrollable revolutionary upheaval. My case, rather, is that the U.S. government did not exhaust the opportunities for influencing the Dominican upheaval before the military intervention, and that even by April 28, when the opportunities had passed, the risk was still not sufficiently great to justify the predictably enormous political and moral costs that the intervention entailed.

What might the United States have done before April 28 to influence the Dominican situation? Here it must be recalled that the United States

probably had greater influence in the Dominican Republic than any other state in the world, perhaps matched only by its influence in Cuba before the Castro revolution. As a result of a history of intervention in the early twentieth century, the economic sanctions and military displays of the 1960-62 period, and the extraordinary role the United States had been playing in the day-to-day politics of the Dominican Republic in the preceding five years, Dominican political actors were accustomed to giving heavy weight indeed to anticipated U.S. reactions in all their political behavior. Thus, there is every reason to believe that appropriate U.S. actions and statements between April 24-28 could have avoided the necessity for military action. The most crucial preintervention error the United States made was that it failed, or more precisely it refused, to use its considerable influence to aid the moderate, non-Communist PRD leadership within the constitutionalist movement, vis-à-vis both a rightist military and the Castroite forces. Thanks to the general hostility to Bosch throughout the U.S. government and the generally conservative political attitudes of key officials in the U.S. Embassy, the embassy deliberately refused a number of opportunities to mediate during the crisis. Had it not chosen to remain aloof, wishfully anticipating a military defeat of the revolution, there was a strong possibility that the United States could have used its influence to ensure that control of the movement was retained by the moderate leadership. In that way it would have averted the Communist threat--whatever its magnitude--and Juan Bosch could have peacefully returned to the presidency, with at least the acquiescence of a divided and confused military. If U.S. diplomatic mediation had failed, Washington might simply have announced that it would by no means allow a Communist victory in the Dominican Republic, and would use its full economic and, if need be, military power to prevent it. Specifically, the government could have threatened to end all economic assistance to the Dominican Republic, suspend its imports of Dominican sugar, and once again deploy powerful naval groups to Dominican waters. In view of the effectiveness of these actions in the 1960-62 period, such a show of U.S. determination would have had great credibility and almost surely considerable effect on the actions of all the Dominican actors, including the radicals.

Thus (still accepting for the moment the underlying premises of U.S. policies), even if the United States had tried and failed to ensure a democratic outcome, it still could have done nothing more for the moment than reiterate its No Second Cuba policy in strong terms and ostentatiously deploy strong naval forces to Dominican waters, while waiting until the Dominican situation sorted itself out. To be sure, this course of action might itself have posed serious risks, as State Department officials are quick to point out. The longer the delay, the more resistance a later intervention would be likely to meet. Even worse, the longer the delay, the greater the likelihood that the whole crisis would become entwined in the larger Cold War conflict. As the State Department saw the matter, the United States had delayed in Cuba, taking firm action only after the political orientation of the Castro government was unmistakably clear. By that time, it was too late to do anything effective about it. Relatively

small-scale military actions, like the Bay of Pigs, had failed completely, and larger-scale direct U.S. military intervention would have risked a major confrontation with the USSR.

These arguments are by no means implausible or indefensible. Nonetheless, I remain persuaded that on April 28, the balance of costs and risks was still clearly on the side of nonintervention. Consider the costs of the U.S. military actions:

- 1. The intervention was almost universally opposed around the world. It was in direct defiance of international law, made a mockery of the inter-American system, and, along with the escalating Vietnam war, it seemed to reflect "an impetuous and doctrinaire anticommunism; a reckless reliance on military force...a penchant for putting action ahead of calculation." (53)
- 2. The intervention contributed massively to the sharply increased public alienation from the U.S. government and even the political system as a whole within the United States itself. Along with the Vietnam crisis, it was seen as both the symbol and the inevitable outcome of a pathologically anti-Communist policy. Of course, no one can say what the permanent costs of the Dominican intervention have been to this country's political and social fabric, but surely it played a role in the general domestic crisis of the past decade.
- 3. Within Latin America, the intervention dealt a death blow to the Alliance for Progress and the policy of nonrevolutionary democratic change that underlay it. One of the major premises of the alliance had been that the privileged classes of Latin America and their allies in the military, the church, and the established political parties could be persuaded to support democratic change, or at least to recognize that the forces for democratic change were the only realistic alternative to much more radical and violent change. But the Dominican intervention opened the possibility of another alternative-- the United States might, at the moment of truth, bail out the oligarchies rather than let them face the consequences of their own inadequacies and their steadfast addiction to an outmoded and unjust status quo. And surely enough (though of course many other factors played substantial roles), in the ensuing years, Latin American politics became increasingly polarized between the radical left and the extreme right, and the hopes of the early 1960s that the democratic left would prevail have been bitterly dashed.

On the other hand, what were the risks of deferring military intervention until it should become absolutely necessary? The prospect that the USSR would have committed itself to the protection of a radical government in the Dominican Republic, in the face of a firm U.S. threat to take military action to prevent a new Cuba, must be considered as nil. It is, of course, easier to be confident of such an assessment in retrospect, for the USSR did in fact remain on the sidelines throughout the crisis. Even at the time, however, it seems to me, the previous Soviet

caution in the Cuban missile crisis strongly indicated that it would follow a noninterventionist course in any future Caribbean crisis that the United States again defined as critical to its national interests, much as the cautious behavior of the United States in the 1956 Hungarian revolution allowed the USSR correctly to predict similar behavior in the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968.

Until now, I have been arguing from within the framework of established policies—that is, that a U.S. intervention would have been justifiable if it had been really necessary to prevent Communism from coming to power in another Latin American or Caribbean country. Put a little differently, I have not challenged the No Second Cuba policy itself, but simply its application in the Dominican Republic. This assumption must now be squarely faced. Let us now return to the first of the questions we posed earlier: In what way would another Communist government in the Caribbean threaten U.S. security, threaten it so massively as to require military intervention against a genuinely indigenous revolution?

It is my view that the Caribbean is in fact of no great significance to the United States. The only importance of the Caribbean today is psychological--the Caribbean is important because we think it is. (54) Unfortunately, because of the very nature of this self-fulfilling prophecy, a serious argument could be made that in 1965 if the U.S. government had passively accepted an actual--not potential--Communist victory in the Dominican Republic there would have been very severe domestic and international consequences. As discussed earlier, domestic considerations did, in fact, play a crucial role in the U.S. decision to intervene-- the fear that the American people would not stand for passivity in the event of a new Castro in this hemisphere. And in the prevailing climate of opinion, that fear might very well have been justified. The continued existence of the Castro government is no longer a domestic issue, but one need only recall the hysteria of the early 1960s over the Cuban revolution -- "Only ninety wiles away," "Cuba is a dagger pointing at the heart of America"-to understand the Johnson administration's concern. With the Cuban missile crisis still a very live memory, reasonable men could and in fact did fear that a successful Communist revolution in the Dominican Republic might well jeopardize the future of the Democratic party, if not of American liberalism in general. Even short of that, a new Communist revolution in the hemisphere could certainly have made politically impossible a more flexible and relaxed policy toward the entire Communist world, and it might have set back for years U.S. willingness to seek a detente in the Cold War.

Similarly, a failure to act against an unmistakably Communist revolution in the Caribbean might have produced serious destabilizing consequences in the rest of the world. A new Communist government in the hemisphere would not in fact threaten U.S. security, but the United States had been proclaiming since the Castro revolution that it would. Although a genuinely indigenous revolution was in fact a far cry from international Communist aggression, the United States had been loudly denying such a distinction. An indigenous Communist government in the

Caribbean would in fact almost certainly be independent of Moscow, Peking, or Havana, but the United States had been minimizing the significance of pluralism in the Communist world. Thus, caught in the crisis, the government could not suddenly reverse itself and deny the implications of its policies, without inviting dangerous consequences elsewhere in the world. Assuming (as seems plausible) the existence of a militant Kremlin faction favoring pressing on with the Cold War, the price of nonaction in the Caribbean might have been more aggressive Soviet behavior elsewhere, say in Berlin or the Middle East. If Washington refused to act in the Caribbean, which the United States itself had insisted was essential to its national security, why would it live up to its commitments in areas outside its immediate sphere of influence?

Put differently, the United States in 1965 was a prisoner of its own oversimplifications, myths, outmoded policies, and self-fulfilling prophecies. To reiterate the major points of my argument: (1) the overall No Second Cuba policy was an error, based on obsolescent premises, which should have been abandoned before the crisis ever arose; (2) because that had not been done, however, it is arguable that, in the domestic and international environment prevailing in 1965, the United States had trapped itself into the necessity of intervening against a genuine Communist revolution; (3) in the Dominican crisis itself, the United States had failed to exercise its influence in a constructive manner to avert a potential Communist threat. In any case, its intervention on April 28 was premature, for the evidence of Communist influence in the constitutionalist movement was not nearly sufficient to justify the predictable political and human costs of the intervention. The appropriate course, even within the framework of existing policy, would have been to intervene only if an unmistakably Communist government had actually come to power.

In addition to the intervention itself, the United States made a number of serious errors in the post-intervention period. The landing of U.S. troops should have been directed not only at forestalling whatever danger there was of a Communist takeover, but also at curbing the Dominican military, strengthening the non-Communist democratic elements in the constitutionalist movement, and restoring Juan Bosch to the presidency. As the troops landed, the United States might have made the following announcement: "In view of the possible threat of a Communist takeover of a revolutionary movement in the Dominican Republic, as well as the serious dangers to both foreign and Dominican lives, the United States has been forced to intervene militarily. The purpose of this intervention, however, will be not only to prevent a new Castro in the Western Hemisphere but also to end the fighting, restore order, prevent a military takeover, and restore the constitutional president to his office." Once the troops were on the ground, it would not have been difficult to isolate completely the Communist elements within the constitutionalist movement and ensure that they would not be in any position to dominate the government. Had the United States thrown its weight behind Bosch, instituted farreaching reform of the Dominican military, and in other ways used its power unequivocally on behalf of progressive democracy, the intervention probably would have been welcomed by most Dominicans, and it would have been viewed far differently in the United States and Latin America.

In fact, however, the United States used excessive force against the constitutionalists and failed to use enough force to curb the terrorism of the Dominican police and military. Although the Johnson administration had proclaimed as one of the principal reasons for the intervention the need to save lives in a bloody civil war, most of the estimated 3,000 Dominican deaths occurred after the intervention, some of them in clashes between the constitutionalists and U.S. troops, and the rest at the hands of a Dominican military that the United States had rescued from probable annihilation in April, and thereafter helped protect and rebuild.

The most inexcusable U.S. action during the entire period of the intervention, in my view, was its support of Imbert's military attack in May on the constitutionalist sector in northern Santo Domingo, which ended in the brutal slaughter of hundreds of constitutionalists and innocent civilians. In one sense, this might be looked upon as a successful use of military force for political purposes, for it did indeed generate additional pressures on the constitutionalists in the negotiating process. But the fact was that the constitutionalists were helpless anyway in the face of 23,000 American troops and a rebuilt Dominican police and military, and they knew it. In such circumstances, to have taken lives deliberately in exchange for slight political advantage was morally questionable, to put it as mildly as possible.

On the other hand, once the negotiating process had begun in earnest in the summer of 1965, the continued presence of U.S. troops and their occasional deployment, especially to prevent the attempted coups against the García-Godoy government, was absolutely essential to the realization of U.S. political objectives, which in turn were both politically and morally praiseworthy—namely, putting an end to rightist terrorism against the constitutionalists and establishing a democratic and progressive provisional regime to preside over the holding of free elections. Though U.S. forces remained in the Dominican Republic for eighteen months, after the first weeks their primary function was less to occupy the country than to keep the peace, less to dictate U.S. objectives than to ensure that the majority of Dominicans could give effective expression to their own political will.

Was the intervention ultimately a "success?" Even if we ignore the moral and political costs of the actions of the first few weeks, and the failure to exhaust nonmilitary alternatives, it would be hard to say. There is no Communist government in the Dominican Republic today, but that is not to say there would have been if the United States had not intervened. The United States did weed out the worst of the Trujillists from the Dominican military, but ultimately, despite its initial intentions, it failed to use the opportunity to engage in truly fundamental reform of the military. The United States did seek a democratic solution and presided over free elections, but once its troops were withdrawn, it lost most of its leverage over internal Dominican affairs, and few observers think that the Balaguer regime has done much to establish stable, democratic, and progressive

government in the Dominican Republic over the longer run.

Moreover, even if the Dominican intervention were not such a flawed "success," it would not be a very useful model or precedent for other such political uses of military force because of the special circumstances of the Dominican case and even because of the great amount of sheer luck. "The Dominican Republic was a comparatively easy place for the United States to intervene and from which to withdraw," (55) not only because its size and proximity to the United States enabled rapid and massive military intervention, but also because thirty years of Trujilloism had so fragmented and demoralized Dominican society that the conditions for a nationalist resistance movement against the U.S. intervention did not exist.

As in November 1961, the United States had complete strategic military control of the situation in 1965. Moscow was of no mind to become more than rhetorically involved, and Cuba had no capability to support the constitutionalists once the United States intervened. U.S. forces did not have to face any military opposition that had a strong base of support in the countryside. The opposition, such as it was, comprised the constitutionalists. It was located in a narrow geographic area, and could be quickly isolated. Nevertheless, an action to root out the constitutionalists violently would have been bloody; it also would have occasioned disastrous political repercussions. Had ideologues of the left actually gained control of the constitutionalist forces, compromise would not have been so likely, and there might well have been disastrous political consequences. As it was, neither side had the military capability to stage a successful offensive. The troops on both sides quickly perceived that any such action was out of the question. All they could do was resist -- and that only for the sake of a longer term political effect. In short, strategic and local isolation, minimal capabilities, and the absence of long term political plans and ideological commitment all combined to allow the 23,000 U.S. troops an easy time of it.

Finally, it is interesting to consider what might have been the result of a lesser action, such as was carried out in November 1961. Certainly, the political repercussions would not have been so great; but could the situation have been stabilized and similar outcomes been obtained by explicit and direct threats to the principals, coupled with only the offshore appearance of a large naval and amphibious force?

It is very probable that the situation had gone too far, and individuals on the constitutionalist side had become too committed to believe that the United States would intervene if it had not already stationed troops there. The constitutionalists could have done little to prevent the intervention even if they had been fully aware of U.S. intentions beforehand. It also is possible that they may have felt an early compromise in the absence of U.S. troops would yield more than could be expected if troops actually iid land. In short, the best

answer is "who knows?", but it would not have been especially risky to find out. At the least, a six- or eight-hour ultimatum could have been issued.

Perhaps a more serious problem than the willingness of the constitutionalist leaders to compromise would have been the ability of the U.S. forcefully to communicate an ultimatum to the right people on short notice. During the period of near chaos when the U.S. troops landed, the relations between the embassy and the constitutionalists were very poor in terms of both physical contact and mutual trust.

Of further significance, though, was that, unlike the situation in 1961, power was largely in the streets. It is reasonable to hypothesize that without U.S. troops on the ground, the constitutionalist leaders could not have enforced a compromise without seriously endangering their own positions. The situation was unstable, and an agreement with one group of leaders might only have led to that group's replacement by another—and more radical—group. Certainly, the emplacement on Dominican soil rather than offshore presence of U.S. troops made it easier for the constitutionalist leaders to compromise, insofar as they could point to the actual dominance of U.S. forces on the ground rather than to the mere threat of it.

Still another factor to consider is what would have been the result of a brief cease-fire in place. Both the loyalists and the constitution-alists had a tremendous fear as well as hatred of each other. This situation would probably have resulted in a series of broken cease-fires, ending only when one of the two sides destroyed the other. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine that a provisional government of the García-Godoy type would have come to pass and that such free and fair elections as were held in 1966 would have taken place.

In the long run, apart from the holding of elections and the inauguration of a popularly elected government in 1966, can we consider that the U.S. intervention was justified? It is true that Washington has not had to worry about Communism in the Dominican Republic, and Balaguer is no Trujillo. On the other hand, a decade later, there is also very little democracy in the Dominican Republic. The country is not a "showcase" of anything.

In sum then, one might conclude that by ousting the Trujillos in 1965, the worst of two extremes were proscribed. The realities of both, however, were always questionable: Trujillo's heirs probably were not made of the same stuff as <u>El Jefe</u>, and the Communists probably would not have been able to seize power in 1965 or thereafter. In a constructive and longer term sense, these interventions had little effect; as a society and as a polity, the Dominican Republic has followed its own rather than any U.S.-directed course.

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Footnotes

- 1. In 1945-47, however, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Spruille Braden did attempt to use U.S. dipromatic and economic leverage on behalf of democracy. The failure of the Braden efforts, especially in Argentina, led to the abandonment of such efforts.
- 2. For details on the CIA plots, see Howard Wiarda, <u>Dictatorship</u>, <u>Development and Disintegration</u> (Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 838-43, and the "Summary of the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Intelligence," <u>New York Times</u>, November 21, 1975.
- 3. Quoted by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Fawcett, 1965), p. 769.
- 4. New York Times, June 2-4, 1961; Wiarda, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration, p. 854.
- 5. According to Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Just days after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy personally approved a contingency plan for landing troops in the Dominican Republic which stressed as the principal policy guide-lines that the United States could not afford and would not permit the imposition in the Dominican Republic of a pro-Castro or pro-Communist government. This theme was repeated time and again in presidential instructions to U.S. officials concerned with the Dominican Republic."

 Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 26. See also the memoirs of Chester Bowles, who cryptically refers to the "successful resistance" of the Kennedy administration to "pressures" for a military takeover of the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's assassination, in order to forestall a feared takeover by Castro. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, (Harper & Row, 1971), p. 342.
- 6. New York Times, June 2, 1961; Wiards, <u>Dictatorship</u>, <u>Development and Disintegration</u>, pp. 846-47; Thomas M. Millington, "U.S. Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," <u>SAIS Review</u>, Summer, 1963.
- 7. The ensuing discussion is based on a series of interviews with government officials in 1962. As these interviews were on a not-for-attribution basis, I cannot identify particular individuals with particular policy positions.
- 8. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 770.
- 9. Wiards, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration, p. 854.
- 10. For details on the May 31-November 14 period, see ibid., pp. 846-52; the New York Times daily reports; and Jerome Slater, "The United States, the Organization of American States, and the Dominican Republic, 1961-1963," International Organization, VIII (1964).

- 11. For details on this point, and Trujillo's use of the Dominican Communist party leader Maximo Lopez Molina to frighten the United States, see Wiarda, <u>Dictatorship</u>, <u>Development and Disintegration</u>, p. 833; and John Bartlow Martin, <u>Overtaken by Events</u> (Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 40. Lopez had been imprisoned by Balaguer on November 14, and U.S. officials might have been concerned that a new Trujillo government would once again release him and allow him to attack the United States, as the Trujillos had done in the past.
- 12. The text of the news conference is in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 45, no. 1171, (December 4, 1961), p. 931.
- 13. See the stories by Tad Szulc in the New York Times on November 17, and November 20, 1961, and by Philip Geyelin, Wall Street Journal, November 20, 1961.
- 14. For details on the makeup of the naval force and the objectives of the military display, see U.S. Department of the Navy, Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Second Fleet Historical Report, 1961; Martin, Overtaken by Events, pp. 82-83; Wiarda, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration, p. 853; New York Times, November 18-20, 1961.
- 15. New York Times, November 18-21, 1961; Lt. Col. Edwin H. Simmons, "Military-Political Situation in the Dominican Republic," Office of Naval Information Review (May 1962); interview of Simmons by Stephen S. Kaplan, February 10, 1975.
- 16. New York Times, November 20, 1971; on the Spanish-language broadcasts, see Wiarda, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration, p. 853.
- 17. New York Times, November 21, November 25, November 27, 1961.
- 18. New York Times, January 20, 1972; Wiarda, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration, p. 854-55; 2nd Fleet History, 1961; personal interview with John C. Hill.
- 19. The extent of U.S. influence in the internal politics of a supposedly sovereign state is rather vividly illustrated in Martin, Overtaken by Events, in which he reports a conversation he had with Bosch and Fiallo shortly before the elections: "We, the United States...support free elections.... We intend to exert our influence to see that such elections are held. We intend to see that the winner is able to take office. We intend to use our influence to see that his government is not dominated by the military or the police...." (p. 227) When Bosch and Fiallo quibbled at some of the details of the electoral process arranged by the United States, the Venezuelan Ambassador who had worked closely with Martin on the matter reprimanded them: "We diplomats are up to here with the ingenuity of you two." (p. 229)

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- 20. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 196; see also pp. 121-22, 192-197, 255, 271, for details on Council of State visits to U.S. warships and U.S. thinking about potential military coups.
- 21. New York Times, November 25, 1961.
- 22. For example, see the New York Times editorials of December 1, 1961, and January 20, 1962.
- 23. New York Times, January 11, 1963; Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 308.
- 24. Quoted by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New American Library, 1966) p. 513.
- 25. On the background of the constitutionalists, see José A. Moreno, Barrios in Arms (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Arpad von Laxar and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (Allyn & Bacon, 1969).
- 26. Quoted in Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 661.
- 27. Quoted in Charles Roberts, <u>LBJ's Inner Circle</u> (Delacorte Press, 1965), p. 205.
- 28. Much of the research for this study is drawn on my not-for-attribution interviews with U.S. and Dominican actors and on my access to the cable traffic between the U.S. Embassy and the State Department. The sole restriction I was asked to accept on use of material gathered from these sources is that I not directly cite individuals or specific cables. I have chosen to deal with this matter by using such phrases as "there are a number of indications," or to quote directly from individuals or documents without further attribution.
- 29. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, p. 201.
- 30. For details on U.S. actions see <u>ibid.</u>, p. 83; and Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 24-26.
- 31. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, p. 89.
- 32. "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions," <u>Department of State Bulletin</u> (November 8, 1965).
- 33. One of the primary sources of information on the constitutionalists is Moreno, <u>Barrios in Arms</u>. Although an active supporter of the constitutionalists, Moreno is very explicit on the central role of Communist and Castroite activists in the commandos and their emergence in leadership roles after the first few days of the revolution. See also the analysis

50. See footmore 28.

51. 1016.

- by Bryant Wedge, "The Case of Student Political Violence," World Politics vol. XXI, no. 2, (January 1969).
- 34. Lloyd Free, "Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the Dominican People" (Institute for International Social Research, 1962),
- 35. See Theodore Draper, The Dominican Revolt (New York: Commentary Report, 1968); and the Communist party's own assessment, reprinted in Martin, Overtaken by Events, pp. 770-90.
- 36. Ibid., p. 658.

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- 37. Ibid., pp. 661-62, 672.
- 38. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, pp. 115-20. mandaged of water well at 1
- 39. Kenneth O. Gilmore, "The Truth about Santo Domingo," Readers Digest (May 1966).
- 40. The data on the U.S. military buildup are drawn from the following sources: U.S. Department of the Navy, Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Second Fleet Historical Report, 1966; U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Historical Division, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, vol. IV, pp. 2-3; Gilmore, "The Truth about Santo Domingo."
- 41. Lowenthal, <u>Dominican Intervention</u>, p. 112; U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Memorandum on Army Contingency Operations</u>, May 21, 1974. (Includes data on 82nd Airborn Division actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965); Gilmore, "The Truth about Santo Domingo."
- 42. In Lowenthal's words, "the continuing kaleidescope of Dominican politics...[is] virtually unchecked by program commitments or mediating institutions..." Dominican Intervention, p. 38. Moreno (Barrios in Arms) also tends to minimize the significance of true ideological conflict in the Dominican Republic, and Martin (Overtaken by Events) refers to the "swirling dance of Dominican politics." The major works embodying this point of view are Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in von Laxar and Kaufman, Reform and Revolution; and Howard Wiards, The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition (Praeger, 1969).
- 43. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Little, Brown, 1971).
- 44. Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1960).
- 45. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, p. 150.
- 46. For details, see Slater, <u>Intervention and Negotiation</u>, esp. pp. 113-14, and Lowenthal, <u>The Dominican Intervention</u>, esp. pp. 4, 205-06.

- 47. The Johnson quote is from Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 525. For details on the establishment of the Imbert Regime, see Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, pp. 57-65.
- 48. See especially the New York Times, May 20, 21, 1965; Tad Szulc, Dominican Diary (Delacorte Press, 1965); Selden Rodman, "A Close View of Santo Domingo," The Reporter (July 15, 1965).
- 49. Dan Guisman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Dammed (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 272.
- 50. See footnote 28.
- 51. Ibid.
- 52. I follow Barry M. Blechman's and Stephen S. Kaplan's concept here:
 "A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are
 taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as
 part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities...to influence
 specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in
 a continuing contest of violence...." "Use of Armed Forces as a Political
 Instrument" (paper prepared for 1976 Meetings of the International Studies
 Association, Toronto, February, 1976).
- 53. Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1965 (Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966), p. 68.
- 54. Jerome Slater, "The United States and Latin America: Premises for the New Administration," Yale Review (Autumn 1974).

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55. Abraham Lowenthal, "The Dominican Intervention in Retrospect," Public Policy, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (Fall 1969), p. 144.

Chapter XII

CASE STUDIES: THE BERLIN CRISES OF 1958-1959 AND 1961

By Robert M. Slusser

In the period from November 1958 to October 1961, the divided city of Berlin served as the focal point of a continuing international conflict that pitted the USSR and its allies against the Western alliance of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Chronologically, the action centering on Berlin falls into two distinct segments: (1) the Berlin crisis of 1958-59, which opened on November 27, 1958, with a Soviet note calling for withdrawal of the Western occupation forces from West Berlin and its conversion into a "free city" under a new agreement to be negotiated by the Western powers with a six-month dealine; this crisis reached its muted and inconclusive end ten months later when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev joined President Dwight Eisenhower in an agreement to hold negotiations on the Berlin question without the pressure of a Soviet-imposed deadline; and (2) the Berlin crisis of 1961, which began in February of that year with a Soviet note to the Federal Republic of Germany; escalated sharply in June, when the USSR announced another six-month deadline, this time for the conclusion of peace treaties with the East and West German states; reached a climax on August 12 when the USSR and its East German allies established a physical barrier, the Berlin Wall, between the Soviet-occupied sector of East Berlin and the three Westernoccupied sectors of the city; and finally receded after a tank confrontation between the United States and the USSR along the sector boundary in the divided city in October.

Between the two Berlin crises, that is, between September 1959 and February 1961, there intervened a period during which significant changes took place in the relative strength and internal power relationships of the USSR and the United States and their respective allies. The second Berlin crisis was therefore by no means a mere replay of the first. The 1961 crisis took up the conflict in a new international context, with differing strategies on either side, and with a different conclusion. The two crises, nevertheless, can usefully be regarded as "all a single tapestry,"(1) or, in a longer perspective, as phases in a single extended struggle for world supremacy between the USSR and the United States.

Historical Background

Berlin became the fulcrum of the Soviet-Western struggle as the result of a series of decisions, agreements, and actions taken during and shortly after the Second World War.(2) The European Advisory Commission decided at a meeting in September 1944, to divide Germany, after its defeat, into three zones of occupation, to be administered by the three principal allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. At the same time, the commission agreed that the German capital, Berlin, should be administered jointly by the three powers, each occupying a sector of the city. Despite the fact that Berlin lies some 110 miles east of the border separating the

Soviet zone of occupation from those of the Western allies, no provision was made at that time to guarantee Western rights of access to the city.

At the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, the three powers agreed to invite France to share in the occupation of postwar Germany and Berlin. When the war in Europe ended, therefore, Germany was divided into four zones of occupation, and Berlin into four occupation sectors. It was agreed that the nation and its capital should be administered as undivided entities by the four powers acting together. Arrangements for ground and air access to Berlin from the Western zones were agreed on orally by Soviet and Western military authorities at the end of June 1945, and were later spelled out in more precise detail.(3)

The occupation zones and sectors were originally thought of as temporary administrative arrangements having no long-term significance. Increasingly sharp disagreements between the USSR and the three Western powers, however, soon led to the breakdown of four-power administrative machinery in Germany and Berlin. In place of a single, united but occupied Germany, there developed in the postwar years two separate German states, the Communist-ruled German Democratic Republic (GDR) in what had been the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), created by the merger of the three zones occupied by the Western powers.

In occupied Berlin, four-power administrative machinery also broke down as the result of the unbridgeable gulf between Soviet policies and those of the Western powers, so that Berlin was split into Soviet-controlled East Berlin and the three allied-occupied sectors that constituted West Berlin. In the period between April 1948 and July 1949, the USSR imposed a blockade on Berlin by blocking Western access via the road, water, and rail routes to West Germany, but they refrained from taking the final step of challenging Western access to the city by air, with the result that the Western powers were able to mount an airlift, which finally forced the USSR to lift the blockade. The agreements reached by the four occupying powers after the Berlin Blockade implicitly confirmed Western rights of access to the city.(4)

In the 1950s the GDR, with Soviet approval, began to stake a claim to East Berlin as its capital and as a legal part of its territory. From time to time, East German spokesmen asserted that West Berlin, too, was part of the territory of the GDR and by rights should be incorporated into it. A particularly bold claim of this kind was made just before the onset of the 1958-59 crisis by Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary and boss of the Communist-controlled Socialist United Party (SED), the dominant political force in the GDR.(5) The Western powers steadfastly resisted claims of this kind, however, insisting on their rights of occupation. When the USSR, in September 1955, transferred to East German authorities responsibility for control of civilian traffic from West Germany to Berlin, the Western powers declared that the USSR was still bound by the wartime agreements on Berlin and could not assign to the GDR the rights and responsibilities that devolved upon the USSR as a result of those agreements.(6) In particular, they insisted that the USSR must

continue to respect their rights of military access to West Berlin via the arterial highways (autobahns), railroads, canals, and air corridors. Reluctantly, the USSR accepted these demands.

Shaped by the occupying powers, the two German states took sharply divergent paths in the fields of political, economic, military, and cultural policies. East Germany, under the rule of the SED, enacted a series of measures designed to create a socialist society on the Soviet model, while West Germany, with help and encouragement from the United States, adopted the economic system of capitalist free enterprise and a democratic political structure. Partly as a result of these policies, West Germany entered a period of rapid economic expansion, with a sharp rise in the economic well-being of the population, while East Germany encountered grave difficulties in its economic policies and was unable to match the prosperity increasingly characteristic of the FRG.

In the competition of the two politico-economic systems, the divided city of Berlin came to play a fateful role. Surrounded by the territory of the East German state but closely linked with West Germany, West Berlin symbolized the economic prosperity and political freedoms of the West in the midst of the state-controlled economy and regimented political system of the East German state. The Western allies, conscious of the symbolic value of West Berlin as an outpost of freedom in Communist-controlled Eastern Europe, lavished funds on its economic growth and deliberately made it a showpiece of capitalist democracy.

From the Soviet and East German standpoint, the material contrast between prosperous West Berlin and the drab Eastern sector of the city was a constant irritant. The situation was really intolerable to the East Germans because West Berlin provided an easy escape route to the West for East Germans dissatisfied by conditions in the GDR and lured by the prospect of steady employment, political rights, and cultural diversity in West Germany.

In 1957 and early 1958, the GDR implemented a series of measures designed to accelerate the socialization of agriculture and industry, measures that resulted in increased curbs on individual rights. The result was a greatly increased flow of population from East to West Germany via West Berlin. By September 1958, the tide was running at the rate of over 10,000 a month, with a cumulative loss to the GDR of over three million inhabitants over a tenyear period. Since young people and professionally trained specialists constituted a high proportion of the migrants, the GDR could not tolerate the loss indefinitely.

The stability and viability of the GDR, in turn, were matters of paramount importance to the USSR, because the USSR maintained in East Germany the twenty divisions that constituted its principal military force in Europe, the guarantee of continued dominance over the empire it had carved out for itself in Europe during the Second World War.

The conflict between the two German states inevitably involved the rival alliance systems headed by the USSR and the United States. After the formal division of Germany, the GDR became a member of the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact organization, while the FRG was incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To counter the military threat to the Western position posed by Soviet armed power and the clandestine rearmament of East Germany, the Western allies step by step lifted for the FRG the restrictions on German rearmament agreed to by the wartime allies at Potsdam in 1945. In December 1957, the NATO Council resolved to station medium-range ballistic missiles in West Germany, as well as nuclear weapons under U.S. control, a move the USSR promptly denounced as a threat to its peace and security.(7)

By 1958. West Berlin had come to represent to the USSR the most acute aspect of a dangerous and threatening situation. The problem of how to remedy the situation was one not easily solved, however, because the United States possessed superior strategic power in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and had repeatedly proclaimed its commitment to the defense of Western occupation rights in West Berlin. U.S. strategic superiority, however, was based in large part on manned heavy bombers, whereas the USSR had devoted special attention to the development of heavy rockets capable of serving as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In October 1957, the USSR startled the world by putting into orbit the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, using a heavy rocket-launcher for the purpose. Soviet spokesmen were quick to point out the military implications of the feat. In November 1958, as part of the buildup surrounding the onset of the first Berlin crisis, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev strongly hinted that Soviet armaments factories were producing ICBMs on a regular basis. (8) The implication he wished to convey was obviously that the USSR had succeeded in overcoming U.S. strategic superiority, or was likely to do so in the near future. Like much else in Khrushchev's policies, however, this implication was based on a bluff: having developed the prototype rocket launcher used to put Sputnik I into orbit, Soviet planners had decided to avoid the heavy expenditures that would have been needed to achieve largescale production of the ICBMs, and were in fact producing only a small number of the new weapons. (9)

Khrushchev's bluff was not fully exposed until September 1961, when reliable new information on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs became available to the United States through reconnaissance satellites. Top leaders in the United States had been aware of the hollowness of Khrushchev's claims well before September 1961, however, thanks in large part to photographic evidence obtained by the high-level U-2 flights over Soviet territory inaugurated in 1956. But the United States maintained official secrecy with regard to these flights until they were inadvertently exposed in May 1960, when the USSR finally succeeded in bringing one down. U.S. leaders could not, therefore, counter Khrushchev's claims convincingly, with the result that public opinion in the West tended to take the Soviet leader's boast seriously, a situation Khrushchev exploited to Soviet advantage.

The international context within which the first Berlin crisis developed was therefore a highly complex one, in which real Western strength and illusory

Soviet claims competed on apparently equal terms. Khrushchev and his colleagues were undoubtedly well aware of the real strategic balance, but they had compelling reasons to try to effect a change in the status of West Berlin by challenging Western rights in the city. It was this action that precipitated the crisis of 1958-59.

Major participants in the 1958-59 crisis and their relationships

Before taking up a detailed analysis of the 1958-59, crisis, it will be useful to make a few observations about the principal participants in the crisis and their relationships.

The USSR and the German Democratic Republic. On the Soviet side, the major actors were the USSR and its client state, the GDR. Vastly unequal in size, resources, and power though they were, the relationship between the two was not simply one of Soviet dominance and GDR subservience. The point is well made by a British historian of the Berlin crises: "It is important not to ignore the part played by the East German government throughout the crisis. It has, within its limited room of maneuver, shown remarkable ingenuity and tenacity in persuading the Soviet Union to accept its own objectives." (10) Well aware of the high stakes the USSR had invested in East Germany, GDR leader Walter Ulbricht was able on occasion to act with great boldness and even seeming recklessness, secure in the knowledge that in the final analysis the USSR could not afford to disavow him.

One reason Ulbricht was able to wield an influence on Soviet policy disproportionate to the size and importance of the GDR was that the Soviet leadership was by no means unified in its objectives. Bold and risky statements or actions by Ulbricht might therefore on occasion find tacit support from individuals or factions in the Soviet leadership that favored a high-rank Soviet foreign policy.

The split in the Soviet leadership was the direct result of recent developments in the evolution of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In June 1957, Khrushchev had won a narrow victory against the so-called "anti-perty group," a coalition headed by former Chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgi Malenkov and former First Deputy Chairmen Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, with support from a number of other high-ranking figures in the Presidium.(11) Khrushchev's victory was achieved in part thanks to support from tactical allies who had no real liking for him or his policies, internal as well as foreign, and who presented an increasingly serious challenge to his dominance after June 1957. This situation added an additional element of bluff to Khrushchev's position as Soviet leader in international affairs: not merely was he claiming for the USSR strategic power it did not have, but he was claiming for himself a stature that was not justified by the facts. In this instance, however, Khrushchev's bluff was not fully exposed until October 1964, when he was custed as the result of a clandestine conspiracy mounted by

his domestic opponents. Before that date, most Western analysts of Soviet politics were convinced that Khrushchev wielded unchallenged power in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, and Western political leaders in general subscribed to that view.(12)

The discrepancy between Khrushchev's apparent and real power as Soviet leader can be graphically demonstrated by an episode that occurred at the climax of the 1958-59 Berlin crisis, as described by President Dwight Eisenhower. The fact that Eisenhower was one of those who accepted the general view that Khrushchev enjoyed unfettered power makes his account all the more significant. At the conclusion of his visit to the United States, on September 27, 1959, Khrushchev made a major concession by agreeing with Eisenhower that the USSR would join the Western powers in negotiations on Berlin and Germany without imposing any time limit on the negotiations, a concession Eisenhower regarded as of vital importance. Having taken this step, however, Khrushchev manifested unmistakable signs of nervousness in communicating it to his principal aides at the talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Mikhail Menshikov. If Eisenhower's view of Khrushchev's power had been accurate, Gromyko and Menshikov should have been no more than employees required in line of duty to carry out without question any decisions reached by Khrushchev.

Even more striking is the fact that Khrushchev then asked Eisenhower to permit him to disclose the Soviet-U.S. agreement not in the form of a joint communique issued immediately after the talks, but separately, after he had returned to Moscow and had had an opportunity "to explain to the members of his own government the reasons that led him to his decision."(13) Khrushchev thus demonstrated that he was not entirely a free agent in determining Soviet foreign policy, and that a decision modifying a major Soviet foreign policy objective required the consent of his colleagues in the collective leadership.

China. Though not directly involved in the Berlin crises, the People's Republic of China (PRC) played a significant role in shaping Soviet foreign policy in the period 1958-61. Formally, in both the 1958-59 and 1961 crises, the PRC supported Soviet policy, but during this period its leaders grew increasingly critical of what they saw as Khrushchev's tendency to seek an accommodation with the United States. (Needless to say, numerous other issues were involved in Chinese Communist criticism of Soviet policies in the Khrushchev era.)

It was during the period of 1958-61 that the split between Moscow and Peking, which had deep historical roots, first became manifest. The Sino-Soviet split had a notable effect on the divisions in the Soviet leadership, polarizing it into a pro-Peking and pro-Western factions. Thus, another element of bluff was added to Soviet foreign policy during this period, since the publicly proclaimed unity between the two principal Communist states masked their increasingly divergent views on a whole range of problems, including foreign policy.(14)

Poland. A minor but not unimportant part in the genesis and development of the Berlin crises was played by Poland. Postwar Poland, which had received sizable accessions of territory at Germany's expense in 1945, felt seriously threatened by West German rearmament, membership in NATO, and possible access to U.S. missiles and nuclear weapons, since a rearmed and resurgent West Germany might one day decide to use its new-found military power to try to recapture its lost eastern territories. To guard against this danger, in October 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, including the two German states (the so-called "Rapacki Plan"), a suggestion for which Soviet spokesmen promptly voiced support, but which the Western powers refused to accept, with the result that the plan was moribund well before the onset of the 1958-59 crisis.(15)

More immediately germane to the subject of the present paper is the fact that it was at a meeting of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society in Moscow that Khrushchev delivered the speech of November 10, 1958, which marked the opening of the 1958-59 crisis. It has been argued that in demanding a major change in the situation in Berlin on that occasion, Khrushchev was responding in part to Polish fears and pressures. (16)

The Western alliance. Dominating the Western alliance was the United States, with the United Kingdom as its closest partner, France as a more distant ally, and a number of smaller states as members of NATO. Rapidly gaining in power, prestige, and international stature was the Federal Republic of Germany, since 1954 a member of NATO and a principal contributor to its military strength, with eight divisions under arms.

Within the Western alliance, there were marked differences of opinion over the policy to be pursued in the Berlin crises. The British, led by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, consistently favored negotiations, preferably at the level of heads of state, and deprecated the actual or threatened use of force. The French, under President Charles de Gaulle, were far less optimistic about the prospects of negotiations with the USSR, and tended to see merit in the use of limited force to defend Western rights in Berlin.

The West German republic maintained close links with France and shared its views on Berlin, but its policies in the Berlin crises were marked by a perceptible though never fully acknowledged inconsistency: On the other hand the FRG, under the aging but indomitable Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, was unalterably opposed to any change in the status of West Berlin that might weaken its ties to West Germany; on the other hand, the FRG leadership feared that the use of force by the Western powers in defense of their rights in West Berlin might escalate into a war that would inevitably be fought on German territory and in which countless German lives would be lost.(17) Adenauer therefore advocated an unyielding Western posture in Berlin, but shrank from calling for any substantive actions to back up Western firmness. Less inhibited in his attitude toward the use of limited force by the Western powers was the socialist mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, a vigorous and

outspoken personality, who made a number of significant contributions to the shaping of Western policy in the Berlin crises.

The United States. Within the United States, there were diverse and conflicting views among policymakers in the government and armed forces. The first Berlin crisis occurred at a time when a historical phase of U.S. foreign policy, then dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was drawing to a close. In part this was because of the rapid advance of the fatal illness (cancer) that claimed his life in May 1959. In large part, however, it reflected the increasing sterility and even bankruptcy of the policies with which Dulles was most closely identified, especially the policy of opposing to the threat of Soviet aggression the counterthreat of "massive retaliation," that is, an all-out attack on the USSR with U.S. strategic air power employing nuclear weapons. Originally formulated in 1954, the doctrine of massive retaliation had become increasingly suspect. By 1957, even Dulles himself was beginning to cast about for some alternative strategy that would possess greater plausibility and that would lend a greater degree of flexibility to U.S. policy.(18)

Basically, however, Dulles remained committed to the doctrine of "massive retaliation" to the end of his life. Shortly before his death, he told a friend, William J. McComber, Jr., "Never forget, Bill, that if the United States is willing to go to war over Berlin—there won't be any war over Berlin."(19)

Dulles's policies enjoyed the unfailing support of President Eisenhower, who not only admired Dulles as a statesman, but found him eminently compatible as a friend and adviser. Eisenhower was not, however, simply a mouthpiece for Dulles's views, without substantive ideas of his own. Increasingly, as Dulles's illness reduced his capacity to provide leadership in U.S. foreign policy, Eisenhower began to strike out on his own, and after Dulles's death, Eisenhower took a number of steps of which Dulles would certainly have disapproved, most notably the invitation to Khrushchev to visit the United States, which Eisenhower extended in July, two months after Dulles's death.

Despite its increasing vulnerability to criticism, the doctrine of massive retaliation continued to enjoy the support of the Eisenhower administration throughout the 1958-59 crisis. An important corollary of the doctrine, to which the Eisenhower administration also subscribed, was avoidance of the use of force on a limited scale for limited objectives. In part, as Morton Halperin and others have pointed out, this attitude was a result of a general American disinclination to engage in limited wars. (20) To a large degree, however, it was based on fiscal considerations: Eisenhower placed a high value on maintaining the fiscal stability of the federal government, feared the unsettling effect an accelerated arms race would have on the budget, and he therefore diligently curbed any tendency to use force in ways that might escalate into a larger conflict. (21)

Within the U.S. military establishment, the doctrine of massive retaliation

was subjected to the most searching criticism. Defense Secretary Neil McElroy and General Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went along with the administration's fiscal limitations on the armed forces budget, but the Army chief of staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, was openly critical of the doctrine of massive retaliation and its corollary, the avoidance of the use of limited force. Summing up his critique, Taylor developed a doctrine known as "flexible response"—the development of a broad range of military capabilities, including conventional weapons, which would enable U.S. policy-makers to choose the kind and degree of force appropriate to a given situation, rather than being limited, as they increasingly found themselves with the doctrine of massive retaliation, to a choice between threats of all-out war or acquiescence to Soviet demands. (22)

A vocal and outspoken critic of U.S. military and foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration, Taylor became a major influence on the making of policy in the Kennedy administration, which accepted his principle of flexible response as the basis for its program of arms buildup and diversification, and which put into effect some of his recommendations, including the use of limited force to achieve specific ends.

The effect of Dulles's illness and death

The increasingly serious illness of Dulles in the period from December 1958 to April 1959 made it more and more difficult for him to exercise leadership in U.S. foreign policy, and his death in May 1959 left the United States temporarily without a strong figure in foreign policy formulation. Christian Herter, who succeeded Dulles as Secretary of State, never achieved the degree of intimacy with Eisenhower that had made Dulles's position so strong, nor did he have the same prestige and influence with U.S. allies.

Sensing an opportunity to display increased British initiative in the Western alliance, Macmillan made a trip to Moscow for bilateral talks with Khrushchev in February and March 1959. These meetings may have helped lessen the danger of overt Soviet-Western conflict by persuading the Soviet leader to agree to holding a conference of foreign ministers preparatory to a summit meeting of heads of state. (23)

In the 1961 crisis, by contrast, U.S. leadership of the Western alliance was not seriously challenged by the British. Macmillan, who was still prime minister, found Kennedy a compatible personality however much he might deplore some American initiatives in foreign policy. In any case, by 1961 the British were forced to recognize that they no longer commanded sufficient power to justify a larger part in the determination of policy for the Western alliance.

The problem of Soviet policy formulation

Throughout this study, hypotheses will be advanced about the struggle for power in the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the effect of that struggle on the formulation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy. In analyzing Soviet policy in the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961, the need to face this problem appears inescapable.

Three explanations for Soviet policy formulation in this period have been advanced by Western analysts. The first, which may be called the traditional view, holds that decisionmaking in the realm of foreign policy was the sole prerogative of Khrushchev, as the result of his occupancy of the top positions in both the party-first secretary-and government-chairman of the Council of Ministers, or premier. In this view, Khrushchev had the power to take, single-handed, foreign policy decisions that were binding on his colleagues in the party Presidium as well as on all subordinate officials and institutions. If Khrushchev was absent from the Kremlin on extended tours (as was frequently the case), his colleagues back home in Moscow pursued as best they could the policy lines laid down by Khrushchev. If sharp zigzags occurred in Soviet foreign policy (this too was frequently the case). the explanation was to be sought either in the vagaries of Khrushchev's own termperment and shifting priorities, or perhaps (and not all followers of the traditional interpretation were willing to make this concession) in some form of institutionalized pressure on him. (24)

Challenging the traditionalists is a "collectivist" school, which sees the formulation of policy in the Khrushchev era as a group process, with the so-called "collective leadership" in the Presidium playing a major role. Even the collectivists, however, subscribe to the view that foreign policy remained the prerogative of Khrushchev, though they are more willing than the traditionalists to make allowance for group pressures on him. (25)

A third approach to the problem which can be characterized as a "radical collectivist" view, is set forth in my book, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, and in a number of shorter writings based on the same concept. (26) This approach, which serves as the basis for the present study, holds that Khrushchev's position was at all times subject to internal pressures and that a continuing struggle for power took place in the USSR in the Khrushchev period. This power struggle had a direct and at times decisive effect on the formulation of foreign as well as domestic policy.

Ideally, perhaps, a study of this kind should present not just one point of view, but all three. Limitations of time and space rule out this procedure. The "radical collectivist" approach will be used throughout this study, but due attention will be paid to other hypotheses where appropriate.

The Berlin Crises of 1958-59

The immediate prelude to the crisis of 1958-59 was a speech by Khrushchev at a meeting of the Soviet-Polish Friendship Society in Moscow on November 10, 1958, in which he demanded that the Western powers give up their occupation rights in West Berlin (which he erroneously attributed to the Potsdam agreement of 1945), "and thus make it possible to create a normal atmosphere in the capital of the German Democratic Republic." The USSR, he said, would "hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic those functions in Berlin which are still wielded by Soviet organs," in other words, responsibility for administration of the city, including control of Western access rights. To back up his demand Khrushchev voiced a threat of force:

If any aggressive forces attack the German Democratic Republic, which is an equal member of the Warsaw Treaty, we will regard this as an attack on the Soviet Union, on all the Warsaw Treaty countries. We shall then rise in defence of the German Democratic Republic and this will mean defence of the vital security interests of the Soviet Union, of the entire socialist camp, and of the cause of world peace. (27)

At the very onset of the crisis, therefore, Khrushchev raised the conflict over Berlin to a test of strength between the USSR and the Western powers, with the threat of force if Soviet demands were not met.

The U.S. decision not to respond to Khrushchev's speech

Three days before Khrushchev's speech, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had reaffirmed the determination of the United States to defend its rights in West Berlin. "We are most solemnly committed," he told a news conference, "to hold West Berlin, if need be by military force."(28) Basic U.S. strategy in Berlin thus continued to be reliance on the U.S. strategic deterrent. Khrushchev's speech on November 10 provided an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to redefine this strategy and to spell out its implications, including avoidance of the use of limited force.

With regard to Khrushchev's speech, Risenhower in his memoirs claims to have "at once recognized the dangerous potential of the Russian declaration," but he promptly decided that no reply was called for. Militarily, in his judgment, "Our forces in the city were token garrisons only. Berlin's actual defense lay only in the West's publicly expressed intention that to defend it we would, if necessary, resort to war." (29) Underlying Eisenhower's decision was the belief that increased expenditures on armaments would endanger the economic stability of the United States. Eisenhower was, in fact, convinced that a major goal of the USSR in precipitating a crisis over Berlin was to

provoke the United States into unnecessary arms outlays. (30)

In addition, Eisenhower thought that "too much eagerness to counter Khrushchev's statement would give the impression that our government was edgy. . . . So, for the moment, we said nothing."(31)

Thus, the U.S. decision not to respond promptly to Khrushchev's November 10 challenge, either verbally or with limited force, was a reasoned one based on a consistent long-term evaluation of U.S-Soviet relations. This is not, of course, to say that the decision was necessarily a wise one; from the standpoint of deterrence strategy, Alexander George and Paul Smoke made the cogent charge that

The administration apparently did not recognize that the <u>absence</u> of an American reaction to the November 10 speech was more likely to have a negative effect on the Kremlin's image of the U.S. than the presence of an appropriate and expectable reaction.(32)

The plane incidents of November 7

Three days before Khrushchev's speech, Soviet fighter planes attacked U.S. recomnaissance planes in two separate incidents, one over the Baltic Sea, the other over the Sea of Japan. The U.S. planes, according to a note sent to the USSR on November 13, "withheld fire and did not in any way menace the Soviet aircraft." (33) Although there is no evidence directly linking the November 7 plane incidents to the Berlin crisis, the correspondence generated as a result of the incidents added a note of tension to U.S.—Soviet relations in the period. Furthermore, the plane incidents provided an opportunity for the United States to draw a line beyond which it would not refrain from the use of force in response to future Soviet attacks, and thus to some extent served as a counterweight to the administration's decision to ignore Khrushchev's challenge to the Western position in Berlin. (34)

The tie-up on the autobahn

On November 14, the USSR took its first overt step toward tightening the noose around West Berlin by detaining three U.S. Army trucks on the autobahn just outside Berlin. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, informed Washington that unless instructed otherwise he intended to send a convoy along the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn as a test. "If the Soviets were to detain it and if protest did not effect 'early release'—within two hours—he planned to extricate the convoy 'by minimum force necessary.'"(35)

In the War Department, meanwhile, General Maxwell Taylor was at work on a contingency plan for the defense of Berlin by conventional means. (36) "U.S. and NATO military planners, however, were overruled by Eisenhower, on the grounds that the proposed action ". . . should first be made known to our allies. To give time for consultations an order was sent temporarily suspending all convoys to Berlin."(37)

The November incident, seen as a probing operation by the USSR, fits neatly into Herman Kahn's "escalation ladder," corresponding to his Rung 7, "'legal harassments'--retortions."(38) If Soviet action was in fact designed to test Western willingness to use force to defend its rights, George and Smoke draw the appropriate deduction: "With hindsight it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Soviet leaders, possibly surprised at the lack of an initial Western reaction, were dipping a second toe in the water."(39)

If the USSR was taking an inclusive view of its relations with the United States, however, the firm tone of the U.S. note of November 13 regarding the November 7 plane incidents should have served as an indication of the limits beyond which it would be dangerous to press the United States. From the very outset, therefore, the Berlin crisis of 1958-59 was circumscribed in its possible ramifications, lending force to Herman Kahn's view that the crisis was "more ostensible than real." (40) Conscious of U.S. strategic superiority, and never completely certain that the United States could be relied on not to use its power, Khrushchev and his colleagues moved cautiously, testing each stage before advancing to the next one and leaving themselves plenty of room for maneuver or retreat if the United States and its allies showed any intention of forcibly resisting Soviet demands. It was at the exploratory stage, probably, that the use of limited force by the Western powers had the best prospects of heading off a full-scale international conflict over Berlin. Yet it would be unrealistic to censure too severely the Western policymakers who ruled out the use of limited force at this point. Until the full extent of the Soviet demands was known, Western leaders felt they must move cautiously, avoiding the twin dangers of panicking or overreacting.

Soviet pressure on West Germany

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a focal point of Khrushchev's attack, was far less complacent about the Soviet threat than was the Eisenhower administration. Two days after Khrushchev's November 10 speech, without awaiting the U.S. response, the West German government warned the USSR against "any unilateral renunciation" of the international agreements on the four-power status of Berlin.(41)

To exert pressure on West Germany, the USSR on November 20 sent its ambassador in Bonn, A.A. Smirnov, to inform Adenauer of their plans. Deeply shaken, Adenauer on the next day sent British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan an urgent message stating that Smirnov had "informed him [Adenauer] brutally

that his government intended 'to liquidate the occupation statutes concerning Berlin.'"(42) Convinced that "the Soviet Union is resolved to make the Berlin question a test for the policy of the free world," Adenauer asked Macmillan to use British influence in Moscow "with a view to drawing the attention of the Soviet government to the fateful consequences of such a decision."(43) In response, Macmillan sent Khrushchev a message on November 22, warning him that "the British government have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based."(44)

With surprising inconsistency, however, the West German government chose just this moment to sign a supplementary trade agreement with the GDR, thus "... inadvertantly confirming [Dulles's] view that one could do business with the East Germans in strictly operational terms without granting them diplomatic recognition." (45)

Thus, in the absence of strong leadership by the United States, other members of the Western alliance were responding to the Soviet challenge in various ways, on an uncoordinated basis. The results, coupled with the U.S. action in halting convoys to Berlin, could only encourage the USSR to take the next step up the escalation ladder. What Eisenhower himself characterizes as a "low-key" announcement on November 21, to the effect that "the United States' firm intentions in West Berlin remain unchanged,"(46) did nothing to alter this perception.

A final stimulus to Soviet boldness, if any were needed, was provided by Dulles at a news conference on November 26, in which he gave a comprehensive analysis of his perception of Soviet goals in Berlin. These Dulles saw as limited:

I think that, at least as far as it is exposed, the motivation at the present time would be not a purpose to drive us out of Berlin or to obstruct access to Berlin, but to try to compel an increased recognition and the according of increased stature to the GDR. (47)

Dulles thus tried to play down the gravity of the situation by imputing limited goals to the Soviet leaders, and he made an effort to meet them halfway by indicating that the United States would be willing to deal with East German authorities as agents of the USSR in supervising Western access to Berlin. As to the possible use of force to defend Western rights, Dulles dismissed the question as "academic," since he saw no indication that the USSR or East Germany intended to impede Western access to Berlin. (48)

Even before the real onset of the crisis, therefore, authoritative U.S. spokesmen had indicated by words and deeds that the United States did not intend to respond by force to the Soviet threat to the Western position in Berlin; that it was prepared to accept a transfer of access controls from Soviet to GDR officials acting as their agents; and that it continued to rely solely on the threat of massive retaliation to defend its position in Berlin.

The Soviet notes of November 27

Seventeen days after Khrushchev's November 10 speech, the USSR formally opened its campaign on Berlin with notes to the three Western allies calling for a change in the status of West Berlin. In the notes, the USSR announced that it regarded as "null and void" the wartime agreements concerning the occupation of Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin; that it intended to transfer its functions under these agreements, including control of Western access rights, to the GDR; that while it preferred to see West Berlin reunited with the eastern sector of the city and established as the capital of the GDR, it was willing to accept a "free city" status for West Berlin, under four-power gurantee and with the possibility of UN support; and that while it would continue to respect Western rights in the city for six months, if the Western powers had failed to accept Soviet demands at the end of that period, it would turn its functions in the city over to the GDR. (49)

Implicit in the notes was the threat of force if the Western powers failed to accept Soviet demands. The onus of initiating the use of force, however, was placed on the Western powers: If they refused to negotiate new access agreements with the GDR or refused to accept the "free city" proposal, it would be they, the Soviet notes asserted, who would thereby reveal their "intention to resort to force and draw the world into a war over Berlin." For its part, the USSR asserted that any aggressive action against the GDR, a signatory to the Warsaw Pact, "will be regarded by all its signatories as an act of aggression against all of them and will immediately result in appropriate retaliation." (50)

The USSR thus made shrewd use of the distinction between force and violence. As George and Smoke point out:

With the exception of any air action in the corridors, Moscow needed only to close off Berlin forcibly, then passively wait for the West to resort to violence to reopen them. In the fifteen-year protracted conflict over Berlin the West thus constantly had to wrestle with the fact that, while strategically, legally, and morally it was the defensive power there, tactically it had to be the offensive one. (51)

By its notes of November 27, the USSR presented a series of nonnegotiable demands to the Western powers involving the surrender of their rights in West Berlin, under a six-month deadline and with the implied military power of the USSR and its allies to back up the demands. The notes thus raised the struggle over Berlin to the level of a test of strength between the USSR and the Western alliance. Soviet strategy in the crisis, as George and Smoke point out, was based on the implied allegation—erroneous, as both the Soviet leaders and those of the United States knew—that the USSR enjoyed not merely local military superiority in Berlin but strategic superiority over the United States and its allies. (52) In this situation, a refusal by the Western powers to use limited force to defend their rights in Berlin could be hailed by Sowiet

spokesmen as proof of their claim to strategic superiority, even though the West's restraint might be, and in fact was, motivated by other considerations entirely. Thus, the West was put in a position from which the only way it could effectively challenge exaggerated and unsubstantiated Soviet claims was to demonstrate a willingness to use limited force, even at the risk of escalating the crisis. In their approach to this dilemma, the two U.S. administrations involved, that of Eisenhower in 1958-59 and John Kennedy in 1961, took diametrically opposed attitudes toward the use of limited force.

The impact of Gecal considerations on U.S. policy

It is frequently assumed by writers on U.S. foreign policy that the Eisenhower administration's decision not to use limited force in the 1958-59 crisis was dictated by conceptions based ultimately on Dulles's foreign policy strategy. (53) An equally potent influence in shaping U.S. views, however, was Eisenhower's determination to maintain fiscal stability and his belief that a major Soviet goal in precipitating the crisis was to force the United States into additional military expenditures that would unbalance the budget. (54) During the opening phase of the 1958-59 crisis, when the USSR was cautiously feeling its way, testing U.S. response before each new step up the escalation ladder, Eisenhower was making a determined effort to keep the lid on a different king of escalation—that of government expenditures, including those for the armed services. Thus, on November 19, Eisenhower instructed all heads of federal departments and agencies to live within the reduced budgets assigned to them for fiscal 1960, beginning in July 1959. (55)

In pursuit of this policy, Eisenhower invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the armed forces service secretaries to a stag dinner at the White House on December 3, at which Treasury Secretary Clinton Anderson delivered "a very able statement concerning the importance of a balanced budget and a stable dollar."(56) Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, while accepting the established monetary ceiling on the defense budget, argued that even within that limitation the country was not getting "the most defense for our money." His effort was unavailing, however: "In the end the 1960 budget followed the same pattern as the former ones."(57) At year's end, Hanson W. Baldwin, the New York Times' military specialist, reported that "cut-back, scale-down and cancellation are the order of the day" in the armed forces.(58)

It was to critics like Taylor and Baldwin that Eisenhower was addressing himself when he defended his decision against the use of limited force in Berlin at the outset of the 1958-59 crisis on the grounds of fiscal stability. Thus, the deliberate decision by the Eisenhower administration not to use limited force in the opening phase of the crisis was shaped primarily by fiscal considerations based on a long-term view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, in the context of which the tension over Berlin was regarded as a factor of temporary and secondary importance. Instead of U.S. policy in the crisis being dictated primarily by the foreign policy views of Dulles, it would be more accurate to say that Dulles's policies were tailored to fit within the restraints

imposed by the fiscal policies of Eisenhower and Anderson, just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the defense service chiefs were expected to carry out their functions within the restraints dictated by the budgetary limitations imposed by Eisenhower and Anderson. (59)

The impact of domestic politics on Soviet policy

At a time when the policies of the United States were being strongly influenced by domestic considerations, the foreign policy of the USSR was being shaped in part by alterations in the power relationships within the ruling Communist party and the Soviet government. Just as the USSR was making the opening moves in its Berlin campaign of late 1958, a major shift occurred in Khrushchev's position within the ruling presidium, which altered his personal priorities and goals in a way that had a direct bearing on the outcome of the crisis.

In November 1958, when tension over Berlin was just beginning to build, Khrushchev had still not fully won his struggle against the "anti-party group," which had tried to unseat him in June 1957. At that time, only the three ringleaders in the anti-Krushchev coalition--Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich-had been expelled from the Presidium, leaving a number of others in the Presidium who had supported the "anti-party group," but whose opposition to Khrushchev was not publicly disclosed at that time. One of these still undisclosed opponents of Khrushchev was Nikolai A. Bulganin, who had held the post of Soviet premier from February 1955 until March 1958, when he yielded it to Khrushchev. He retained his seat on the Presidium until September 1958. Even at that late date, however, he still balked at publicly admitting his support for the anti-Khrushchev coalition in 1957. It was not until December 18, 1958, at a plenum of the party Central Committee, that Bulganin finally confessed to his part in the "anti-party conspiracy." (60) The unmasking of Bulganin, a major triumph for Khrushchev, came shortly after a momentous change in the Soviet government. On December 9, control of the secret police (KGB, Committee for State Security) was taken from General Ivan A. Serov, a long-time associate of Khrushchev and a veteran secret police official; two weeks later it was announced that the vacant post had been assigned to Alexander N. Shelepin, a party functionary whose career had been meinly in the Soviet youth organization (Komsomol), in which capacity he had provided valuable support for Khrushchev before and after the June 1957 showdown. (61)

The appointment of Shelepin and the unmasking of Bulganin were accompanied by a third event that bears the unmistakable imprint of Khrushchev's style. On December 17, the Soviet government abruptly and without the usual diplomatic formalities requested a U.S. visa for Soviet Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, generally regarded as a close associate of Khrushchev. (62) Mikoyan's visit to the United States, which took place in January 1959, proved to be the opening move in an ultimately successful campaign by Khrushchev to obtain an invitation to visit the United States himself. His efforts to achieve this

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goal ran parallel with and at times intersected the Soviet campaign on Berlin, adding a note of complexity to Soviet policy and in the end decisively affecting Soviet strategy in the crisis.

Development of the Sino-Soviet conflict

Khrushchev's sudden decision to angle for an invitation to visit the United States must be seen in the light of the growing tension between the Soviet leadership and the Chinese Communists. The conflict between Moscow and Peking played a major role in shaping Khrushchev's policies toward the United States, and thus constituted one of the determining factors in the Berlin crises.

A turning point in the Sino-Soviet conflict was Khrushchev's decision not to honor a secret Soviet-Chinese agreement of October 1957, under which the USSR was obligated to provide China with assistance in the development of an atomic bomb. Although the breaching of the 1957 agreement was not publicly disclosed until 1963, it was implied in Khrushchev's opening speech to the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU on January 27, 1959, when he called for the establishment of a nuclear-free "zone of peace" in the Far East. (63)

Another factor in cooling Soviet-Chinese amity was the challenge to Soviet doctrinal supremacy offered by Chinese development of the so-called people's communes in the summer of 1958, and the claims made by the Chinese that they had hit on a short-cut to the building of a socialist society, which had eluded the Soviet Communists. It was in part because of the need to rebut this challenge that the USSR decided to stage a special party congress, the Twenty-first, in order to re-establish Soviet claims to doctrinal supremacy.(64)

The tendency toward an estrangement between Moscow and Peking helped exacerbate existing conflicts in the Soviet leadership and thereby introduced an element of ambiguity and uncertainty into the formulation of Soviet policy. Khrushchev, increasingly critical of the Chinese, hesitated between two opposite lines for Soviet policy toward the United States: on the one hand, he felt the need for a resounding symbolic victory over the United States that would validate his handling of Soviet foreign policy, solidify his internal position, and permit him to redirect Soviet investment priorities away from armaments and heavy industry toward agriculture, consumer goods, and the chemical industry; on the other hand, he was attracted by the prospect of a deal with the United States that would reduce tensions and allow the USSR to lower its expenditures for defense.

The leaders of the internal opposition, of whom Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov are the most readily identifiable, maintained unremitting pressure on Khrushchev to adopt a hostile stance toward the United States and its allies and to moderate or end entirely the escalating conflict with Peking. (65) Sharing the views of the internal opposition were several officials who helped

shape Soviet policy during the Berlin crises, notably Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov.(66) Much of the Soviet hard line on Berlin in the period 1958-59 can be attributed directly to Gromyko, who was a far from negligible factor in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, contrary to the views of Eisenhower and others who regarded him as a mere mouthpiece of Khrushchev's policies.(67)

Further Soviet warnings against Western use of force

On December 11, 1958, the Soviet news agency TASS issued a statement warning that

'any attempt to force a way into Berlin' by a Western military column would be regarded as 'an attack on the German Democratic Government' which would bring the Warsaw Pact into action and lead to a 'military conflict', the extension of which into a general war involving 'the most modern means of annihilation including nuclear and rocket weapons! it would be 'hardly possible to avoid.'

Two weeks later Gromkyo repeated the warning. (68)

The TASS statement was no doubt issued in response to a flurry of Western press reports that the United States and NATO planned to send an armed truck convoy over the autobahn to West Berlin in order to test Soviet intentions and emphasize Western determination to remain in the city. (69)

In the face of the top-level U.S. decision early in the crisis not to use limited force, however, Western military commanders had not merely to sidetrack their contingency plans but to play down even those actions that might have been interpreted by Soviet leaders as meaningful displays of limited force. Thus, when the U.S. garrison in West Berlin was reinforced by six M-59 armored personnel carriers toward the end of December 1958,

The army attempted to play down the shipment by asserting that it had no connection with the Soviet demand that the Americans, British, and French get out of Berlin. The [army] spokesman said that the shipment had been planned for several months. (70)

The Eisenhower strategic plan

Toward the end of January 1959, Eisenhower convened a meeting of Defense and State Department officials to discuss the Berlin situation. By this time the general outlines of the Soviet position had been clarified, though no essential modifications had been introduced into the position announced in

the notes of November 27. Mikoyan, after his visit to the United States, had indicated some flexibility in his six-month deadline for Western acquiescence in the demand for "open city" status for West Berlin, (71) and the details of the Soviet position had been drawn more precisely in a draft peace treaty with the GDR. They produced the draft treaty on January 10, together with a note restating their position. (72) These documents indicated no letup in Soviet pressure to force the Western powers out of Berlin, with or without a six-month deadline.

By late January 1959, therefore, the Eisenhower administration realized more fully than it had at the outset of the crisis that the Soviet challenge was not merely to the precarious Western position in Berlin, but extended to the entire strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States, and that the administration must therefore draw up equally comprehensive plans to meet the Soviet challenge with all available means, including the use of force. In Eisenhower's words.

To show the Soviets that we meant business, the Chiefs of Staff were instructed to send sufficient replacements to Europe to fill out the rosters of all our military units. This routine movement of replacements would be done quietly but quickly; it was certain that the Soviets would detect the movements and would probably interpret them correctly as evidence of our determination. (73)

At this point, however, a serious difference of opinion emerged between Dulles and the military chiefs. Dulles, convinced of the need to marshal the forces of world public opinion in support of Western rights in Berlin, felt it was still too early to sanction the limited use of force. Eisenhower supported Dulles, but on military grounds, considering that "one division was far too weak to fight its way through to Berlin and far more than necessary to be a mere show of force or evidence of determination." (74)

By the time of the meeting in late January, however, Eisenhower was no longer as reluctant to use limited force as he had been earlier, and the meeting thus resulted in a distinct hardening of U.S. policy, reflected in a six-point plan, which Eisenhower describes as follows:

The plan, as I approved it at this meeting, included these steps: (a) A refusal to acquiesce in any substitution of East Germans for Soviet officials in checking the Western occupying powers' movement to and from Berlin. . . (b) A decision to begin quiet military preparations in West Germany and Berlin prior to May 27, sufficient to be detected by Soviet intelligence but not sufficient to create public alarm; (c) Should there be any substitution of East German officials for Soviets, a small convoy with armed protection would attempt to get through, and if this convoy were stopped; the effects [sic: error for effort?] would be discontinued and the probe would fire only if fired upon; (d) Transit would then be suspended and pressure

would be brought to bear on the Soviets by publicizing the blockade and taking the matter to the UN Security Council and, if
necessary, to the General Assembly. In these circumstances our
further military preparations would be intensified by observable
means such as the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin and
possibly from all Germany; (e) In the event that this moral and
other pressure was not sufficient, use of additional force would
be subject to governmental decision; (f) We would at once attempt
to bring about a foreign ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union
to be held about the middle of April.(75)

In effect, then, the late January plan outlined a series of graduated steps up the escalation ladder in which the use of limited force would be sanctioned, but carefully circumscribed with safeguards to ensure against too rapid or uncontrolled an escalation, and with due attention to Dulles's insistence on the need to educate world public opinion as to the basic issues in the conflict underlying the apparently minor superficial technicalities.

The February 2 autobahn tie-up and the U.S. response

The hardened U.S. position was almost immediately reflected in a firmer U.S. response to a new Soviet challenge. On February 2, the USSR caused a tie-up on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn by demanding, for the first time, the right to inspect the contents of a U.S. military convoy. When the non-commissioned officer in charge of the convoy refused, the Soviet troops forcibly detained the convoy. In accordance with the plan drawn up at the late January meeting, the United States thereupon sent the USSR a stiff note characterizing the Soviet action as "a clear violation of the United States' right of access to Berlin," and calling on the Soviet government not only to permit the convoy to proceed unchecked, but "to ensure against a repetition of the incident." (76) To dramatize the incident and emphasize U.S. firmness, Eisenhower called a special press conference, at which he repeated the U.S. charge. Soviet response was quick: "Three and one half hours after the American note was delivered in Moscow the convoy was released." (77)

In addition to its significance as a test of the new U.S. policy of firmness, the convoy incident brought into the open a serious divergence between U.S. and British policy. Faced by a similar Soviet demand for inspection of a military convoy, British authorities promptly complied. (78) That this difference at the local level reflected real differences at the top was made plain when Dulles conferred with Macmillan in London on February 4. Informed by Dulles of the substance of the late January meeting and its decisions, Macmillan interpreted the report to mean that Dulles had "completely abandoned" earlier U.S. contingency plans for the use of limited but substantial force in probing operation on the autobahn to Berlin. (79)

Macmillan's trip to the Soviet Union

Critical of what he regarded as excessive U.S. willingness to contemplate the use of force, and apprehensive lest the unresolved crisis over Berlin suddenly escalate into a more serious conflict, Macmillan made a bold bid in mid-January for his own and British leadership of the Western alliance by proposing that he and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd go to Moscow in an effort to steer the crisis away from the danger of military confrontation and toward negotiation.

Macmillan first informed Washington of his intention to visit the USSR on January 20, and received a warm and prompt response, the Americans expressing "complete confidence" in the British leader. (80) The visit was formally announced on February 5, and opened with Macmillan's arrival in Moscow on February 21.

Although approved in advance by the Americans, Macmillan's trip disclosed new differences of opinion within the Western alliance. When Dulles paid a visit to French President Charles de Gaulle after leaving London, he found the French leader unenthusiastic about the proposed trip, which he feared would encourage the Soviet leaders to believe the Western powers were eager to open negotiations before expiration of the six-month deadline imposed by the USSR.(81) Remembering the fateful role played in the genesis of World War II by French failure to oppose by force Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, de Gaulle, in Fisenhower's words, "seemed to be prepared to use force a little more suddenly than we felt advisable."(82)

In his talks with de Gaulle, Dulles admitted there was a possibility that war might come if Khrushchev acted rashly, but he said the United States considered retention of its rights in West Berlin to be vital; efforts to negotiate with the Soviet leader were therefore essential in order to avert disaster.(83) Before he left France, Dulles explained to senior American officials there his plan for a "political offensive" against the Communists in East Germany designed to recapture the initiative for the Western alliance and to make more effective use of the attractive power which West Germany had demonstrated in relation to the population of the GDR. As the ultimate payoff for such an "offensive," Dulles saw the weakening of Communist controls in the GDR and the undermining of Soviet power in Europe. (84) Surprisingly, Dulles seems not to have realized that East Germany and the USSR would not sit idly by while their position in East Germany was being weakened by a massive population flow from East to West Germany. In a sense, Dulles's "political offensive" succeeded all too well: By encouraging East Germans to flee to the West, it forced the GDR leaders to demand action by Moscow to protect their own interests and those of the USSR. There is thus a direct connection between Dulles's conception of West Germany as a "magnet" acting on East Germany and the Soviet campaign to force the Western powers out of West Berlin in order to end its availability as an escape route for dissatisifed citizens of the GDR.

Opening moves toward Khrushchev's visit to the United States

Unbeknownst to the British, the movement toward high-level, bilateral Soviet-Western contacts was already under way by the time Macmillan formed his plan for visiting Moscow. The first indirect indication that Khrushchev had developed a yearning to see the United States was the abrupt Soviet request for a visa for Mikoyan on December 17, 1956. In retrospect it can be seen that one of the principal purposes of Mikoyan's trip was to spy out the land and, if the auguries were favorable, lay the groundwork for a trip to the United States by Khrushchev.

Evidently, the report Mikoyan gave Khrushchev on his return was encouraging, for in his final speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress on February 5, Khrushchev pointedly raised the subject of his possible visit to the United States. At a press conference on January 28, Khrushchev complained, Eisenhower had ruled out the possibility that the United States would grant him a visa, as it had done for Mikoyan. Rather unconvincingly, Khrushchev protested that he was not actually interested in visiting the United States, but was simply pained by the unequal standard being applied to him. He then went on to extend a broadly formulated invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR.(85)

Eisenhower lost no time in rebuffing this feeler: On the day after Khrushchev's speech, White House press secretary Jim Hagerty announced that Eisenhower had no plans to visit the USSR, especially in view of the rather roundabout way in which the invitation had been extended. (%) The statement nevertheless "left the door open in [the] event future developments would suggest a visit to the USSR in the cause of peace." (%) As to the possibility of Khrushchev's visiting the United States, the statement on February 6 ignored it completely, just as Eisenhower did when the subject came up at his February 10 press conference. (%) For the moment, therefore, Khrushchev's wish had been frustrated, but he had planted a seed in the minds of Eisenhower and his advisers that would eventually germinate.

The trawler incidents

Rapid and unimpeded cable communications between Washington and the Western capitals—London, Paris, and Bonn—was an essential requirement for maintenance of a working unity within the alliance. It was therefore a matter of considerable concern when a Soviet trawler, the Novorossiisk, was discovered engaged in deep-water grappling operations in an area where a series of breaks in the transatlantic cables had been occurring. On February 26, after several incidents in the period February 21-25, the U.S. Navy put a boarding party onto the Novorossiisk to investigate whether its crew had violated the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, to which the USSR was a party, and two days later the United States sent the USSR a cool but firm aide memoire reporting the Navy's action. (89)

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In its reply of March 4, the Soviet government protested the U.S. action and asserted that information in its possession showed that the Novorossiisk had "caused no damage of any kind" to the transatlantic cables. The note then went on to charge that "the detention of the Soviet trawler was undertaken with provocative purposes," including "an attempt to strain Soviet-American relations." (90)

The incident was formally closed with a U.S. note of March 23 rejecting the Soviet protest and setting forth the facts in the case as reported by U.S. naval personnel, which it charged added up to "a strong presumption" that the Novorossiisk had in fact violated the 1884 Convention. The note concluded with the taciturn warning that the U.S. government "will continue to fulfill its international obligations with regard to the protection of submarine cables." (91)

The agreement to hold a conference of foreign ministers

It was a long-standing policy of Eisenhower to refuse to attend a summit meeting until a working-level conference of foreign ministers had made substantial progress toward the settlement of outstanding international problems, including Berlin. An invitation to attend a foreign ministers conference was presented in a note from the United States to the USSR on February 16, 1959, together with the laconic warning that the Western powers "reserve the right to uphold by all appropriate means their communications with their sectors of Berlin." (92)

The British tended to regard U.S. insistence on successful preparatory work at the foreign ministers' level as an unnecessary complication. Strongly convinced that only Khrushchev could negotiate meaningfully for the USSR, Macmillan considered the American position a regrettable and time-consuming formality. Unwilling to challenge the American position head-on, however, Macmillan in his talks with Khrushchev in Moscow spoke in favor of a conference of foreign ministers, but with the clear implication that he really favored the convocation of a summit meeting. Since there was a meeting of minds with the Soviet leader on this point, it is not surprising that the USSR in a note to the Western powers on March 2 accepted the U.S. proposal for a foreign ministers' conference. Balancing this concession, however, was an insistence that the agenda of the proposed conference conform to the position taken by the USSR in its November 27 deadline note and subsequent statements, including acceptance of the "free city" status for Berlin and the conclusion of a German peace treaty. In an apparent concession, however, the note relaxed the sixmonth deadline by suggesting that the conference should meet in April and should last "not more than two or three months." (93) Like earlier Soviet communications, the March 2 note contained a strong warning against the use of force by the Western powers.

A different approach was reflected in the Soviet-British joint communique issued the following day at the conclusion of Macmillan's visit to Moscow. At British request, this document included a reference to the possibility of "some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection." (94) Like the Rapacki Plan which it resembled, this aspiration was doomed to remain unfulfilled.

Renewed debate in the United States over the limited use of force

Despite Eisenhower's efforts early in the 1958-59 crisis to exclude the use of limited force in Berlin, the problem refused to go away. At a press conference on February 25, Eisenhower spoke of undefined "plans" for defending Berlin, implying that the Western powers had some undisclosed alternative to "massive retaliation."(95) On March 5, however, Secretary of Defense McElroy, in rejecting the army's request for an increase of conventional forces, declared that it would be impossible to limit a war over Berlin, and raised the spector of a preventive war by the West if the USSR was perceived to be preparing an attack.(96)

In a March 7 Seturday Evening Post article, former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson urged the administration not only to prepare contingency plans
for the defense of Berlin, which he characterized as crucial to the Western
position in Europe, but also to mobilize the army and initiate a crash program
for the production of ICHMs, in order to head off an anticipated Soviet lead. (97)

In an effort to clarify the administration's position on the use of limited force, Eisenhower held several meetings with congressional leaders on March 6, at which he endeavored to convince the doubters that the administration's policy of reducing the armed forces by 30,000 men "in the midst of a critical period" was sound from the long-range point of view. Eisenhower admitted that war might result if the administration was "miscalculating," but he assured the congressional representatives that even in that case the United States "had the courage and the means to follow through successfully." He ruled out completely any effort to match Soviet forces in central Europe, and said nothing about the use of limited force to defend West Berlin. (98)

Still the critics of the administration refused to be silent, and at a press conference on March 11, Eisenhower made another attempt to explain his position, prompting Morton Halperin to remark,

defend local areas by strategic retaliatory threats was most in evidence. The Eisenhower administration, in effect, seemed to rule out the possibility of defending Berlin by ground action. (99)

Considerations of budgetary restraint still, as earlier in the crisis, underlay Eisenhower's opposition to the use of limited force; the New York Times

reported his position as being that "even if Congress appropriates increases for conventional forces he would not expend the appropriations." (100)

The subject came up again at a press conference on March 12, where Eisenhower said, "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe. What good would it do to send a few more thousand or indeed even a few divisions of troops to Europe?" But when asked directly if the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend West Berlin, Eisenhower hedged, finally admitting that, in his words, "Destruction is not a good police force."(101)

Dissatisfaction with the administration's policies was not slow to appear, both in the Pentagon, where General Taylor voiced approval of Acheson's call for the strengthening of conventional forces, and at NATO headquarters, where General Norstad asked for supplemental forces to meet the "deadline crisis." (102)

In a renewed attempt to calm the mounting storm, Eisenhower delivered a television address to the American people on March 16, providing a full-scale review of U.S. policy and its long-term goals. Once again he reaffirmed U.S. determination to maintain its links with West Berlin, but he ruled out any move to strengthen U.S. conventional forces, claiming that existing U.S. strategic power gave the nation the capacity "to rapidly apply necessary force to any area of trouble." (103)

Counterbalancing this strong emphasis on U.S. strategic power, Eisenhower stressed the administration's willingness to negotiate with the USSR, both at the foreign ministers' level and at the summit. It was the latter component of the speech, far more than the emphasis on U.S. military power, that caught the public mood of the moment. The Berlin crisis was about to enter a phase of negotiations, in which the actual employment or threat of force would seem out of place. Before agreement was reached on negotiations, however, there was a last flare-up of tension.

The high-altitude plane incidents

Just as the USSR and the Western powers were slowly moving toward an agreement to hold a conference of foreign ministers on the Berlin question a new source of conflict was injected into Soviet-Western relations. Schick provides a concise summary of the problem:

On March 27 American transport aircraft flew above the customary 10,000 foot level for Berlin air corridor traffic. The State Department stated that the particular type of aircraft involved operated most efficiently above 10,000 feet. The aircraft, the Lockheed Hercules C-130 transport, had a capacity for carrying 20 tons of cargo. . . Actually, the Pentagon wanted to test Soviet

reactions to the possibility of an airlift using aircraft that could double the supply tonnage to the garrisons and population of West Berlin. The flight also demonstrated that an airlift from French bases could be used in another blockade.

Soviet fighter aircraft buzzed the transport in the corridors. This action, in turn, provided the administration with an opportunity prior to a blockade to state: 'The United States never has recognized and does not recognize any limitation to the right to fly at any altitude in the corridors'... The administration made its point in a unilateral test without acquiring the consent of the British or other allies, who considered the test provocative.(104)

Predictably, the USSR protested the flights on April 1, and two days later Soviet fighter planes buzzed U.S. planes in the air corridor.(105) On April 4, the USSR sent a further note, suggesting that the United States was attempting to sabotage the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers.(106)

Rejecting the Soviet protest on April 13, the United States repeated its high-altitude flights on April 15, this time from a base in northeast France. Despite renewed Soviet buzzing, the operation was carried through successfully. The flights, in Schick's words, "served to indicate that the United States probably would resort to an airlift, if necessary."(107) The net effect of the flights was to arm the Western powers with a new technical capability and thereby to strengthen their negotiating position at the conference of foreign ministers.(108) They also confirmed the U.S. position that no technical limitations could be imposed by the USSR on Western flights to Berlin.

Preparing for the Geneva conference

When the three Western ambassadors in Moscow presented the Western notes of March 26 proposing a conference of foreign ministers to meet in Geneva on April 11, they added a suggestion that unilateral actions by any of the four powers in the period of preparation for the conference should be avoided.(109) The USSR seized on the suggestion as the basis for a challenge to current Western military preparations. In a note of April 21, Moscow charged that the United States was

. . . undertaking measures in order to push the nuclear and rocket armament of certain states participants in the North Atlantic bloc, to speed up the implementation of plans for stationing its rocket bases on the territories of these countries.(110)

As evidence of its charges, the Soviet note cited a recently concluded agreement for the stationing of U.S. rockets in Italy and the preparation of similar agreements with Greece, Turkey, and West Germany.(111) The Soviet note saw in these steps an attempt

. . . to confront the forthcoming conference with accomplished

facts in order to bring to naught the possibilities of achieving agreements, if not in general to undermine the very understanding about negotiations between East and West.(112)

The Soviet charges were picked up and repeated at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, held in Warsaw on April 27-28.(113)

In separate notes rebutting the Soviet charges, the NATO Council on May 7 and the U.S. government a day later pointed out that the measures in question had been in preparation since long before the agreement on holding a foreign ministers' conference, and justified the measures on the grounds of the danger of Soviet aggression.(114)

Stiff Western words were accompanied by stiff actions. By this time, the steps to reinforce U.S. units in Germany, which had been decided on at the late January meeting, were no doubt being carried out. In addition, the U.S. Sixth Fleet at this time held a series of exercises designed to put it in a state of combat readiness. On May 9, the Sixth Fleet conducted exercises in the Western Atlantic with two aircraft carriers ready for redeployment and the Intrepid and the Franklin Delano Roosevelt in an advance state of readiness; these were later joined by the Saratoga and the Essex (115) Finally, on May 5, the United States and West Germany signed an "agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes" at Bonn.(116)

By its statements and actions immediately before the opening of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers, the Eisenhower administration thus deliberately brought to Soviet attention evidence of its military and naval power and of its readiness for action. The U.S.-West German agreement on atomic weapons, concluded less than a week before the opening of the conference, was a particularly pointed sign of the administration's lack of concern over Soviet sensibilities, since opposition to West Germany's access to nuclear weapons was widely believed to be a major motive behind the Soviet campaign in Berlin. It seems scarcely open to doubt that the Eisenhower administration took these steps on the eve of the foreign ministers' conference on Berlin with the deliberate intention of stressing U.S. strategic power.

The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers

The conference of foreign ministers opened in Geneva on May 11 and continued until August 5, with a recess between June 21 and July 13, for a total of twenty-five sessions. During the conference, both the USSR and the Western powers presented comprehensive proposals on Berlin and Germany. As the conference dragged on, both sides introduced modifications into their original positions. At the end, however, no agreement had been reached, though there had been some narrowing of the gap between the two sides' positions, and there were a few points on which their views coincided—for example, that the level

of Western occupation forces in West Berlin should not be increased.

In an analysis of the use of force in the Berlin crises, it is neither necessary nor desirable to enter into an extended analysis of the proceedings of the conference.(117) The questions to be asked are, first, whether the use or threat of force by either side played a significant part in producing the agreement to hold the conference, and second, whether the use or threat of force during the conference significantly affected its proceedings.

The answer to the first question would appear to be yes. British fear that if negotiations were not initiated before the May 27 deadline, the USSR might resort to the use of force, with unpredictable consequences, motivated Macmillan's decision to visit Moscow for bilateral talks with Khrushchev, and it was that visit, more than any other factor, that produced the Soviet leader's agreement for the USSR to participate in a foreign ministers' conference. Here, too, the factor of force may have played a role: realization that the United States was neither intimidated by Soviet threats nor impressed by Soviet claims for strategic superiority may have induced Khrushchev to agree to a conference at the foreign minister level at a time when he had made it clear that he greatly preferred a summit conference of heads of state.

There were two phases in the use or threat of force during the conference, and there appears to be a clear distinction between them. During the first phase, from May 11 to June 21, neither side made any overt moves of a military nature, and on May 19 the United States even cancelled the projected transfer of a marine battalion to West Berlin.(118)

Threats and counterthreats, however, there were in plenty during this first phase. On May 23, a Soviet note protested U.S. plans to provide atomic weapons to West Germany, a step that it warned would have "extremely dangerous consequences for the cause of peace."(119) The United States simply brushed aside this threat, asserting that it was not worth a formal reply.(120) Between May 25 and June 4, Khrushchev headed a Soviet delegation to Albania, where he made a number of bellicose speeches, attacking among other things the U.S. moves to establish NATO rocket bases in Italy and Greece. Shortly after his return to Moscow, in a speech on June 6, Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, with the warning that if the West rejected the proposal, the USSR would be "forced to set up missile bases closer to the bases of the aggressors," in Albania and Bulgaria.(121) Five days later, in Riga, he made a similar proposal with regard to the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic.(122)

Khrushchev's verbal belligerence reached a climax on June 23, just at the beginning of the three-week recess in the foreign ministers' conference. In an interview with Averell Harriman, Khrushchev restated the Soviet position on Berlin in the most uncompromising terms and for added emphasis threw a temper tantrum, shouting, "If you send in tanks they will burn, and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically."(123) In his memoirs, Eisenhower

gives further details of Harriman's "alarming" interview with Khrushchev:

Khrushchev announced his intention to terminate Western rights in Berlin and boasted of rockets poised in China. He claimed that Soviet fighters could shoot down our air-breathing long-range missiles and made lavish claims regarding the quantity and capabilities of the Soviet ICBMs. He alleges that for an expenditure of 30 billion rubles on ballistic missiles the Soviets could destroy every industrial center in the United States and Europe, but that he, of course, preferred not to do so.: (124)

Apparently timed to coincide with Khrushchev's outburst were new Soviet attempts to transfer to East German authorities jurisdiction over military traffic between West Germany and West Berlin.(125) At about the same time, the East German customs police

... attempted to interfere with an American military train, the first time that an incident of this type had happened. This was one of a new rash of incidents involving Western access rights to Berlin.(126)

Not all the military muscle-flexing was on the Soviet side, however; on July 12, columnist Joseph Alsop reported that "[Western] military convoys were now heavily armed on the autobahn and NATO aircraft were deployed out of France into West Germany." (127)

Eisenhower extends an invitation to Khrushchev

It was at this moment of apparent deadlock at the Geneva conference, with Khrushchev uttering increasingly belligerent statements and the United States stressing its readiness to defend the access routes to Berlin, that Soviet-U.S. relations suddenly took an entirely unexpected turn, one that rendered the conference of foreign ministers virtually irrelevant.

At a meeting with a group of U.S. governors in the Kremlin on July 7, Khrushchev indicated that he would regard favorably an invitation to visit the United States. Eisenhower, at a press conference the following day, professed surprise at the suggestion, but did not rule it out completely. (128) A number of State Department officials, meanwhile, including Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy, had been drawing up a recommendation to Eisenhower for an exchange of visits by him and Khrushchev. (129) Suitably prepared by this groundwork, Eisenhower now took a quick decision: in an effort to overcome the impasse at Geneva, he would invite Khrushchev to visit the United States, with the explicit condition that substantial progress toward an agreement on Berlin must first be achieved by the foreign ministers' conference. In Eisenhower's mind, the condition and the invitation were indissolubly linked. Inexplicably, however, in the plans he drew up for

actually making the invitation, the link was weakened by the fact that Murphy was to deliver the invitation itself in writing to Soviet Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov when he left New York for Moscow on July 11 (at the conclusion of a ten-day trip to the United States to open a Soviet exhibit in New York), but Murphy was to deliver orally the message concerning the need for progress at the foreign ministers' meeting at the same time he gave Kozlov the written invitation.(130) For reasons that he fails to make clear, however, Murphy simply neglected to deliver the oral message to Kozlov, with the result that the invitation to Khrushchev was made with no strings attached.(131)

The significance of Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-Albanian relations

In order to understand Khrushchev's prompt and favorable response to Eisenhower's invitation and the significant alteration it produced in his foreign policy goals, attention must be directed briefly to developments in Soviet-Chinese relations and the closely related Soviet-Albanian relations at this point.

After the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU, which closed on February 5, 1959, the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties established a tenuous truce in the covert polemics conducted between them earlier.(132) Tension between the two parties continued to smolder, however, and by May it was threatening to spread to relations between the USSR and the Albanian Communist leadership. Khrushchev's visit to Albania in late May "must be viewed as a final unsuccessful effort to avert Hoxha [the Albanian party leader]'s alliance with Mao against him."(133)

Soviet refusal to honor the secret 1957 agreement on atomic aid to China followed on June 20, 1959, according to a Chinese statement issued on August 15, 1963.(134) On July 18, in a speech at Poznán, Khrushchev launched an indirect but unmistakable attack on the Chinese Communists for their program of setting up "people's communes," and thereby, in Donald Zagoria's words, "tore the 21st Congress truce to shreds."(135)

Eisenhower's invitation to Khrushchev, inadvertently stripped of the condition that would have rendered it unacceptable, thus arrived at a critical moment in Khrushchev's complex and risky policy maneuvers toward the Chinese Communists.

Evidently the invitation appeared to Khrushchev in the light of an unexpected and providential way out of the impasse into which his policies had led him. The negotiations on Berlin at Geneva were making no progress: the Western powers had yielded no essential points, and the United States was showing an increased willingness to resist by force Soviet and East German encroachment on Western access to Berlin.

Earlier, in the period between mid-December 1958 and early February 1959, Khrushchev had shown a lively interest in soliciting an invitation to visit the United States. At that time, however, Eisenhower, under the watchful eye of Dulles, had completely failed to respond to Khrushchev's hints. Rebuffed by the United States, Khrushchev had perforce patched up his quarrel with Peking, meanwhile accepting Macmillan's proposal for a British visit to Moscow. The Soviet-Western agreement on the convocation of a conference of foreign ministers grew out of that visit. Now, in July, the moment of choice between Peking and Washington had arrived: Relations with the Chinese were going from bad to worse, the Albanians had begun to side openly with Peking, and the foreign ministers' conference was hopelessly bogged down.

The Eisenhower invitation, which Khrushchev had deliberately evoked by his July 7 feeler to the American governors, offered Khrushchev a new option, that of a direct deal with the United States. No wonder that he snapped it up eagerly. With the U.S. invitation secure, Khrushchev quickly launched his deliberate doctrinal attack on the Chinese in his July 18 speech at Poznán.

Under these circumstances, the foreign ministers' conference lost its basic reason for existence. The USSR was no longer interested in it, and even a last-minute compromise offer by the Western powers, with new concessions, failed to evoke a favorable Soviet response, even though, in the view of some Western analysts, the concessions offered by the West would have rendered the Western position in Berlin untenable in the long run. (136)

Why did the USSR fail to consolidate the gains it had achieved at the foreign ministers' conference? Partially, it would seem, the reason was strategic in nature. As Horelick and Rush point out, "acceptance [of Western concessions] would have committed the USSR, at least temporarily, to the status quo in all other respects and therefore might have lessened Soviet freedom to renew pressure at will."(137) Horelick and Rush argue that if the USSR had accepted a Western proposal offered on July 28 for a five-year interim solution of the Berlin problem, this

... might have led to demoralization of the West Berliners and to a weakening of the West's will to resist once Soviet pressure was resumed. The Soviet leaders were not enticed by this prospect, however, presumebly because their basic strategy enjoined the exertion of direct pressure sufficient to compel the Western powers to make more damaging concessions and if possible sufficient to end the occupation of Berlin.(138)

The failure of the Soviet 1958-59 campaign in Berlin, as George and Smoke point out, amounted to a failure to convince the West that a significant shift had occurred in their favor in the strategic balance of power. "The Kremlin," they write, "clearly perceived and respected U.S. deterrence, and despite rhetoric evidently found that deterrence credible—or at least credible enough vis-à-vis the more overt options."(139)

Less convincing is the same authors' assertion that the Western powers' success in weathering the 1958-59 crisis without substantial impairment of their position in Berlin was due in part to the fact that "the NATO Allies displayed unexpectedly great skill in achieving the necessary degree of unity within the alliance."(140) Although an adequate working level of unity was displayed by the Western powers at Geneva, the general tendency of their diplomacy throughout the crisis was to drift slowly but inexorably in the direction of more and more damaging concessions to the Soviet position. The fact that the Soviet leaders saw matters in precisely that light is indicated by the statement made by Gromyko on August 5, summing up the results of the conference from the Soviet viewpoint. "It can hardly be questioned," he said, "that our conference has made progress towards a realistic [read: acceptable to the Soviets] approach to the settlement of questions relating to West Berlin."(141)

We come back, then, to the question raised earlier: why did the USSR fail to consolidate its gains at Geneva as the basis for further encroachment on the Western position in Berlin? I would argue that any attempt to answer this question solely with reference to deterrence strategy, and with the implied assumption of a unitary process of Soviet policy-formulation, is bound to produce unsatisfactory results. I believe it is essential to take into account both the internal tensions in the Soviet leadership and the sudden escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which occurred just before the Geneva conference concluded. In my view, it was Khrushchev's perception of a new option in his policy toward the Chinese Communists, which produced the abrupt shift in Soviet policy that led the USSR to accept termination of the foreign ministers' conference just as the West was on the point of making seriously damaging concessions. Neither diplomatic skill nor the use of force were involved, though both had been displayed earlier in the crisis in ways that had paved the way for this unexpected denoument.

Eisenhower and Khruschev at Camp David

The final act in the 1958-59 Berlin crisis was played out in the United States, during the visit of Khrushchev from September 15 to 27. To provide a suitable buildup for the visit, the USSR staged another spectacular space exploit just before Khrushchev's arrival. On September 12, the USSR launched Lunik 2, a moon rocket with a weight of more than 3,300 pounds (1,500 kilograms), thereby repeating the maneuver they had executed just before Mikoyan's visit to the United States in January. (142) This time, however, the effect on U.S. policymakers was minimal, because the United States had itself just achieved an important strategic goal: On September 1, the Atlas ICHM was declared operational. (143)

The Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks, held at Camp David in the final days of the Soviet leader's visit, were marked by a direct test of wills, in which the President emerged the victor. Eisenhower describes the incident in his memoirs:

As we were obviously at an impasse, he and I, by common consent, moved away from the remaining members of the conference, taking with us again only his interpreter, Oleg Troyanovski. He talked about Germany and Berlin without rancor, but obviously felt he had committed himself so firmly that he saw no way to retreat from his position. However, the Chairman finally said he recognized my determination in this matter and said he would take steps publicly to remove any suggestion of a time limit within which he would sign a Soviet-East German peace treaty, thus making the future of Berlin a proper subject for negotiation, not one for unilateral action. I replied that by this concession he was putting the matter back into the status quo ante, with the result that all of us could honestly seek for a decent solution to the problem of a city divided. (144)

Evaluation: the use of force in the 1958-59 crisis

The West emerged from the Berlin crisis of 1958-59 with its basic positions intact. Not only had the local Soviet challenge in Berlin been successfully faced, but the larger Soviet challenge to the Western strategic position had been defeated. In achieving these successes, the use of force played a key role, but one that must be seen in the total context of Soviet-Western and Soviet-Chinese relations.

Throughout the crisis, the Eisenhower administration drew a consistent distinction between strategic power, which it maintained at a level superior to that of the USSR, and limited conventional power. In the interests of budgetary economy, the administration consistently played down the use of limited conventional force to keep the lid on military expenditures. The strategic equivalent of this approach was Dulles's doctrine of "massive retaliation" and its corollary of avoiding the use of limited force.

There is abundant evidence to support the views of analysts such as Jack M. Schick or Alexander George and Paul Smoke that the Eisenhower administration's policy with regard to the use of force in the 1958-59 Berlin crisis was not entirely successful. In particular, its failure to use limited force early in the crisis to signify its determination to defend its position in Berlin may well have encouraged the USSR to press ahead with its efforts to force the Western Allies out of Berlin.

Once the crisis had been precipitated by the Soviet "deadline note" of November 27, 1958, the use or threat of force by either side became one of several optional moves in a strategic game, a test of wills and of willingness to move up the escalation ladder. Here, in the long run, U.S. strategic power, the confidence of the U.S. leadership in that power, and its recognition by the Soviet leadership proved decisive. Diplomatic skill was displayed on both sides, perhaps more effectively in the Western Alliance, where rather

serious differences of opinion over the best tactics to pursue on the Berlin question threatened at times to disrupt the working unity of the alliance, and where the persistent determination of the British to negotiate a way out of the crisis led the West to make a number of potentially damaging concessions to the USSR.

In the end, however, it was not the West but the Soviet-Chinese alliance, seemingly so strong at the outset of the crisis, that cracked under the enormous strain imposed by the Soviet challenge to Western strategic supremacy. That historic break would have been sufficient in itself to ensure that the next Soviet challenge to the Western position in Berlin would operate with substantially different ground rules than those that obstained in 1958-59. Even more directly pertinent is the fact that in the next Berlin crisis, in 1961, there was a new administration in Washington, with a radically altered position on the use of force, strategic as well as conventional.

Between Two Crises: The Period From September 1959 To February 1961

The meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev was followed by a long interval—nearly a year and a half—during which the Soviet-Western conflict over Berlin moved from the stage of acute crisis to that of chronic irritant. The meeting, however, had solved none of the basic problems underlying the conflict, but had merely led to an agreement to negotiate on them without the pressure of a fixed deadline. Deprived of leverage, the USSR for the time being dropped its campaign on Berlin, though without formally withdrawing any of its claims or demands. Sowiet leaders had failed to achieve any significant alteration in the status of West Berlin, having neglected to pin down the West on those points it was prepared to concede (for example, a ceiling on Western troop strengths in West Berlin), and had thus thrown away the advantages won by their pressure tactics at Geneva. The interval between crises thus resulted in no significant shifts in either the Soviet or Western positions. Examining the international context in which the 1961 crisis unfolded, however, makes it apparent that fundamental and far-reaching changes had taken place in the interval since the last crisis.

Deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict

During the crisis of 1958-59, the conflict between Moscow and Peking, though deep and unresolved, had remained hidden. Neither side had given any public indication of its existence, and until the final months of the crisis it did not directly affect Soviet behavior in its Berlin campaign.

By the time of the 1961 crisis, however, the Sino-Soviet conflict had been openly acknowledged by both sides and was a factor the Soviet leadership had to take into account in its strategic calculations. As the 1961 crisis developed, moreover, the split between Moscow and Peking deepened the internal conflicts in the Soviet leadership in ways that had a direct bearing on Soviet goals and tactics.

The U-2 incident and the breakdown of the Paris Summit Conference

A strong desire for a summit conference on Berlin and Germany had been a persistent theme in Khrushchev's maneuverings throughout the 1958-59 crisis. Forced to delay his wishes in this regard by Eisenhower's insistence on preliminary progress at the foreign minister level, Khrushchev came back to the summit proposal in the summer of 1960 at a time when the Geneva conference of foreign ministers seemed doomed to failure. By agreeing at Camp David to lift the threat of a deadline on negotiations over Berlin, Khrushchev was finally able to obtain Eisenhower's assent to the idea of a summit conference.

Although the four heads of government duly assembled in Paris in May 1960, the Paris summit conference broke up in disorder before any substantive action had been taken. The immediate cause of this fiasco was a sequence of events that began on May 1, when the USSR finally succeeded in forcing down over its territory a high-altitude reconnaissance plane, the U-2, piloted by Lt. Francis Gary Powers.(145) Concealing for several days the fact that they had downed the plane and captured Powers alive, Soviet leaders permitted U.S. authorities to entangle themselves in a succession of cover stories before disclosing the true facts. Still hoping to salvage the summit meeting, Khrushchev now called on Eisenhower to disavow responsibility for the U-2 flights and apologize to the Soviet government, but Eisenhower refused.

At this point, Khrushchev staged one of his famous temper tantrums, storming out of the meeting place just as the conference was scheduled to begin, despite efforts by Macmillan and de Gaulle to smooth things over. Western fears that Khrushchev might seize this moment to carry through his long-standing threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany were eased, however, when he made a speech in East Berlin a few days later pledging that the USSR would not reopen the Berlin question until another summit conference could be arranged, in six to eight months—in other words, after the U.S. presidential elections had been held and a new administration was in power in Washington. (146)

The United States did not get off scot-free from the U-2 incident, however. On May 30, Soviet Defense Minister Roman Malinovsky warned that if U.S. planes made overflights of Soviet territory in the future, the USSR would not only shoot down the aircraft but would "deal a crushing blow to the bases from which they take off." Malinovsky said he had issued an order to the commander-inchief of the Soviet rocket troops "to strike at the take-off base of an aircraft if it violates the space of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries." (147)

The grave implications of the new Soviet stance are underlined by Horelick and Rush: "Thus for the first time, Soviet leaders threatened to strike

allies of the United States, possibly with nuclear weapons, in response to other than a physical attack on the USSR, one of its allies, or a friendly third power. (148)

The growing internal challenge to Khrushchev's power

The U-2 incident, with its revelation of prior Soviet inability to prevent these flights, and the collapse of the Paris summit conference, on which Khrushchev had staked so much of his prestige, resulted in a sharp upsurge of internal opposition to his dominance. At a plenum of the party Central Committee on May 4, his position was weakened by a series of sweeping changes in the leading bodies of the Communist party and the Soviet government, the most important of which was a drastic reduction in the size of the Secretariat from ten members to five, with the removal of a group of loyal followers of Khrushchev. In the new Secretariat, Frol Kozlov, a staunch opponent of Khrushchev's initiatives in internal and foreign policy, joined forces with Mikhail Suslov, another long-time critic of Khrushchev. (149)

Kozlov was the principal beneficiary of the May 4 changes and thereafter presented the most direct challenge to Khrushchev's dominance. Kozlov's triumph was incomplete, however, since Khrushchev had been able to retain control of a key position in the Secretariat, that of Secretary for Cadres, the occupant of which enjoys the power to make changes in party bodies throughout the USSR in the name of the Central Committee. At the May 4 plenum, Leonid Brezhnev, at that time a loyal supporter of Khrushchev, had continued as secretary for cadres. Brezhnev, therefore, became the next target for Kozlov in his drive for power.

The RB-47 incident and its consequences

From the standpoint of the internal opposition, the shooting down of the U-2 was a highly successful operation, resulting as it did in serious inroads into Khrushchev's power. It was to be expected, therefore, that an attempt would soon be made to repeat the incident.

On June 30, Khrushchev left Moscow for a state visit to Austria. On the next day, July 1, Soviet fighter planes shot down an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane, an RB-47, over the Barents Sea. The repetition of the U-2 incident was under way, with the advantage, from the standpoint of the internal opposition, that this time Khrushchev was not in Moscow. There is, in fact, substantial evidence to indicate that he first learned of the action only on July 6, the date on which, visibly upset, he abruptly cut short his visit to Austria. (150)

Just as in the U-2 incident, the USSR for a time kept silent about the

shooting down of the RB-47 and even offered to send a cruiser to join in the search for the missing plane. The United States announced the failure of the plane to return to its base, but issued no cover story. Washington, in fact, possessed accurate information indicating that the place had been at least thirty miles from Soviet territory and headed away from the USSR when it was overtaken by Soviet fighter planes and shot down.(151) The British, despite their natural skepticism after the U-2 fiasco, fully accepted the U.S. evidence, Macmillan going so far as to characterize the incident as "a fake."(152)

A fake, but staged by whom and for what purpose? The answer to these questions, I believe, can be found in the Soviet internal political struggle. Baffling if one considers it as an action ordered or approved by Khrushchev, the shooting down of the RB-47 makes excellent sense if it is regarded as a step by his internal opponents to force him to sacrifice Brezhnev and hand over to Kozlov the post of secretary for cadres. These actions were, in fact, taken at the next plenum of the Central Committee, which met from July 13 to 16.(153)

The sacrifice of Brezhnev, however, was not the only price Khrushchev had to pay to extricate himself from his predicament. Two other concessions were forced from him, both having a direct bearing on Soviet foreign policy.

- (1) On July 9, in the first major speech delivered after his hurried return to Moscow, Khrushchev pledged missile aid to Cuba in case the United States threatened it with invasion.(154) That he made this pledge unwillingly, under pressure, is shown by the fact that he later did his best to water it down, stressing that the missiles being offered were merely "symbolic."(155)
- (2) An even more serious consequence for Khrushchev was a drastic impairment of his status within the "collective leadership." The new arrangements, which were publicly demonstrated for the first time on July 17, "reflected the triumph of collective leadership," in Tatu's view. "The effect had been to upgrade the role of the Presidium to a marked extent and correspondingly to downgrade Khrushchev." (156)

The reduction in Khrushchev's stature was graphically demonstrated when the Soviet press failed to publish the full text of a speech he delivered on July 17, whereas it did publish the full text of Suslov's speech at the same meeting. Suslov was one of the principal beneficiaries of the change. (157) Khrushchev's speech was only published ten months later. (158)

The upsurge of Soviet militancy

Khrushchev's position weakened at a time when Soviet policy toward the United States was marked by greatly increased militancy. There were sharp conflicts between the two powers in the Congo, in the disarmament negotiations at Geneva, at the United Nations, and in Japan, where Communist riots in June

forced the Japanese government to cancel an invitation to President Eisenhower.

These developments, coupled with the uncertainties of U.S. foreign policy-making in the period after Dulles's death, helped create a widespread impression that the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration was being systematically undermined by the USSR and its allies on a global scale. An authoritative British observer sums up the situation as follows:

During the weeks between the collapse of the Geneva [disarmament] talks on 27 June and the re-assembly of the United Nations on 17 September the condition of world politics deteriorated in an alarming way. Basically, it was probably fair to say that this deterioration was the consequence of the failure of American policy to keep pace with the changes in world conditions which had been so distinctive a feature of the past three or four years. . . In many ways, indeed, this period must be accounted a low-water mark in the conduct of American policy.(159)

The shift in U.S. military thinking

During the summer of 1960, as the presidential campaign got under way, a profound shift took place in the U.S. attitude toward the use of military force as an element in foreign policy, a shift reflected in the views of both major parties. In a campaign platform adopted on July 12, the Democratic party stated that America's first task under a new administration would be to "restore our national strength--military, political, economic, and moral," and "to recast our military capacity in order to provide forces and weapons of a diversity, balance, and mobility sufficient in quantity and quality to deter both limited and general aggression." (160)

In the Republican party, too, there were influential voices calling for change. On July 23, shortly before he was nominated for President, Vice President Richard M. Nixon reached an agreement with New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller, which defined the "two imperatives of national security in the 1960s" as

a. A powerful second-strike capability—a nuclear retaliatory power capable of surviving surprise attack to inflict devastating punishment on any aggressor, and

b. A modern, flexible and balanced military estalishment capable of deterring or meeting any local aggression.

In a direct break with the economy-minded policies of the Eisenhower era, the Nixon-Rockefeller statement asserted:

The United States can afford and must provide the increased expenditures to implement fully this necessary program for

strengthening our defense posture. There must be no price ceiling on America's security.(161)

Stung by the implied criticism, Eisenhower showed that he felt the need at this time to stress American military power. In a message to Congress on August 8, he disclosed that while "he still had no plans to increase defense spending in any substantial way, despite the recent 'intensification of Communist truculence,'" he had ordered

. . . certain practical measures within the framework of the existing program: deployment of additional aircraft carriers to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific; steps to increase the operational readiness of the Strategic Air Command and the ground forces; and an expansion of certain long-range programs, particularly those relating to the Polaris missile system. (162)

Helping to brighten the record of the Eisenhower administration was "a series of remarkable current accomplishments in the missile and space field," including the first test firing on July 20 of two Polaris misssiles from the nuclear submarine <u>George Washington</u>, and the 5,000 mile test-firing of a Titan missile on August 30.(163) It was the cumulative record of the Eisenhower administration, however, that Kennedy attacked during the campaign, most extensively and systematically in a speech before the American Legion Convention at Miami Beach on October 18, 1960.(164) The basic theme of that speech was

. . . American strength relative to the Soviet Union has been slipping and communism has been advancing steadily in every area of the world, until the Iron Curtain now rests on the island of Cuba, only 90 miles away.

Kennedy traced the relative decline in U.S. military power to 1953, when the development of the hydrogen bomb had led to the emergence of long-range missiles as the "key to future military power." Whereas the USSR "decided to go all out in missile development," however,

here, in the United States, we cut back on funds for missile development. We slashed our defense budget. We slowed up the modernization of our conventional forces until, today, the Soviet Union is rapidly building up a missile striking force than endangers our power to retaliate—and thus our survival itself.

To remedy this situation, Kennedy offered a four-point program: first, "immediate steps to protect our present nuclear striking force from surprise attack;" second, a crash program for the production of Polaris submarines and Minuteman missiles to "close the missile gap by providing us with an invulnerable retaliatory force;" third, a program of modernizing and giving increased mobility to conventional forces, "our only protection against limited war;" and fourth, a fundamental reorganization of the Defense Department.

During the campaign, Kennedy made it clear that he expected a "most serious crisis" over Berlin to confront the President in the early days of the new administration, (165) and in the third of his television debates with Nixon he pledged to "meet our commitments to maintain the freedom and independence of West Berlin." (166)

Continuing Soviet claims for strategic superiority and the threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany

· Attended to

Throughout the inter-crisis period Khrushchev continued to make exaggerated claims for Soviet strategic power. Thus in a speech on October 6, 1959, he declared that the Soviet Union was "ahead of all countries in the production of missiles."(167) He amplified the claim a month later when he told a group of journalists, "... now we have accumulated such a quantity of missiles, such a quantity of atomic and hydrogen warheads that if they [the Western powers] attack us, we could wipe all our potential enemies off the face of the earth." He went on to describe a visit to a Soviet munitions plant which, he said, "produced on the assembly line 250 missiles with hydrogen warheads."(168)

In Budapest on December 1, Khrushchev boasted that the USSR had enough nuclear-tipped rockets to "raze to the ground all our potential enemies." (169) In the same speech, he revived the threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, and directed a particularly sharp attack against West German Chancellor Adenauer.

One purpose of Khrushchev's boasts, it soon became clear, was to cushion the shock of a major military cutback, which he announced on January 14, 1960—reduction of the size of the Soviet armed forces by some 1,200,000.(170) The speech in which he made this announcement contained the assertion that the USSR was "several years ahead of other countries in the creation and production of ICHMs, "as well as an apocalyptic vision of the horrors of a future nuclear war, in which "not a single capital [or] industrial center would escape attack, not merely during the first days but during the first minutes of the war." And once again, Khrushchev raised the threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, "with all the attendant implications," if the West failed to agree to Soviet demands on Berlin.(171)

Toward the end of February, Khrushchev repeated the peace treaty threat, adding that such an action "would mean the immediate cancellation of all allied rights in East Germany, including Berlin."(172) In a speech delivered on a trip to France toward the end of March, Khrushchev ridiculed the military value of the Western garrisons in Berlin and said that if the West put as many as half a million additional troops there, "It would be easier to smash them."(173)

Khrushchev's steady hammering on the issue of a German peace treaty, together with his fraudulent claims and distortions of the historical record,

finally goaded U.S. officials into making a formal rebuttal. On April 4, 1960, Secretary of State Herter categorically reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to West Berlin, and on April 20, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon warned Khrushchev that the United States was not prepared to negotiate on the "distorted picture of the German problem" drawn by Soviet spokesmen.(174)

Under particularly heavy pressure at just this time from the internal opposition, Khrushchev responded with one of his most bellicose ulterances, delivered at Baku on April 25.(175) The collapse of the Paris summit conference was soon followed, however, by Khrushchev's pledge not to reopen the Berlin question for another six to eight months. The respite was brief. By the time of his trip to Austria at the end of June, Khrushchev was once again raising the threat of a separate East German peace treaty.

The flareup of the Berlin issue, July-December 1960

At a diplomatic reception on June 29, 1960, Khrushchev told the West German ambassador, Hans Kroll, that "the Berlin question could no longer remain unresolved" and that if a solution was not found soon he would be forced to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany "without further delay." Kroll received the impression that Khrushchev "was under strong pressure from the 'Ulbricht group' in the Presidium and could not extend the Berlin pause indefinitely."(176)

One reason for Khrushchev's sense of urgency was revealed in a Soviet note of June 30 protesting West German plans to recruit for the West German army in West Berlin.(177) Another touchy issue was a plan for the West German lower house (Bundestag) to hold an autumn session in West Berlin as it had done for several years. At a press conference on July 8, Khrushchev warned that if the session was held, the USSR "would then consider signing an East German peace treaty in the same months."(178)

Undeterred, the West German government not only went ahead with its plans, but added several rallies of West German refugee organizations clamoring for the return to Germany of territory lost to Poland and the USSR after the Second World War. Not surprisingly, the East German and Soviet governments strongly objected to these plans, and the conflict soon reached a stage of acute tension.

The Berlin mini-crisis of 1960, which lasted from early July through the beginning of December, had certain characterisites that set it apart from the two major Berlin crises, those of 1958-59 and 1961. First, the principal actors in 1960 were not the great powers, but the two German states. Second, the USSR in 1960 did not stress the issues of strategic rivalry and East-West conflict. Third, the threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and thereby to end Western occupation rights in Berlin was not voiced. In searching for an explanation of these aberrations, it is noteworthy that throughout most of the period of conflict in 1960, Khrushchev was either not in Moscow or was

occupied with other matters, for example, the eighty-one-party conference in November.

Since the 1960 mini-crisis was primarily a tug-of-war between the two German states, it is appropriate that it finally eased when the West German government at the end of November withdrew an earlier threat to cut off interzonal trade unless the East German government lifted its restrictions on travel from West Germany to West Berlin. The mini-crisis served to keep alive the great power tensions over Berlin, however, and reminded both sides that neither the Berlin question itself nor the larger question of the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR had been settled.

Crosscurrents in Soviet policy, early 1961

As the time neared for the inauguration of a new administration in Washington, Khrushchev seemed intent on improving relations with the United States. At a New Year's Eve reception in the Kremlin he expressed the hope that "in the new year the United States of America and the Soviet Union will turn a new page, as it were, in their relations."(179)

Prospects for better Soviet relations with West Germany also seemed bright. At the same reception, Khrushchev had a long talk with FRG Ambassador Kroll, in the course of which he expressed pleasure at the signing of a Soviet-FRG trade agreement, and even had some rare words of praise for Adenauer. He warned Kroll, however, that "the German problem must be solved in 1961," to which Mikoyan added, "... that Khrushchev could not hold out much longer against the pressure being brought to bear on him for some time by certain circles—he was obviously referring to the Ulbricht lobby in the Presidium."(180)

Unfortunately, Khrushchev's wishes for an improvement in relations between the United States and the USSR seemed incompatible with Soviet actions in Laos, where extensive Soviet military aid to the insurgent Pathet Lao was producing a direct threat to the stability of the Laotian government. Nevertheless, Khrushchev himself delivered the most crushing blow to Soviet-American détente just as the Kennedy administration was making its last-minute preparations to take power. He did this in a major speech on January 6, 1961, given before a select audience of Soviet ideologists and party savants. (181)

Khrushchev's speech has as one of its principal themes the typology of wars from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism. The USSR, he said, would try to prevent the outbreak of general nuclear wars; it was also opposed to "local wars" that might develop into general nuclear wars. What Khrushchev called "wars of national liberation," however, were "sacred," and he pledged that Communists would support such wars "fully and without reservation."

There remained a danger, he continued, that the capitalist nations might attack the USSR, but this threat could be averted by combining peaceful

coexistence and disarmament. The ultimate goal of a Communist world, which had been called for in the final statement issued by the eight-one-party conference, could best be achieved, he asserted, not by force but by the victory or Communism in "intensive economic, political, and ideological struggle within the limits of peaceful coexistence." Khrushchev gave particular attention to West Berlin, where, he said,

France have proved to be specially vulnerable. . . . These powers are still trying to cling to the old positions but they cannot fail to realize that sooner or later the occupation regime in this city must be ended. It is necessary step by step to continue to bring the aggressive imperialist circles to their senses, to compel them to reckon with the real situation. If they balk, we shall take decisive measures, we shall sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

It would be difficult to overstate the impact this speech made on the Kennedy administration and the extent to which it shaped the thinking of Kennedy and his advisers on the whole subject of U.S. policy toward the USSR. According to Schlesinger, the speech "... made a conspicuous impression on the new President, who took it as an authoritative exposition of Soviet intentions, discussed it with his staff, and read excerpts from it aloud to the National Security Council."(182)

It seems probable that one of Khrushchev's major purposes in delivering the speech was to defend his concept of "peaceful coexistence" against his critics in Peking and elsewhere. (183) Seen from this angle, the devastating effect the speech produced in Washington was simply an unfortunate byproduct of what was intended for Communist ears. Even if one accepts this analysis, however, the fact remains that the January 6 speech seriously reduced the possibilities of a thaw in Soviet-U.S. relations and contributed mightily to the skepticism with which the new administration viewed Soviet expression of a desire for an improvement in those relations.

The Crisis of 1961

Analyzing the complex issues involved in the Berlin crisis of 1961 is a difficult task at best. It becomes far more difficult if some of the basic facts in the situation are misstated through ignorance or carelessness. Unfortunately, serious errors have crept into otherwise well-documented accounts of the crisis and have been accepted as established facts in later studies. A number of these errors have a direct bearing on U.S. and Soviet strategies in the opening phase of the 1961 crisis.

(1) Several studies assert that Kennedy, shortly after taking office, sent a message to Khrushchev requesting a delay in negotiations on Berlin

in order to give the new administration time to prepare its position. (184) No evidence has been found, however, to support this assertion. It may result from confusion with a request the Kennedy administration did make, and which the Soviets accepted, for a delay in resumption of the three-power talks at Geneva on a test-ban agreement. (185)

(2) It has been maintained that Khrushchev told U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in January 1961 that "his prestige was engaged in Berlin and he had waited long enough to move." (186) Available evidence indicates, however, that Khrushchev made this statement to Thompson not at their meeting in Moscow on January 21, 1961, but a month and a half later, when they met again at Novosibirsk on March 9. (187)

Straightening out these errors and misconceptions is not a mere niggling over dates: the evaluation of Soviet and U.S. strategy in the 1961 crisis is directly affected by the question of when and how Khruschev first broached the matter with an authoritative U.S. representative.

The Kennedy administration lowers its estimate of Soviet strategic power

Between Khrushchev's two meetings with Thompson, a significant change occurred in the Kennedy administration's perception of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. During the 1960 campaign, Kennedy had referred frequently to the so-called "missile gap," a period during which the United States was believed to be endangered by a Soviet lead in the production of ICBMs.(183) Shortly after taking office, however, the Kennedy administration discovered that there was in fact no "missile gap," a conclusion that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara disclosed to an off-the-record press briefing on February 6.(189) McNamara's statement, though accurate, was considered inexpedient by Kennedy, who told a press conference two days later that studies he had ordered of the U.S. strategic position were not yet completed "and therefore it would be premature to reach a judgment as to whether there is a gap or not a gap."(190)

For the Soviet leadership, however, which had been basing its foreign policy strategy on the inflated claims that had helped give rise to the "missile gap" theory, the cat was out of the bag with McNamara's disclosure of February 6.(191) Something, it was clear, would have to be done.

The Presidium meeting of mid-February 1961

I have presented elsewhere the evidence pointing to a meeting of the Presidium of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in mid-February 1961, and will therefore confine my discussion at this point to a summary of my conclusions. (192) It should be stressed that the following analysis is a hypothesis, but in my view it offers a more satisfactory explanation of the known facts than any

alternative interpretation. It is also crucial for an understanding of Soviet policies in the later stages of the 1961 crisis.

The meeting was called, I believe, on the insistence of Khrushchev's critics and opponents in the presidium, as the result of their realization, after McNamara's February 6 press briefing, that the U.S. leadership was now aware of the true facts about Soviet missile production and consequently about U.S. strategic preponderance. Khrushchev, who at the time was engaged in an extended tour of agricultural centers in the provinces, was forced to hurry back to Moscow to face his critics and, together with them, work out a new foreign policy strategy. It should be remembered that at this time—February 1961—Khrushchev's decisionmaking powers were still subject to the restraints imposed on him at the July 1960 plenum.

The collapse of the myth of Soviet strategic preponderance had especially serious implications for Soviet policy in Germany. In the 1958-59 crisis, Khrushchev had used greatly exaggerated claims for Soviet strength as a means to force the Western powers to withdraw from Berlin, a retreat that would have solved the acute problem of population drain from East Germany. As the result of Soviet failure to achieve its goals in the 1958-59 crisis, this problem had not been solved, and by early 1961 it was more acute than ever: "By early 1961 over a thousand East Germans a day arrived in West Berlin seeking refuge." (193)

At the New Year's reception, Khrushchev had told the West German ambassador that he was under heavy pressure from the "Ulbricht group" in the Presidium to "solve" the Berlin and German questions. Now, with McNamara's disclosure, the foundation on which Khrushchev's Berlin strategy had been based seemed to have crumbled. It was urgently necessary to adopt a new policy, one that would end, once and for all, the debilitating drain on East Germany's vitality caused by the availability of the West Berlin escape route.

The principal decisions which, in my view, the Presidium took at its mid-February meeting were designed to achieve this goal. Khrushchev was given six months to demonstrate that his approach to the problem—diplomatic and military pressure on the Western Allies to force them out of West Berlin—could produce the desired result. If he failed, the security and viability of the East German state would be assured by physically sealing off West Berlin from the Soviet—occupied eastern sector of the city and from the surrounding territory of the East German state.

I believe that a corollary to this program, with its maximum and minimum goals and its fixed time limit, concerned the testing of nuclear weapons. Since early November 1958, the USSR, like the two principal Western atomic powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, had been observing a defacto ban on testing, despite mounting pressure from military spokesmen on both sides and their political allies to resume testing. There is good reason to believe that Soviet leaders decided at that February 1961 meeting to begin making preparations for a new test series, scheduled to start shortly

after the expiration of Khrushchev's six-month time limit for a solution to the East German problem. (194) It seems likely that this decision was an optional one, related to the decision on Berlin: If Khrushchev failed to force the Western Allies out of the city, the test series would be launched after expiration of the six-month period as soon as the technical preparations were complete.

Khrushchev initiates the Soviet campaign

A cardinal piece of evidence in support of the view that a meeting of the Presidium took place in mid-February 1961 is an aide-mémoire on Germany, which the Soviet government sent Adenauer on February 17, 1961.(195) In this document, all the familiar Soviet proposals on Germany were restated, but in rather muted form, and with a new note of respect for and even pleading with the West German chancellor, so often in the past a target for Khrushchevis abuse. Muted, too, were the note's claims for Soviet military power: In place of the old boasts of supremacy appeared the sober statement, "The Soviet Union and its friends have everything they need to uphold their just cause in a fitting manner." (196) The note hinted strongly at a time limit without, however, actually specifying one:

The Soviet Union still does not rule out the possibility of an interim settlement on West Berlin pending conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, in the understanding that a strictly specified time limit for the conclusion of such a treaty be fixed in advance.

Should no peace treaty with both states be concluded within the agreed time limit, the Soviet Union, together with the other nations wishing to do so, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR. That will also mean ending the occupation regime in West Berlin with all the attendant consequences. In particular, questions of the use of lines of communication by land, water, and air through the territory of the GDR will in that case be settled only on the basis of appropriate agreements with the GDR.(197)

Without waiting for a reply from the West German government (the reply was not, in fact, forthcoming until July 12), the USSR published the text of the note on March 3, thereby serving public notice of the formal reopening of its Berlin campaign. In his meeting with Thompson in Novosibirsk on March 9, Khrushchev cited the note as the basis for Soviet policy in Germany. (198)

At the end of March, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee met in Moscow, with Walter Ulbricht presiding, to consider measures for "further strengthening their defensive capacity and consolidating peace throughout the world." The communiqué issued on March 31 called for signature of "a peace treaty with both German states and, in this connection, rendering

the hotbed of danger in West Berlin by converting it into a demilitarized free city."(199) George and Smoke cite a West German journalist's later report that Ulbricht at the meeting

... demanded that he be allowed to close the border between East and West Berlin. But the other East European countries opposed such a move on grounds both of embarrassment and of the risk of a violent Western response; and the USSR stated that it was necessary first to determine how Kennedy's Berlin policies might differ from Eisenhower's.(200)

George and Smoke note that "the reliability of this account may be open to question;" in my view it can be recognized as a fabrication, based on a gross exaggeration of the policymaking capabilities of the Warsaw Pact organization. Ulbricht was far too experienced as a Communist functionary not to realize that the place to apply pressure was not a meeting of the Consultative Committee, but the Presidium of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. It is far more likely, in my view, that the meeting of the Warsaw Pact committee was convened by the USSR for the purpose of coordinating the satellite nations' foreign policies with that of the USSR in the unfolding campaign on Berlin. If my reconstruction of the February 1961 Presidium meeting is close to the truth, Ulbricht already knew by the time of the Warsaw Pact meeting that, one way or another, his problems with West Berlin were going to be solved in the fairly near future.

Khrushchev's interview with Lippman and Gagarin's flight

To ensure maximum publicity for his renewed drive to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, Khrushchev now resorted to one of his favorite procedures, an interview with a prominent Western journalist. To mark the importance he attached to the event, he invited one of the most respected of American news analysts, Walter Lippman, for a lengthy discussion at Sochi, in the course of which he presented his case for the signing of a German peace treaty that would "fix" the German frontiers and give a legal foundation to the existence of the "three elements of Germany—the two German states and the free city of West Berlin." (201)

Failing this, Mr. Khrushchev proposed. . . a temporary agreement for three years while the 'two Germanies' negotiated some form of unification, perhaps a loose confederation. If no agreement were reached during that period, the legal rights of the occupying powers would lapse. Failing that, he returned to his original threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German state, which would thereby obtain full sovereignty over the access routes to West Berlin. If the west then refused to do business with the East German state and tried to use force to enter Berlin, the Red Army would interpose itself across the access routes and blockade Berlin. (202)

Khrushchev assured Lippmann that he would not precipitate a crisis over Berlin until he had had a chance to talk face to face with Kennedy, and he disclosed confidentially that "there was the possibility of a meeting with the President early in June either in Vienna or Stockholm. (203)

To give added impact to the publication of Lippmann's report of the interview, Khrushchev resorted to another well-tried device, a new demonstration of Soviet technical and scientific prowess. On April 12, two days after the Lippmann interview, the USSR achieved a milestone in the exploration of space with the successful launching of the world's first manned space flight. Using a 10,395-pound (4,725-kilogram) space ship, Major Yuri Gagarin made an orbital flight that circled the earth in one hour and forty-eight minutes and then landed safely.(204)

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the effect of his well-planned journalistic coup was spoiled by a totally unrelated development that captured the headlines of the world press just as Lippmannn's report was beginning to appear: the attempted invasion of Cuba by U.S.-trained anti-Castro refugees from Cuba, an attempt which was preceded by an air raid on Havana on April 15 and which ended in ignominious defeat four days later when Castro's forces rounded up the last survivors of the invasion force at the Bay of Pigs. For Khrushchev, the most ominous aspect of the Bay of Pigs invasion was the possibility that the United States might intervene directly on the side of the invaders, thereby forcing the USSR to make good on Khrushchev's pledge to use Soviet missiles in the defense of Cuba against U.S. aggression. Kennedy's decision not to support the invaders with U.S. military power, and the message he sent Khrushchev on April 18 informing him of this decision, lifted the shadow of danger. (205) Khrushchev could breathe a little easier, reassured by this indication that the new occupant of the White House was a prudent man who wished to avoid a direct confrontation with the USSR.

The agreement on a Khrushchev-Kennedy meeting at Vienna

Before Khrushchev could feel fully confident about the risks involved in precipitating a new Berlin crisis, nevertheless, he felt the need for direct contact with the new U.S. president. It was not until May 4, however, that the USSR indicated an interest in accepting Kennedy's invitation of February 22--if it was still valid. (206) What happened between April 10, when Khrushchev spoke to Lippmann of the meeting with Kennedy as a possibility, and May 4, when he moved to make it a reality? Among other things, a distinct improvement in Khrushchev's position in the Presidium as the result of the temporary elimination of his most implacable foe, Frol Kozlov. On April 17, Kozlov, an ardent proponent of Soviet military aid to the Lactian insurgents, attended a state dinner for Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos that marked Soviet acceptance of the establishment of a neutral Laos. This was Kozlov's last public appearance until early June. "Diplomatic sources" in Moscow, the New York Times reported in late May, explained his absence from public view as

the result of a mild heart attack. (207)

The eclipse of Kozlov was promptly followed by a number of signs that Khrushchev's position had been strenghened, including the belated publication of his speech of July 17, 1960. Soviet acceptance of Kennedy's invitation came early in this period of the strengthening of Khrushchev's position, and it seems reasonable to suggest that the earlier delay in responding was due, at least in part, to opposition from Kozlov, who had shown himself a staunch critic of any move toward improving Soviet relations with the United States.

By early May, then, the broad outlines of the new campaign on Berlin were clearly visible, though the USSR had not yet made any specific demands. What had the Kennedy administration been doing meanwhile to prepare for the "most serious crisis over Berlin," which Kennedy himself had predicted the U.S. would face by the spring of 1961? (208)

The Kennedy administration's initial changes in defense strategy

In analyzing the Kennedy administration's response to Soviet words and actions in the Berlin crisis of 1961, a clear distinction must be made between the overall policies worked out by the President and his advisers, based on their view of the United States' strategic posture and its ability to meet its commitments on a global scale, and the specific policies and actions they adopted to achieve U.S. goals in Berlin and Germany. Admittedly these two areas were closely related and frequently overlapped, but in principle they remained separate and distinct. Failure to recognize this difference can lead to faulty evaluation of U.S. moves in the crisis and to the confusion of long-term and short-term goals. (209)

Highly critical as he had been of the Eisenhower defense policies, as president-elect, Kennedy made it one of his first priorities to obtain a comprehensive review of existing military power in relation to current or anticipated needs. In assigning this task to his new defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, Kennedy signaled his conscious break from the Eisenhower era by laying down the basic principle that "under no circumstances should we allow a predetermined arbitrary financial limit to establish either strategy or force levels." (210)

McNamara's preliminary survey, as summarised by Sorensen, found that U.S. military policy was characterized by

1. A strategy of massive nuclear retaliation as the answer to all military and political aggression, a strategy believed in by few of our friends and none of our enemies and resulting in serious weakenesses in our conventional forces.

- 2. A financial ceiling on national security, making military strategy the stepchild of a predetermined budget.
- 3. A strategic nuclear force vulnerable to surprise missile attack, a nonnuclear force weak in combat-ready divisions, in airlift capacity and in tactical air support, a counterinsurgency force for all practical purposes nonexistent, and a weapons inventory completely lacking in certain major elements but far oversupplied in others.
- 4. Too many automatic decisions made in advance instead of in the light of an actual emergency, and too few Pentagon-wide plans for each kind of contingency. . . . (211)

McNamara's preliminary report was in Kennedy's hands in time to provide the basis for some recommendations in the new president's first major pronouncement on national policy, his State of the Union Message sent to Congress on January 30, 1961.(212) In this statement, Kennedy set as the national goal the establishment of "a Free World force so powerful as to make any aggression clearly futile," and he disclosed that he had instructed McNamara to reappraise the nation's entire defense strategy, with preliminary conclusions due by the end of February. Meanwhile, as stop-gap measures to remedy what he regarded as the most glaring inadequacies in the nation's existing defense posture, Kennedy called for an increase in the airlift capacity for conventional forces and an acceleration of the Polaris submarine program and of missile output. The rationale underlying these measures, as well as the entire massive arms buildup the Kennedy administration carried through in its first year in office, was defined in the State of the Union message as follows:

If we are to keep the peace, we need an invulnerable missile force powerful enough to deter any aggressor from even threatening an attack that he would know could not destroy enough of our force to prevent his own destruction. (213)

By the middle of March, McNamara had completed his comprehensive review of U.S. defense capabilities. On the basis of his findings, Kennedy sent to Congress on March 26 a Special Presidential Message, which included what Sorenson calls "the first full statement of a coherent national defense doctrine for the age of mutual nuclear capabilities." (214) The heart of this section of the message, which was to serve as one of the basic principles of the Kennedy administration's defense policies, was the statement:

Our strategic arms and defenses must be adequate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or our allies—by making it clear to any potential aggressor that sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive a first strike and penetrate his defenses in order to inflict unacceptable losses upon him.(215)

The goal Kennedy set for the nation, therefore, was neither strategic parity with the USSR nor a modest level of superiority, but a preponderance

so decisive that the Soviet leaders would be under no temptation to launch a nuclear-missile attack on the United States. This goal, clearly stated in the March 28 message, in no way constitutes an admission of U.S. strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR, as George and Smoke seem to think. (216)

Included in the March 28 message were recommendations for a rapid buildup of conventional (nonnuclear) forces, requiring an additional \$650 million.(217) The purpose of these moves was essentially based on the arguments voiced earlier by critics of the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" such as General Taylor. As Sorensen points out,

Kennedy inherited in 1961 a 1956 National Security Council directive relying chiefly on nuclear retaliation to any Communist action larger than a brush fire in general and to any serious Soviet military action whatsoever in Western Europe. . . . Because NATO strategy had a similar basis, no serious effort had been made to bring the force levels up to full strength, and our own Army had been sharply reduced in size. (218)

Development of tactical nuclear weapons, on which Dulles had once pinned his hopes, did not appeal to Kennedy as an answer to the search for greater flexibility, although his administration "increased the development and deployment of those weapons world-wide, and by 60 percent in Western Europe alone."(219) Kennedy's skepticism in this area was the result of his inability to see any real difference between the use of the "small" nuclear weapons and the larger strategic bombs. It was his belief that "once an exchange of these weapons started. . . there was no well-defined dividing line that could keep the big bomb out."(220)

To solve this dilemma, the administration developed what Sorensen calls "the new Kennedy-McNamara doctrine on conventional forces," which he summarizes as follows:

The essence of this doctrine was choice: If the President was to have balanced range of forces from which to select the most appropriate response for each situation—if this country was to be able to confine a limited challenge to the local and nonnuclear level, without permitting a Communist victory—then it was necessary to build our own nonnuclear forces to the point where any aggressor would be confronted with the same poor choice Kennedy wanted to avoid: humiliation or escalation. (221)

The "Kennedy-McNamara doctrine," first articulated in the message of March 28, 1961, was further developed in a Special Message on Urgent National Needs, which Kennedy presented before Congress on May 25. In this message he requested additional funds to upgrade and strengthen the regular army, special forces and unconventional warfare units, the reserves, and the Marine Corps. Implementation of these plans, he said, "... will allow us to almost double the combat power of the Army in less than two months, compared to

the nearly nine months heretofore required."(222)

The doctrine on which this military buildup was based, according to Sorensen, was "the heart and hard core of his [Kennedy's] military response to the 1961 Berlin crisis."(223) That being the case, one is confronted by a seeming paradox: The enormous military buildup carried through by the Kennedy administration in its first three months in office, a buildup that raised total defense expenditures by nearly \$1 billion (excluding foreign military aid)(224) was undertaken before the Kennedy administration showed any real awareness that a new crisis in Berlin was about to break out. For despite all Kennedy's warnings in the 1961 campaign that a new Berlin crisis was to be expected no later than the spring of 1961, he and his advisers seem largely to have ignored the numerous indicators that pointed to imminent trouble in that area.

The Kennedy administration's perception of the Berlin situation, January - Way 1961

The problem of Berlin had preoccupied Kennedy long before he entered the White House. In a speech in December 1959, he had expressed the hope for a "long-range solution" of the problem, through some form of Soviet-Western agreement "which would respect the relative position of both of us in that section of Europe and still permit Berlin to live easier," (225) and he returned to the theme in a speech of June 14, 1960. (226) The next month, early in the presidential campaign, he accepted an offer by Adlai Stevenson to prepare a report on foreign policy which, when it was delivered in mid-November, included Berlin among the questions requiring the new administration's "immediate attention." (227)

By the time Kennedy took office, however, the most urgent foreign policy problem confronting Washington appeared to be the threatened collapse of the American-sponsored royal government in Laos in the face of a Soviet-supported insurgent drive, and perhaps for that reason Kennedy and his advisers devoted little attention to Berlin. (228) It was not until early March that the administration began seriously to concern itself with the Berlin problem, and then the stimulus was evidently the publication in the Soviet press on March 3 of the Soviet aide-mémoire to West Germany of February 17. (229) There followed a flurry of statements by spokesmen of the administration: a press conference statement by Rusk affirming U.S. intentions to maintain its rights in Berlin; an official denial of reports that the United States was considering reducing its garrison in Berlin; and a statement by newly appointed Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman that "all discussion on Berlin must begin from the start," (230) a statement Schlesinger characterizes as "a move to disengage Kennedy from the concessions the Eisenhower administration had made in 1959 and even more from the ones we had been informed Eisenhower was ready to make at the 1961 summit meeting in Paris." (231)

The ominous report sent by Ambassador Thompson on his March 9 meeting with Khrushchev, however, seems finally to have prodded Kennedy into turning his attention toward Berlin. It was at about this time, at any rate, that Kennedy asked Dean Acheson "to undertake special studies of the problems of NATO and Germany," not because he shared Acheson's hard-line views on Berlin but because he "considered Acheson one of the most intelligent and experienced men around and did not see why he should not avail himself of 'hard' views before making his own judgments." (232)

There was still no sense of urgency, however, nor any realization that a new crisis might be brewing; Kennedy's special defense message of March 28 contained no reference to Berlin as a potential trouble spot, and apparently his staff completely missed the clear warning signal in the Warsaw Pact communiqué published on March 31.(233)

When Kennedy played host to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in early April, the most urgent item on the agenda was the crisis in Laos, but time was found for Acheson to present preview of his report on Berlin. The report followed closely the lines Acheson had developed in his March 1959 critique of the Eisenhower-Dulles policy on Berlin. As summarized by Schlesinger, Acheson said it looked

... as if the Soviet Union planned to force the Berlin issue this year. He did not believe that Berlin could be satisfactorily settled apart from the larger question of Germany; and he saw no prospect of any agreement on either Berlin or Germany compatible with the interests of the west. Therefore, when Khrushchev moved to cut off West Berlin the allies must instantly demonstrate their determination to stand up to the Soviet challenge. Skipping over possibilities of diplomatic or economic response, Acheson crisply offered a formidable catalogue of military countermeasures, concluding tentatively in favor of sending a division down the Autobahn. . . If the Russians resisted the probe, then at least the west would know where it stood, and it could rally and rearm as it did during the Korean war.(234)

It seemed like a replay of the debate between the Eisenhower administration and the British in the early months of 1959, except that this time Macmillan kept silent, leaving the task of advocating the diplomatic approach to this foreign secretary, Lord Home. (235)

Whether because he found Kennedy a sympathetic personality, considered it futile to combat Acheson's vigorous presentation of his thesis, or recognized that the United States was now boldly reasserting its leadership of the Western alliance, Macmillan seems to have gracefully accepted the role of a supporting rather than a principal actor in the drama that was about to unfold. The communiqué issued at the end of the Kennedy-Macmillan talks mentioned the "critical problem of Laos and Vietnam," and expressed hope for an agreement with the USSR in the test-ban talks at Geneva, but said

nothing about Berlin. (236)

Berlin was prominently featured, however, in a joint statement issued on April 13 by Kennedy and Adenauer following the latter's two-day visit to Washington. The statement blandly ignored the Soviet proposals on Berlin and Germany, instead affirming the position of the two heads of government

. . . that only through the application of the principle of selfdetermination can a just and enduring solution be found for the problem of Germany including Berlin. They renewed their pledge to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin pending the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and the restoration of Berlin as the capital of a reunified country. (237)

The final base to be touched in Kennedy's contacts with the leaders of the Western alliance was Paris, where he planned to see de Gaulle at the end of May. Khrushchev's acceptance of the bid for a rendezvous at Vienna, however, had the effect of converting the Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting into a curtain-raiser before the main show. The two statesmen found themselves in agreement on the need for firmness in Berlin in case the USSR applied pressure. De Gaulle was reported to believe that "Khrushchev must be made to recognize that fighting around Berlin would mean a general war . . . the last thing Khrushchev wanted," to which Kennedy replied that "Khrushchev must understand that if necessary, we would go to nuclear war."(238) Things seemed not to have moved very far from the Dulles days of "massive retaliation."

Kennedy prepares for the Vienna meeting

To get set for his meeting with Khrushchev, Kennedy systematically canvassed the views of Americans who knew the Soviet leader at first hand or who had talked with him recently, and boned up on the records of previous summit meetings as well as a collection of Khrushchev's major speeches. (239) On the eve of his departure for Europe he told Hugh Sidey, the White House correspondent for Time magazine, that he had "two main considerations" in his forthcoming talks with Khrushchev: (1) the impasse in the nuclear testban talks, with mounting pressure in the United States for a resumption of testing and the growing (and well-founded) suspicion that the USSR was preparing to resume testing, and (2) the need "to warn Khrushchev on Berlin." "The President and all his Soviet experts," Sidey wrote, "felt that Berlin would be the real trouble spot of the year."

It was in that city that Kennedy felt Khrushchev could make a grave miscalculation. For in Berlin there was less of the vagueness that was inherent in Laos. In Berlin there were specific commitments, specific lines. This country would fight for the basic rights it retained in Berlin. War in Berlin was far more likely to bring on a world conflict than war in Laos. (240)

Recognising as he did the high degree of probability that a new international orisis over Berlin was about to break out, why did Kennedy not take some specific action to signal U.S. determination to maintain its rights there? Why, in effect, did he wait for Khrushchev to make the first move? The answer to these questions cannot be found in the difficulties of coordinating policies within the Western alliance, as had been true at an analogous stage in the 1958-59 crisis. Then there had been sharp disagreements between the United States and its allies over the risks inherent in the use of limited force as proposed by U.S. and NATO military commanders. Now there seemed general agreement that some form of limited force might have to be used.

Kennedy's restraint, it seems likely, was the result of his realization that U.S. and NATO military forces were completely unprepared for any serious test of strength with the USSR. Pentagon contingency plans for trouble in Berlin, McNamera reported in early May, "assumed almost immediate resort to nuclear war." (241)

It was at about this time that a large-scale troop exercise, Operation Long Thrust, involving the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division and the 1611th Air Transport Wing (MATS), together with other units, was cancelled on the day it was to have started. (242)

It seems probable that Kennedy's realisation of the imminence of a new crisis in Berlin, coupled with his discovery of the inadequacy of U.S. forces to cope with a situation calling for the application of limited military forces, contributed to his decision to ask Congress on May 25 for additional funds to strengthen the conventional armed forces and increase their mobility. (243)

The encounter at Vienna

In the two days Kennedy and Khrushchev spent together at Vienna (June 3 and 4), the American leader found his Soviet counterpart a tough and unvielding adversary. On the Berlin issue especially, the clash between the two men was direct and unmitigated. Despite Kennedy's categorical statement that Berlin was "a matter of the highest concern to the United States" in which "our national security was involved," (244) Khrushchev asserted that

. . . no force in the world could prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty by the end of the year. No further delay was possible or necessary. The sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. . . would have to be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty would be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggression against a peace-loving country with all the consequences ensuing therefrom. If East German borders—land, air or sea borders—were violated, they would be defended.(245)

The most Khrushchev was willing to concede was that

... a face-saving interim agreement might be reached to cover the next six months, but the USSR could no longer delay. Any continued Western presence inside East Germany after a peace treaty had ended the war would be illegal, humiliating, and a violation of East Germany's borders—and those borders would be defended. Force would be met by force. . The decision to sign a peace treaty in December (unless there was an interim six months' agreement) was firm and irrevocable.(246)

To nail down the Soviet position still more firmly, Khrushchev gave Kennedy an aide-mémoire on Germany at the end of their meeting, in which the same position was restated, though with a less categorical insistence on the six-month deadline. (247)

Khrushchev's position and motives at Vienna

The encounter with Khrushchev at Vienna was so "sobering" to Kennedy (his own word)(248) that a widely-accepted evaluation of the meeting has grown up picturing the Soviet leader as "bullying" or "browbeating" the American president, often with the added inference that Khrushchev's overbearing manner was the result of his belief that Kennedy had shown himself weak-willed and irresolute in the Bay of Pigs disaster, and could therefore be pushed around on Berlin.(249) Sorensen suggests that this evaluation, which he dismisses as a "legend," may have resulted from "over-management" of the press by Kennedy, who "... wanted no one to think that the surface cordiality in Vienna justified any notion of a new 'Spirit of Geneva, 1955,' or 'Spirit of Camp David, 1959.'"(250)

Sorensen is on the right track, I believe, in the explanation he offers for the widespread misconception of Kennedy's role at Vienna, but he fails to explain Khrushchev's behavior. To solve that problem, I suggest it will be useful to consider the position of Khrushchev himself and the pressures under which he was operating.

This study has presented evidence indicating that a decision was reached in the CPSU Presidium in mid-February 1961 to "solve" East Germany's security problem either along the lines of Khrushchev's program of a peace treaty with East Germany and the conversion of West Berlin into a "free city" or by physically severing West Berlin from the Soviet-occupied eastern sector. Khrushchev, in this view, was given six months to show he could solve the Berlin problem his way; if he failed, the alternative plan would be implemented.

Knowing as he did that by mid-February 1961 the policy of strategic bluff on which he had based his Berlin campaign in 1958-59 was no longer serviceable, Khrushchev faced a difficult task. Only by putting intense pressure on the United States could he hope to achieve his goal, yet the prospects for success in 1961 were far slimmer than they had been in 1958-59,

when at least some prominent Americans accepted Soviet claims for strategic superiority over the United States.

Another serious consideration in Khrushchev's task was his comparative ignorance of Kennedy's views and character. If the USSR precipitated a new crisis over Berlin, there was a definite risk that the United States might respond by using its superior nuclear arsenal. Khrushchev's confidential disclosure to Lippmann that he would not unleash a new Perlin crisis until he had had a face-to-face meeting with Kennedy indicates his perception of this danger, as does the concern he manifested over the possibility of U.S. intervention in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A paradoxical conclusion that emerges from this line of analysis is that Kennedy's best hope of avoiding a new crisis over Berlin lay in playing the part of an irresponsible, trigger-happy hothead, who might easily react to new Soviet pressure in Berlin by unleashing his heavy weapons—in effect, imitating Herman Kahn's description of a teenager playing the game of "chicken" who give "the appearance of being drunk, blind, and without a steering wheel."(251) Instead, Kennedy stressed the need for both sides to exercise caution and restraint, and went to great lengths to convey to Khrushchev his concern that war between the United States and the USSR might result from miscalculation or misunderstanding on either side.(252)

At Vienna, Kennedy completed the process of reassuring Khrushchev as to his sobriety and restraint, which he had begun with his letter to the Soviet leader pledging that the United States would not intervene directly in the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Vienna meeting therefore served Khrushchev as a testing ground with regard to the degree of risk involved in launching a new Berlin crisis, and so he was stating the simple truth when he said, in a radio and television report to the Soviet people on June 15, that the Vienna meeting was "more than worth while and, more than that, it had to be held." He went on to say that he had "formed the impression that President Kennedy appreciates the great responsibility that rests with the governments of two such might states," and he expressed the hope that "the time will come when Soviet-American relations will improve." (253)

At Vienna, Kennedy suggested a joint Soviet-U.S. program to prepare for a manned landing on the moon, but Khrushchev declined, saying "that the U.S. could better afford to go to the moon first and then the Soviet Union would follow."(254) This was the first indication that the USSR might be finding it difficult to keep up with the United States in space expenditures, and a foreshadowing of the Soviet decision at the end of July to drop out of the military bidding in the Berlin crisis.

During the Vienna talks, Khrushchev raised the subject of nuclear testing, saying, in Sorensen's paraphrase, that "Kennedy's defense requests put pressure on him to increase his forces, just as both of them were under pressure from their scientists and military to resume nuclear tests." Sorensen quotes Khrushchev as saying, "But we will wait for you to resume testing and, if you do, we will."(255)

The formal opening of the Soviet campaign

Reassured by his talks with Kennedy as to the American leader's sobriety and healthy fear of nuclear war, Khrushchev now took a series of steps that constituted his opening bid in the new Soviet campaign on Berlin. He had to work fast: On the hypothesis that the "collective leadership" in February had set a six-month deadline for a solution of the Berlin question, Khrushchev had a scant two months remaining in which to work. The broad military buildup already launched by the Kennedy administration consituted a sobering warning that any Soviet attempt to intimidate the United States would make little headway, while the Soviet recognition that the American now knew the true facts about Soviet ICBM strength still further lengthened the odds against Khrushchev. His off-the-cuff decision not to try to match the United States program of landing a man on the moon by 1970 showed he was acutely conscious of the pressures being exerted on the Soviet budget by the Soviet space program, always closely tied in with Soviet missile development.

From Khrushchev's standpoint, nevertheless, the effort to win a diplomatic victory over the United States in Berlin was worth making, not only because there was an outside chance it might be successful -- a prospect that must have appealed to the gambler in Khrushchev -- but for more cogent reasons: First, it would give him a new opportunity to appear before the world as the Soviet leader, brandishing his rockets and ordering the West to abandon its outpost in Berlin; second, even if, or rather especially if it failed, it could serve as a valuable smoke-screen behind which preparations could go forward for implementing the minimum goal adopted at the (hypothetical) mid-February meeting of the Presidium, the physical sealing off of West Berlin. That action, as Khrushchev could not fail to realize, also entailed a certain element of risk, since it would be a direct violation of the four-power agreements on the administration of Greater Berlin, which the Western Allies had pledged themselves to defend. Sealing off West Berlin, however, while risky, would mean a far less provocative challenge to the Western powers than the threat or actuality of interference with their rights of access to the city. They might even feel a certain sense of relief if Khrushchev and Ulbricht solved their problem in Berlin by means that left the Western position in the city intact. There was only one serious drawback to this line of reasoning, from Khrushchev's standpoint: In order to make a credible opening bid he would have to grant certain concessions to the Soviet military establishment, since their support would be essential to his endeavors.

Against this background, we can summarize Khrushchev's opening moves in the 1961 crisis.

(1) On June 15, as already noted, Khrushchev broadcast a report on the Vienna meeting to the Soviet people in which, for the first time in public, he announced the end-of-the-year deadline for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The speech was far less bellicose than many he had delivered during the 1958-59 crisis, however, and contained not

only words of praise for Kennedy but a strong defense of the Khrushchev version of peaceful coexistence.

(2) Six days later, at a formal meeting in Moscow to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Nazi attack on the USSR, Khrushchev, wearing the uniform of a lieutenant general (his wartime rank as a political adviser), delivered a ringing call for the elimination of the danger of a new war through signature of a peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year. Again he stated, as he had to Kennedy at Vienna, that the USSR would resume nuclear testing only if the United States did so: "Thus the entire responsibility for resumption of the testing of nuclear weapons will rest with the governments of the Western powers. (256) Again, even more than at Vienna, he showed an awareness of the heavy costs of military escalation. Citing the Kennedy administration's \$2.5 billion military buildup he said:

The Soviet government is doing everything in its power to end the arms race and to remove from the people's shoulders the heavy burden of military expenditures. Unfortunately, the imperialist powers are answering our call to compete in the production of material and spiritual values with increased military expenditures and expansion of their armed forces. This may confront the Soviet Union with the necessity of increasing allocations for armaments too, in order to strengthen and improve car defenses and, if necessary, also increasing the numerical strength of our armed forces in order, on the basis of our might, to ensure peace and peaceful coexistence.(257)

An extensive section of Khrushchev's June 21 speech was devoted to extolling the Soviet rocket troops and "their capacity to strike a retaliatory blow. . . which will inevitably punish an aggressor if he nevertheless decides on an act of folly and unleashes a new war." (258) Strikingly absent, however, were the claims for Soviet superiority in ICBM production that had marked so many of Khrushchev's speeches in 1958-59.

A prominent feature of the June 21 meeting was the presence of a solid phalanx of Soviet military leaders, headed by Defense Minister Malinovsky. By their speeches and physical presence the top brass were rendering public testimony to their solidarity with the First Secretary Premier.

(3) The price Khrushchev was required to pay for the military leaders' support was disclosed in a speech he delivered on July 8 to a class of graduating cadets. Citing the recent increases in the U.S. military budget, Khrushchev stated that "the Soviet government had been forced to issue instructions to the Minister of Defense to suspend temporarily, pending a special order, the reduction in the armed forces planned for 1961," and to put through a 3 billion ruble increase in military expenditures for the current year—approximately a 25 percent hike.

Khrushchev defended these moves as "temporary," and asserted, not very convincingly, that they would not result in a lowering of Soviet funds for

investment in consumers' goods, agriculture, and other nonmilitary needs. (259)

While Khrushchev was carrying out these steps, the East German political boss, Walter Ulbricht, was manifesting unmistakable signs of incipient euphoria. At a press conference on June 15, Ulbricht almost openly predicted the construction of a wall to seal off West Berlin and dropped broad hints that this action would mean the end of unrestricted Western access to the city by air. (260)

Kennedy girds for the crisis

The Vienna meeting brought Kennedy face to face with the crisis he had so long expected. Khruschev's double-barreled approach-his unyielding oral presentation of the Soviet position (given, it should be noted, under the watchful eyes of two hard-liners on Berlin, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador to the United States Menshikov), followed by the statement of the same demands in the aide-mémoire (obviously prepared in advance of the meeting, and thus carrying the approval of the full Presidium, including the now recovered Kozlov) left no room for doubt that the long-anticipated storm was at hand. One illusion was still left to Kennedy, however, that he had six months in which to prepare before the USSR lowered the boom. A great deal of the acute tension of the next few months was because the Soviets made their key move, the construction of the Berlin Wall, on August 12, at a time when Kennedy thought he still had several months to maneuver and negotiate. It was widely believed in Washington that the USSR might announce its decision to sign a peace treaty with East Germany at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, due to take place in the second half of October. Another favored date was late September, following scheduled elections in West Germany.

Not that Kennedy procrastinated; his actions during June and July conveyed a sense of urgency that reflected his "somber" clash with Khrushchev at Vienna. The British too, this time, seemed reconciled to the need to reply to Soviet pressure with limited force. In London on June 5 and 6, Kennedy told Macmillan:

. . . military planning in Berlin had to be stepped up. They would have to decide what the West should do in a series of contingencies—if the Russians signed the treaty but made no changes in the existing arrangements; or if they interrupted the civilian supply of West Berlin; or if they interrupted military traffic. (261)

This time Macmillan raised no strong objections.

Significantly, Kennedy's catalogue of possible Soviet actions concentrated on steps Khrushchev had frequently threatened to take but which the USSR, in fact, never took, and omitted two it did take—the building of the Berlin Wall and the resumption of nuclear testing. By placing heavy emphasis on the alleged

intention to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year, and by assuring Kennedy that the USSR would not resume testing unless the United States did so first, Khrushchev had thrown sand in Kennedy's eyes and has maximized the factor of surprise in preparation for the forthcoming Soviet campaign.

One positive result of Khrushchev's truculence at Vienna, from Kennedy's standpoint, was that it helped persuade Congress that the military buildup he had been calling for was indeed necessary. On June 21, Congress passed a \$12.6 billion procurement bill covering not only the missiles, warships, and aircraft Kennedy had requested, but half a billion dollars for the continued procurement of heavy bombers, which he had not.(262) On the following day, Rusk replied to the Khrushchev speech of the 21st with a categorical warning that

... the three Western powers... are in Berlin not by sufferance but by right and those rights can't be terminated by unilateral action by the Soviet Union. You start from there. And our commitments to the people of 'West Berlin are very strong and very far-reaching.(263)

During this period of mounting tension, Acheson finally produced the report on Berlin which Kennedy had called for in March. Schlesinger describes the report, which has not yet been published, as "a long and powerful paper," and summarizes it as follows:

Acheson's basic thesis. . . was that West Berlin was not a problem but a pretext. Khrushchev's demands had nothing to do with Berlin, Germany or Europe. His object, as Acheson saw it, was not to rectify a local situation but to test the general American will to resist; his hope was that, by making us back down on a sacred commitment, he could shatter our world power and influence. This was a simple conflict of wills, and, until it was resolved, any effort to negotiate the Berlin issue per se would be fatal. Since there was nothing to negotiate, willingness on our part to go to the conference table would be taken in Moscow as evidence of weakness and make the crisis so much worse.

Khrushdev had only dared precipitate the crisis, Acheson continued, because his fear of nuclear war declined. Our problem was to convince him that that complacency was misplaced and that we would, in fact, go to nuclear war rather than abandon the status quo. This called for the buildup--prompt, serious and quiet--of both our conventional and nuclear forces. . . . The moment there was an interruption of access itself, we must act: first an airlift--and then, if that could not be sustained against Soviet counter-measures, a ground probe in force too large to be stopped by East German border troops alone. . . . There was a substantial chance, Acheson said, that the necessary military preparations would by themselves cause Khrushchev to alter his purpose; but he added frankly that there was a substantial possibility that nuclear war might result. (264)

Although the major thrust of his paper was its emphasis on military power, Acheson also considered the possibility of negotiations, but only after Khrushchev had retreated in the face of the Western arms buildup.

Acheson's paper generated a fierce debate in the Kennedy administration between the "hard-line" advocates of a military response to the Soviet challenge and those, including some ranking Soviet affairs specialists, who believed Khrushchev's objectives might be limited and open to bargaining. (265) Gradually it became clear that the President himself, who had sat "poker-faced" (Schlesinger's description) through Acheson's preliminary presentation in April, was among the advocates of negotiation. Throughout the 1961 crisis, he was to emphasize repeatedly the need to present something more than a military response to the Soviet challenge, the need to have a positive negotiating position as an alternative to the threat of armed conflict. Here, however, Kennedy found himself entangled in the thorny problem of coordinating a position with America's allies, a problem that was to prove one of his most frustrating experiences throughout the crisis. Even to get prompt action from the State Department turned out to be unexpectedly difficult, and Kennedy fumed at what he regarded as the excessive time it took to prepare an official reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire on June 4. When one was finally forthcoming, he liked it so little that he asked Sorensen to prepare a shorter, more cogent variant, with the result that there were two U.S. replies, the State Department note issued on July 17 and Sorensen's variant, which appeared two days later.

Meanwhile, on June 28, Kennedy issued a statement designed to leave no doubt in Soviet minds about the unalterable determination of the United States to maintain its position and rights in West Berlin. The statement raised the conflict to the level of a test of fundamental U.S. policy. "This is not just a question of legal rights," Kennedy said.

. . . It involves the peace and the security of the people of West Berlin. It involves the direct responsibilities and commitments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It involves the peace and the security of the Western world. (266)

The U.S. response to Khrushchev's July 8 speech

Khrushchev's speech to the graduating cadets, in which he announced an increase in Soviet military spending, was immediately accepted in Washington as a formal statement of the Soviet intention to force the issue and to lay down a direct challenge to the United States. At a meeting of the National Security Council on the day after Khrushchev's speech, Kennedy ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. military capabilities. (267) The meeting saw a sharp debate between supporters of Acheson's "hard-line" approach and his critics, who believed a willingness to negotiate was essential if catastrophe was to be avoided. The latter group, which included presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., had been encouraged by

Kennedy to prepare a summary of their views as an alternative to Acheson's call for all-out military preparations, including the proclamation of a national emergency. (268)

While the debate was raging, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Menshikov, indiscreetly expressed in public a view that he had no doubt been cabling back to Moscow, namely that "When the chips are down, the United States won't fight." (269) Asked to comment at a news conference on July 19, Kennedy said drily, "We intend to honor our commitments." (270)

Kennedy raises the ante

Kennedy's formal response to Khrushchev's opening bid in the conflict over Berlin took the form of a radio and television report to the American people on July 25.(271) In it he summed up everything he had learned in the long struggle over Berlin stretching back to the Second World War. The speech crystallized his thinking on the whole complex of problems centering on Berlin: the historical origins of the problem and the legal basis of western rights in the city; the reason Berlin had become "the focal point where our solemn commitments. . . and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation:" the way in which Communist challenges in Berlin and elsewhere had tested and strengthened the Western alliance; the relation between the current crisis and the administration's long-range buildup program; the willingness of the United States to consider "any arrangement or treaty in Germany consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom, and with the legitimate security interests of all nations; and—in a final lapidary summation, the basic issue starkly set forth: . . . we seek peace but we shall not surrender." Kennedy closed with a fervent warning of the danger of nuclear war resulting from "any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other," and an appeal to the American people for understanding and support.

From the standpoint of the present study, the most significant passage in the July 25 speech was the list of additional military measures Kennedy said he would ask Congress to authorize, as follows:

- 1. An additional \$3.247 billion for the armed forces;
- 2. An increase in the army's total authorized strength from 875,000 to approximately 1 million men;
- 3. Increases in the active duty strength of the Navy by 29,000 and of the Air Force by 63,000;
- 4. A doubling and tripling of draft calls in coming months, the call-up of reserve units and extension of terms of duty, and the ordering to active duty of air transport squadrons, both regular and National Guard;

- 5. Retention or reactivation of ships and planes previously headed for retirement, together with deactivation of B-47 bombers;
- 6. The procurement of nonnuclear weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Kennedy also called for an additional \$207 million in Civil Defense appropriations, bringing his total new defense budget requests to \$3.454 billion. This brought to more than \$6 billion the increases he had requested since January, with a resulting projected deficit of over \$5 billion. Appropriately, part of the July 25 speech was concerned with an analysis of the nation's economic health, which Kennedy confidently asserted was strong enough to sustain the effort he called for.

Kennedy's July 25 speech and the measures it set in motion mark the real turning point in the Berlin crisis of 1961. The program it outlined constituted both a reasonsed response to the Soviet challenge and a massive counterchallenge, which had behind it the entire weight of the U.S. economy, now well on its way to recovery from the stagnation that had marked the final years of the Eisenhower administration.

Khrushchev opts out

Reports of Kennedy's July 25 speech reached Khristnev two day later at Sochi, where he was vacationing. An American, John McCloy, Kennedy's special representative for Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks, was present and able to observe and report Khrushchev's reaction.(272) Stripped of its emotional rhetoric, it boiled down to an admission that the USSR would not attempt to meet the massive U.S. challenge. Khrushchev gave McCloy no hint of any decision to seal off West Berlin, but he did reveal that Soviet technical preparations for the resumption of nuclear testing were well advanced and that they included the detonation of a mammoth 100-megaton bomb. Another fact Khrushchev did not divulge to his American guest was that he was host that day to a delegation from Communist North Vietnam and that a decision was taken at about this time to grant that nation Soviet military aid, with which it would be able to expand its program of infiltration and subversion against non-Communist South Vietnam.

The evidence indicates, then, that Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's July 25 speech included the following decisions: (1) to drop out of the military arms race; (2) to initiate steps leading to the physical isolation of West Berlin; (3) to go shead with preparations for the resumption of nuclear testing; and (4)(probably) to grant Soviet military aid to North Vietnes, which may have appeared to Khrushchev as an economical means of countering the massive buildup of U.S. military power called for by Kennedy.

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The August climax: the Berlin Wall

There is evidence suggesting that Khrushchev's decision to switch from the maximum to the minimum goal on Berlin was approved by the collective leadership at an unannounced meeting of the Presidium early in August, and communicated to the leaders of the satellite nations at a conference of the Warsaw Pact powers on August 3 - 5.(273) To help minimize the danger that the Western allies, especially West Germany, would react violently to the construction of the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev delivered a series of inflammatory speeches and public statements threatening the West with dire consequences if it dared challenge Soviet policy in Germany.(274) To maintain the Soviet cover story, however, he still defined that policy in terms of the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany no later than the end of the year.

Among those who recognized the likelihood of an imminent Soviet-East German move to choke off West Berlin were those who had the most to lose, the alert citizens of the GDR. Forewarned by Khrushchev's renewal of the Soviet campaign on Berlin at Vienna, record numbers of East Germans streamed into the West Berlin refugee centers during July and early August. (275) In a series of legislative measures, the GDR tried to stem the flow, but the effect was simply to heighten the sense of panic that had begun to grip East Germany. (276)

To provide an additional guarantee against any Western inclination to use force in Berlin, the USSR moved two divisions into positions around the city just before construction of the wall began. (277)

Somehow, the increasingly clear indications of a Soviet-East German decision to close the border in Berlin failed to register in Washington, though there were some perspicacious U.S. officials who wondered aloud why East Germany didn't solve its refugee problem by stringent border control measures. (278)

Viewed as a problem in tactics, the border-sealing operation was a model of effectiveness. When the East German border police put up the first obstacles along the East-West sector line on the night of August 12 - 13, they caught the Western nations totally unprepared, and a period of disarray and confusion followed in Washington. (279) The most urgent question now confronting Kennedy was whether the East German action—a clear violation of the wartime agreements on the four-power administration of Berlin—should be contested by force. He decided that it should not, for reasons Sorensen summarizes:

Kennedy promptly turned to his aides and allies for advice, but there was little useful they could say in such a situation.

. . . All agreed . . . that the Wall . . . was illegal, immoral and inhumane, but not a cause for war. It ended West Berlin's role as a showcase and escape route for the East, but it did not interfere with

the three basic objectives the West had long stressed: our presence in West Berlin, our access to West Berlin and the freedom of West Berliners to choose their own system. Not one responsible official—in this country, in West Berlin, West Germany or Western Europe—suggested that allied forces should march into East German territory and tear the Wall down. (280)

The accelerated U.S. military buildup in August

If force was inapplicable as a response to the wall, there were other ways in which it could be and was employed to express American determination. Even before the wall went up, Congress authorized the call-up of as many as 250,000 reservists.(281) This was followed by the authorization of additional sums for weapons procurement on August 3.(282) On August 6, the U.S. Third Army and 40,000 Air Force reserves conducted Operation Swift Strike I, just before the call-up of reserves.(283)

After the construction of the wall, U.S. military actions came thick and fast. On August 14, the Navy announced it would hold 26,800 officers and men on active duty for six to twelve months beyond normal terms. (284) On August 16, 113 Reserve and National Guard units were alerted and 84,000 enlistments were extended beyond normal release dates. (285)

These moves were made in line with the program announced in the President's speech of July 25, though they may have been accelerated by the sense of urgency that resulted from the wall. That action, with its revelation that the Western powers had been, in effect, preparing for the wrong challenge, generated pressure for a military response, especially in West Berlin itself, where the construction of the wall and the apparent inability of the West to take any effective countermeasures were creating a serious morale problem. It was primarily to meet this need that Kennedy on August 17 ordered the dispatch to West Berlin of a battle group of 1,500 men along the autobahn from West Germany. (286) Here at last, it seemed, was the contingency plan for which Acheson, Taylor, and others had been calling, but under very different circumstances from those they had envisaged: instead of being a move to warn the USSR against taking a decisive step in the Berlin situation, it was a move designed to prop up West Berlin's sagging morale after a definitive Soviet move. In size and scope, too, the battle group operation differed from earlier contingency plans, which had usually called for the employment of at least a division. By reason of its diminutive size, the battle group's deployment was clearly a symbolic gesture: It was too small to represent any real challenge even to the East German "people's police" or any effective reinforcement to the Western garrison in Berlin; it was large enough to make plain the continuing U.S. commitment to West Berlin.

The period during which the battle group was en route to Berlin across East German territory provided some of Kennedy's most anxious moments, but

the operation was carried out successfully and achieved its aim: The U.S. commitment to West Berlin had been visibly reaffirmed and the morale of its citizens began to recover from the low ebb of the immediate post-wall depression. (287)

One inadvertent by-product of the movement of the battle group to Berlin was the establishment of a precedent that gave the Soviets added leverage over U.S. troop movements along the autobahn. According to Schick, the commander of the battle group, in order to expedite its passage, "... accepted a Soviet request at the checkpoint to dismount his troops for a head count... a request U.S. commanders had previously refused." "His action," writes Schick, "stuck as official practice between 1961 and 1963."(288)

America's major allies, Britain and France, to shoulder a larger part of the military burden. In this effort he had only mixed success. The British, though willing to support the United States verbally, were hard put to it to come up with any actual reinforcements, since they were suffering the adverse effects of a financial crisis coupled with sharp demands on their available troop reserves in Kuwait. The French, too, though sympathetic to U.S. policy in words, made little tangible contribution to the Western buildup. In the immediate aftermath of the construction of the Berlin Wall, however, both nations did order reinforcements for NATO forces in Germany: On August 17, it was reported that the French had announced plans to strengthen their ground and air forces in West Germany and continental France, while the United Kingdom was reported to have ordered limited reinforcement of its tactical units in West Germany and the recall of an armored unit from Kuwait to serve as the nucleus of a new strategic reserve division capable of reinforcing the British Army of the Rhine. (289)

U.S. response to the heightened tension generated by the Berlin Wall included the passage by Congress on August 16 of two key measures: a \$46.5 billion defense appropriation covering virtually all the points specified in Kennedy's speech of July 25, as well as funds for extra bomber procurement and a further \$180 million for accelerated development of the supersonic B-70 bombers; and a bill providing the extra funds Kennedy had requested to launch the U.S. program to land a man on the moon by 1970.(290)

The opposition in the Kremlin takes charge

Immediately after the construction of the wall, and as soon as it was clear that the Western powers were not going to challenge that act by force, Khrushchev left Moscow for an extended vacation in Sochi. There is evidence to indicate that he returned to the Kremlin briefly on August 16 to take several actions: to dispatch a personal message to Adenauer via Ambassador

Smirnov reassuring the West German leader about Soviet intentions in Berlin, and to order the recall of the Soviet ambassador to Albania. (291) Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev resumed his interrupted vacation, and he remained at Sochi until the end of August.

During the period Khrushchev was absent from Moscow, the Soviet and East German governments took a series of steps constituting a more extreme challenge to the Western position in Berlin than any previous Communist actions.

- (1) On August 22, the East German government closed all but one of the border crossing points in Berlin open for "foreigners," including members of the Western occupation forces, and ordered the establishment of a 100-meter no-man's-land on either side of the sector boundary. (292)
- (2) On the following day, Soviet notes were sent to the three Western Allies accusing them of using the air corridors to West Berlin to transport "revanchists, extremists, saboteurs, and spies," and for the first time threatening direct Soviet interference with Western access to the city by air.(293) "In making these claims," a British observer writes, "... the Soviet authorities were crossing the boundary between claims for which some legal basis could be found... and trespassing into the area where force would be necessary to establish their claims."(294)

The August 23 note thus for the first time presented a direct challenge to rights Kennedy had explicitly vowed to defend. Washington's response was prompt and clear. A White House statement issued on August 24 called the Soviet charges and allegations "false, as the Soviet government well knows," and it warned that

. . . any interference by the Soviet Government or its East German regime with free access to West Berlin would be an aggressive act for the consequences of which the Soviet Government would bear full responsibility. (295)

This time, U.S. allies responded with almost equal alacrity, and on the 26th, the United Kingdom and France sent protests to the USSR restating the warning contained in the U.S. note of August 23.(296) meanwhile, to counter the GDR border control measure ordered on August 22, he U.S. commandant in Berlin on the 24th ordered the deployment of a thousand troops, with tanks, along the East-West sector border.(297)

- (3) On August 29, the Soviet government announced the "temporary deferment" of reservists from the Soviet Army and Navy, a move explicitly linked with the "immediate conclusion of a German peace treaty . . . by the end of this year." (298)
- (4) On the following day, the Soviet government announced it would resume the testing of nuclear weapons. Professing reluctance to take this step, the note said the USSR had been forced to do so "under the pressure of the international situation being created by the imperialist forces." (299)

While these actions were being taken in Moscow, Khrushchev, in Sochi, was stressing the Soviet desire for negotiations on Germany as a means to head off the threat of war between the USSR and the Western powers. On August 24, he told columnist Drew Pearson of his desire for talks with the Western powers on Berlin and Germany, (300) and two days later he sent an urgent message to C. L. Sulzberger, senior diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, proposing an interview. (The interview with Sulzberger took place after Khrushchev's return to Moscow, on September 6.) (301)

The complex and apparently contradictory pattern of Soviet policy in the period from August 22 to 31 is interpreted in diametrically opposite ways by the "traditionalists" and myself. Schick, for example, sees the bellicose Soviet statements and actions of this period as means to apply further pressure to the West and as responses to Kennedy's program of military buildup. Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, according to Schick, was intended to underline the lunacy of war."(302) My explanation for the "dialectical contradictions" of Soviet policy in this period is simple: During Khrushchev's absence from the Kremlin, his internal opponents seized control of Soviet policymaking and put through a series of measures that brought the USSR and the Western powers close to the brink of war.(303)

An added advantage of this approach is that it provides an explanation of the no less confusing and apparently contradictory pattern of Soviet foreign policy in the period from early September to the end of October 1961. It will be convenient to summarize the principal moves in chronological order:

- (1) The new Soviet nuclear test series began on September 1 and continued thereafter at short intervals until October 31, when the USSR detonated a super-bomb with a yield estimated at 50 megatons. (304)
- (2) On September 13, Kozlov, addressing a congress of the North Korean Communist party in Pyongyang, disclosed that the December 31 deadline for the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany had been lifted, a disclosure that passed almost unnoticed in the West.(305)
- (3) The next day, Soviet fighter planes buzzed two U.S. commercial airliners en route to Berlin.(306) This was the last direct Soviet threat to Western access to Berlin by air during 1961, however; in the words of a British observer, "A turning point in the crisis seemed to have been reached and passed."(307)
- (4) On September 20, before Kozlov had returned to Moscow, U.S. and Soviet negotiators reached agreement on a statement of basic principles to govern disarmament talks between the two powers. (308)
- (5) On September 24, a personal emissary of Khrushchev sought out Pierre Salinger, White House press secretary, and delivered a confidential

message to Kennedy from Khrushchev assuring him that "the storm in Berlin is over." (309)

(6) Finally, on October 17, in his opening address to the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev told the West what it was anxiously waiting to hear:

The question of a time limit for the signing of a German peace treaty will not be so important if the Western powers show a readiness to settle the German problem; we shall not in that case absolutely insist on signing the peace treaty before December 31, 1961.(310)

With this lifting of the deadline, one might think, the 1961 crisis should have been finally over. Not so: there was to be one final moment of acute lension and anxiety, a Soviet-U.S. tank confrontation in Berlin on October 27. Before we consider that event, however, it will be useful to summarize U.S. military actions in the period from early September through mid-October.

U.S. military moves. September - October

Spurred on by the Soviet actions of the last ten days of August, the U.S. armed forces in September and October rapidly embarked on the program of expansion and upgrading called for in Kennedy's speech of July 25. Sorensen summarizes the moves of the second half of 1961 as follows:

Some 158,000 men, Reservists and Guardsmen, mostly for the Army, were actually called up; and altogether the strength of our armed forces was increased by 300,000 men before winter. Some 40,000 were sent to Europe and others were prepared for swift deployment. Six 'priority divisions' in the Reserves were made ready for quick mobilization, and three Regular Army divisions engaged in training were converted to full combat readiness.

Along with the manpower, the Berlin build-up provided enough equipment and ammunition to supply the new troops, enough sealift and airlift to transport them and enough airpower to cover ground combat. Some three hundred tactical fighter aircraft, more than 100,000 tons of equipment and several thousand tanks, jeeps, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles were placed in position on the European continent and still more on 'floating depot' ships.(311)

The following list of specific actions is not complete, but it conveys a vivid impression of the sense of urgency that animated U.S. policymakers at this time:

(1) On September 2, four fighter squadrons (seventy_two planes) were sent to Europe to participate in war games.(312)

- (2) On September 5, after Khrushchev's rejection of a personal plea from Kennedy and Macmillan to halt the Soviet series of atomic tests, Kennedy ordered the resumption of underground testing by the United States. The first U.S. test in the new series, a small-yield improvised shot because of the lack of advance preparations, took place on September 15.(313)
- (3) Between September 7 and 26, the 101st Airborne Division, together with the 1611th Air Transport Wing (C-135s), other units, and forces from Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom took part in NATO Exercise Checkmate I.(314) Ships of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean also participated in the exercise.(315)
- (4) On September 13, nearly 2,000 naval air reservists were recalled to duty.(316)
- (5) Between September 15 and 25, the 101st Airborne Division took part in Exercise Checkmate II, at Adama, Turkey.(317)
- (6) On September 19, 2 Army National Guard divisions and 249 smaller reserve and guard units were ordered to active duty.(318)
- (7) On September 20, two ships of the Sixth Fleet, the Newman K. Perry (DDR-883) and the Haynsworth (DD-700) visited Eregli, Turkey, during a cruise of the Black Sea.(319)
- (8) During the period from August to December 1961, the following Air National Guard units were called to active duty: the 102nd Tactical Fighter Wing, the 152nd Tactical Control Group, and the 7108th, 7117th, 7121st, 7122nd, and 7131st Tactical Wings.
- (9) During the second half of 1961, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, was augmented by eight TAC fighter squadrons, subsequently supplemented by eleven National Guard tactical fighter and reconnaissance squadrons.
- (10) On October 14-15, operation Sky Shield II was conducted, the largest air defense maneuvers ever held up to that time.
- (11) During October, the 1611th Air Transport Wing, employing thirteen C-118s, moved Air National Guard units to Europe in Operation Stair Step. (320)

The tank confrontation of October 27

The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU opened in Moscow on October 17 with a lengthy report for the Central Committee by Khrushchev, in the course of which he announced the lifting of the December 1961 deadline for the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. Following this contribution to the relaxation of international tensions, Khrushchev pushed on to what was

evidently, in his eyes, the central task of the Congress—discussion and approval of a new party program (the first since 1919), the major feature of which was the forecast that the USSR would enter the era of full Communism by 1980.

Contrary to Khrushchev's hopes and expectations, however, the Twenty-second Congress turned out to be a tense and dramatic battleground, at which sharp clashes took place between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and those of Albania and China. During the congress, Khrushchev reopened old party wounds with a slashing attack on Stalin, culminating in the demand for the removal of his corpse from the mausoleum on Red Square. Finally, the congress witnessed a vigorous battle between Khrushchev and his followers, on the one side, and party functionaries opposed to him on the other, over the question of his powers as first secretary, a battle that ended in Khrushchev's defeat and the elevation of Kozlov to the position of number two man in the Secretariat.(321)

It was while these turbulent developments were taking place that the tank confrontation of October 27 occurred. The event presents a sharp challenge to analysts of Soviet policy. Why did the USSR choose this particular moment, ten days after Khrushchev had defused the crisis, to bring tension in Berlin close to the flash point, with the issue of war or peace dependent on the steadiness of nerves of tank crews and their commanders?

"Traditionalist" analysts of the Berlin crisis meet this difficulty in various ways, none of them very satisfactory. Schick simply ignores the tank confrontation.(322) George and Smoke mention it, but dismiss it as one of a series of "minor probes around Berlin" by the Soviet forces, though they concede it was "the most spectacular." At a later point in their analysis, they downgrade it still farther, calling it "probably unnecessary," and citing it as one of a series of actions by General Lucius Clay that "caused a number of very sharp reactions to local incidents" in Berlin.(323) This evaluation, in my opinion, indicates a fundamental misunderstanding not only of Soviet policy but also of the basic issues in the Berlin conflict.

The issue at stake, as Clay recognized, was the Soviet and East German challenge to the continuing validity of the wartime four-power agreements on the administration of Berlin, providing for the right of unimpeded access by Western military personnel to all sectors of the city, including that occupied by the USSR. This right was challenged on October 22 by an administrative measure enacted by East German authorities, the demand that Western military personnel in civilian clothes present identity cards to the East German border police when entering East Gerlin. This action, which led directly to the tank confrontation, constitutes, in the view of a British observer, a break in the pattern of Soviet policy after Khrushchev's speech of October 17 "which is difficult to explain." (324)

The explanation, as I have tried to show in The Berlin Crisis of 1961, is a complicated one, involving the drastic deterioration in Soviet-Albanian

and Soviet-Chinese relations that occurred at the Twenty-second Congress; Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempt to reestablish his unchallenged authority over the party, using the anti-Stalin issue as his principal weapon; Kozlov's covert defiance of Khrushchev, his siding with the Chinese, and his conniving with Ulbricht to stage a direct provocation to Western rights in Berlin; and Kozlov's ultimate triumph, achieved by means of the pressure exerted on Khrushchev by the tank confrontation, which was called off by the USSR as soon as word was received in East Berlin of the outcome of the struggle for power in Moscow. (325)

Whatever explanation of the tank confrontation one accepts—and it is an event that urgently demands explanation—the only aspect of the incident relevant to the present study is the use of force by the USSR and the United States. The point at which Soviet forces reluctantly moved their tanks up to the sector boundary, facing those previously deployed by the United States, signifies the Soviet leadership's acknowledgment that the four-power administrative structure of Berlin still retained its validity and a tacit admission that the USSR could not turn over to East German authorities its responsibilities in the city. The withdrawal of the Soviet tanks on the morning of October 28 amounted to an open confession that they had been defeated in the test of wills. Seen in this light, the tank confrontation marked the real climax of the entire U.S.—Soviet tug-of-war that had started with Khrushchev's speech of November 10, 1958.

The scaling-down of the crisis

October 28 can be regarded as the real end of the Berlin crisis of 1961. There were to be flareups and tension in early 1962, but when the next major Soviet-U.S. test of will occurred, Cuba, not Berlin, was to be the focus. For some time, the U.S. military and naval buildup continued under the momentum generated by the events of August-October 1961.

Over the next two years, however, most of the reserve and National Guard units called to active duty in 1961 were demobilized. On August 1, 1962, for example, the Navy released all reservists. (326) The crisis in Berlin was over; but not the struggle for supremacy between the USSR and the United States.

A Comparative Evaluation, 1958-59 and 1961

It remains to strike a balance and evaluate the effectiveness of military force as a tool for the achievement of national goals in the two Berlin crises. The task can be accomplished most expeditiously by making a point-by-point comparison.

(1) The use of limited force. During the 1958-59 crisis, in the era of the Eisenhower-Dulles policies, the United States strove to avoid the use of limited force, fearing that its use might lead to an escalation toward the nuclear threshold. Considerations of expense were also involved: Acutely conscious of the enormous cost of the nuclear arsenal in which he placed his major reliance for deterrence, Eisenhower was determined to avoid anything that might create a demand for additional military expense.

U.S. reluctance to use limited force in the opening phase of the 1958-59 crisis may well have encouraged the USSR to develop its campaign in Berlin more fully than it would have done had it been faced at the outset by a show of U.S. firmness.

In the opening phase of the 1961 crisis, too, the United States failed to use limited force, even though Kennedy had explicitly broken with the Eisenhower administration's insistence on fiscal restraints on military spending. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration, even though it recognized the high probability of a new Soviet-inspired crisis in Berlin, refrained from taking any action—for example, a token reinforcement of the U.S. garrison in Berlin, which might have conveyed to the USSR a realization of the U.S. determination to maintain its position there.

There were several reasons for this restraint: The failure of U.S. intelligence to pick up the signs of impending crisis probably played a part, but the major reason was no doubt Kennedy's discovery of the unpreparedness of the U.S. military establishment to take effective limited action in Berlin. Whatever the reason, the effect of U.S. inaction in 1961, as in 1958, was to encourage Soviet leaders to push ahead with their plans.

(2) The use of conventional force. A clear-cut difference between the two administrations was their attitude toward the use of conventional (nonnuclear) force. Pinning its hopes for deterrence on "massive retaliation" using nuclear weapons and striving to keep a lid on other military expenditures, the Eisenhower administration cut back on army strength and adopted a no-growth policy for the conventional forces. In contrast, Kennedy strongly endorsed a program of building up the conventional forces, and relied on them for his major military moves in the 1961 crisis.

There were four main examples of the use of force by the Kennedy administration during the 1961 crisis, each designed to serve a specific purpose.

(a) Kennedy's July 25 speech can be interpreted as a logical step in his long-range plans to strengthen U.S. military power and increase its flexibility. It thus represents the continuation of the policy set forth in his messages to Congress of January 30, March 28, and May 25. Taken as a whole, the 1961 military expansion was the Kennedy administration's response to the Soviet strategic challenge dating back to the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and to Khrushchev's subsequent exploitation of Soviet space achievements to convey the impression that the strategic balance had shifted decisively in the USSR's favor.

Viewed in the context of the Berlin crisis, the July 25 speech served as a massive response to Khrushchev's deadline challenge at Vienna and his subsequent announcement of an increase in Soviet military spending. The July 25 speech achieved its immediate purpose in forcing Khrushchev to drop out of the bidding at this point, but it entailed certain concealed corollaries that went far to nullify the advantage thus gained for the United States: first, the building of the Berlin Wall; second, the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing; and third—conjecturally—a Soviet decision to extend aid to North Vietnam.

- (b) Kennedy's order sending a battle group down the Autobahn to Berlin on August 17 represented a calculated risk designed to help restore the morale of West Berlin after the jolting impact of the construction of the wall. By keeping the size of the force small enough to rule out any thought on the part of the Soviet leaders that he was offering a direct challenge to them, Kennedy managed to achieve his goal without enlarging the conflict.
- (c) The program of call-ups, maneuvers, war games, and nuclear test shots in September 1961 constituted the realization of the measures Kennedy had called for in his July 25 speech, and which Congress had approved on August 1, 3, and 16. Seen in relation to the immediate context of the Berlin crisis, these moves might be criticized as a case of locking the barn after the horse is stolen—this on the assumption that the construction of the wall marked the turning point in Soviet strategy in the crisis. In the larger context of the continuing U.S.—Soviet strategic rivalry, however, the September 1961 moves were an essential part of the U.S. effort to establish clearcut strategic predominance over the USSR and thereby recapture the diplomatic initiative on a world scale that the Eisenhower administration had come close to losing. The September 1961 buildup also served as the indispensable background to the final conflict in the crisis.
- (d) The tank confrontation in Berlin on October 27, far from being irrelevant or unnecessary, was a direct affirmation by the United States of its determination to retain its rights in Berlin and to force the USSR to observe its obligations under the wartime agreements for four-power administration of the city. To achieve these goals, it was necessary for U.S. decisionmakers to have an insight into the issues at stake and a willingness to risk a violent or unpredictable Soviet response rather than yield rights the United States considered vital. Soviet action in the confrontation showed that their decisionmakers understood the issues at stake equally clearly, and that they accepted, though grudgingly, the U.S. demands.
- (3) The use of nuclear weapons and ICBMs. With regard to the use of nuclear weapons and ICBMs, the two administrations differed in degree rather than in kind. A severe critic of the Eisenhower administration's record in this field up to the end of 1961, Kennedy found on taking office that the level of U.S. strategic power was higher, that of the USSR lower than he had believed

and asserted during the 1960 presidential campaign. Kennedy's recognition in February 1961 that there was no "missile gap," however, did not induce in him a sense of complacency or a willingness to stabilize the strategic balance at the existing level; rather he accepted the doctrine that the United States, as a nation that would never initiate a nuclear exchange with the USSR, must have a strategic arsenal so powerful and so invulnerable that the United States could take the full brunt of a surprise nuclear attack by the USSR and still have enough reserve power to destroy the Soviet capacity to wage war.

In the 1958-59 crisis, which broke out just after the beginning of the Soviet-Western de facto test ban agreement, nuclear weapons played a largely symbolic role. It was Khrushchev's exaggerated claims for Soviet superiority in missile production and emplacement that provided the major leverage in Soviet strategy.

During the 1961 crisis, Soviet claims to ICBM superiority were drastically toned down, once the Soviet leadership realized that the United States knew the true facts about the strategic balance. This enforced moderation, however, may have had bearing on the Soviet decision to begin preparations for the resumption of nuclear testing.

Renewed testing by both the USSR and the United States was one of the most regrettable aspects of the 1961 crisis, and here the U.S. leadership seems fairly clear of responsibility, at least on the existing public record. Especially harmful were the massive Soviet tests in the atmosphere, which produced extensive radioactive fallout. Since the crisis in Berlin was over before the 50-megaton blast of October 31, 1961, and since the United States by that time had given ample evidence of its readiness to meet the USSR at the negotiating table, the Soviet resumption of testing cannot be explained as a means of exerting pressures on the West to consent to negotiations.

(4) Negotiations and the use of force. In his book The Berlin Crisis, Schick argues that the Kennedy administration, by combining the offer to negotiate with the use of limited force, actually helped prolong the 1961 crisis.(327) The logical conclusion would seem to be that U.S. leaders would have been better advised to eschew the search for a common meeting ground with the USSR in the Berlin conflict and to limit their response to the Soviet challenge to military actions. One detects here an echo of the Acheson thesis.

Granted that the mixture of professed willingness to negotiate and limited force that Kennedy employed may have encouraged some Soviet leaders to believe that the USSR could achieve its goals by intimidation, it is difficult to accept the view that Kennedy's two-track approach was a mistake. Taking the long-range view, one of the greatest achievements of the Kennedy administration in foreign policy was without doubt the nuclear test-ban treaty of August 5, 1963, which for the first time since 1945 brought the USSR and the United States together on a matter of fundamental international importance. It seems highly doubtful that the USSR would have signed the test-ban treaty had Kennedy not held the door open to negotiations all along, even at the moments of greatest U.S.-Soviet tension.

The Eisenhower administration, too, tried to mix force with the willingness to negotiate, but since it never succeeded in convincing the USSR of its determination to hold fast in Berlin, since its threat to use nuclear weapons was regarded with widespread skepticism, and since it eschewed the use of limited force, its negotiating position was weak. Only Soviet failure to cash in on the consessions made by the West at the Geneva Conference of foreign ministers in 1959 prevented a serious erosion of the Western position in Berlin. Similarly, the collapse of the Paris summit meeting in May 1961 fortuitously saved the Eisenhower administration from making new concessions on Berlin. It was by luck, then, rather than by good management or skillful planning that the Eisenhower administration managed to weather the 1958-59 crisis in Berlin and its sequel at the Paris summit meeting. The same thing cannot be said, however, of the other foreign policy defeats the Eisenhower administration suffered in the summer and fall of 1960.

The Kennedy record is not without blemishes: His administration made a number of serious blunders in 1961, not only at the Bay of Pigs but elsewhere, including (at least in the opening phase of the crisis), Berlin. Given the nature of the Soviet campaign in Berlin, however; given the impossibility of knowing what the real Soviet goals were, and how far they were willing to go to achieve them; given the Soviet capacity to inflict heavy damage on the West in a surprise attack, using either nuclear or conventional weapons, or both; given the unpredictability of Soviet moves, and the impossibility of knowing the real power relations within the Soviet leadership-given all these things, I believe Sorensen is justified in his assertion that Kennedy's objectives at Berlin were achieved, and that "his conventional force build-up had helped prevent a confrontation over Berlin that might otherwise have reached the nuclear level." (328)

"One never knows, of course," Schlesinger writes,

. . . what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight to negotiation, but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. Instead he applied power and diplomacy in a combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the West and hold off the holocaust.(329)

Both Sorensen and Schlesinger, of course, were prominent members of the Kennedy administration and avowed admirers of Kennedy himself, and their evaluation of his record has not won universal acceptance. But no one who has made a thorough study of Soviet policy in the Berlin crises (and the staunchest critics of Kennedy have not done so)(330) can easily deny that he underwent a testing period of extreme danger in 1961, or that he came through it with, on the whole, remarkable success.

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Footnotes

- 1. Alexander George and Paul Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:</u>
 Theory and <u>Practice</u> (Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 395.
- 2. The historical background of the Berlin crises is covered in Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 1-130, and, more briefly, in Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. ix-xvi. For a useful documentary survey, see <u>Documents on Germany 1944-1970</u>, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 92 Cong., 1 Sess., (1971; hereafter cited as <u>Documents on Germany 1944-1970</u>.)
- 3. Ibid., pp. 21-22, 46-54.
- 4. Ibid., pp. 194-56.
- 5. Survey of International Affairs 1956-1958 (Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 82-83, citing Neues Deutschland, October 28, 1958.
- 6. Documents on Germany 1944-1970, pp. 276-77.
- 7. Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 7-8.
- 8. Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 50, citing Prayda, Nov. 14, 1958.
- 9. On the "politics of Soviet missile deception," see Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 35-70 and 105-16. They argue that Soviet actions in the Berlin crises can best be explained "by reference to the Soviet strategy of bluff and deception." Ibid., p. 150.
- 10. Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945-1962 (Chatto and Windus, 1963), p. 205.
- 11. For a concise history of the "anti-party group," see Roger Pethybridge,

 A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group (Preeger,
 1962).
- 12. For example, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, after his trip to Moscow in February-March 1959, recorded in his diary the opinion that "Mr. Khrushchev is absolute ruler of Russia and completely controls the situation." Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (Macmillan, 1971), p. 633. Italies in the original. Subsequently, however, Macmillan reconsidered, and when he published this diary entry in 1971 he added the comment, "Perhaps the only change I would wish now to make in this

appreciation regards the undisputed supremacy of Khrushchev. He had not the strength of Stalin, for he had eschewed, or could not rely on, Stalin's chief weapon—the Terror." Ibid., p. 634.

- 13. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Doubleday, 1965), pp. 446-48.
- 14. In the extensive literature on the Sino-Soviet dispute, Donald B. Zagoria's pioneering study, <u>The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961</u> (Princeton University Press, 1962) is still required reading.
- 15. On the Rapacki Plan and its fate, see <u>Survey of International Affairs</u>, 1956-1958, pp. 562-64.
- 16. Ibid., p. 587.

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- 17. For a perceptive analysis of the ambiguities of West German policy, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 86 and footnote, p. 334.
- 18. In his article, "Challenge and Response in U.S. Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, (October 1957), pp. 25-43, Dulles entertained the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons might hold out the prospect of waging limited nuclear war.
- 19. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), p. 229.
- 20. Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (Wiley, 1963), p. 19.
 A similar point is made by Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Praeger, 1965), p. 17.
- 21. Evidence in support of this point is provided later in this study.
- 22. For Taylor's critique of the doctrine of "massive retaliation," see his The Uncertain Trumpet (Harper, 1960), pp. 47-79.
- 23. For Macmillan's account of his talks with Khrushchev, see his Riding the Storm, pp. 592-634.
- 24. The classic formulation of the "traditional" point of view is Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (rev. ed.; Harvard University Press, 1963). On p. 583 Fainsod writes: "Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, tolerates no derogation of his own authority, permits no opposition to raise its head within the Party, and insists that the Party function as a unit in executing his will." Another good "traditionalist" presentation is Schick, Berlin Crisis, which has served as one of the principal sources for the more recent study by George and Smoke, Deterrance in American Foreign Policy.

- 25. The principal "collectivist" studies of the Khrushchev era are (1)
 Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin From Khrushchev to Kosvein (N.Y.,
 Viking Press, 1969); (2) Sidney I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making
 in Soviet Russia. A Case Study of Agricultural Politics (Princeton,
 Princeton University Press, 1965); and (3) Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev
 and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press,
 1966). Tatu and Linden treat both foreign and internal policy.
- 26. The principal publications in which I have presented my views, in order of publications, are (1) "Die Sonderstellung Belorusslands," Osteuropa, vol. 14, no. 11 (November 1964), pp. 851-64; (2) "America, China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition: The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry Morton, eds., Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition (Praeger, 1967), pp. 186-269; (3) The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin. June-November 1961 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and (4) "The Presidium Meeting of February 1961: A Reconstruction" in Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, with Ladis K.D. Kristof, eds., Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Memory of B.I. Nicolaevsky (Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 281-92.
- 27. Documents on Germany. 1944-1970, p. 354. Minor changes have been made here and elsewhere in the translations from this source.
- 28. Decuments on Germany, 1944-1961, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 87 Cong., 1 sess. (1961), p. 339. Dulles's assertion of U.S. rights in Berlin was made in rebuttal to Walter Ulbricht's claim to the entire city for the GDR.
- 29. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 330.
- 30. Ibid., p. 336.
- 31. Ibid., p. 330.
- 32. George and Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, p. 405. Italies in the original.
- 33. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39 (Dec. 8, 1958), p. 909.
- 34. Ibid.
- 35. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 331.
- 36. New York Times, Nov. 13, 1958, p. 1. For Taylor's defense of his contingency planning for West Berlin see his <u>Uncertain Trumpet</u>, p. 8.
- 37. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 331.

- 38. Herman Kahn, On Escalation, p. 72.
- 39. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 406.
- 40. Kahn, On Escalation, p. 54.
- 41. Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, Germany and East Europe Since 1945 (Scribners, 1973), p. 154. Hereinafter cited as Keesing, Germany.
- 42. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 571.
- 43. Ibid.
- 44. Ibid., p. 572.
- 45. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, p. 33.
- 46. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 332.
- 47. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39 (December 15, 1958), p. 953. See also Schick, The Berlin Crisis, p. 33.
- 48. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39 (December 15, 1958), p. 953.
- 49. For the full text of the Soviet note to the United States, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (January 19, 1959), pp. 81-89. Extracts in Documents on Germany, 1944-1970, pp. 360-66.
- 50. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (January 19, 1959), p. 88.
- 51. George and Smoke, Deterrence, p. 439.
- 52. Ibid., p. 396.
- 53. This viewpoint, for example, characterizes Schick, The Berlin Crisis.
- 54. See footnote 5.
- 55. New York Times, November 23, 1958.
- 56. Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, p. 70.
- 57. Ibid.
- 58. New York Times, December 30, 1958.
- 59. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Nathan F. Twining, accepted the budgetary limitations called for by the Eisenhower administration. In his book, Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military

Policy and Strategy (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 119, Twining asserts that the United States <u>did</u> possess military flexibility, even in the era of "massive retaliation." Unfortunately, he does not comment directly on the administration's decision to avoid the use of limited force at the outset of the Berlin crisis of 1958-59.

- 60. New York Times, December 19, 1958 (an edition prepared during a newspaper strike, but not published until December 31, 1958).
- 61. For Serov's dismissal, see New York Times, Dec. 9, 1958. Shelepin's appointment is reported in the New York Times, December 26, 1958 (published December 31, 1958).
- 62. New York Times, December 19, 1958 (published December 31, 1958).
- Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 59, citing Prayda, January 28, 1959. William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (MIT Press, 1964), p. 12, dates the cancellation of the 1957 USSR-PRO agreement on atomic aid in June 1959, but the Khrushchev speech cited shows that the decision had been taken well before that time.
- 64. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, pp. 82-85.
- 65. A full-scale study of the role of the internal opposition in shaping Soviet foreign policy in the period 1958-60 has not yet been carried out. An article I published in 1967 was designed to provide the basic framework for such an analysis: "America, China, and the Hydra-headed Opposition", pp. 183-269.
- 66. The view that Gromyko and Menshikov were hard-liners on policy toward the United States is based on the analysis of data from their careers, actions, and statements over the period 1956-64.
- Ambassador in Moscow, predicting that if Gromyko represented the USSR in the forthcoming Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, "We could expect little progress." Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 359.

 Eisenhower assumed that this was because "Apparently Gromyko did not enjoy the confidence of Khrushchev to the extent that he was empowered by the Kremlin to negotiate seriously on important issues; he was little more than a messanger and one, I often thought, whose every word and action, including his bad manners, were dictated by his Soviet master." Ibid. Even when Gromyko candidly disclosed during the Geneva conference of foreign ministers that a Soviet demand for a one-year termination of Western rights in Berlin had been made on his own initiative, Eisenhower's reaction was one of tolerant amusement. Ibid., p. 400.

- 68. Survey of International Affairs 1956-1958, p. 586.
- 69. New York Times, Nov. 25, 1958, and New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 21, 1958; Ibid., p. 47, citing Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1958.
- 70. New York Times, Dec. 30, 1958.
- 71. New York Times, Jan. 25, 1959.
- 72. Text in Documents on Germany, 1944-1970, pp. 390-411.
- 73. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 340.
- 74. Ibid., p. 340-41.
- 75. Ibid., p. 341.
- 76. Text of the U.S. note in <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 40, (February 23, 1959), pp. 271-72.
- 77. Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 197.
- 78. Survey of International Affairs 1959-1960 (Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 28.
- 79. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 587-88. Italics in the original.
- 80. Ibid., pp. 582-83.
- 81. New York Times, Feb. 5, 1959, p. 3.
- 82. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 343.
- 83. Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, <u>Duel At the Brink: John Foster</u>
 <u>Dulles' Command of American Power</u> (Doubleday, 1960), p. 214.
- 84. Ibid., p. 215.
- 85. Current Soviet Policies III, p. 203, citing Pravda, February 6, 1959.
- 86. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 343-44.
- 87. Ibid., p. 343. For the text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (March 2, 1959), p. 297.
- 88. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 344.
- 89. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (April 20, 1959), p. 558. Eisenhower calls the Soviet action "conceivably an accident," but labels it "suspicious." Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 356.

- 90. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (April 20, 1959), p. 558.
- 91. Ibid., pp. 555-58.
- 92. Ibid., vol. 40 (March 9, 1959), p. 333; Documents on International Affairs, 1959, pp. 9-11.
- 93. Text of the Soviet note in <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 40 (April 13, 1959), pp. 508-11. See also Schick, <u>Berlin Crisis</u>, p. 59; Smith, <u>Defense of Berlin</u>, p. 198; Eisenhower, <u>White House Years</u>, p. 345; <u>Macmillan</u>, <u>Riding the Storm</u>, pp. 623-24.
- 94. Documents on International Affairs, 1959, p. 12.
- 95. New York Times, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 12.
- 96. Survey of International Affairs, 1959-1960, p. 22; Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 52, citing Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1959, p. 9.
- 97. Dean Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," Saturday Evening Post, March 7, 1959, pp. 30-31, 85-86.
- 98. Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 348-49.
- 99. New York Times, March 12, 1959, p. 12.
- 100. New York Times, March 12, 1959, p. 1, cited in Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 51.
- 101. New York Times. March 13, 1959, p. 12.
- New York Times, March 15, 1959, and Washington Post, March 15, 1959, p. 1. See also the testimony of General Taylor before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on March 11, 1959, in Hearings ... on Major Defense Matters (With Emphasis on Fiscal Year 1960 Military Budget and Berlin Situation), Part 1 (1959).
- 103. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, (April 6, 1959), pp. 469-71.
- 104. Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 77.
- 105. Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 201.
- 106. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (May 4, 1959), p. 633.
- 107. Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 77. Text of U.S. note of April 13, rejecting the Soviet protest, in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (May 14, 1959), pp. 632-33.

- 108. Survey of International Affairs 1959-1960, p. 28, considers that "Acceptance of the restrictions would have made an airlift by high-flying jet supply aircraft impossible. . ."
- 109. The Western ambassadors' suggestion is referred to in the Soviet note of April 21, 1959, <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 40 (May 25, 1959), p. 742.
- 110. Ibid., p. 741.
- 111. On March 30, 1959, a State Department spokesman announced that final agreement had been reached between the United States and Italy on the delivery of intermediate-range ballistic missiles to the Italian armed forces, in accordance with a decision of the NATO Heads of Government in December 1957. U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959.
- 112. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (May 25, 1959), p. 742.
- 113. Survey of International Affairs 1959-1960, p. 29.
- 114. NATO Council note in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (May 25, 1959), p. 739.
- 115. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, "Short of War" Documentation. Special List No. 2, and J.C. Donaldson, Jr., "Memorandum to Director of Naval History and Curator for the Navy Department," August 20, 1969.
- 116. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 644-48.
- 117. A full documentary record of the conference is given in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva (1959).

 For comprehensive summaries of its proceedings, see Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 77-96; Survey of International Affairs, 1959-1960, pp. 30-39; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1959 (Harper, 1960), pp. 150-57.
- 118. U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Historical Division, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, vol. III (1971), p. 41.
- 119. Text in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (June 15, 1959), pp. 866-67.
- 120. Thid., p. 866.
- 121. For the formal Soviet proposal on establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, in a note sent on June 25, see <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 41 (August 3, 1959), pp. 160-61.

- 122. Pravda, June 12, 1959.
- 123. Averell Harriman, "My Alarming Interview with Mhrushchev," Life, vol. 47, no. 2 (July 13, 1959), p. 33.
- 124. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 404. Italics in the original. These details were not contained in the published report of the Harriman interview.
- 125. Ibid.
- 126. Ibid., p. 406.
- 127. New York Herald Tribune, July 12, 1959.
- 128. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 878.
- 129. Murphy and others in the State Department believed that "a substantial impact might be made on the thinking of the Soviet masses if President Eisenhower could tour the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. . . . So we conceived the plan that Nikita Khrushchev should be invited to visit the United States, with the understanding that the Russians would reciprocate by inviting Eisenhower to tour the Soviet Union." Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Doubleday, 1964), p. 438.
- 130. Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 405.
- 131. In his memoirs, Murphy makes no attempt to explain his failure to carry out Eisenhower's instructions; instead he simply ignores it. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. p. 438.
- 132. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 133-34.
- 133. William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1963), p. 34.
- 134. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 351.
- 135. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 134.
- 136. For example, Schick considers that "In the diplomatic game the Allies lost and lost badly. . . The Geneva conference increased Soviet momentum in the crisis, contrary to the claims of the Western ministers that their diplomacy had prevented the crisis from worsening." Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 96. Similarly, Jean Edward Smith writes, "The final days [of the Geneva conference], between the submission of the Western and Soviet plans on July 28 and the adjournment. . .was an extremely critical period for the West. Had Gromyko accepted the final Western proposals, West Berlin's hope of survival would have been destroyed." Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 208.

- Smith's position is contested by James H. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 270-71.
- 137. Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 121.
- 138. Ibid., pp. 121-22.
- 139. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 399.
- 140. Ibid., p. 402.
- 141. Documents on International Affairs 1959, p. 76.
- 142. Soviet Space Programs, 1962-1965, p. 530. Mikoyan's trip was preceded by the launching of Lunik 1, weight 3,238 pounds, 1,472 kilograms—more than 17 times the weight of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik 1, in 1957. Ibid. The September 1959 moon shot, as Harry Schwartz notes, "gave Nikita S. Khrushchev much to boast about when he toured the United States as President Eisenhower's guest." New York Times, December 11, 1972, p. 39. An authoritative British survey calls the moon shot "an astonishing demonstration of Soviet technological skill, a feat of enormous propaganda value, and a reminder that leadership in the 'space race' was one of the main reasons for the Soviet leader's reception in America." Survey of International Affairs 1959-1960, p. 41.
- 143. New York Times, February 9, 1961, p. 5.
- 144. Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 446-47.
- 145. For a concise account of the U-2 incident and its effect on the Paris summit conference, see Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs 1960</u>, (Harpers, 1961), pp. 28-30.
- 146. New York Times, May 21, 1960.
- 147. Ibid., May 31, 1960.
- 148. Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 75.
- 149. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia, p. 184. For a similar evaluation see Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, pp. 79-80, 84-85.
- 150. For an eyewitness account of Khrushchev's reaction see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 7, 1960.
- 151. Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 568.
- 152. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (Harper and Row, 1972), p. 237.

- 153. Pravda, July 17, 1960.
- 154. Ibid., July 10, 1960.
- 155. New York Times, Oct. 29, 1960.
- 156. Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, p. 112.
- 157. Ibid., p. 113.
- 158. A shortened version of the speech was published in Kommunist, no. 7, (1961), pp. 3-16.
- 159. Survey of International Affairs 1959-1960, p. 534.
- 160. Stebbins. United States in World Affairs 1960, p. 34.
- 161. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (Atheneum, 1961), pp. 388-89.
- 162. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs 1960, p. 35.
- 163. Ibid., p. 36.
- 164. For the advance release text of the speech, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Communication, 87 Cong., 1 sess.,

 Freedom of Communication. Final Report. Part I. The Speeches,

 August 1 through November 7, 1960, pp. 1154-59. All quotations from the speech are from this source.
- 165. See his remarks of September 29, October 16, and October 23, 1960, Told, pp. 405, 613, 710.
- 166. Ibid., Part III, p. 205.
- 167. Prayda, October 8, 1959.
- 168. Ibid., November 15, 1959.
- 169. Ibid., December 2, 1959.
- 170. Ibid., January 15, 1960.
- 171. Ibid. For analysis, see Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 58-59, 66-67, and Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Technology on the Soviet Military: A Challenge to Traditional Military Professionalism" (RAND Corporation, 1964), pp. 7-9.

- 172. New York Times, March 1, 1960.
- 173. New York Herald Tribune (European edition), March 26-27, 1960.
- 174. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 42 (April 25, 1960), p. 638, and May 9, 1960, p. 725.
- 175. Pravda, April 26, 1960. For analysis, see Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, pp. 49-50, and Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs 1960</u>, pp. 82-83.
- 176. Hans Kroll, Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters (Cologne and Berlin, Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1967), pp. 460-61. Kroll does not explain what he means by the "Ulbricht group," but elsewhere (p. 366) he cites evidence of a link between Kozlov, Ulbricht, and Gromkyo.
- 177. Pravda, July 1, 1960.
- 178. The Times (London), July 9, 1960.
- 179. Pravda, January 2, 1961.
- 180. Kroll, Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, p. 472.
- 181. The speech, delivered to a joint meeting of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Marx-Engels Institute, was published in Kommunist, no. 1 (1961), pp. 3-37.
- 182. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House (Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 302.
- 183. For the view that the speech was in part "directed at Communist China," see Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs 1961</u>, p. 65, and Zagoria, <u>The Sino-Soviet Conflict</u>, p. 352.
- 184. Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 139. See also George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 414, 422, 424.
- 185. Facts on File (1961), pp. 33, 62.
- 186. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 419.
- 187. George and Smoke cite Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 347. Schlesinger's account of the Khrushchev-Thompson meeting is ambiguous as to the date, however. For a circumstantial and probably accurate account of the March 9 meeting, see the New York Times, March 18, 1961.
- 188. For example, in a speech in Chicago on November 4, 1960, Kennedy said, "We are now entering the age of the missile gap, when our nuclear striking power, backed up by larger, more mobile conventional forces,

may no longer necessarily convince the Russians of our capacity to survive a surprise attack and also be able to strike back at their willingness to fight." <u>Freedom of Communications</u>, U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications, 87 Cong., 1 sess., Pt. 1, pp. 895-96. On the "missile gap" as a campaign issue, see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 317.

189. New York Times, February 7, 1961.

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- 190. Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman, eds., Kennedy and the Press. The News Conferences (Crowell, 1965), p. 20.
- 191. For the effect of McNamara's disclosure on Soviet strategy, see Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 80.
- 192. "The Presidium Meeting of February, 1961: A Reconstruction".
- 193. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 420.
- 194. It was the view of Dr. Hans Bethe, an American nuclear physicist, that preparations for the Soviet test series, which began on September 1, 1961, must have started at least as early as March 1961. See his article, "Disarmament and Strategy," <u>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</u>, vol. 18, no. 7 (September 1962), p. 18.
- 195. Text in <u>Documents on Germany 1944-1961</u>, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, (87 Cong., 1 sess.), (1961), pp. 635-41.
- 196. Ibid., p. 639.
- 197. Ibid., pp. 638-39.
- 198. New York Times, March 18, 1961.
- 199. Pravda, March 31, 1961; translation, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 13, no. 13, pp. 7-8.
- 200. George and Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 437-38, citing <u>Der Spiegel</u>, August 15, 1966, p. 27.
- 201. Lippman's account of the interview was published in the New York
 Herald Tribune, April 17, 18, and 19, 1961, and, with an additional note,
 in his book, The Coming Tests With Russia (Little, Brown, 1961).
- 202. Survey of International Affairs 1961 (Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 224.
- 203. Lippmen, The Coming Tests With Russia, p. 27.

- 204. For the technical specifications of the Gagarin flight see F.J. Krieger, "Recent Soviet Advances in Aerospace Technology" (RAND Corporation, February 1962), p. 10.
- 205. Text of Kennedy's message is in <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 44, May 8, 1961, pp. 661-62. "I have previously stated," wrote Kennedy, "and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba." He warned, however, that "In the event of any military intervention by outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression."
- 206. Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy. President (Atheneum, 1963), p. 165.
- 207. New York Times, May 24, 1961.
- 208. See Kennedy's remarks at Wilmington, Delaware, on October 16, 1960, in <u>Freedom of Communications</u>, U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Pt. I, p. 613.
- 209. George and Smoke, with their focus on deterrence, tend to blur this distinction and to assume that all major defense moves initiated by the Kennedy administration in the first half of 1961 were directly related to the Berlin crisis.
- 210. Theodore C. Sorensen, <u>Kennedy</u> (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 603.

 See also William W. Kaufman, <u>The McNamara Strategy</u> (Harper & Row, 1966),
 p. 48. Schlesinger rether unconvincingly dismisses the Democratic
 party's criticism of the Eisenhower administration's fiscal restraints
 on military spending as "another fake issue." Schlesinger, <u>A Thousand</u>
 Days, p. 317.
- 211. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 603.
- 212. Text in <u>Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States</u>. John F. Kennedv 1961. Containing the <u>Public Messages</u>. Speeches, and <u>Statements of the President January 20 to December 31, 1961 (1962), pp. 12-28. Hereinafter cited as Kennedy 1961.</u>
- 213. Ibid., p. 24.
- 214. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 604.
- Kennedy 1961, p. 231. For Sorensen's formulation of the doctrine, see his Kennedy, p. 610. Esentially the same principle formed part of the Nixon-Rockefeller agreement on national defense of July 23, 1960; see Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (Atheneum, 1961), p. 389. The broad area of agreement on this issue between Kennedy and the liberal wing of the Republic party helps explain how he was able to get his requests for greatly increased defense spending through Congress.

- 216. In their <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, p. 425, George and Smoke write, "During his first six months or so in office, Kennedy partially believed the Soviet claim. . . that the United States was the strategically inferior power, at least in offensive missile capabilities." McNamara's statement on the nonexistence of the "missile gap" at his press briefing on February 6, and Kennedy's tacit acceptance of its essential accuracy, prove that neither man held this view.
- 217. Schlesinger, A Thousand Davs, p. 318.

- 218. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 625.
- 219. Ibid.
- 220. Ibid., p. 626.
- 221. Ibid.
- 222. Kennedy 1961, p. 401.
- 223. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 627.
- 224. Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs</u> 1961, p. 31. This figure does not reflect additional funds requested in Kennedy's message of May 25, 1961, including \$100 million for weapons procurement and \$60 million for expansion of the Marine Corps to 190,000 men. <u>Kennedy 1961</u>, p. 401.
- 225. Cited in Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 143, from John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (Harper, 1960), p. 214.
- 226. Schick, Berlin Crisis, loc. cit.
- 227. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 155-56. Schlesinger does not identify any specific proposals on Berlin in the Stevenson report, but elsewhere (p. 346) mentions Stevenson as one of the Democrats who "were prepared to trade legal points for definitive guarantees of Allied presence and access" to Berlin.
- 228. No reference to Berlin occurs in the inaugural address (January 20), the State of the Union Message (January 25), or the two special messages on defense of March 28 and May 25.
- 229. "... the publication of the Soviet Note forced the U.S. administration to demonstrate its inflexibility on Berlin." Survey of International Affairs 1961, p. 219.

White will have able to the

- 230. New York Times, March 9, 1961.
- 231. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 348.

- 232. Ibid., p. 38C. George and Smoke misdate Kennedy's request to Acheson to the time of his inaugural (January 1961), thus further beclouding their analysis of U.S. strategy in the opening phase of the 1961 crisis. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 421. It should be noted, however, that Sorensen says that Kennedy commissioned a special report on Berlin from Acheson "in early 1961." Kennedy, p. 583. On balance, however, it appears likely that Schlesinger's dating is more accurate on this point, partly because it seems doubtful that Acheson would have taken five months (the final report was presented to Kennedy in June) to draft a report summarizing views he had held strongly for over a year.
- Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 347, remarks, "As late as the end of March 1961, a Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries adjourned 233. without mention of Berlin."
- 234. Ibid., p. 380.
- 235. In his memoirs, Macmillan avoids entirely any discussion of Acheson's presentation. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 348, 352. According to Schlesinger, the major British critique of the Acheson report was delivered by Lord Home. Schlesinger, A Thousand Dave, pp. 380-81.

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- 236. Text, Kennedy 1961, p. 252.
- 237. Toid., pp. 265-66.
- 238. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 349-50.
- 239. Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President, pp. 167-69.
- 240. Ibid., p. 169.
- 241. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 388.
- 242. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1611th Air Transport Wing, History of the 1611th Air Transport Wing, January-June 1961.
- 243. For the May 25 message, see above, p. 98.
- Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 584. 244.
- 245. Ibid., p. 585.
- 246. Told., pp. 585-86.
- Text in <u>Documents on Germany 1944-61</u>, pp. 542-46. Sorensen, <u>Kennedy</u>, p. 586, notes that the aide-mémoire "confused the question of deadlines." The fact that it failed to specify the six-month deadline has sometimes 247.

- been interpreted to mean, erroneously, that Khrushchev made this demand part of the Soviet position only subsequently. See, for example, George and Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, p. 415.
- 248. Kennedy repeatedly used this term or one of its variants to describe the Vienna meeting in his radio and TV report to the American people on June 6. Text in Kennedy 1961, pp. 441-46.
- 249. For an early and influential analysis along these lines see James Reston, "What was killed was not only the President but the Promise," New York Times Magazine, Nov. 15, 1964, pp. 24-25, 126-27. Reston, a senior New York Times correspondent, was the first American journalist to interview Kennedy after his meeting with Khrushchev. Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, Doubleday, 1966), p. 236. For a recent study accepting this evaluation see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 421.
- 250. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 550.
- 251. Kahn, On Escalation, p. 11.
- 252. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 360-61.
- 253. Pravda, June 16, 1961; translation, <u>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</u>, vol. 13, no. 24, pp. 3-8 (quote at p. 6). See also Schlesinger, <u>A Thousand Davs</u>, p. 378, for Khrushchev's positive evaluation of Kennedy as a result of the Vienna meeting.
- 254. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 527. See also Schlesinger, A Thousand Davis, p. 373.
- 255. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 544. See also Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 373.
- 256. Pravda, June 22, 1961.
- 257. Ibid.; translation from <u>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</u>, vol. 13, no. 25, pp. 9, 20.
- 258. Prayda, Jume 22, 1961; passage omitted from the <u>Current Digest</u> translation. Carl Linden comments, "The speech, which probably was discussed in the Presidium beforehand, undoubtedly had the blessing of those leaders who sympathized with military opinion and backed a hard line in the Berlin question." Carl A. Linden, <u>Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership</u> (Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 115.
- 259. Prevds, July 9, 1961; translation, <u>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</u>, vol. 13, no. 27, pp. 3-6. For a technical analysis of the economic implications of Khrushchev's speech, see Abraham S. Becker, "Soviet military outlays since 1958," (RAND Corporation, July 1964), p. 50. Linden comments, "The suspension of the troop cats. . . . clearly

- represented a retreat for him [Khrushchev], not simply a sudden or basic change in his political outlook." Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, p. 115.
- 260. Documents on Germany 1949-61, pp. 652-54, 658-60; summary, New York Times, June 16, 1961.
- 261. Ibid., p. 376.
- 262. Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs 1961</u>, p. 41, citing Public Lew 87-53.
- 263. Documents on Germany 1944-1961, p. 670.
- 264: Schlesinger, A Thousand Davs, pp. 381-82.
- 265. Ibid., pp. 382-83.
- 266. Kennedy 1961, pp. 476-77.
- 267. New York Times, July 11, 1961, p. 1.
- 268. Schlesinger, A Thousand Davs, pp. 387-88.
- 269. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 64-65.
- 270. Kennedy and the Press, p. 102.
- 271. Text in Kennedy 1961, pp. 533-40. All quotations are from this source.
- 272. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 88-93.
- 273. Ibid., pp. 95-96, 100-104.
- 274. Ibid., pp. 107-14.
- 275. Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 257.
- 276. Ibid., pp. 257-66. See also Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 137.
- 277. New York Times, July 19, 1961, p. 1, and August 14, 1961, p. 1.
- 278. Notably Senator J. William Fulbright, in a speech on July 30. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 394. George and Smoke argue that Fulbright's suggestion was probably made with the approval of the Kennedy administration (Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 437), but this seems unlikely, not only because all available evidence indicates that the administration was completely surprised when the Soviets did seal off West Berlin, but also because Fulbright himself a few days later

stated that "he had not meant to include Berlin; East Germany had a right to restrict travel outside Berlin, but not to hamper movement within Berlin." Congressional Record, vol. CVII, no. 133 (August 4, 1961), p. 13659, cited in Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, p. 284.

- 279. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 395.
- 280. Sorensen, <u>Kennedy</u>, pp. 593-94. See also Schick, <u>Berlin Crisis</u>, pp. 171-73; Schlesinger, <u>A Thousand Davs</u>, p. 402; George and Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 439-40.
- 281. Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs</u>, 1961, p. 42, citing Public Law 87-117, Aug. 1, 1961.
- 282. Ibid., citing Public Law 87-116, August 3, 1961.
- 283. U.S. Department of the Army, Third Army, <u>History of the United States</u>
 Third Army 1918-1962.
- 284. Barbara H. Gilmore, comp., Chronology of Naval Events, 1960-1974 (U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives).
- 285. U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Defense Policies from World War II (Army Historical Series). Hereinafter cited as U.S. Defense Policies.
- 286. Kennedy's decision was prompted by an urgent letter from Willy Brandt calling attention to the dangerous threat to West Berliners' morale posed by the wall. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 395-96. In a concurrent move to shore up West Berlin's morale, Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to the beleaguered city.
- 287. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 594. See also Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 396-97.
- 288. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, p. xv.
- 289. New York Times, August 18, 1961, p. 1.
- 290. Stebbins, <u>United States in World Affairs 1961</u>, p. 46, citing Public Laws 87-141 and 87-144.
- 291. Slusser, Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 140-42.
- 292. Survey of International Affairs 1961, p. 250.
- 293. New York Times, August 25, 1961. See also Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 398.

- 294. Survey of International Affairs 1961, p. 251.
- 295. Kennedy 1961, pp. 568-69.
- 296. Documents on Germany 1944-1961, pp. 756-57.
- 297. U.S. Defense Policies.
- 298. Pravda, August 30, 1961; translation, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 13, no. 35, pp. 8-10, 29.
- 299. Pravda, August 31, 1961; translation, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 13, no. 35, pp. 3, 6-8.
- 300. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 145-48.
- 301. Ibid., pp. 190-210.
- 302. Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 175, 178.
- 303. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 147-49.
- 304. Ibid., pp. 183, 387.
- 305. Ibid., pp. 214-215.
- 306. Ibid., p. 225.
- 307. Survey of International Affairs 1961, p. 262.
- 308. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 226-29.
- 309. Ibid., pp. 207, 239-42.
- 310. Pravda, October 18, 1961.
- 311. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 627.
- 312. Robert W. Coakley et al, comp., U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness. 1961-1962. (Hereinafter cited as U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness.)
- 313. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 210-13, 225.
- 314. U.S. Department of the Army, 101st Airborne Division, <u>History of the 101st Airborne Division</u>, 1942-1964.
- 315. U.S. Department of the Navy, Sixth Fleet, History of the Sixth Fleet, Calendar Year 1961.

- 316. Naval and Maritime Chronology. Compiled from Ten Years of Naval Review (Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 10.
- 317. History of the 101st Airborne Division, 1942-1964.
- 318. U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness.
- 319. History of the Sixth Fleet, Calendar Year 1961.
- 320. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1611th Air Transport Wing, <u>History of the 1611th Air Transport Wing</u>, July-Dec. 1961, and U.S. Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Europe, Office of History, <u>Historical Highlights: United States Air Forces in Europe, 1954-1973</u>, prepared by R. Bruce Harley (USAFE Historical Monograph Series, No. 4, 1974).
- 321. Developments at the congress are analyzed in Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, chapter 9.
- 322. Schick's analysis jumps from Khrushchev's announcement of the lifting of the deadline on October 17 (The Berlin Crisis, p. 184) to a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council on December 13-15 (Ibid., p. 186).
- 323. George and Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 416, 440. General Lucius Clay, a hero in the eyes of West Berliners, had been sent to West Berlin at the end of August as Kennedy's personal representative. Slusser, <u>The Berlin Crisis of 1961</u>, p. 172.
- 324. Survey of International Affairs 1961, p. 271.
- 325. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, pp. 339-461.
- 326. J.S. Donaldson, Jr., "Memorandum for Director of Naval History and Curator for the Navy Department," August 20, 1969.
- 327. Schick, Berlin Crisis, p. 237.
- 328. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 628-29.
- 329. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 402.
- 330. For two characteristic examples of the literature critical of Kennedy, see Louise Fitzsimons, The Kennedy Doctrine (Random House, 1972), and Richard F. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (Viking Press, 1972).

Chapter XIII

CASE STUDIES: YUGOSLAVIA 1951 AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968

By Philip Windsor

In this chapter we will examine two critical situations in Eastern Europe that led the United States to take some demonstrative military action. The use of armed force in a crisis--even where that use is purely demonstrative -- reflects a series of difficult decisions. In the case of Eastern Europe, the difficulty is the greater since it is clearly an overriding interest of the United States to avoid war with the USSR. The role of military force is therefore bound to be circumscribed. But it is also ambiguous. If the movement of forces is regarded as purely demonstrative, and if it is understood that it could never lead to war, then it is unlikely that it would demonstrate anything at all. The purposes of military action must therefore vary. They can range from an indication of resolve, and interest in the outcome of a crisis, to the attempt to reassure allies and convince opponents of an existing commitment; they can include a clear warning to an adversary that a crisis could indeed lead to war. But the very fact that the risk of war might be entailed in a use of force intended primarily to demonstrate support or commitment suggests that the scale and movements of forces are likely to be restricted. From demonstrating commitment to declaring war is a major step. For the most part, the chief concern of the United States in these Eastern European crises was to demonstrate interest or commitment. The use of force could be--and was--significant; but it was principally on a small scale.

Even the significance of such restricted movements, however, can only be appreciated within the context of a political analysis of the interests and interactions concerned. I shall suggest the nature of these interactions, and shall hope in so doing to indicate the limitations, as well as the effectiveness, implicit in the use of American force. The political context—though vastly different in 1968 from what it had been in 1951—was characterized in both cases by a very complex interplay of considerations, involving Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, the reactions of certain Eastern European countries to those policies, the secuirty of the United States, and the reactions of the Western European countries when confronted with this interaction. I will demonstrate how the use of force—both in its demonstrative capacity and in its wider implications—was informed by the political context.

I would also suggest that the use of force in such circumstances was necessarily directed toward more than one objective. We observed that force could serve one of several different functions. But in certain cases, including the two under consideration here, it had to serve more than

one at a time. The targets of U.S. military action were both the Western European nations and the USSR. This, too, dictated the way in which the decisions to take military action came about.

Although such considerations are common to the two cases, there is also an immense difference between them. In the case of Yugoslavia in 1951, the United States was still concerned with the attempt to establish a direction for its foreign policy. If that foreign policy was posited on the idea of containment, it was still far from clear where the lines of containment were to be drawn--precisely because Yugoslavia provided an ambiguous and difficult case--or whether Tito would prove a viable instrument in the execution of such a policy. For these reasons, and because American policymakers were uncertain about both Soviet intentions and Yugoslav objectives, initial U.S. reactions to the case of Yugoslavia were characterized by a slow deliberation of decision. I shall argue that the decision to supply military aid was the culmination of a decision process that hardened and formalized the changes that had already come about.

In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the case was very different. The primary consideration of U.S. policy was to prevent an existing situation from degenerating into a new one involving other Eastern European nations that might bring with it the threat of war. Containment was by then recognized as a mutual process in which both superpowers sought to avoid the threat of war or the uncertainties that could lead to conflict. Yet the attempt to confine the crisis involved the real possibility of war.

I shall begin with an analysis of the background to the Yugoslav situation and show now the decision to extend military aid arose from the originally more revolutionary decision to give the country economic assistance.

Yugoslavia 1951

On June 28, 1964, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) passed a resolution expelling the "Tito clique" from the Soviet camp and from any participation in the world Communist movement. This was a particularly important date in Serb history, Vidov Dan, a day of national mourning commemorating the Serbian defeat by Turkish armies at Kossovo in 1389.(2) For Stalin to proceed to this ultimate action on Vidov Dan was, in terms of the Serb national consciousness, almost equivalent to the Arabs' attack on Israel on Yom Kippur. Probably, Stalin had no idea of its significance. Beyond ignorance suggested, Stalin also confirmed the rightness and tactical superiority of Tito's moves during the quarrel that led to the explusion.

For two months, the USSR and Yugoslavia had done nothing but exchange polemics. The USSR had withdrawn its military mission in Yugoslavia. A long letter, signed on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by Georgi Molotov and Josef Stalin, accused Tito and his principal comrades—Milovan Djilas, Svetozar Vukmanovic, Boris Kidric, Alexander Rankovic "and others"—of being "questionable Marxists." Ultimately, by his action of expelling them from the Cominform on Vidov Dan, Stalin demonstrated that an ideological quarrel had turned into a nationalist principle. Indeed, the very fact that Tito's expulsion from the Cominform occurred on the day observed by the Serbs underlined the disparateness of the nations he was trying to weld together. It was of no particular significance to Croats or Slovenes or Montenegrans—let alone, of course, to the Moslems in Bosnia. Like Stalin, Tito had chosen an authoritarian ideology to force his peoples to work together in the construction of socialism.

This situation created a dilemma for the United States. no Western democrat. Originally supported by the British in the Second World War and later by other Western allies, Tito was encouraged by Stalin at a comparatively late date. Immediately after victory, he turned against the Western powers with considerable ferocity. The first threat of a military clash between the Western and Communist allies occurred when Tito's forces threatened to advance into Carinthia and were faced down by Allies forces under General Harold Alexander. There was one other moment at which matters came to the verge of open conflict: at Trieste, which Tito tried to occupy in 1945. Yugoslavia had pushed harder on Trieste than the USSR was willing to contemplate. Tito had even warned "outside powers" in a public speech against treating Yugoslavia's vital interests lightly. (A letter from the Soviet leadership subsequently reproached Tito on this matter, and invited him to explain himself to the Cominform.) (3) Yugoslavia had also expressed its territorial ambitions by proposing to the USSR that it bring Bulgaria into the federation as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia.

The U.S. policy of containment took shape in 1947 partly as a response to the Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey, but also as a device to contain Communist influence in general. "Communist influence," though principally equated with Soviet influence, also had other guises. In American and Western eyes, Yugoslavia was in some ways the most ferocious member of the Socialist camp.(4) Tito, while seeming to be a Stalinist in his domestic policy, behaved remarkably like a Trotskyist in his foreign policy. His disputes with both the USSR and Bulgaria over the nature and degree of support to be given to the Markos "government" in Greece seemed to cast him as the most expansive and aggressive member of the socialist bloc. Perhaps, indeed, he was.

Given this background, it would not be easy for any U.S. administration suddenly to see Yugoslavia as the arch-challenger of the USSR. After all, it was only with great reluctance that the Yugoslavs themselves

agreed to play this role—in which they had been cast by Stalin rather than themselves. One could go farther: it was the very energy and drive of Yugoslav national ambition under Tito that had made the country appear to be the most aggressive Communist state. If these same qualities subsequently precipitated the break with the USSR, if Stalin recognized them as a menace, it might nonetheless appear from the U.S. perspective that they merely provided confirming evidence of the expansionism of the socialist camp as a whole. The USSR believed in the socialist camp; Yugoslavia believed in the socialist camp; why should the United States not do so?

All the evidence seeming to confirm Yugoslavia's role as the most active and aggressive protagonist of Communist expansionism could be interpreted to indicate that its relation with the USSR were those of inherent conflict. In each case, Tito and his associates, while trying to emphasize their total solidarity with the USSR stressing their expansionist tendencies to the greater glory of the socialist camp, were perhaps also trying to cover up the conflict between the needs of the multinational state that had emerged from the bloody and bitter divisions of the war, and the need for overall solidarity. The fact that it was their very expansionism and aggression that led them into conflict with the rest of the socialist camp took a long time to show. But when it showed, they had to choose between ideological purity, as defined by Stalin, and national unity, as defined by Tito. Stalin helped them choose national unity.

Hence the American dilemma. Could the United States believe that this aggressive, neo-Stalinist, anti-Western country had really broken with Stalin? In the American public and in Congress, skepticism prevailed over hope. Indeed, a widely respected Yugoslav immigrant historian, Alex Dragnich, wrote a book-- Tito: Moscow's Trojan Horse--which found a wide resonance in the United States at the time. The notion of a division of labor is not easy to dismiss if one accepts the original premise of a Communist monolith. After all, if other European Communist parties were controlled from Moscow (whose actions were only confirmed by the Cominform), should Yugoslavia be an exception? And if Stalin had been foolish enough to turn down the funds made available to the USSR under the original Marshall Plan proposal, and if these funds were monetheless needed, why not use one of the Soviet satellites to attract them, without, of course, therby impairing the ideological purity of the other satellites. The American ambassador in Belgrade, Cavendish W. Cannon, recognized shortly before June 28 that Yugoslav-Soviet relations were going seriously wrong. (5) He also suggested that the dissension would provide the United States with a major policy breakthrough.

It is worth remembering that this was the period in which the Berlin blockade was reaching full intensity; in which, only a few months before, the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia had seemed to confirm that there was no prospect whatever of any country's being able to provide a bridge between East and West--and that if it tried, its leaders were likely to

be defenestrated and its people brought firmly under Eastern control. This period also preceded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There was no Western security organization that committed the United States to Western Europe. Such Western European defense agreements as existed were embryonic (and destined to be stillborn). In such circumstances, the idea that the most ferocious member of the socialist camp should strike a stance independent of the two blocs, should reverse the fate of Czechoslovakia, was not easily acceptable. Neither the President, nor his national security advisers were disposed at first to take the ambassador's prognostications seriously.

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The events of 1949 soon impelled the responsible authorities in Washington to change their minds. To summarize these events briefly: They were of two kinds. First, the Cominform countries in Eastern Europe attempted to isolate Yugoslavia diplomatically and then economically. This process was accompanied by a war of nerves, in which the USSR threatened to establish a new, "legitimate" Yugoslav Communist party, and in which the Cominform members openly discussed the prospects of guerrilla war against the "Tito clique." The threat of guerrilla war was amplified by a very large number of border incidents, which began almost as soon as Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform. As is usually the case, the precise origin of such incidents is not clear. It would appear that their origin lay in the attempt of Yugoslav frontier guards to prevent pro-Soviet refugees from escaping. They very rapidly became part of an established pattern, in which the Soviet satellites -- especially Albania and Bulgaria, which flanked the eastern and western borders of Yugoslavia's state--attempted to intimidate the country and wear down the resistance of its defense forces. Indeed, the incidents were so numerous that Yugoslavia claimed 219 frontier clashes and 60 violations of its air space within 14 months of its expulsion from the Cominform. (6)

This pattern of developments in Eastern Europe was shortly accomplished by a Yugoslav counterattack in the United Nations. This was the second development that precipitated a change of mind by U.S. decision-makers.

Strategically, the Yugoslav defection from the Soviet bloc breached the Adriatic fortress of the Cominform defenses, isolated Albania, and saved both Austria and Greece from encirclement. Economically, it deprived the bloc of raw materials valued at about \$100 million a year.(7). Politically, the import of Tito's challenge to Stalin could not be measured: Communism was no longer equated with Stalinism. Although these factors would soon be appreciated, the United States had, understandably, acted on the assumption that Stalinism and Communism were identical. There was not yet any way to translate the distinctions into policy.

What I would like to suggest is that there was no conceptual scheme of reference, no alternative system into which Yugoslavia could easily be fitted.(8) Moreover, the polemics between Tito and Stalin had largely been

kept secret, and therefore, to all but a very few, the expulsion from the Cominform came as a universal surprise. "No hint of the growing tension between Moscow and Belgrade had been given, and there had been no sign of any relaxation in (Yugoslavia's) intransigent anti-Western policies or the pace of her revolutionary domestic changes."(9) But the difficulties went farther. Stalin accused Yugoslavia of defecting to the "imperialist camp"--a charge so patently absurb, as Yugoslavia's own continuing record demonstrated, that it was very hard to make sense of the quarrel, from either the Yugoslav or the Soviet point of view. Finally, and most important, there was no knowing whether Tito could last -- even if the conflict was genuine. Stalin himself did not believe it. "I will shake my little finger," he told his colleagues, "and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."(10) Stalin, after all, was well placed to know. was Tito. Tito himself was particularly concerned not to emphasize the split between himself and Stalin. When the fifth full congress of the Communist party of Yugoslavia (the first full congress since the fourth, illegal, congress of 1928) opened on July 21, Tito appealed to the party's pride in its wartime achievements, its success in "building socialism" in Yugoslavia, and the patriotism of the Yugoslav people in general. Although in so doing he reemphasized the appeal to national independence he had already detailed in his exchanges with Stalin, he was very careful not to indicate any hostility between Stalin and himself. On the contrary, he emphasized "our faithfulness and solidarity with the Soviet Union," and stressed the pain it brought him to be called nationalist rather than internationalist. (11) His quarrel was not with the USSR, but with the Cominform.

The Change in the U.S. Appraisal

Stalin believed that Tito would fall. Tito believed that he was in danger, and rightly so. In fact the danger was to continue for some years. It was already apparent in the manner in which the USSR sought to infiltrate and subvert the Yugoslav intelligence service, local party organizations in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and in the Soviet attempt to set up a Yugoslav government-in-exile in Rumania. This last effort was only prevented by the timely shooting d its intended head as he tried to cross the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier. It was certainly helpful to Yugoslavia that Rankovic had learned Stalinist methods so well. According to his own account, he arrested 8,400 Cominform sympathizers. If this figure is true, it means either that Stalin had a very strong base inside Yugoslavia or that the Yugoslav authorities were very worried. In this combination of national and international circumstances, it took a bold man to suggest that Tito's quarrel with Stalin provided the United States with much of a chance.

Only in early 1949 did the State Department conclude that the ambassador in Belgrade was right, and that the break was real.(12)

Thereafter, a change in the procedures for export licensing was made, so that U.S. exports to Yugoslavia would be freed of the trammels that impeded deliveries to other Communist countries. But the U.S. government had merely accepted what had already happened; it had not yet begun to frame a deliberate policy to ensure the survival and strength of Yugoslavia. It was, perhaps, the resistance of those hostile to the concept of trading with the country that helped to endow it with a more purposive significance (for example, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, who held up the export of a steel mill for some months until President Harry Truman finally intervened against him in August.)(13) The President's action to intervene was taken on overtly political grounds, and by then it was becoming clear that the survival of Yugoslavia's national independence, regardless of its Communist allegiance, was in the political interest of the United States.

Equally, the United States was (yet again) helped to this conclusion by Stalin's own actions. After the summer of 1948, commercial relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Albania were first seriously curtailed and finally stepped. A Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement of December 1948 reduced the volume of trade between the two countries by 88 percent. (14) Czechoslovakia had been particularly reluctant to break off trade relations with Yugoslavia, but in 1949 it was finally forced to do so. Until then, Yugoslavia's trade relations with the Western world were confined to Italy, Sweden, and the U.S. and UK zones of Germany. From 1949 on, it was forced by the facts of the Cominform economic blockade to expand trade where it could.

By summer, a loan had been asked of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. In September, the Bank announced that it had granted Yugoslavia a loan of \$20 million. In October, the United States helped Yugoslavia to secure a loan of \$2.7 million from the International Bank, and a further loan of \$9 million from the International Monetary Fund. These organizations had until that point shown a marked reluctance to extend assistance to Yugoslavia, whose infrastructure was regarded as totally inadequate for the scope and level of its economic planning; they seem to have regarded it (quite rightly) as a country trying to create capital by borrowing abroad rather than investing capital borrowed from abroad. The difference was of course fundamental. If Yugoslavia had been able to persist in its attempts to create an autarchic, balanced economy on the Stalinist model, it would have used up all available resources and been unable to repay loans in any financially acceptable form. It would have been condemned to trading by barter, and any money poured into it would have been money down the drain. The U.S. intervention was certainly decisive in securing this aid, and in so doing, involving Yugoslavia in the general pattern of international trade. In December, the British government, too, granted Yugoslavia a credit of £8 million (\$22.4 million.)

Yugoslavia now needed Western, and especially U.S. help to survive. Was this going to make a difference to its foreign policy?

In fact, foreign policy changes were coming about rapidly. First. and most important, Foreign Minister Edward Kardelj had announced in July the closing of the frontier with Greece. This could at that stage have been interpreted as ambiguous. The Yugoslav-backed Markos forces were losing anyway. Equally, the American-backed Alexander Papagos had been able to take the offensive since the beginning of 1949. Moreover, a renewal of agitation on the Macedonian issue prompted speculation among the Greek guerrillas that Yugoslavia would cease to support them -- and even that it might turn against them. In May of 1949, Stalin had already suggested, through Ardrei Gromyko at the United Nations, that the United States, the USSR, and The United Kingdom might arrange a cease-fire, and the closing of the frontier, in Greece. This proposal had been rejected as an attempt by Stalin to compensate for his military defeats in Greece. When Tito closed the frontier, did this mean that he was acting as Stalin might have wished anyway, or that he was striking out on a new line of foreign policy? The situation appears to have been paradoxical. For now it was a staunch Cominformist who led the last (and disastrous) Communist offensive in the Greek civil war. Yet, as he has been noted earlier, Djilas has reported that Stalin led the last offensive of the Greek Communists, while the hitherto expansionist Tito now withdrew support. In a sense, therefore, Tito was now only doing what Stalin had already advocated.

Equally, in announcing the closing of the frontier with Greece, Tito went out of his way to denounce the Greek "monarcho-fascists" as much as the erstwhile allies of the socialist camp. Moreover, while he was skillful enough to bring in a reference to his own hopes for economic aid at the time he announced this major reversal of Yugoslav foreign policy, he nonetheless stressed that "we have and shall establish economic relations without making any political concessions, and everyone is aware of this. . . . "(15) It might therefore be suggested that although, objectively speaking, the closing of the Greek frontier was the most significant policy change Yugoslavia had made since its expulsion from the Cominform, the import of this change for its future relations with the Western powers was by no means clear.

Less ambiguous was a move in the autumn--that is, while the loans already mentioned were being negotiated or announced. At the UN General Assembly, Yugoslavia denounced the aggressive actions of the USSR. The import of that action was twofold. First, Yugoslavia now publicly uncoupled its foreign policy from its ideological alignment, and from the assumption that its ideology or foreign policy in any sense coincided with those of the USSR. Second, it was now emphasizing that the principles of the UN Charter--stressing as they did the sovereign equality and independence of all member-states--applied to relations among Communist countries as much as to those among other nations. If this sounds like a truism, it is a truism that the USSR has frequently been at pains to forget, and it was certainly not in keeping with the norms of behavior between East European Communist parties.(16)

The question therefore arose: If Yugoslav policy toward the West and in the United Nations now coincided with Yugoslavia's new economic oreintation, did the economic assistance granted by the United States also imply the beginnings of a closer relationship with Yugoslavia? Did it, indeed, imply the beginnings of a commitment?

The Three Factors in U.S. Commitment

It was at first unclear whether there would be a commitment. Tito was certainly not asking for Western military aid. In fact, even as late as 1951, he still insisted that he would not dream of doing so. But what of the United States? In the first instance, it, too, was careful not to raise the question of possible defensive assistance to Yugoslavia. It was concerned primarily with the need to make further economic aid available if the country should need it. But it would appear that contingency studies were undertaken in the Pentagon to determine how Yugoslav military resistance could be strengthened.(17) The most significant indication of a new appraisal came in December, when the new U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, George V. Allen, said to the press on taking leave of the President:

The President confirmed that the United States is unalterably opposed to aggression whenever it occurs or threatens to do so. Furthermore, the United States supports the principle of the sovereignty of independent nations. As regards Yugoslavia, we are just as opposed to aggression against that country as any other, and just as favorable to the retention of Yugoslavia's sovereignty. (18)

By the end of 1949, therefore, U.S. economic aid, undertaken so hesitantly at the beginning of that year, had already expanded to include an interest in Yugoslavia's security and an implicit warning that the United States would not lightly see it threatened.

Still, in 1950, it would have proven as difficult for the United States to offer specific military assistance to Yugoslavia as it was for Tito to ask for it. But one development of the greatest importance had already occurred, and it provided the background to the events in the offing. This was the arrival of U.S. troops in Europe. NATO began to change, during the course of 1950, from a declaratory alliance to a full-scale military organization, and the essence of the organization lay in the willingness of the United States to provide a permanent force in Europe. Tito was careful not to refer to this presence, and indeed his references to NATO were, then as ever since, couched in the most hostile terms. But the knowledge that U.S. forces were now continuously prepared to do combat with the USSR cannot have failed to strengthen his resolve,

even when he was most apprehensive of attack. And, as he was shortly to demonstrate, he was certainly not averse to accepting moral and military support from the naval forces that the United States had brought into the NATO area.

Meanwhile, also during 1950, two catastrophes brought about a major change in the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States. The nature of Soviet policy, of Yugoslav attitudes, and of U.S. commitments were all focused and transformed by these events. The first was the outbreak of the Korean War; the second was the disastrous drought in Yugoslavia.

The Twin Disasters and the U.S. Commitment

The effect of the Korean War was twofold. On the one hand, it showed that the United States could take swift and powerful action even in circumstances and in a theater in which it was taken by surprise; and it helped to establish the credibility of the U.S. will to fight, even in areas where it had no specific commitment. In this manner, the war was extremely helpful to Yugoslavia, should the country need reassurance, or Stalin need a warning.

On the other hand, it seemed also to confirm a different possibility. Both the U.S. and Yugoslav governments agreed in the first instance that the USSR was fighting a war by proxy in Korea. It is perhaps difficult at this distance to understand the impact of such views in 1950. But if one looks back, it is clear that much U.S. diplomatic maneuvering between 1947 and 1950 had been directed at the USSR. (If there was another power whose activities had worried the U.S. government, it was precisely Yugoslavia.) The commitments made between 1947 and 1949 were directed at the overwhelming strength of the USSR in areas where the two powers were likely to compete. Now it appears that Stalin might be able to pursue his expansionist policies without involving his own country directly at all. Americans would be killed; and North Koreans and Chinese would be killed; but no Soviet citizens would be killed. Moreover, any attempt to call him, to threaten the USSR directly, would only have put the Europeans at risk; to the best of my knowledge, such a course was never even considered. The USSR was sitting pretty. But where did that leave Tito? It left him confronting the very considerable danger that the USSR might attack Yugoslavia by proxy, just as it had acted in Korea.

Tito and Truman "agreed" that a satellite attack of the kind that had occurred in Korea could also occur in Europe, and that Yugoslavia was a likely target. The argument was based not only on the general view that the Korean War represented a potential decoy for U.S. forces and might be followed by military action in Europe while the United States was engaged elsewhere, but also on the fact that the Hungarian and Bulgarian armed

forces were being greatly strengthened, and that the USSR was concentrating its own troops on the borders of Yugoslavia. Any of the numerous border incidents and clashes that occurred continuously throughout this period could have provided the occasion for a major war.

At the same time as the effects of the Korean War were being felt in this way, the drought of 1950 made it urgent to consider an increased program of economic aid. The drought, and the imminent threat that the Yugoslav economy might collapse, induced the United States to extend its program of aid. The combined problems of the drought and the Korean War helped to mark the transition from exclusively economic aid to a program that included military assistance as well. This came about in part because Tito himself was now forced by the position of his country to request aid directly from the United States—a step he had hitherto consistently avoided. Now, however, he had to contemplate an extensive defense expenditure in the most unfavorable of conditions. Not only was the drought cutting heavily into overall production, it was also depriving Yugoslavia of the export potential which alone could provide it with the means of importing necessary industrial or military equipment. There was no alternative to officially requesting aid from the United States.

Hitherto, as has been made clear, U.S. aid had reached Yugoslavia by decision of the executive branch. It had been channeled through trade controls, through the Export-Import Bank, and through as generous an interpretation as possible of existing aid legislation. (19) In part, this pattern continued. In November 1950, for example, the administration made available \$15 million, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, for food that was nominally for the Yugoslav armed forces. It also made arrangements in the same period to transfer to Yugoslavia \$11.5 milion worth of flour stored in Germany and Italy under the European Recovery Act. Also, part of a third Export-Import Bank loan of \$15 million was diverted to food purchases for Yugoslavia. Although these interpretations testified both to the ingenuity of the administration and to its sense of urgency, there was no aid agreement, which would of course have been a requirement for aid to be authorized under the Marshall Plan. And there was no overall strategy for either the provision or the administration of aid to Yugoslavia.

At the same time, however, there were suggestions that Yugoslavia was now receiving military aid. Tito certainly dropped hints to this effect between the summer and autumn of 1950, but he never specified the kind or amounts of aid that he was receiving. His later requests for military equipment and his continuous insistence on Yugoslavia's intention to purchase arms through normal commercial channels suggest that he was not, in fact, receiving any great supplies of equipment or armaments. It is probable that he was referring to the administration's

Defense Assistance Act. But the situation on both sides began to change when the President recalled Congress, in November 1950, for a special session and, among other issues, put the case for emergency aid to Yugoslavia.

In a sense, all that has been said so far provides no more than the background for the U.S. decisions on aid to Yugoslavia in 1951. At the same time, it should perhaps be clear that this is not merely background. The decisions did not mark a particular break in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy: They grew out of a process that had begun with Cannon's suggestions in the summer of 1948, and that had developed continuously ever since. But the transformation of the international situation in 1949 and the twin emergencies of 1950 helped to accelerate this process and to bring about an important change in the manner and in the scope of providing aid to Yugoslavia. The most significant aspect of this situation is the transformation of a policy originally designed as a short term pragmatic measure and dedicated only to the proposition that Tito should be kept afloat, by the domestic and foreign pattern of events, into a regular and full-scale commitment. Equally, it became international in scope. The United Kingdom and France joined with the United States in establishing a regular program of economic and military aid. It is apparent that by the end of 1950 the United States, France, and the United Kingdom had all decided that Tito's Yugoslavia now represented a major Western interest, and that without any form of alliance commitment, they were prepared to subsidize and support the country. limited military aid supplied by executive action on an ad hoc basis in the latter half of 1950 represented a degree of U.S. commitment. The United States was not not only giving help but also signaling support for the country. As more than one voice suggested at the time, if the United States had shown the degree of commitment to Korea that it was now prepared to show Yugoslavia, the Korean War would never have happened.

The basic transformation, therefore, had already occurred by November 1950. Before examining the nature and the impact of the events that followed, it is worth considering in more detail the motives behind the U.S. decisions. These were of two kinds: Strategic and political.

The Motives for U.S. Decisions

In strategic terms, the decision to extend ongoing aid to Yugoslavia was taken over a period in which Yugoslavia itself was beginning to change its foreign policy. The general reasons outlined earlier indicate that this was already a significant gain for the Western powers. Yugoslavia lost its virtual protectorate over Albania, it withdrew from the civil war in Greece, and it deprived the USSR of an important strategic asset in the Balkans and on the Adriatic. If Yugoslavia remained an ally of the

USSR, Soviet power reached to the borders of Italy and extended along the whole Eastern shore of the Adriatic. Neutral Yugoslavia virtually ensured that Italy and the Mediterranean would not be immediately threatened by the USSR; it moved Soviet power--even before the foundation of NATO--back to the middle of the Balkan Peninsula; it isolated Albania from Soviet support; and it meant that Soviet and satellite forces would be tied down by the need to confront or contain Tito's own thirty-three divisions. The very fact of subtracting these thirty-three divisions from the combined strength of the Eastern bloc represented a considerable Western gain; but if they were threatened with hostile action from Hungary, or Bulgaria, thus effectively removing even more of the Soviet potential, the gain was multiplied. Thus, even a neutral Yugoslavia constituted an effective Western ally. There is little doubt that some Western analysts at the time were inclined to exaggerate Tito's military power--much as the United Kingdom had exaggerated Poland's military power But it was hard to exaggerate the military importance of an independent Yugoslavia. Moreover, it was possible that if war were coming in Europe anyway, and if it was as likely as not to start in Yugoslavia, then that country would be a positive ally of the West. possibility had two implications. It simplified the defense of Italy; the natural geographical frontier of Italy runs down the Ljubljana Gap, and not, like its political frontier, through the middle of the Venetian Plain. Equally, Greece, if Yugoslavia were disposed to cooperate, could be defended much more effectively. These were the essential strategic considerations. It is worth remarking at this point that they were bound to suggest the question: Would aid to Yugoslavia involve the United States in war? But this question need only be asked to be dismissed. Outside the mind of Senator Robert A. Taft, very few American considered that U.S. aid would drag the United States into another war. On the contrary. By both its practical and its demonstrative effect, such aid might help to deter another war. And if, on the other hand, war occurred, that would only be because it was inevitable. In that case, a friendly Yugoslavia would represent a tremendous asset.

The political considerations were rather different, and were longer term in their implications. There is little evidence to suggest that they were important in the transformation and institutionalization of U.S. aid that took place in 1950-51. As rationalizations of the decisions taken then, they make a certain limited sense; but it would appear that the rationalizations were after the fact. In any event, the argument, as subsequently expressed, was that Yugoslavia represented the first major defeat for the Soviet policy of imposing total control in Eastern Europe, that Tito had accomplished this on his own, and that this precendent was of the greatest importance for the future. Not only that, Stalin had realized the importance of Tito's stand, as the trials of the "Titoists" in Eastern Europe were beginning to show. If the Western powers could not show that they were willing to help Yugoslavia maintain its independence, but without trying to influence or change its system of government, they would surely encourage other forces in Eastern Europe

that might be anxious to reassert the principle of national sovereignty but were inhibited from doing so by fear that this would drive them back into the arms of capitalism.

Whether these arguments were seriously considered at the time or not, the really interesting point about the political and strategic considerations is that they suggested opposite conclusions. Aid given for strategic reasons should be administered in the interests of the United States and the Western powers, should give the United States the right to see that it was spent on objectives that matched U.S. priorities. In other words, it implied supervision. The argument that Tito's precedent might encourage the other Communist bloc nations was surely an argument for the limitation of aid, for the clear understanding that it would not challenge the Yugoslav model of socialism that was then beginning to emerge. So aid given for the political reasons suggested here would have to be free of checks and restraints. Both these sets of considerations were to find expression in practical politics in the coming months. The program of military aid arose initially from the ad hoc prescriptions of economic aid, but the two were to be sharply distinguished before long.

So far, the argument has been that the decision to implement a program of military aid to Yugoslavia in 1951 can not be understood without reference to the whole train of developments since 1948. But two events in the last weeks of 1950 stand out. The first, in November, was that President Truman asked the specially reconvened Congress to consider an extended program of aid. The House on November 12, and the Senate on November 14, voted the Yugoslavia Emergency Relief Act, which authorized the expenditure of \$50 million. It secured considerable majorities in both houses: 60 to 21 in the Senate, and 225 to 142 in the House. The \$50 million was itself significant, but much more important was the fact that the aid program was not institutionalized; that it no longer depended on ad hoc decisions by the executive branch or on clever interpretations of legislation; and that the Congress, by a very substantial majority, agreed with the executive analysis. Thereafter, the way was clear for Yugoslavia to be included in the regular appropriations of the Economic Co-operation Administration, and for the United States to work with the United Kingdom and France on a regular international program. (20)

The second event was related to Korea rather than to Yugoslavia. Following dire warnings from General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signaled to U.S. commanders the world over that "the situation in Korea has greatly increased the possibility of general war" and ordered them "to increase their readiness."(21) Under this directive, the U.S. Mediterranean fleet was ordered to sea at the end of the first week in December. As I have suggested, both Tito and Truman feared the possibility of war in Yugoslavia. The movements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet were dictated, certainly, by global considerations; but there is little doubt that the question of Yugoslavia was predominant at the time—at least

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as far as the Mediterranean was concerned. During the spring and summer of 1951, the Sixth Fleet was reinforced on several occasions, and on at least one of these occasions the reinforcements arrived shortly after Tito had made a declaration of his willingness to fight. By the end of 1951, Tito cruised on a U.S. aircraft carrier during a port visit it made to Yugoslavia. It is worth noting that economic aid been transformed into a regular program of assistance, and, further, significant military support was, at least indirectly, being offered. The question now arises, however, of how this military aid was itself transformed into a direct and overt program of assistance. As I have indicated, the commitment already existed—and in the case of Yugoslavia it was the aid that followed the commitment. But how did the decision to expand economic into military assistance come about?

The Decisions of 1951

Two aspects of the U.S. aid to Yugoslavia are worth noting. The first was that the aid was officially military, but largely economic. Yugoslavia did receive some minor items of specific military supplies, but much of what reached the country was food, nominally designed for the armed forces, but intended in practice to relieve the effects of the drought. The second point followed from the first: The aid was formally military because that represented the simplest way of getting help to the country. The amendment of the Mutual Devense Assistance Act of 1949, in the form it took in July 1950, required a Presidential finding that military aid could be extended to European countries, other than the members of NATO or Greece and Turkey (indeed, it resulted principally from the range of considerations involved in the Greek and Turkish attempts to join NATO) "whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose immediately increased ability to defend itself. . . contributed to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and is vital to the security of the United States." (22) But Presidential findings provided no scope for the kind of supervision the United States soon thought desirable, nor for the provision of aid in the quantity Yugoslavia might want. Any extended program of aid had to meet these two requirements. The transition toward such a program began early in 1951, and it began largely in Yugoslavia.

The changes in Yugoslav foreign policy that began in 1949 gathered momentum in 1950. Already in 1949, the United States had shown its recognization of the new trends at work in Belgrade by supporting Yugoslavia against much Soviet (and, originally, British) opposition for the "East European" seat on the Security Council. In 1950, it began to reap its reward. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Yugoslavia voted for the Uniting for Peace Resolution to override the Soviet veto in the Security Council. But the implications of the Korean War did not stop in the United Nations. In February 1951, Tito declared to the Partiesa Guards

Division that they must now be prepared to resist aggression in any part of Europe if Yugoslav independence was thereby threatened; to drive the message home, he remarked that a local war in Europe was now hardly possible. (23) Later, Kardelj uttered an explicit warning against the USSR. "We shall not," he told the Foreign Political Committee of the National Assembly, "allow anyone to stage a new Korea in Yugoslavia; that is to say, to throw this or that satellite or several of them against Yugoslavia while he himself is supposedly protecting peace." (24)

Tito made his declaration in February, Kardelj, in July. They are juxtaposed here to emphasize the change in Yugoslav policy during the first six months of 1951. The terms of Kardelj's speech made it unmistakably clear that he was referring to the USSR. Who was Yugoslavia to "allow" or "not allow" a particular course of Soviet action? In effect, surely, he was proclaiming general war in the event of even a satellite attack upon the country. What had happened in the meantime to inspire such confidence?

It might be convenient to summarize the nature of the U.S. involvement up to this point, and to indicate the actions taken by the U.S. government in the early part of 1951. First, the executive branch had already shown that it was prepared to interpret the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in such a manner that it could be used to extend economic aid to Yugoslavia. Second, Tito was desperate for further economic aid, and shortly made it clear that he was prepared to couch his request for assistance in terms that made it possible under the Act. Third, a sympathetic intermediary was present in the person of the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade. Fourth, Yugoslavia had approached the British government in the hope of obtaining a long-term loan, (25) but at that stage the British government, while able to help to some degree, could hardly be regarded as more than another intermediary. This was the background to the decisions that now followed, but those decisions indicated an increasing degree of support—military as well as economic—for Yugoslavia.

U.S. and British experts (26) were apparently in agreement that Yugoslavia needed a long-term loan of \$400 to \$500 million for capital investment, and that otherwise the economy was threatened with collapse. But the current economic crisis was far more immediate; and the government officially informed the United States and the United Kingdom in March that without raw materials to a total value of some \$30 million, the country's factories would have to close within 90 days. At the end of March, it requested a grant of \$20 million from the United States and 4 million (\$11.2 million) from the United Kingdom for the purchase of raw materials. In its request to the United States the Yugoslav government declared that these materials were needed to maintain the country's military program, and in so doing put the request within the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Within a few days (on April 9) the Foreign Office and State Department began discussions in London. They were supposed to be continued until June, and were to be

joined by the Quai d'Orsay, but Truman acted before they were anywhere near conclusion. On April 16, he informed Congress that he had authorized the expenditure of \$29 million under the Act to enable Yugoslavia to obtain raw materials "critically" needed to support its armed forces. In a letter to the chairmen of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he defended his decision with the argument that the Yugoslav shortage of raw materials would jeopardize the country's ability to defend itself, and so weakened the security of the United States. The following day, Ambassador Allen was able to implement the decision through an exchange of notes with the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister. The British government, for its part, decided that it could affort to find the \$4 (\$11.2 million) million requested by Yugoslavia by the end of May. All three Western governments, which concluded their discussions in mid-June, were agreed that shortterm emergency measures were one thing; long-term measures, such as a guarantee of the Yugoslav deficit, which would enable Belgrade to obtain a loan from the World Bank, were another, and would require some evidence that the Yugoslav economy was viable. They objected to the enormous emphasis still placed on investment in Yugoslav economic planning; they desired the country to divert more if its resources to export--not only agriculture, but also commodities like nonferrous metals--and they wished to see some investment diverted from heavy industry, on which, according to the proper Stalinist model, it was still concentrated. Yugoslavia rejected all these arguments, as an unwarranted interference in its internal affairs and a Western attempt to keep the country in a backward condition of neocolonial dependency.

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In itself, the act of rejection suggests that Tito was desperate for short-term economic aid, but that he could afford to be obstinate over the longer term questions once that was assured. In that sense, it provides support for the argument above. But it also suggests that the difference in criteria for the provision of economic aid on the one hand and military aid on the other now had to be faced. Were the three Western powers going to make economic aid conditional or unconditional?

The answer was soon clear. The three powers had reached agreement, and though it was not officially published, it was clear that they were prepared to cover the deficit until the middle of 1952 (the United States bearing 65 percent of the cost, Britain 23 percent, and France the remaining 12 percent) and that this help would be unconditional.(27) Moreover, Herbert Morrison, now British Foreign Secretary, announced to the House of Commons that among the criteria considered was the strengthening of Yugoslavia against the Cominform, which was of "the utmost importance."

Tito had won--in economic terms. But it was also announced that the proposed aid would not include arms, which would be "bought in the ordinary way."

But what of the military decisions the United States had been taking at the same time? Here, it is important to distinguish between the general and the particular. In general terms, the United States was clearly anxious to preserve Yugoslav independence, and this policy found expression in the general reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet. In the middle of March, the Second Battalion of the Sixth Marines Regiment arrived in the Mediterranean. This was a reinforced battalion, with two attack transport ships, one attack cargo ship, one high speed transport ship, one dock-landing ship, and three other landing ships. In other words, it was a force prepared for shore intervention(28) at short notice. Nowhere in the Mediterranean was such an intervention more likely than in Yugoslavia. Not only did the presence of such a force give point to Tito's remarks to the Guards Division in February that war in Europe was unlikely to be confined to any one country; it must powerfully have assisted the transition from that original statement to Kardelj's later, more explicit, warning to the USSR, And later in March, a relief force for the Mediterranean Fleet arrived, six weeks early, specifically to cover the "politically critical spring period." This relief force consisted of an aircraft carrier (probably the Coral Sea), eleven destroyers, a submarine, and an oiler. At the same time, the force it was relieving remained until its scheduled departure date. The Mediterranean Fleet represented an exceptionally powerful force in the ensuing weeks. (29) Finally, in the fourth week of May, this fleet was augmented by another aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, and another destroyer. (30)

In general terms, therefore, the United States was showing demonstrative support for any Mediterranean country that might come under the threat of attack from the USSR or its satellites. Such general support certainly heartened and encouraged Tito, but the prospect of more particular military assistance was bound to raise problems of its own.

If Tito had exploited the possibility of a military threat to Yugoslavia as a means to securing economic aid, he had nonetheless always been careful to preserve his economic independence and the political system that went with it. How much more careful would he be to secure his military independence? It should now be clear that the United States and Yugoslavia were moving, by a parallel process, to opposite conclusions on the subject of military aid. For if the United States were to extend Yugoslavia proper military assistance, and not merely economic aid in a military disguise, would it not demand the controls that went with it? For this reason, Tito had, at the beginning of the year, emphatically refused military aid. But he was about to lose this battle.

In his speech to the Guards Division in February, Tito defended his decision to seek economic assistance from the West. This, he said, would make the country stronger as a socialist country, and stronger "in general." But he also said that there was no intention of seeking military

aid: It could not be accepted because the Cominform would hold it as proof of the existence of U.S. bases. He even went so far as to spell out the price that was entailed:

We must leave aside training in up-to-date technique, precisely because they wish to depict us as those who are preparing for war. . . . However the moment we see that attack on us is imminent, matters will be different. Today, we think that the final moment has not yet come. (31)

Was there here, too, a point of agreement between Tito and Senator Taft—that aid would consistute more in provocation than it would be worth in defense? In any event, it is clear that Tito was keeping his options open, but at the same time trying hard to steer clear of military assistance. At the end of the month, in an interview, he suggested that Yugoslavia could resist an attack by the combined forces of its satellite neighbors, but hedged on the question of whether it could also fend off Soviet "volunteers" (32)—the question itself showing how much the model of Korea was present in everyone's minds. He was also asked whether Yugoslavia would request Western assistance if the difference between its neighbors and itself became overwhelming. He replied that it would do so if its independence were threatened by an aggressor. It would appear that he was, in fact, consistently trying to avoid committing himself to a program of Western military assistance, but also hoping that aid would be rushed to him if he had to ask for it.

This was, however, the period in which Tito was also trying to maximize Yugoslavia's potential military danger to obtain economic assistance. The two policies in fact appear quite consistent. In each case, he was suggesting that there might not be any immediate danger, but that there was a long-term need to build up the country's military potential. It is for this reason that the arguments that he had in fact already decided to ask for Western military aid seem unconvincing. (33) What he had decided on, however, was the purchase of Western military equipment—in particular, captured German stocks from the Second World War.

In January, Djilas had already visited London, where he had presented a modest list of the items Yugoslavia wished to buy commercially. But a few weeks later (34) he presented a more comprehensive list, which was transmitted by the British government to the United States and France. This was in April—at the same time as the Anglo-American discussions on the scope and scale of economic aid. It would seem, therefore, that from now on, the two (and then three) governments were agreed on considering all forms of aid to Yugoslavia together. The question naturally arises at this point as to who made the decision. It is probable that in was the United States, in the persons of the ambassador in Belgrade, of Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Europe, George Perkins, who had visited Belgrade in February, and presumably of the Secretary of State and the President. (35)

The decision to ask for extensive rather than minimal military purchases also represented a change in Yugoslav policy. Whereas minimal purchases could have been managed either from income or from economic aid, extensive purchases represented a real request for assistance. On June 8, Kardelj told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Yugoslav Assembly that the Army Chief of Staff was already in Washington discussing the purchase of military equipment. He pointed to the rearmament of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria as the principal reason for this purchase. In fact, the Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Kotche Popovic, had been in Washington since mid-May, as the Department of Defense now announced. A few days after Kardelj's announcement, it was reported in the New York Times (36) that U.S. "officials" were willing to supply Yugoslavia with substantial quantities of military assistance.

It was apparent that Yugoslavia's determination to catch up with its neighbors was now exercizing a contradictory pressure from its determination to purchase arms on a purely commercial basis. On June 18, General Kotche Popovic announced that he had discussed whether Yugoslavia would qualify for aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act with both General Omar Bradley and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Since the country had already received aid under the Act anyway, the discussions must have dealt more with the conditions than the principle. But his discussions nonetheless represented the second major change in the position. Yugoslavia had now been brought to request formal military assistance; and the request was presented to Dean Acheson by the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Popovic, at the end of the month. The ambassador declared that there was no immediate crisis, but he also pointed to the continuous pressure from the East and announced that what Yugoslavia wanted was heavy armaments, and that as soon as possible. Finally, he remarked that the transactions would be "within the framework" of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. This was the public transaction. But in private, the United States had already anticipated Yugoslavia's actions. The Department of Defense had sent Yugoslavia a quantity of arms in the middle of May. In itself. this was no more significant than the limited amounts that had been dispatched after the outbreak of the Korean War. What was important was that the shipment was financed from the department's own funds, and that the announcement was held up until the formal negotiations were completed. It was later reported that the value of this shipment was \$3 million.(37) The final act in this whole process was the Yugoslav decision to purchase arms, diverting some of the \$29 million of economic aid it had just received so it could do that.

Thereafter, the real questions would be the scale and level of armaments supplied by the United States and the agreements it was possible to reach on a bilateral basis between the United States and Yugoslavia on the use of this help. In this regard, two U.S. visits to Yugoslavia were

of particular interest. The first was by Averell Harriman, at the end of August. At this moment in his varied and distinguished career, Harriman was Mutual Security administrator. His visit was therefore of some moment. But he emphasized in a press conference at the time that he was there on the initiative of the Yugoslav government, and that he had no advice to offer. In the end, however, this looks like moumental tact, for he had discussed the questions of economic and military assistance with Tito, agreed with his analysis of the dangers of war, and promised an increase in both economic and military aid. He also suggested that Yugoslavia's defense industries could do with a bit of help. Thereafter, he went to London and Paris, where he apparently discussed the question of Yugoslavia with Clement Attlee and René Pleven. (38)

The second visit occurred in October. It had been preceded by a reverse call, in which the chief of operations of the Yugoslav Army (Major-General Sumonja) and its chief of supply (Major-General Kilibarda) went to Washington to confer with Secretary of Defense General George Marshall. On October 14, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General J. Lawton Collins, arrived in Belgrade. In retrospect, it is clear that Collins's visit was designed to help Yugoslavia reach a military aid agreement. The same Marshall Tito who had ceaselessly warned his country about the dangers of overreliance on the West now allowed Collins to inspect Yugoslav military installations in Skopje (headquarters of the Military region that guarded the approach from Bulgaria) Macedonia, Bosnia, and Slovenia. He also observed military exercises involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Collins made no secret of the fact that he was greatly impressed by the Yugoslav forces, and subsequently became a champion of Yugoslav interests in the Pentagon. (39) On this occasion. Tito is reported to have told him that Yugoslavia now had forty-two divisions (it was normally assumed that at the time of the break with Stalin he had had thirty-three), that he particularly wanted tanks, and that he was by now determined to defend Yugoslavia on the frontiers and not through a retreat into the mountains. Collins agreed publicly with him that the Yugoslav forces were far more than mere guerrillas, and thereafter the two men continued to state from their respective positions that what Yugoslavia needed and was building up was a regular army of high caliber.

Collins had arrived on October 14. On October 27, it was announced in the New York Herald Tribune (it had by then become an open secret in Washington) that Yugoslavia was ready to sign a military assistance agreement, including an American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), as was the normal procedure under other agreements in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The MAAG was to be led by Brigadier-General John W. Harmany. The Tribune added that Collins had promised Tito that the MAAG would not spy on Yugoslav defenses or roam around the country.

The final act in this protracted decision process came on the last day of October, when Tito himself announced at a press conference that the agreement would be signed shortly. When asked what the United States would receive in return for its help, he declared that the United States

would now have a friendly country by its side if hostilities broke out anywhere in Europe. In a letter to the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 7, President Truman announced that Yugoslavia would receive economic and military assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (The Act was substantially the same, in this regard, as the amended Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1950, except that it gave the President a somewhat wider latitude by substituting the word "important" for the word "vital" in its reference to the security interests of the United States.) The military aid agreement was signed in Belgrade on November 14 by Marshal Tito and Ambassador Allen. The United States had effectively created a commitment from which it would be impossible to back down without losing its credibility on a global scale. Just as Ambassador Allen had supervised the transition from a general commitment to Yugoslav independence to a more particular commitment to help the country maintain its independence, so too the movement of U.S. warships helped to translate the general into the particular.

On December 17, just over a month after the military aid agreement had been signed in Belgrade, the heavy cruiser Des Moines visited Rijeka. (40) The attack aircraft carrier Coral Sea visited Yugoslavia in the same month. Marshal Tito now lay aside all his eloquent warnings against Western entanglement, and cruised on board. (41) These visits--the cruise in particular -- were obviously highly demonstrative. The United States was showing both its commitment to Yugoslav independence and its ability to intervene on its behalf. Tito was showing how far his policies had changed, and how far he had accepted a new alignment. And for some time thereafter, an increased momentum was maintained in the developing relations between the two. Also in December, Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers were sent to the United States for training. Relations between the MAAG and the Yugoslav military authorities did remain prickly and suspicious, but the ambassador was usually able to restore a degree of harmony and also to ensure that the military cooperation program served U.S. as well as Yugoslav interests. Later, plans were announced for direct Yugoslav-Italian military talks, and also for U.S.-Yugoslav strategic discussions. Before considering these developments, it is worth considering what the United States had achieved in the short term by the decisions it took in 1951.

Effect of the Decisions of 1951

It was suggested earlier that the greatest moment of danger for Yugoslavia probably occurred in the summer of 1949. But if it is true that plans for an invasion were first laid and then abandoned by the USSR in these months, this certainly did not mean that the danger had passed. It persisted throughout 1950 and 1951, and probably reached a high point again in the spring of 1951. During that period, between the outbreak of the Korean war and the signing of the military assistance agreement, U.S. officials at almost every level of government had voiced the concern that the Korean episode might merely be the prelude to a Soviet attack in Europe,

or the precedent for satellite action in "grey" areas. Averell Harriman emphasized after his conversations with Tito that the most likely cause for such an attack would be a miscalculation on Stalin's part of the U.S. will to resist. Aid to Yugoslavia was therefore both a prophylactic measure and a signal to the USSR that the U.S. will was unimpaired. Equally, it allowed the main burden of defense preparations to rest on Yugoslavia, according both with Yugoslav interests and desires and the need of the United States not to become overextended at a time when it was still building up its military strength.

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The principal result of the decision was therefore that it uncoupled the question of Yugoslavia from the global situation, making it a separate and serious issue in superpower military relations. It rescued Yugoslavia from the status of "grey areas," dependent for its fate on calculations in Moscow of the U.S. will or capability to resist an attack. Instead, it harnessed the U.S. will to the Yugoslav will, U.S. intervention capacity to the Yugoslav ability to fight. In so doing, it decisively transformed the situation: From now on, it was clear that any attack on Yugoslavia would carry with it the risks of a European—and therefore a general—war. This mutual reinforcement of will and capacity effectively deterred any further prospect of a Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia.

U.S. aid in 1951 also had another effect. In 1951, Yugoslavia had, after all, changed its position decisively. Not only had it accepted the provisions for U.S. military assistance; it had also cosponsored, along with the United States, a UN resolution denouncing the the USSR's aggressive attitude toward Yugoslavia and calling for a normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Yugoslavia had circulated among the Western governments a White Book containing details of Soviet harassment, of the military buildup on Yugoslavia's borders, and of the frontier incidents—2,000 in all—that had taken place over the past three years. Speaking before the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations in November, Djilas also detailed the course of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

It was in 1951, in this sense, that Yugoslavia marked its definitive break with the USSR. At first sight this might appear to be absurd. Yugoslav foreign policy had already begun to change in 1949; Yugoslavia had been anxious about the possibility of a Soviet military attack for a long time. But it is perhaps too easy from today's perspective to take it for granted that Yugoslavia could never have effected a reconciliation with the USSR. The fact that it did not tempts one to overlook too easily the degree to which many Yugoslav leaders—Tito not least of them—long remained anxious to do so. The acts of denunciation in 1951, Yugoslavia's association with the tripartite economic aid agreements, and the acceptance of U.S. military aid all marked the turning point at which Yugoslavia became, in foreign policy, effectively an ally of the West. Even if its function as a sub-rosa military ally was both limited and temporary, this turning marked an immense political and strategic gain for U.S. interests—a gain whose effects are still apparent.

These were the principal effects of the decisions of 1951--an immediate military consequence and a longer term foreign policy consequence. But they also raise a question about the longer-term consequences of U.S. military aid.

The Longer-term Consequences

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During the negotiations that followed the Popovic visit to Washington and culminated in the Collins visit to Belgrade, Tito was of course concerned to show that he was in no sense turning into a Western stooge. Shortly after March 1953, Yugoslavia abandoned any prospect to strategic discussions with the United States, even though in the summer of that year the 317th Troop Carrier Wing carried mobile training equipment to Belgrade. (42) The Yugoslav-Italian military talks came to very little, and throughout 1953 the Yugoslav General Staff began to prepare for a better balanced defense. This indicated one side of Tito's determination to recover his freedom as the threat receded. But there was also (from the Western standpoint) a more positive aspect.

Although Tito was anxious after 1953 to dissociate himself gradually from the very close dependence on the United States he had built up, his overall foreign policy was not deflected from its course by the news of Stalin's death. Tito was, no doubt, less apprehensive about the effects of association with small states than with big ones. Nonetheless, the small states were Western allies and, after 1952, members of NATO. In February 1953, Yugoslavia signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Greece and Turkey. By August 1954, this entente had turned into a military pact, in which the three countries gave each other mutual guarantees against attack, and Yugoslavia undertook to take into account the NATO obligations of the other two. The Balkan Pact was interesting as an indicator of Tito's views, of the assurance he now felt that he had received from the West, and of the fact that -- even after the death of Stalin and the fall of Beria -- he was still prepared to proceed along his tortuous but carefully chosen path. In the end, then, even at its lowest estimate, Tito's foreign policy had become mobile and flexible, but the mobility and flexibility were now sustained by the United States and its military commitment. The commitment was implicit, but it was there when needed -- as, for example, it was when Tito called upon it even in 1968, that is ten years after the supply of arms furnished under the Mutual Security Act had come to an end.

In sum, therefore, the United States succeeded totally in its major objectives, succeeded partially and temporarily in the incidental objective of creating a link between Yugoslav and NATO defense needs, but also succeeded in the longer term transformation of the political and strategic equations in the Balkans. Thereafter, two final questions are worth mentioning. The first relates to the process of decision, the second to the

relevance of the decisions of 1951 to any future actions concerning Yugoslavia.

The Process of Decision

The developments that led to the 1951 agreement were dependent throughout on Yugoslav initiatives. It was Tito who had to bring himself to ask for military aid, just as it was Tito who was capable of changing his foreign policy to suit the economic requirements of his country. It was Tito who sent Popovic to Washington, who hoped at first to purchase arms commercially, who finally changed his mind, and who subsequently invited Averell Harriman to Yugoslavia. U.S. policy was in this sense reactive. Through the original economic program, it had become committed to keeping Tito afloat; but the transition to military assistance depended on him, and he was at first very reluctant to become too dependent. Nonetheless, even in a reactive rather than an active role, and even faced with an obdurate suppliant, the United States showed considerable skill and understanding in its response to Tito's move. The credit for the initial perception of the implications of Tito's break with Stalin must go to Ambassador Cannon. Economic aid was thereafter transformed into military aid. The 1950 commitment seems to have grown out of the events preceding it, rather than by conscious decision, and to have been related more to the President's changing view than to any State Department analysis. The State Department, particularly Secretary of State Dean Acheson, took it for granted that Tito was on the Western side, and that this was a view shared by the United Kingdom. (43) Finally, the Department of Defense would appear to have played the decisive role in extending substantial military aid to the country. Its action in granting \$3 million worth of aid from its own funds indicated the seriousness with which it viewed both the potential threat to and the potential worth of Yugoslavia, even while Tito was still hesitating to apply for more extensive (and perhaps more legal) assistance. Thereafter, once the major decisions of principle had been reached, it was perhaps the visits of Averell Harriman, but more particularly General Collins, that inclined Tito to accept the conditions of aid and to swing Yugoslav defense into a posture that would be of direct use to NATO.

The final question for consideration is the relevance of 1951 to any thinking about Yugoslavia today, but that is something that can by understood more clearly after a discussion of the events arising out of the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Czechoslovakia, 1968

In this section, we will examine those aspects of the crisis arising from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that affected U.S. policy-making. It will, of course, be necessary to indicate the character of the

crisis and some of the developments that led to the invasion, but in essence the crisis was internal to the Warsaw Pact. The United States had to deal only with its repercussions. Yet these repercussions were in many ways more threatening to international peace than the invasion itself. U.S. demonstrative military action and diplomatic action were engaged in dealing with them. For, once the scope of the crisis widened to include a possible threat to Rumania, Yugoslavia could hardly avoid being involved. And once that was so, the crisis became a matter of grave concern.

U.S. military actions following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia were very limited; the diplomatic import of these actions and the kind of signal they conveyed to the USSR mattered most. The task of the United States was not to take extensive or dramatic military measures, but to choose the right signals -- and in so doing to secure the acquiescence of its NATO allies. This was partly because the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not itself make much difference to the power balance in Europe, but it did bring about changes in the power structure--the disposition of forces, the potential order of battle--and these were naturally of concern to NATO. Most important, the major interest of the United States was predicated on the assumption that a stable relationship with the USSR had to be preserved, and that the risk of a nuclear confrontation in Europe had to be avoided. It was fundamental to this view that each superpower visibly respect the other's sphere of interest. U.S. action, therefore, had to protect broader U.S. interests without appearing thereby to threaten the USSR. All these considerations together created a complex set of requirements, which we will examine in some detail.

Background

In one sense, the USSR could be said to have <u>resolved</u> the crisis by the act of invasion. This is the view that might be taken by those who attach importance to the conventions of crisis management. (44) In that sense, Czechoslovakia represented a threat to the political and ideological cohesion of the Socialist bloc, and Soviet action prevented this threat from developing. Even more emphatically, the Soviet invasion prevented the intramural crisis of the Warsaw Pact from becoming a confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But such a view, while schematically plausible, is not only morally unattractive; it also overlooks some of the distinctive characteristics of the crisis itself. These characteristics, as they developed between Alexander Dubcek's accession to power in January 1968 and the invasion by Warsaw Pact troops on August 21, were roughly as follows:

First, it was very clear that the USSR was reluctant to invade. Pressures within the Central Committee for an invasion had certainly been evident as early as April. (45) Yet it was not until the very last minute-perhaps shortly after August 10 (46)—that the actual decision to invade was taken.

Second, Soviet reluctance to invade was accompanied by an equally evident determination to treat the democratization program in Czechoslovakia as a matter affecting the security of the socialist camp, and not merely as a matter of ideological disagreement. Increasingly, between April and August, the Soviet leaders used the Warsaw Pact as the main instrument of their discussions with the Czechoslovaks.

Third, these twin considerations—Soviet reluctance to invade and Soviet determination to use security as an instrument of control—in fact intensified the crisis. Soviet reluctance to invade encouraged some Czechoslovak leaders to believe that they could manage developments slowly and avoid the risk of outright confrontation. Every attempt made by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders to contain and control the developments in Czechoslovakia was interpreted by the Czechoslovak press and people as a threat, and this view encouraged continually more radical demands. In the very attempt to keep some kind of control—which meant both placating the USSR and maintaining popular support—the Czechoslovak government found instead that it was losing control. Concessions to the Soviet leadership were unacceptable at home; concessions to popular demand were unacceptable to the USSR. In this manner, and largely because of the dilatoriness of the Soviet decision, the Czechoslovak government was reduced to helplessness.

What do these considerations together amount to? At one level it is comparatively simple to treat the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a matter of purely intramural concern to the Warsaw Pact, with very little bearing on either detente or security relations in Europe, but on another level it is very difficult to do so. Did the crisis mean that it was now going to be dangerous for East European countries to move toward greater internal liberalization, or was there a fundamental difference between the democratization proposed in Czechoslovakia and the patterns of liberalization that were emerging elsewhere? Did the USSR recognize such a difference? Or was the invasion a prelude to wider intervention in East European affairs? The enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," in the form of an authoritative article in Pravda and in statements by Brezhnev himself, could be read either way. Indeed, during the complex period of negotiations between the Czechoslovak leaders and the Soviet occupying troops, a period in which the Czechoslovaks appeared at first unexpectedly successful in recapturing much of their autonomy, it is probable that the Soviet leadership itself had not yet decided.

One thing was unmistakably clear: Détente had led to the crisis. This was only an apparent paradox, for in reality such a crisis had been inherent in the progress of détente. For some years, the USSR had apparently been prepared to accept that détente entailed a relaxation of control in Eastern Europe. This had been a major premise of Gaullist diplomacy. Indeed, this relaxation of Soviet control—the dismantling of the apparatus of economic supervision, the loosening of interparty ties, the formal acceptance of "separate roads to Socialism" at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1959—appeared to have

gone so far that it was possible for acute observers of East European politics to discuss the "collapse of the Soviet empire." (47) But the seeds of crisis began to grow from such discussions. If ultimate Soviet authority were challenged, or the ideological basis of a fraternal party were threatened, the USSR might feel itself impelled to take corrective action. If the price for détente had initially appeared to be a relaxation of control, that relaxation might now seem to-imply more dangerous developments. The difficulty for Western observers lay in determining the likely impact of Soviet action in Eastern Europe.

In fact, further crisis could have had any of three potential results. The first could have been a change in the overall balance of military power in Europe through the heavy reinforcement of Soviet forces there. The second could have been changes in the power structure through the realignment and redeployment of Soviet or other Warsaw Pact forces, necessitating an overhaul of the NATO order of battle. The relocation of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia did subsequently oblige Western commanders to take account of the greater flexibility that this conferred upon the Warsaw Pact forces. Although not a major factor, it was nonetheless a factor in the restructuring of German and U.S. forces in the central area. Thus, while the invasion made no great difference to the overall power balance, it did change the power structure. The third, and most serious, consequence could have been a major upheaval in Europe leading to an East-West confrontation and the danger of war, either through emotional and national Western interests, as in the case of a conflict involving East Germany, or else through intervention by the USSR in areas of strategic importance, as in the case of Yugoslavia.

This was the background against which the United States had to consider the action it should take following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The crisis was not a neat and tidy affair, confined to the Warsaw Pact alone; its implications ranged over very important areas of East-West relations. Who, then, did the United States have to consider in framing a possible pattern of response? As usual, U.S. reactions had to take into account the principal opponent, the USSR; its friends, in this case principally the NATO countries of the central area; and finally, others who, while not necessarily directly concerned with the conflict, might find themselves caught up in the implications.

The USSR

The relationship of Soviet and U.S. objectives in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia is in one sense clear. The primary concern of the United States was inevitably to demonstrate to the USSR that although it disapproved of the Soviet action, it would in no sense interfere in the Soviet sphere of influence. Equally, the USSR sought to reassure the United States that its actions against Czechoslovakia in no way represented a threat to the U.S. position in Western Europe.

Indeed, at the moment that the invasion was underway (some three hours after the first Soviet troops landed at Ruzyne Airport in Prague), the Soviet embassies in Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn all sought interviews with the foreign ministries of the governments to which they were accredited. In the case of the United Kingdom, the Soviet emissary apparently delivered a message in two parts. (48) The first part indicated that the Soviet action was directed exclusively against Czechoslovakia, that it would be of short duration, that Soviet troop movements, particularly in East Germany, need be no cause for alarm, and that the USSR hoped that its action against counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia would not impair relations between the British and Soviet governments. The second part was shorter and consisted simply of a warning that any attempt to intervene would mean a world war. Indeed, it ended with a verbal assurance: "if you interfere, we will blow you off the map." Subsequent conversations with members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London have indicated to me that, as far as liaison between Washington and London permitted them to know, the contents of the message delivered in Washington were very similar -- although no doubt the second part was expressed somewhat less tersely. In other worlds, the two superpowers already understood that military action by one against the other's sphere of influence in Europe would leave no alternative but general war. By the same token that U.S. military power was helpless to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, U.S. military power also remained a viable and completely credible guarantor for Western Europe. But the first level of understanding, although of primary importance in containing the crisis, did nothing to deal with its implications. What was the relationship of the objectives of the two powers at other levels?

The invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred at a moment when the intermittent progress toward East-West détente was about to be transformed into a steadier working relationship. President Johnson was due to visit Moscow very shortly afterward, and it was hoped that his visit would lead to an effective beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Had this been the case, the United States would have begun the process of SALT in a very good bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR, and with some hope that the process could have reached speedier conclusions than in fact it has. But it was not pessible simply to go ahead as planned, although Kosygin publicly pleaded that the President do so. Although the Soviet invasion apparently had much less emotional impact on the U.S. public than its action in Hungary twelve years earlier, American opinion had nonetheless to be considered. The emotional shock in Europe was intense. And in the European perspective it was not merely a matter of emotional shock. First, the invasion did prompt questions about the nature of the new power structure, a point that West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger raised with President Johnson. And second, the invasion meant that after a period of relative assurance that Soviet behavior was becoming more or less rational and predictable, Soviet reactions were again as aggressive as ever. The President of the United States could not appear to condone such behavior

if he needed to assure Western Europe of the validity of a continuing American commitment. There was therefore a temporary disjunction between the Soviet objective of gaining a freer hand again in Eastern Europe while leaving the East-West detente unimpaired and the U.S. objective of demonstrating that while world security implied U.S.-Soviet understanding, this did not imply Soviet freedom to invade another state without paying some kind of price. But because the disjunction was temporary, the price was small. The United States initially confined its reaction to cancelling President Johnson's visit to Moscow and postponing the SALT talks. At this level, again, the nature of the superpower relationship helped confine and control the crisis in Czechoslovakia to the status of an intramural affair. The uncertain implications for further developments in Europe of the crisis and the Brezhnev doctrine later propelled the U.S. government to further action.

The details of action will be examined later. For the present, it is worth mentioning only that it seems to have implied change of mind in in the United States. The initial U.S. response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia itself was to carry on as usual, at least in military terms. The troops were temporarily returned to Europe and some exercises were advanced in date. This action was intended, and conveyed, as a demonstration of U.S. intent at a time when the Czechoslovakian crisis was threatening to spread. But even them, the primary intent was to reassure the West Europeans. The kind of movement that was involved was hardly calculated to deter the USSR from other potential action. In order to clarify the considerations involved, it is therefore worth examining the second category of states that the U.S. government had to consider, namely, the NATO allies.

The NATO Allies

Although the shock and uncertainty felt in Western Europe after the invasion were profound, the principal Western European governments were unanimous in minimizing the importance of the Soviet action. French Prime Minister Michel Debré declared that traffic accidents could not be helped. Chancellor Kiesinger was obviously concerned about the possible effects of changes in the power structure. Indeed, he proposed strategic discussions in NATO about the effects of Soviet redeployment, (49) but it made no difference to his view of detente; he merely declared that there was no alternative. The British made deploring noises, but that was all. In part this reaction was no doubt due to the nature of their several exchanges with the Soviet government. It is interesing to note that at no time was any form of sanction discussed among West European leaders.

There was no framework within which Western European governments could discuss common action except NATO. NATO's primary concern, by definition, was to assure the security of its member states. NATO's attempts at political coordination, for which the machinery was created after the Suez crisis of 1956, had proven ineffective. And in any case there had been

astonishingly little discussion in NATO beforehand of possible reactions to a Soviet coup de main in Czechoslovakia. NATO's concerns, even when considering the likelihood and possibilities of such action, had been limited to an assessment of its security implications for Western Europe. In view of these considerations, NATO's interests were limited to matters of physical security; devoid of adequate machinery for political consultation; and ill-prepared to cope with anything beyond the military implications of the crisis itself. Thus, NATO could not serve as any vehicle at all for European consultation, with or without the United States, about European interests and/or potential action vis-à-vis the USSR in the aftermath of the invasion.

Consequently, the predisposition implied in superpower relations to contain and control the Czechoslovak crisis as an intramural problem found little opposition among the United States' NATO allies. As Europeans, they were ill prepared to ponder the wider implications of the crisis for pan-European relations. As members of NATO, they were concerned primarily with military security. Thus, any superpower reaction indicating that the USSR was not mounting a serious threat, and that the United States was prepared to deal with any contingencies that might arise, was pretty satisfactory to the European govenrments. The first of these assurances was conveyed directly by the USSR. The second was served in purpose by a NATO "Yellow Alert." In fact, so far as I have been able to ascertain, this Yellow Alert provided not only a very low level of readiness, but it was also extremely inefficient. It would appear that it was conducted very much more through the press than through any active military preparations. Indeed, there were some units, from at least two different national contingents in Germany, which were not involved at all, and even some senior officers who were practically unaware that it was going on. (50) In other words, all the evidence suggests that NATO's contingency measures were adopted at a comparatively low level of decisionmaking, that they were not, and were not intended to be, comprehensive, and that the major decisionmaking centers in the United States (the National Security Council, the President, the Joint Chiefs, and the centers of command) were barely involved. The Yellow Alert was a routine precautionary measure, and one that was fully within the competence--and indeed the duties--of the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and the group commanders to carry out on their own. Even so, it fulfilled the U.S. objective toward its NATO allies: to indicate a basic degree of commitment and readiness. This was the maximum that the European governments seemed to have desired. Furthermore, a low-level, routine precautionary measure of this nature would be consistent with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, in the sense that it would reinforce the prevailing understanding that neither power was prepared to tangle with, nor yet allow the other to tangle with, the opposing sphere of influence.

In this sense, therefore, the U.S. military and diplomatic response to the Soviet action did not have to meet any requirements of conflicting interests. It could serve the objectives of U.S. relations with the USSR and with the NATO allies simultaneously. As I have tried to suggest, such a posture might no longer suffice today to meet the requirements of both

the European and the Soviet relations of the United States. But that is because the West European governments are now capable of articulating a greater, a more distinctive, and a more comprehensive interest in the process of detente than they were then. It is also because in 1968, detente was still an experimental notion; by now that notion has been fleshed out with at least some sense of minimal conditions and requirements.

The Issue of Rumania

Rumania's military significance in the Soviet bloc scarcely mattered: Czechoslovakia was of the greatest importance, as Pravda pointed out on September 4:

Let he who is interested in this--including men of letters--outline the Czechoslovak borders sharply on the map of Europe and see what the situation of the Socialist countries would be. This is a wedge dividing the Warsaw Treaty countries. The DDR and Poland remain to the North, Bulgaria and Rumania to the South, without any direct communication between them, and soldiers of the Bundeswehr and American soldiers would appear directly on Soviet frontiers.

Because its lines of communication ran both North-South and East-West, Czechoslovakia was a vital factor in Warsaw Pact calculations. As such, it was a member of the more important "Northern Tier;" it received relatively up-to-date equipment, and was required to take part in significant strategic exercises. None of this applied to Rumania. In breaking the military cohesion of the Pact, Rumania had no effect on Soviet security: The Soviet government merely punished it, as it did for its show of independence over the Six Day War, by withholding arms supplies. Even such a punishment, however, emphasized Rumania's insignificance. One might, in fact, suggest that the potential for Soviet threats to Rumania had been severely curtailed by the development of the Warsaw Pact, for the greater emphasis that was placed on Eastern European participation in Soviet defensive strategy necessarily entailed a higher degree of multilateralism within the Pact itself. Thus, in the late 1960's the organization seems to have undergone a paradoxical development: On the one hand, it was used to contain any tendencies toward East European autonomy (by bringing together under a security rubric considerations ranging from the economic to the ideological); on the other hand, the emergence of the Pact as an important instrument of Soviet security planning meant that a degree of free-voice participation was conferred on the satellite members of the organization. In this sense, it is probably true that Rumania, far from being threatened, was actually protected by the Warsaw Treaty. In the case of Czechoslovakia, of course, the Treaty had proven fatal. But this reflects the difference between the Northern and Southern tiers, and the emphasis the Soviet leadership

laid upon each. But more than that, it reflects the importance attached to the Czechoslovak ideological challenge. It remains, therefore, to see whether Moscow felt Rumania's political position was sufficiently challenging, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for it to change its repressive tolerance to threat, whether, in fact, the Warsaw Treaty would no longer protect Rumania, but rather expose it to danger. This depended not on strategic considerations, but on the politics involved, and on the impact of those politics in the counsels of the Kremlin.

Rumania had never challenged the "leading role of the Party;"(51) on the contrary, it ceaselessly reaffirmed it. Rumania did not threaten, as Czechoslovakia had threatened, to make a nonsense of the principles by which political life in the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe was conducted, by showing that socialism could be achieved without the totalitarian apparatus of state and party control. On the contrary, it ceaselessly reaffirmed the necessity for such control. Even farther, the original Rumanian quarrel with the USSR dated from the Soviet decision to de-Stalinize. (52) But this very apparatus of control, this maintenance of the leading role of the party, had enabled Rumania to adopt a consistently independent policy.

Early in 1968, therefore, the Soviet leadership had faced a challenge on two fronts. On the one hand, the ideological challenge offered by Czechoslovakia, on the other, the political challenge to Soviet authority offered by Rumania. But the Rumanian challenge was based on an ultramontanism more papist than the Pope. On the assumption that détente had implied a relaxation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, Moscow had appeared able to accept the ultramontane independence of Rumania. But once it had taken the risk of occupying Czechoslovakia, and discovered that Western reaction was very restrained, the temptation was very strong to deal with the alternative difficulty of political independence too. The question was bound to arise, once the first step had been taken, as to whether the Brezhnev doctrine did not imply the invasion of Rumania.

Rumania and the Soviet Leadership

It is necessary to distinguish among different tendencies in the Soviet leadership. On the whole, it is true to say that the ruling triumvirate of Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgorny had been reluctant to contemplate the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Or, if they contemplated it, to carry it out. But they were under considerable pressure from other influential members of the Poliburo or regional party bosses—for example Tolstikov of Leningrad or Shelest of the Ukraine (an area that was particularly sensitive to developments in Czechoslovakia, partly because of the local Ruthenians, partly because areas of the Ukraine could receive Slovak television). Both Alexander Shelepin and Yuri Andropov were ambivalent, as was the whole leading apparatus of the KGB, but a number of senior military commanders had been in favor of

invasion from the spring onward. (55) Now the invasion, when it came, did not resolve the dilemma of the Soviet leaders, for they were still confronted with those who were pushing for sterner measures and those who, on the other hand, were concerned that the internal consequences in the USSR itself might prove too repressive. After all, the principal leaders of the CPSU were concerned to clip the wings of a Tolstikov as well as to stem the potential threat from a Dubcek. (Tolstikov was subsequently sent to languish in a representational post in Peking). Even if they were prepared to go ahead with the invasion, they ensured very strict discipline among the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, and on the whole the behavior of the forces there testified to the effectiveness of this discipline. (54) But then, if the Soviet leaders were reluctant to proceed to Draconian measures and if, on the other hand, the population of Czechoslovakia was united behind its government in a prolonged campaign of skillful and stubborn resistence, there was some danger that the whole matter would be seen not as a reassertion of Soviet authority, but as a blow to the authority and prestige of the leadership, especially of Brezhnev.

Within this context, the problem of Rumania was particularly press-The Rumanian party leader, Micolas Cesusescu, had received a delirious welcome in Prague when he visited Czechoslovakia shortly before the invasion. So had President Tito of Yugoslavia. Immediately afterward, both these leaders denounced the invasion in the strongest terms--Rumania indeed declared that it was a violation of the Warsaw Treaty, and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces. This was a skillful Rumanian reaction, but by isolating itself from, as well as in, the Warsaw Pact, the Rumanian government was taking something of a risk. Moreover, in the United Mations, and in every available forum. Yugoslavia and Rumania did all they could to demonstrate their support for Czechoslovakia. If they were able by such means to encourage the Czechoslovak government in its attempts at resistance, that carefully controlled action, which had been directed exclusively at Czecheelovskis, might, in fact, have proven ineffective within the country and incalculable in its consequences throughout the Warsaw Pact countries and Eastern Europe as a whole.

I have been arguing, therefore, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not merely fail to resolve the dilemmas of authority for the Soviet leadership, but that it positively accentuated them, at least temporarily. This was of great importance to any consideration of U.S. response. For if the operation had been as successful as it was smooth, if there were no effective resistance inside Czechoslovakia, if Czechoslovakia had not had the moral support of two other Eastern European countries, if this had not threatened to prolong and extend the crisis—then, American reaction would have been comparatively simple. It would have had to meet only two requirements: demonstrating the inviolability of the respective spheres of the two superpowers, and reassuring the friendly and allied nations in Western Europe. Indeed, these purposes were interdependent, and U.S. reaction in the immediate aftermath of the crisis served them both. But, if the crisis threatened to go beyond Czechoslovakia, it would be very much

more difficult to serve both purposes at once. Action taken to demonstrate U.S. commitment and concern in Europe could risk a superpower confrontation. Action taken to avoid such a confrontation could risk the impression that the United States was backing down from its commitments in Europe. If that impression had gained ground, it would have been a <u>disservice</u> to both U.S. objectives at once: Not only would it have discouraged the West European allies of the United States, it would also have encouraged the hawks in Moscow. Such an outcome would precisely have helped to spread the crisis and to ensure that it became more difficult to manage.

I shall argue that the U.S. government showed itself aware of the balance of necessities in framing its reactions, and, moreover, that it changed its wind on how to react. In the first days after the invasion, President Johnson was adement that he would not, after all, go to Moscow, and he was explicit about the need to demonstrate U.S. displeasure to the Soviet leaders. (55) But at the same time, he refused Kiesinger's request for a Western summit to discuss the strategic consequences of the invasion, reportedly because he did not wish to give Moscow the impression that displeasure could turn into active hostility. (56) Later it would be necessary to reconsider the whole approach of the United States. According to some contemporary reports, U.S. policy began to change because of the adverse effect on European governmental opinion of its early, limited reaction. (57) But there does not appear to be much substance to these speculations. The European leaders knew the score; they had received their several messages from Moscow; they were not so unsophisticated as to believe that a challenge to the principle of the two blocs in Europe would in any way increase their security. Indeed, they were much more likely to be alarmed by any sign of overreaction on the part of the United States. Later, when the implications of the crisis began to stretch beyond the Warsaw Pact, and to involve areas in which the United States had traditionally taken an interest, it would be necessary to reassert the validity of U.S. commitments. The key to the change, and to the new position adopted by the United States, lay in the relations between Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Yugoslavie and the Rumenian Question

Yugoslava foreign policy has, to a remarkable extent, reflected the internal balance of forces within the country. Tito has always had three separate kinds of problems to contend with: the relations between the different nationalities and republics that comprise Yugoslavia; the relationship among the different tendencies within the League of Communists; and the relationship between centralized planning and local autonomy.

Tito has had to juggle these factions not only on the basis of internal compromise but also on the basis of his foreign policy. There are many forces in Yugoslavia favoring a rapprochement with the USSR: the

Macedonian people and leaders are traditionally Russophile; a number of Yugoslav economists are inclined to argue that the economic future of the country lies in association with the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) rather than with Western Burope; on ideological grounds, some of the leading party figures are apprehensive that their rivals and colleagues have inclined too far toward an "Italian" form of socialism. In such circumstances, his foreign policy has been bound to be erratic. But, while erratic, it has always been logical.

Tito's primary concern in 1967 and 1968 was that events in Czechoslovskia should not develop too fast--the more so as the students of Belgrade University were hopeful that they should. Although he went in person to quell the students' revolt, Tito was shaken by the events, occurring as they did, not in some remote Ljubljana but under his own nose in the capital. Even so, his principal concern was to separate the internal consequences from the external aspects of the developments in Czechoslovskia. In spite of the widespread reports that he warned Dubcek against the course he was taking, there is no evidence that he did anything of the kind. (58) Equally, for internal reasons, he certainly could not condemn Dubcek and when the invasion came, he had to condemn it. These considerations help to elucidate the quandary in which he found himself. He had agreed with the Soviet leaders that there was a danger of a general Western offensive in the world. He had watched and shared their alarm at the potential repercussions of the Czechoslovak reform. He had also watched them slowly resolve to put an end to the pace of reform in Prague in the only way they knew. But, by the same token, he knew that they would now have to face further pressures. Would the Soviet leaders stop at Czechoslovakia, or would they tidy up dissent elsewhere in the bloc, too, and were they threatening Rumania?

If they did threaten Rumania, Ingostrvia's internal situation would be transformed. There is no suggestion whatsoever that Soviet leaders ever contemplated attacking Yugoslavia. But Soviet divisions would be stationed on two of Yugoslavia's borders: the Rumanian and the Hungarian. Such a situation would vestly complicate the problems of Yugoslav defense. More than that, the country was, already in 1968, faced with the problem of what to do in the event of Tito's death. While there might not have been any immediate possibility of a Soviet attack, the contingencies that might have followed when Tito departed were wide open. But it goes farther. There has been a persistent tendency in Yugoslavia to seek an accommodation with the USSR. This tendency has, as suggested earlier, been partly the outcome of Tito's cwn desire to normalize relations.

But how was Tito to react to a Soviet threat to Rumania? He obviously could not welcome it. Although he might have shared much of the Soviet analysis, both his domestic and foreign policies made such a course impossible. Further, any Soviet action of that nature would have been bound to polarize Yugoslav society between those who were prepared to appease the USSR and those who were prepared to fight it. Tito had

consistently avoided such a situation since 1948. Even worse, the polarization, while in some ways cutting across nationality boundaries, could also have reinforced national divisions inside the country. With or without a direct Soviet threat, the Yugoslav polity could have fallen apart.

The Nature of Yugoslav Reaction

Tito had no choice. Although in many ways he agreed with the Soviet analysis, he had to act against the eventuality of Soviet forces in Rumania. In fact, largely because he understood Soviet anxieties, he had to be especially cautious to ensure that these anxieties not threaten his own position and his own state.

If there were any danger of a Soviet move against Rumania, Yugoslavia would do all it could to prevent it. On its own, Yugoslavia was powerless; it could only prevent a move against Rumania by widening the implications. These considerations made Yugoslavia a potential target of U.S. interest and action in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The principal U.S. interest was, inevitably, to contain the crisis—to prevent it from developing into a threat of war. Much as it might have deplored the Soviet action, in this sense it saw eye to eye with the USSR. The original U.S. interest in and reaction toward Yugoslavia had to be reconsidered. The Yugoslav interest lay in widening the crisis, the U.S. interest in containing it.

The question of Rumania provided Tito with the opportunity to maximize his own defense potential. The Yugoslav concept of General People's Defense has always contained internal contradictions. The economic development of the country and the growth of urbanization hinder the application of the doctrine in its pure form as it developed after 1945. Beyond that, the requirements of a loosely organized, regionally based defense are sometimes compatible with Tito's policies of decentralization; sometimes they are incompatible with his alternative policies of recentralization. Further, the relationship between an organized army and the irregular units of a people's war has never been clearly defined. In other words, Yugoslav defense planning, although by no means a lost cause, tends to be a mess; and it is bound to remain such as long as it is a variable function of the requirements of domestic policy. Yet, in a sense Yugoslavia can afford this mess, and it can afford it precisely because it has no allies.

The Yugoslav Security Position

Since Yugoslavia separates the main body of the NATO allies in Europe from their own southern flank, and to a degree also separates the central area

NATO from the Warsaw Pact in the Adriatic, it would obviously make a tremendous asset for either alliance. By the same token, each alliance has a strong interest in preventing the other from advancing in Yugoslavia. The unwritten security provided by this position helps to assure the Yugoslav leaders of outside help in the event of attack by either outside party. Equally, it gives the Yugoslav government the strongest possible incentive to avoid a personent commitment to any one alliance. This in turn reinforces the capacity for adjustment in domestic politics. The ideal defense policy for Yugoslavia in the short term, therefore, is to be able to conduct its own defense from every direction, but in the long term to act as a detension for a wider conflict. (59) Tito appears to have been seeking this position in 1968, and developments in Europe handed it to him.

First, the Yugoslav League of Communists protested massively against the Soviet invasion. A resolution passed by the Central Committee of the League refused

to recognize any agreements—open or tacit regarding spheres of interest which transform the small nations into the pawns of power politics. . . . Today, as before, we resolved to use all our forces and means to defend our independence, revoultion and our own way of socialist development. . . and also oppose any provocative action geared towards weakening the strength of our resistance and interference from any quarter whetever.

This was on August 23. On August 25, Pravde attacked both Yugoslovia and Rumania for "giving active assistance to the Czechoslovak antisocialist forces. . . it is precisely in Belgrade and Bucharest that the political adventurers from Prague who find themselves outside Czechoslovakia during this period are weaving their intrigues." The USSR was at least implying a threat to extend the crisis.

The Fundamental Importance of Rumanian-Yugoslav Relations

Rumania had already evinced considerable alarm at the prospect of Soviet action. A week before the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu had declared in the restricted-circulation Army journal Apararea Patriei that Rumania had taken direct steps to strengthen its armed forces. A week later, on the day of the invasion, the minister of the Armed Forces, Colonel-General Ion Ionita, issued an Order of the Day in which he demanded that the Rumanian Army be ready "at a moment's notice" to defend the country's independence and sovereignty. This was

also carried in Apararea Patriei, and the same issue contained a heartening account of the "excellent fighting ability" of the Rumanian forces. (60) Rumania was clearly preparing to fight if necessary, and, more important, signaling its readiness as clearly as possible to the USSR.

In the light of such Rumanian activity, and of the Soviet verbal attacks on both Rumania and Yugoslavia, and in the light of the fact that the Central Committee of the League of Communists had declared, two days after the invasion, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia also represented a danger to Yugoslavia itself, it would be surprising if there had been no consultations between Yugoslavia and Rumania. Their "defense agreement" is frequently referred to, but its import is still a matter for conjecture. It is not an official treaty, it is not embodied in any communiqué, and indeed I have even heard NATO officials deny its very existence. But it is probable that a close and detailed understanding was reached during the meetings between Tito and Ceausescu, and the USSR certainly showed suspicions of its nature. Indeed, for the next two years or so, the USSR from time to time denounced "Balkan Pactism" from time to time.(61) All Yugoslav sources confirm the existence of an understanding; but they disagree about its nature.

If there were any question of a Soviet invasion of Rumania, would Yugoslav troops enter that country to help it resist? Or would Yugoslavia merely support Rumanian resistance with material and moral backing? Or would Yugoslavia open its territory to Rumanian forces, and thus provide a sanctuary for continued resistance, even at the risk of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia itself? In view of the doubts, contradictions, and general secrecy surrounding the agreement, it is impossible to do more than conjecture. Short of fighting side by side with Rumanian forces in Rumania, Yugoslavia would not be able to do very much in terms of material help. Medical supplies and similar aid might have been offered; but Yugoslav weapons were very different from those standard in Rumania. Questions of training, ammunition, and environmental support for the weapons themselves would have made it very difficult to incorporate significant supplies into the Rumanian forces at short notice. It therefore seems unlikely that the "agreement" would have relied on large-scale material help from Yugoslavia. Of the two remaining alternatives, direct Yugoslav participation seems inherently unlikely. It would have weakened Yugoslavia's own defense while not doing very much to impede a determined and massive Soviet advance. Moreover, the prime political purpose of associating Yugoslavia with the defense of Rumania would have been served equally well by using Yugoslav territory as a sanctuary. That would have left Yugoslavia free, had the need arisen, to defend itself with its own combination of regular and irregular war. My own conjecture is therefore that Yugoslavia was prepared to become a passive rather than an active ally of Rumania in the event of Soviet invasion. Equally, this would have served the detonating purpose of Yugoslav defense policy.

Was there any likelihood, however, that the eventuality would arise at all? On August 21. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces had invaded

Czechoslovakia. Two days later, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had protested in a resolution that it construed this action as a potential danger to Yugoslavia itself. Two days after that, Pravda had accused both Rumania and Yugoslavia of haboring and supporting the political adventurers from Prague. Was this accusation to be followed by any Soviet military activity?

Two points need to be considered here. The first is whether the U.S. government would fall in with Tito's conception of Yugoslav interest and defense by construing a threat to Rumania as a threat to Yugolsavia. The second is whether it would allow the USSR time effectively to mount a threat to Yugoslavia. The answer to the first is that it did, and to the second, that it didn't.

The U.S. government was soon to show that it was concerned at the pattern of developments in Eastern Europe. NATO, too, was soon to abandon its original low profile. Both, in fact, were to take measures that would indicate a determination not to allow the crisis to extend to Yugoslavia. On August 30, President Johnson had made a speech to indicate his concern at a new pattern. The next day, Presidential Press Secretary Geroge Christian publicly announced that President Johnson had been watching developments in Eastern Europe and receiving messages on the situation at his ranch "all day." It was clear that a new and potentially disturbing set of developments was beginning to exercise both the United States and NATO. These developments were not—and could not have been—related purely to Czechoslovakia.

For a few days toward the end of August, the USSR did appear to be strengthening its forces in Bessarabia near the Rumanian border. But this was not a large-scale reinforcement, and there is no suggestion that serious preparations were made to invade Rumania. Moreover, any analyst of Soviet defense planning would have concluded that a swift and effective invasion would not be immediately feasible. After a prolonged buildup, and with massive logistical support, the USSR had launched a large, swift, and precise operation in Czechoslovakia. But in these latter days of August, troops were still pouring into Czechosloyakia -- they were not yet leaving it. Half a million men were tied down there. Moreover, these included allied forces from the Warsaw Pact, and it would have been unlikely in the extreme that the Soviet leaders, having taken such care to associate their allies with them in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, would now spoil the effect by going it alone in Rumania. Finally, there is some evidence(62) that Soviet leaders had been concerned about the possibility of military resistance in Czechoslovakia; they could be virtually certain of it in Rumania. After all, Ceausescu had just made it clear that if the USSR contemplated an attack on Rumania, Rumania would fight. (63) All factors point to the same conclusion: that the USSR was not yet ready to invade.

This did not mean, however that it might not be ready one day, perhaps before very long. In the aftermath of the invasion of one country,

in the context of the anxiety to reassert the control of the leadership inside the CPSU that the invasion itself had demonstrated, and confronted with powerful voices demanding further action, the Soviet government might have been tempted to act. One should not exaggerate the risk: for even if such significant military figures as Marshall Ivan Grechko, the Minister of Defense, and Marshall Ivan Yakubovsky, the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact, were to show in the following months a strong predisposition to use the Pact to tighten Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, they were also the best placed to know that a Soviet invasion of Rumania could not be undertaken in a hurry. In 1969, Yakubovsky proposed a Warsaw Pact "fire brigade" for mobile intervention; this was certainly viewed with alarm by Rumania; but it also indicates a desire to remedy deficiencies that were still obvious in the autumn of 1968. So one might suggest that the pressures for immediate action did not arise from the military but from the hard-liners among the politicains, notably Shelest. But Rumania was faced with a threat which, while neither immediate nor tangible, had a potential for growth.

Equally, Western reaction to the "traffic accident" was, at the governmental level at least, remarkably restrained; would the West really raise its voice if somebody else fell victim to the same heavy traffic on Warsaw Pact territory? Finally, the argument that "you can do it once but not twice" barely stands up in such a context. There were, it is true, some repercussions inside the Soviet armed forces after the invasion. Many Soviet troops were astonished and demoralized by their reception. (Indeed some units were thereafter transferred to the Far Eastern Maritime Province--presumably in the hope that they would recover their spirits when faced with the prospect of fighting Chinese.) On the other hand, the invasion had been a highly successful military operation. The fact that it was run so smoothly must in many cases, and particularly perhaps among junior officers, have greatly strengthened morale. Indeed, only a minority of the Soviet forces was exposed to the arguments, the demonstrations, and the general harassment of Czech and Slovak protesters. Not everyone was stationed in Prague or Bratislava or even Banska Bistrica. Most soldiers were quartered in the countryside, many in newly evacuated Czechoslovak army barracks, where they had little contact with the population. One could not really suggest that Soviet forces and Soviet officers were too demoralized to undertake further action.

While, therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the USSR was yet ready to invade Rumania, the option was available, and even small-scale troop movements could give some indication that it was being considered seriously. At this point, the Yugoslav interest in widening the crisis and the U.S. interest in containing it coincided.

The Evolving Pattern

For Ceausescu, the best, and indeed only available deterrent to a Soviet occupation was the threat to fight. This might or might not have been

enough; but for Tito the deterrent would be immeasurably strengthened if the attack on a Warsaw Pact member in the context of an intramural crisis could be transformed into an international crisis by implicating Yugoslavia. It would also give the United States the opportunity to help to deter even an attack within the confines of the Warsaw Pact by showing that it could no longer be so confined. Tito's actions in helping to transform the intramural into the international crisis also, however, gave President Johnson the chance to put it back behind walls. The Yugoslav dimension served both Tito and Johnson. For Yugoslavia it helped to involve the United States as an actively interested participant in decision, and thereby to provide the detonator Tito sought. For the United States it provided the occasion to demonstrate an interest that could not have been demonstrated if the crisis had been confined to members of the Warsaw Pact alone. President Johnson was now able to point out to Soviet leaders the potential dangers of further action, and to do so well before their option had hardened into an intention. He did so in a speech at San Antonio, Texas on August 30. In this speech, only nine days after the occupation of Czechoslovakia and in the middle of the Soviet-Yugoslav polemic, the President referred first to the fact of the occupation. Then he went on to suggest that it "might be repeated elsewhere in the days ahead in Eastern Europe." He followed with the grave and warning words: "Let no-one unleash the dogs of war." (64)

At one level, this might appear to have been a vague warning of the "we-will-not-stand-idly-by" variety. If the speech were considered purely in its domestic context, it might appear to have been constrained purely by the exigencies of the President's position. Johnson, having announced that he would not run for office again, was now a lame-duck President. In spite of his remarkable domestic achievements, he had been undone by the war in Vietnam. The unpopularity of the war and his weakened internal position hardly gave him the authority to engage the United States in new and dangerous entanglements. This explanation, though not necessarily invalid, does not, however, indicate either the subtlety or the effectiveness of Johnson's warning. It was vague, undoubtedly, but there was merit to this vagueness. Johnson named neither the potential target of Soviet ambitions nor the possible course of U.S. action. The statement's strength lay in these omissions. If the President had referred openly to Rumania, he would probably have been told, sharply and explicitly, that the members of the Warsaw Pact were capable of settling their differences among themselves. In that sense it would have been much harder to follow up his ominous, but nonetheless still implicit warning with any explicit threat or action. By keeping his subject area as ill-defined as he did, he was able to prevent the USSR from imposing boundaries. But there was more to it than that: His threat was also vague. He did not commit the United States to any specific course of action, and that was no doubt necessary in terms of domestic politics. Yet it was also vital to his foreign policy considerations. If he had hoped to save Rumania from the threat of invasion by deliberately invoking U.S. military power, he could have done so by only one means: the threat of nuclear war. What consequences

would such a threat have had? There are only three possibilities. One, that the USSR would have invaded Rumania and the United States backed down. Two, that the USSR would have backed down. Three, that neither would have backed down, and that everybody would have had a nuclear war. In such circumstances, to avoid the traditional choice "between annihilation and surrender" was no more than common prudence; but even more, on this occasion the choice would have been loaded against the United States. For if the USSR had been openly contemplating the invasion of Rumania, and if the President had explicitly mentioned this and threatened war (but especially nuclear war), then the USSR would have been almost obliged to invade. To retreat from its traditional sphere within the Warsaw Pact in the face of an overt U.S. threat would obviously have had unforeseeable consequences. Every country in Eastern Europe would have felt free to defy Soviet power; the whole sphere would have crumbled; no Soviet government could have survived. An explicit threat would have created such a challenge to the authority of the Soviet leaders that they would have had to respond. In making the vaguer threat, in fact, Johnson was also making the more effective and meaningful threat.

While avoiding the twin pitfalls of being too explicit about the target or too explicit about the threat, he was conveying a genuine threat. Quite apart from the fact that it showed that even President Johnson's speech writers could read Julius Caesar (actually, a very appropriate text in the case of that particular President) the phrase "to unleash the dogs of war" was both more meaningful and more credible than any bigger threat. It implied that the United States, and perhaps the NATO allies, would do something. What they might do was not to be ascertained. One could presume that it might only entail flying supplies to Yugoslavia. (65) It was in any case unlikely that U.S. or NATO troops would be sent to Yugoslavia in the first instance. But even if airborne supplies were followed by seaborne supplies, this might mean an attempt to neutralize Soviet naval forces in the Adriatic or even to prevent them from entering the Adriatic through the Strait of Otranto. The difficulties and the dangers of escalation would be obvious, and this would apply whatever the terms of the Yugoslav understanding with Rumania. In other words, President Johnson was threatening that if an unspecified action were taken against an unspecified Eastern European country, the unspecified U.S. response would make it very difficult to keep control. And indeed the "threat to lose control" has been eloquently argued by Thomas Schelling to be a highly effective form of deterrence available. - If there were any temptations in , the Kremlin to translate their invasion option into a serious intent, his strategy worked.

On the same day that Johnson delivered his speech, the Soviet embassador in Yugoslavia, Ivan Benediktov, formally acting on the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, made a public statement that

the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government are astonished in the highest degree that

the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav government should have taken the same line as those countries which have adopted measures designed to give active support to . . . (the counter-revolutionaries).(67)

This was, in fact, the height of Soviet protest. Thereafter, Tito continued to protest vehemently against the doctrine of limited sovereignty, and he called for the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia. But the Soviet reactions suggested a basic anxiety to cool matters. By December, Pravda was assuring the Yugoslavs that they had no cause for alarm. By then, too, Tito, seesawing in the opposite direction as usual, was beginning to emphasize the need for good relations with the USSR. In a sense the crisis had passed, and passed very quickly. The coincidence of Tito's attempt to extend its implications and the U.S. desire to limit its implications had (though at the price of Czechoslovakia, as always) ensured that a major upheaval did not follow from the original Soviet action.

This can not all be ascribed to the effects of a single speech. Rather, the speech may be seen as serving three functions. In the first place, obviously, it was intended as a warning to the USSR. In the second, it also marked the change of mind in U.S. policymaking that I referred to above. The carefully studied and restrained approach that characterized the first week after the invasion was now abandoned in favor of an equally studied but more minatory series of gestures. These military gestures were low-key affairs, but they were explicitly intended to convey both a degree of reassurance to Western Europe and an indication to the USSR that the United States was observing the situation with concern. In the third place, the speech provided the framework for more general follow-up action in NATO. The gestures and the follow-up were at least as important as the speech itself. For without them, Johnson's warning could have been forgotten, or dismissed as a temporary reaction in the emotional atmosphere following the invasion. It had, after all, been an intelligent bit of preemption; but it is one thing to preempt before the active need has arisen, it is another to continue the threat when it is attended by risk. It is, therefore, worth considering the gestures that followed the speech, and the more extended follow-up action that was taken later.

The Military Gestures

As I have suggested, the gestures were rather insignificant in themselves, but in the context of the moment they had a certain political significance. It is worth recalling that in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the U.S. Army had declared that it would continue with the "rotation" plans, which meant an effective reduction of its forces in West Germany by some 34,000 men. The rotation was about 75 percent complete in August, and was meant to be completed toward the end of the year. (68) But

early in September, that is in the days immediately after President Johnson's speech, Pentagon officials were taking a modified line. They do not appear to have amended their intentions to proceed with the overall force reduction, and they still ruled out any dramatic moves. For instance, it was decided not to send an extra battalion of U.S. troops to Berlin (an obviously sensible decision unless the U.S. government wished to extend the crisis to that flashpoint), not to adopt forward emergency positions in Europe (which was presumably why the NATO alert was only yellow, and why it was so unremarkable), and not to indulge in any substantial increase in border reconnaissance. As has already been indicated, Kiesinger's proposal for a NATO summit was also rejected. But the Supreme Allied Commander, General Lyman Lemnitzer, was given permission to increase observation along Czechoslovakia's border with West Germany, though only in light formation. (69) And now, Pentagon officials began to hint that some of the troops recently withdrawn from Europe would be flown back for military maneuvers. (70)

Such maneuvers were not of course an innovation: Indeed, they were implicit from the beginning in the whole concept of rotation, whereby some U.S. forces were withdrawn from Europe in order to save foreign exchange costs, but kept on a footing of moderate readiness to return, and flown back periodically for exercises. (This refers to the formations, not the troops themselves: A formation consisting of Vietnam veterans in Bavaria might consist of raw recruits in Kansas, but would be expected to train for the same functions.) But while there was no suggestion that maneuvers should be increased, they were to be advanced. This was the more striking in view of the fact that the Joint Chiefs had previously recommended that they should be postponed. In the view of the Joint Chiefs, it was previously expected that the cost (about 39 million) would have warranted a postponement until the autumn of 1969 -- because of the strains to which both the U.S. defense budget and the U.S. balance of payments were subject at that time. Postponement until the following autum would have allowed the cost of the maneuvers to be covered by funds for the following Fiscal Year. advance them now would mean finding an extra \$9 million from available funds, and in this sense provides an indication of the seriousness the Joint Chiefs attached to demonstrating U.S. commitment.

The important word is commitment. The prime purpose of this particular exercise was to assure the Western European allies. For at the beginning of September, the U.S. ambassador to NATO proposed that if other NATO members also took action to strengthen the alliance, the United States would send four squadrons of F-4 fighter-bombers to Germany, to take part in maneuvers in November or December. And this action was to be followed by the arrival of two brigades of mechanized infantry early in the next year.(71) These two brigades were from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and consisted of inexperienced conscripts. In one sense, therefore, one might suggest that to delay their arrival until the early winter of 1969 was to give them time to train; more important, what was being proposed was the advance of the Reforger exercise from the autumn through the winter; most important was the fact that these proposals were conditional on some sort of matching

exercise by the other NATO allies. The chief emphasis of U.S. policy at this time was clearly to encourage the Western European countries by demonstrating the U.S. commitment, but even this depended on participation by the other members of NATO. Though there is no direct evidence to support it, I would argue that such participation was important because in the new context created by Johnson's warning, the United States was determined to secure NATO support for any moves it might make in the defense of Yugoslavia, and in withstanding any potential threat to Rumania.

This view will appear more substantial if one now examines the third aspect of the significance of the San Antonio speech. Obviously, any gestures of reassurance to the members of NATO constituted a signal to the USSR. Mere commitment where commitments were already explicit, inside the NATO framework, would not necessarily warn the USSR of U.S. interest in areas where the commitment was only implicit, as in the case of Yugoslavia. But if the third aspect, that of a more extended follow-up to President Johnson's warning, could associate NATO with the U.S. interest in Yugoslavia, it would be seen that the initial gestures also served a fundamental purpose. What, then, of the alliance and Yugoslavia?

Yugoslavia and the NATO Follow-up

In the months after the initial crisis, the U.S. government sought to achieve some kind of understanding with Yugoslavia, and also to seek support from the NATO allies. It should be emphasized, perhaps, that it did not pursue either of these tasks with any particular urgency. This was no doubt a tribute to the confidence on all sides after the end of August that the USSR had no intention of proceeding immediately against Rumania. The most striking evidence for this lack of urgency is that Yugoslavia did not at any point ask for new arms supplies, nor for any resumption of the U.S. military assistance that had ended ten years previously. (72) Early in October, Yugoslav officials monetheless began a concerted series of attempts to enlist Western support. They intensively pursued diplomatic contacts with the Western governments -- that is, those of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, perhaps Italy, and certainly the United States. Probably, the highlight of this period occurred when Yugoslav Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic met Secretary of State Dean Rusk, at the United Nations. (73)

At the same time, the United States made another demonstration of interest in Yugoslavia, though it was little publicized. On October 4, a U.S. destroyer from the Sixth Fleet called at Dubrovnik. This visit had more impact when it was followed, on President Johnson's orders, by a visit from Under Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach. Katzenbach had been going to visit Europe anyway, but Johnson instructed him to stop in Belgrade, where he remained from October 17 to 19. Reports of this visit indicate that Tito neither asked for nor received any "guarantees," but that he did receive "assurances" with which he was more than content. (74) Shortly thereafter, at a NATO Council meeting which had been advanced to November from its normal December date, Dean Rusk was

reported by The Times (London) to have declared forthrightly that Yugoslavia and Austria were part of NATO's area of security interest. It was further reported that he said NATO would consider very serious any Soviet move against Rumania or Albania. (75)

It would appear that there was now a very high degree of American-Yugoslav understanding, which was also being translated into NATO terms. This did not mean NATO had made any commitment to send forces to Yugoslavia in the event of either a Soviet attack on Rumania, or even of direct Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. Almost certainly, however, it did include the understanding, and a degree of planning, to reinforce the country with military supplies. (76) Even such measures would carry the implication that the dogs of war might be let slip. In other worlds, a built-in element of deterrence had now been created, and President Johnson's warning at the end of August had taken the form of NATO action by the end of November.

The widening of the crisis had led to its containment. On November 5, NATO had returned two Infantry brigades to West Germany for the exercises that had been moved up to the beginning of 1969. The very prompt reactions on the part of the U.S. government had certainly contributed substantially to the resolution of the crisis.

The Soviet threat to Rumania was not yet dead. By maneuver, by verbal attack, by withholding supplies, and other measures, the USSR had frequently appeared to threaten Rumania between 1964 and 1968. Such activities had been fairly intense in the spring of 1967 after Rumania recognized West Germany. Early in 1969, the threat appeared briefly to have gathered momentum again. Vesna 69, a large Warsaw Pact exercise, began in the last days of March. But the participation was exclusively Northern Tier, and it took place only in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. (77) Similarly, there were naval exercises in the Black Sea, but one could hardly suggest that naval exercises could form a threatening prelude to a land invasion of Rumania. Finally, the USSR held small spring maneuvers in Bulgaria; but it had already been reported (78) that Rumania had refused to involve its own territory, and it would appear that it was on this basis that the government agreed to participate. A concession, but also a victory. Ceausescu once again delivered a warning: In a speech to the Great Electoral Meeting in Bucharest he declared that although there was no danger at the moment from outside reactionary forces, the Rumanians were nevertheless ready to fight.

I want to declare that should anybody try to touch our Socialist achievements, he will come up against the resistance of a 20-million strong, closely united people, determined to fight with all its energies and with all sacrifice, with every means available, in defense of its new life, of the sacred right to liberty and independence. (79)

In fact, the Soviet maneuvers of this period had already been preceded by advanced U.S. maneuvers. On January 6, nearly 12,000 U.S. troops and 96 fighter bombers prepared to leave the United States for exercises in the Grafenwönr area of Germany.(80) Two days later, a total of some 17,000 redeployed U.S. troops began their exercise about 25 miles from the Czechoslovak border. It is worth recalling that in June the German forces had cancelled their summer maneuvers in a similar area in order not to give the USSR any pretext for acting against Czechoslovakia on security grounds. Now that the invasion had occurred, the United States was replying demonstratively. On January 9, began the largest helicopter assault exercise ever held in West Germany. It involved the forces of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic, and the United States. The maneuvers ended on February 5—some three weeks before Ceausescu's speech.(81)

These maneuvers demonstrated U.S. support and NATO readiness, and helped to remind the USSR that its principal concern must be with the Western powers and not with Rumania.

In other words, although Rumania appears to have been alazmed by the Soviet moves, there is little to suggest that it was actually threatened. It was simply that the threat was not yet overtly dead. By August, however, Rumania was emboldened to invite President Nixon to make a state visit to Bucharest. This was clearly a sign of confidence. By then Rumania was no longer threatened, and it has never been threatened since.

One might indeed suggest that Soviet behavior, already cautious, though ultimately ruthless, in the months between the Action Program of the Dubcek government and the moment of invasion, had since that time become even more notably restrained. It did not intervene in Poland in December 1970, when the government of Wladyslaw Gomulka was overthrown by riots. Indeed, it sedulously maintained the position of a friendly but foreign country with no right to interfere in Poland's internal affairs-this in spite of the fact that, according to almost universal reports, Gomulka begged for Soviet military support. There can be no single explanation for such behavior: internal conditions in the Soviet body politic, the interests of a developing superpower détente, the fact that in any case the "leading role of the Party" did not appear threatened in Poland as it had been in Czechoslovakia -- all these factors were probably as important as the experience of what had happened between August and November 1968. Moreover, Gomulka was hardly a saveable figure: his power base had been steadily eroding since 1968, and under his leadership the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) had been bitterly divided. Nonetheless, the fact is that the Soviet government acceded to the overthrow of a government by popular demand. It must have obviously considered its own pragmatic interests in so doing, but it cannot have ignored the experience of the Czechoslovak crisis. It had witnessed a quick military takeover, designed to put an end to an intramural crisis, develop into the threat of a much more widespread crisis; it had seen that it was harder to draw the boundaries between what was inside the Warsaw Pact and what was

outside it than it had previously appeared to assume; and it had heard the President of the United States warn against unleashing war, precisely in order to help contain the original crisis. The U.S. reaction and its translation into NATO policy can not have been far from their minds. But the events of 1968 still leave some paradoxical consequences, and leave questions to be asked.

The Longer Consequences

In an important sense, the chief consequence of the events of 1968 was the development of the Ostpolitik of the West German government. Having shown they were prepared to use force when necessary, having demonstrated that they no longer accept that the rules of détente require them to relinquish control in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders were able to pursue a more radical détente policy than heretofore. If détente had still been dependent on the relaxation of internal control, there would have been no further détente after 1968. The fact that the West European governments reacted so mildly to the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the fact the United States only postponed but did not break off its attempt to create a strategic détente with the USSR—these demonstrated that the Soviet leaders now have both détente and tight control in the East. In one sense a major tragedy, but in another sense, these same considerations allowed the pursuit of a more energetic and radical détente policy, especially by the West German government.

The Federal Republic of Germany had always been the exception, in Soviet eyes, to the slow process of détente that was developing in the mid-1950s. The reasons are less that they needed the threat of a resurgent Germany to keep the Warsaw Pact in order (as has sometimes been suggested) than that, if control were gradually being relinquished in the East, then West Germany was simply going to be too powerful. Its economic strength as well as its geographical position, the fact that a gain for West German diplomacy was automatically a defeat for East German diplomacy in that period, all made this inevitable. But in the new situation created by the Soviet use of force, and in the new context created by the Brezhnev doctrine, there were obvious limits to potential German power. At the same time, West Germany had a new government that was anxious to restore a working relationship with its Eastern neighbors, and above all to establish a dialogue with East Germany. The Ostpolitik that followed the invasion was therefore able to lead much farther than any détente policy pursued by the previous German governments, to lead indeed to resolution of major European conflicts, and to recognition of East Germany itself.

It is tempting to consider this another Soviet victory, and in a sense it was. But it marked certain gains for the West--particularly the elimination of Berlin as a potential source of the third world war--and it also led to a situation in which the nature of détente and the behavior of the USSR are now more clearly on probation than before.

The Questions

The nature of events after the invasion of Czechoslovakia indicates that the United States was successful in containing a crisis, in preventing the spread of its implications to other countries, even inside the Warsaw Pact, and that it was able to do so largely by indirection: by being able to suggest that a threat to Rumania would be a threat to Yugoslavia. Obviously, however, this could not have happened if Yugoslavia had not been willing to suggest the same thing. The first question that arises therefore is: How far did the Yugoslav tail wag the U.S. dog? The answer is probably not at all. Certainly, Tito took bold initiatives. But, as I have suggested, there seems to have been remarkably little coordination between Yugoslavia and the United States until after President Johnson's speech. The speech, in turn, does not appear to have been based on any direct or indirect warning from Yugoslavia about possible Soviet action. Reports at the time (82) suggested that the President was motivated by intelligence reports of the minor Soviet troop movements already discussed. The NATO countries had been taken by surprise when the invasion actually began, having discounted the implications of the large-scale buildup that had preceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia, preferring instead to believe in the apparent assurances provided by the meetings between the Warsaw Pact leaders at Bratislava and Cierna and Tisou. By the end of August, however, the United States was anxious to contain the crisis, and the President acted immediately upon any suggestion of further Soviet moves. As I have tried to show, these moves were most unlikely to imply an invasion of Rumania, but the speech was intended to preempt such a possibility. It therefore seems clear that he was acting from U.S. perceptions of U.S. interests, and not in any way at the behest of Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, the degree of contact and consultation that was achieved between the United States and Yugoslavia in the weeks following the speech shows a very strong coincidence of interests—a coincidence in which Yugoslavia's determination to extend the implications of the crisis and the U.S. determination to contain them met at the right point and allowed the United States to make an effective and independent decision.

The second question is whether the extension of U.S. and NATO interest to Yugoslavia between September and November 1968 made any difference to Yugoslav foreign policy—in the way that, for example, U.S. aid had prompted a reevaluation in 1951. The answer is: none at all. Indeed, Tito was already willing, by the end of November, to deny that he had asked for any kind of help or that he had wanted any kind of help. Of course, one does not, if one is Tito, allow a U.S. warship to call at a domestic port unless one is hoping for some demonstration of assistance. But in fact he went out of his way to warn NATO to mind its own business.(83) Thereafter, and into the present, he used many opportunities to insult NATO, to accuse it of wishing to meddle in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, even to drop heavy hints that Western intelligence might lie behind, for example, the infiltration of a few returning Ustashi.(84) But ultimately,

this is only a part of the rules of the game. Tito's foreign policy need not change in the context established by the nature of superpower relations in Europe. If it is understood that he and the Western government have a common interest in keeping Yugoslavia out of any alliance, then his balancing acts will not affect NATO's interests in the country, nor will these interests affect his public behavior.

The third question is how far the events of 1968-69 affected Soviet behavior. This question, as I have suggested, can not be answered directly. Such evidence as there is would indicate that the Soviet government was not ready to invade Rumania in the autumn of 1968, and the movements that might have been construed as threatening in the early months of 1969 were in fact very minor. It is possible that the USSR never contemplated attacking Rumania, but the option was there; it was not translated into an intention. What is clear is that the Rumanian government, alarmed at first, was nonetheless able to preserve its independence. In spite of intermittent, and sometimes acute, stress in their relations, the USSR has never gone near the edge of threat again.

These three specific conclusions also point to some more general conclusions.

Conclusions

The two sections of this study deal with events that occurred at an interval of twenty years. In the period between 1948 and 1951, the United States was still engaged in the attempt to establish a basic structure of international relations. This attempt implied more than a commitment to Western Europe, or the maintenance of troops there. It involved a mutual learning process by the two superpowers that was complex and, as in Korea, bloody. A crucial element in this process was the definition of boundariesof both superpower influence and superpower behavior. In Korea, war was avoided successfully, though one might argue that the issues at stake, affecting as they did the security of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe, were even more important. It is hard to judge how valid were the fears of a satellite attack on Yugoslavia, but the evidence is overwhelming-in the form of 2,000 border incidents in this period, and in a Soviet confession in a Pravda article--that the USSR was seriously contemplating an attack. It was obviously Yugoslav willingness to fight that constituted the prime deterrent. But, resolute though it was, this attitude could hardly have been a sufficient deterrent. It is worth recalling that the USSR had maintained a military mission in Yugoslavia, and knew the state of the country's defense; it would only have contemplated an attack if it had been confident of victory. The definition of the boundaries of superpower relations within the newly emerging international order demanded U.S. help for Yugoslavia.

I have argued that the success of the United States lay in securing Yugoslavia a particular, perhaps even unique, place in the international order.

It was uncoupled from the global competition between the superpowers, rescued from the status of grey area, and became instead a country whose security was demonstrably of such interest to the United States that it could not be attacked without the risk of general war. As such it is the only state that, with Western help at a crucial moment, has been able to make good its escape from the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe. This fact demonstrates the unique position of Yugoslavia. Although the truce lines of 1945 have now hardened into a definitive East-West boundary, Yugoslavia has not crossed either line or joined any alliance. Instead, its independent status has made it a perpetual test case of Soviet intentions, providing a focus for the relations between the two powers in an area that is of vital concern to both. Such a position has of course given Tito the maneuverability his domestic position requires of him. In this sense, the domestic politics of Yugoslavia have perpetually confirmed the international status of the country by imposing upon Tito the need to balance between the two power blocs. This in turn means that a succession crisis after his departure could be of the greatest international importance. Yugoslavia would still be a test case, but would it still be able to balance?

I have argued that the process of decision was paradoxical. U.S. aid to Yugoslavia was initially economic, but disguised, for legal reasons, as military aid. Later, after the passage of the necessary legislation, it was possible to given the country a full measure of undisguised economic help. Yet this economic help was primarily designed to ensure Yugoslavia's military security. It was therefore possible, as soon as Tito acquiesced, to transform the economic program into a military program, culminating a process that finally demonstrated the U.S. commitment to Yugoslav security. The striking feature of this commitment is the care that was taken by the United States to associate its NATO allies, the United Kingdom, and France, with both the economic and the military assistance. The United States has, by many of its own actions, consistently sought to ensure Yugoslav security, but it has never been alone in evincing concern. This is of great importance in assessing potential reactions to a succession crisis.

The Czechoslovak crisis occurred at a moment when the boundary lines of superpower relations in Europe had long been firmly drawn. I have argued that in the early stage of the Czechoslovak crisis, the United States was not able to take any action, nor willing to do anything that might seem to intensify the dangers of a new upheaval. But later, when the U.S. government had grounds, however uncertain, to believe that the crisis could be extended, it acted promptly to contain it. The key element in this case was the state of relations between the United States and Yugoslavia. Tito's unique position again made it possible to develop swift contacts and consultations between the two countries and also made it possible for him to move away from overt dependence on the United States as soon as the crisis had passed. Once again, Yugoslavia constituted a test case for superpower

relations, and this time the situation enabled the United States to extend a degree of indirect protection even to Rumania, a member of the Warsaw Pact. But in this situation, too, even where the United States was anxious in the first instance to demonstrate commitment and support for Western Europe, it made it plain that it would expect Western European participation. The return of the air squadrons to Europe and the rescheduling of the troop maneuvers was made conditional on matching-activity from the European members of NATO.

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These features of U.S. activity indicate what would seem to be one of the important prerequisites for any consideration of a Yugoslav succession crisis: that the United States would be most unlikely to take action alone. Obviously, a potential, hypothetical crisis can not be considered in detail. There are too many variables, and too many scenarios. The crisis could take the form of an upheaval in the relations between the different Yugoslav republics -- notably between Serbia and Croatia, whose mutual hatred has sometimes been so intense as virtually to threaten civil war. It could take the form of a dispute between "liberals" and "conservatives" in the leadership of the Communist League. It could take the form of showdown between those who argue that the real future of the country lies in a closer alignment with the socialist bloc and those who desire a freer pattern of association with the West. Or it could combine all these forms. The most adequate summary I have heard of the future pattern of events in Yugoslavia came from a Marxist historian: "If nothing happens, anything could happen. If something happens, nothing will happen." This small dialectical masterpiece, however, points to the crucial consideration. If "something happens"--that is, if there is a serious Soviet threat -- it would probably be enough to unite the country in withstanding it, and then "nothing would happen." But if "nothing happens" -- that is, if there is no overt Soviet threat to Yugoslav security -any or all of the potential conflicts inside the country might erupt, and then "anything could happen."

Unfortunately, perhaps, by far the greater likelihood is that there will be no overt threat when Tito departs. Precisely because Yugoslavia constitutes such an important test case of international relations, the USSR would in all probability show a keen awareness of the importance of not interfering. But if the country were to fall into opposing or even fighting factions, would not the USSR be tempted to offer moral and material support to one or another of them? And would not the Western powers be likely to do the same? The prime interest of everybody might lie in preventing such a conflict; but its prevention would also depend on the Yugoslavs themselves, and their future behavior can be neither guaranteed nor foreseen.

In such a case, surely the most important interest of the Western powers, and especially the United States, would lie in not allowing another Angola to develop. It might be tempting to support a Nikosic; and indeed moral and political support would be highly desirable. But it would be essential to draw a firm distinction between political (or even

economic) assistance and military assistance. The "threat to lose control" could become all too real in such circumstances, and on either side.

It might seem therefore that I am arguing that military measures are of no importance, and that the past instances considered here are of no relevance. But I would argue exactly the opposite. The <u>only</u> way to ensure that outside support for any of the competing forces in Yugoslavia remains confined below the military level is to have sufficient force available, and to be able to deploy it sufficiently rapidly to deliver an effective warning to the USSR. As I have suggested, the United States is unlikely to wish to procure all this force on its own. Obviously, the most important elements of any display of force—the Sixth Fleet, the aircraft squadrons—would belong to the United States. But for domestic reasons, the United States would almost certainly require the material association of the Western European powers, and the same is true on general grounds. After all, the United States would have no reason to protect European security if the Europeans themselves were not also interested in doing so.

Contingency planning for a succession crisis would therefore need to seek early involvement by the European members of NATO in any attempts to contain it. Fortunately, many Western European governments are now showing serious (if not altogether accurate) apprehension at the strength of the Soviet forces in Europe and at the Soviet intentions that might feed on such a military superiority. Equally, the West German government has shown a degree of active concern over the future of Yugoslavia Paradoxically, the importance of the Italian Communist party, (PCI) in the process of Italian decisionmaking might give more grounds for hope than for concern. Not only is Yugoslavia Italy's neighbor, but the relations between the the leadership of the PCI and at least some sections of the Yugoslav League of Communists are very close. In the context, particularly, of Yugoslavia, the presence of Admiral Stansfield Turner, (NATO Commander in Southern Europe), in Naples could be very welcome to Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer.

With the necessary degree of European support, therefore, the United States should be able to take the necessary military measures to contain any succession crisis in Yugoslavia. These would demand, in the first instance, a high level of readiness in NATO: the preceding discussion should have made it clear that a commitment to Yugoslavia is ultimately credible when it is seen as part of a commitment to Western Europe. Second, it would entail the ability to fly supplies or even intervention forces if need be to Yugoslavia, though again it should be emphasized that such an ability would serve primarily as a deterrent to Soviet action. Third, it should imply the ability of the Sixth Fleet, and if necessary other European naval forces, to deny access to the Soviet squadrons, particularly in the Strait of Otranto. In spite of the current confusion in NATO, there is no reason why such measures can not be discussed intelligently.

The United States has on two occasions and by different means succeeded in averting threats and containing crises. The possibility of war has proven sufficient to deter the USSR from any actions it might otherwise have contemplated. There is no reason why it should not do so again.

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Footnotes

- 1. The word "camp" had, of course, acquired a technical meaning, indicative of enduring hostility, since Stalin's declaration of February 1946 that the world was irrevocably divided into two antagonistic camps.
- 2. The point is made by John C. Campbell, <u>Tito's Separate Road</u> (Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967). p. 12.
- 3. As he emphasized in his speech in Ljubljana, May 1945.
- 4. Stalin, indeed, appears to have shown some apprehension about Yugoslav policy. See the chapter, "Disappointment," in Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Penguin, 1963).
- 5. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 15, emphasizes Cannon's importance.
- 6. Stephen Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, A Documentary
 Survey (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International
 Affairs, 1975), p. 55.
- 7. Economic Commission for Europe: Annual Report May 1948 to May 1949: UN Doc. E/1328-E/ECE/104, Lake Success, 1949.
- 8. Unfortunately, the relevant volume on the Foreign Relations of the United States has not yet appeared. A useful discussion of this subject is to be found in The United States in World Affairs (Harper & Bros., for the Council on Foreign Relations), pp. 256-58.
- 9. Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Maion, p. 55.
- 10. According to Khrushchev, "Secret Speeck," February 25-26, 1956.
- 11. Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, p. 213.
- 12. This appears to have been a European Affairs department evaluation, not something with which the Secretary of State was immediately concerned. Dean Acheson makes no mention of it in his memoirs. Documentary sources give no indication of how the evaluation was arrived at.
- 13. An episode discussed by Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 16.
- 14. For this and following figures, see Peter Calvorcoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1951 (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p.222 (hereinafter referred to as Survey).
- 15. Speech at Pola, July 10, 1949.
- 16. These points are well brought out by Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 17.

- 17. Ibid., p. 17.
- 18. Ibid.
- 19. Ibid., p. 23.
- 20. Ibid.
- 21. See United States in World Affairs 1951, pp. 25-26.
- 22. Amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
- 23. It was, to make it as explicit as possible, also reported in The Tanjug Weekly Bulletin. See Survey, p. 211.
- 24. See United States in World Affairs 1951, pp. 25-26.
- 25. Survey, p. 242.
- 26. Ibid. Quoted without attribution. See p. 242 and following.
- 27. Ibid., p. 243.
- 28. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, November 1, 1950 to July 1, 1951.
- 29. U.S. Congress, Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Joint Hearings, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier (91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970), p. 361.
- 30. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, July 1, 1951 to June 14, 1952.
- 31. Survey, p. 245.
- 32. New York Times and Manchester Guardian, March 1, 1951.
- 33. The otherwise excellent Survey appears to me to be mistaken on this point. Tito did not ask for assistance, which would seem at least to imply credit terms. He was concerned only to buy arms. By confusing the two, 'Survey has missed the most important point in the transition of Tito's policies.
- 34. Ibid. No date is specified.
- 35. "Presumably" because there is no evidence that the question was considered when Mr. Perkins returned.
- 36. June 12, 1951.
- 37. Survey, p. 248.

- 38. Daily Telegraph, August 30, 1951.
- 39. See Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 27.
- 40. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, "Short of War" Documentation, Special List (Nos. 1 and 2).
- 41. U.S. Congress, Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Joint Hearings, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier (91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970), p. 361.
- 42. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 317th Troop Carrier Wing, Historical Data, 317th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, July-August, 1953.
- 43. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, (W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1969) p. 327.
- 44. See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (Chatto & Windus, 1973).
- 45. Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (Chatto & Windus for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 39.
- 46. It was on August 10 that the New Party Statutes were promulgated. The view that it was this event which finally triggered the Soviet decision was widespread in 1968. Signor Manlio Brosio, the quondam Secretary-General of NATO, argued then that all the evidence suggested that the Soviet decision was taken only in these last ten days. Subsequently, Czechoslovak sources, including the draft memoirs of the late Jozef Smrkovsky, have confirmed that this was their reading too.
- 47. See Chita Ionescu, The Collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, (Penguin Books, 1965).
- 48. I was told of this by Lord Chalfont, at that time Minister of State at the Foreign Office, who received his Soviet visitor at 2 AM, London time. Some confirmation of his report is provided by Harlan Cleveland, at that time American Ambassador to NATO, in his article "NATO after the Invasion," Foreign Affairs, January 1969.
- 49. New York Times, September 5, 1968.
- 50. As recounted to me by Senior (Colonel and upwards rank) U.S. and British officers at a conference shortly afterwards. Neither all German nor all U.S. forces in Germany were involved.
- 51. A consideration which, in the months prior to the invasion, had been paramount in Soviet and Warsaw Pact reproaches to the Czechoslovak Central Committee. See, for example, the "Warsaw Letter" of July 15, 1968.
- 52. See R.V. Burkes, "Rumania," in Kurt London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).
- 53. Le Monde obtained access to a report of the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU held on March 29, 1968. See Le Monde April 1, 1968.

- 54. The deportment of Soviet troops was on the whole remarkably restrained. By far the least disciplined were the Poles.
- 55. New York Times, August 22, 1968.
- 56. New York Times, September 5, 1968.
- 57. Ibid. See Also Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion."
- 58. The fairly general notion that Tito delivered any stern or dramatic warning to Dubcek was categorically denied by Jiri Hajek, foreign minister in the Dubcek government, in an interview with Adam Roberts, the notes of which Mr. Roberts was kind enough to show me.
- 59. Dennison I. Rousinow quoted an anonymous Yugoslav diplomat in these terms in "The Yugoslav Concept of All-National Defense," American Universities Field Staff Reports, 1972.
- 60. Apararea Patriei, August 21, 1968.
- 61. For an account of these denunciations, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 13-20, 1971, 24934, Rumania.
- 62. For example, the USSR had distinctively marked the roofs of all its military vehicles to distinguish them from Czechoslovak vehicles of the same make in order to ensure that, in the event of resistance, it would not be tempted to strafe its own soldiers.
- 63. See Apararea Patriei, August 14, 1968 for Ceausescu's own statement and the even stronger statement by Toita.
- 64. Universally reported in the American and British Press, September 1, 1968.
- 65. Occasionally, Yugoslav military commentators do discuss the idea of receiving external assistance, but usually only in vague and guarded terms. See, for example, Colonel Andre Gabelic, "The Universal Substance of General People's Defense," Viesnik (Zagreb), January 11, 1971. Also General Rade Hamovic, Marodna Armija, (Belgrade), December 23, 1966. Windsor and Roberts, Czechoslovakis 1968, takes up some of the contingencies NATO might have to consider.
- 66. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966).
- 67. Cliscold, Yugoslavia and The Soviet Union, p. 297.
- 68. New York Times, August 22, 1968.
- 69. Ibid., September 17, 1968.

- 70. Ibid., September 5, 1968.
- 71. Ibid., September 17, 1968
- 72. Windsor and Roberts <u>Czechoslovakia 1968</u>, quote resposible American and Yugoslav officials who all agreed on this point.
- 73. The Yugoslav prime minister, Mika Spiljak, had already declared in a Parliamentary speech on September 23, that Yugoslavia attached great importance to closer ties with the West, and stressed the "great significance" of relations with the United States. During this period in general, Yugoslav diplomatic activity was energetically conducted and attracted public attention. See, for example, International Herald Tribune, October 11, 1968, "Yugoslavia reported seeking Western help if invaded."
- 74. Daily Telegraph (London), reporting from Belgrade, October 19, 1968.
- 75. The Times (London), November 16, 1968. It is worth noting that not all accounts name Albania. See, for example, <u>International Herald Tribune</u>, November 29, 1968.
- 76. The Times (London), November 28, 1968.
- 77. Radio Free Europe, Situation Report, Poland, April 2, 1969.
- 78. See The Times (London), February 7, 1969.
- 79. Scinteia (Bucharest), February 29, 1969.
- 80. Ibid., January 5, 1969.
- 81. Ibid., January 30, and February 2, 1969.
- 82. See, for example, Sunday Telegraph, September 1, 1968, and New York Times, September 5, 1968. It is further worth noting President Johnson's own reference in the speech to "rumors" (a nice suphemism?) of further impending Soviet action.
- 83. Press Conference, November 30, 1968, in response to a question by a correspondent of Austrian Television.

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84. Croation Nationalists, partisans during the Second World War.

Chapter XIV

CASE STUDIES: THE PUEBLO, EC-121, AND MAYAGUEZ INCIDENTS

by Robert R. Simmons

The military response of the United States to the <u>Pueblo</u>, EC-121, and <u>Mayaguez</u> crises reflected less the severity of each crisis than the military capability available at the time of each incident.

In 1968 and 1969, North Korea staged spectacular acts of violence against U. S. military craft. On January 23, 1968 it seized the U.S.S. Pueblo, an electronic surveillance ship then in international waters. The crew of eighty-three, which suffered one fatality during the capture, was released after eleven months. The ship itself was never returned. On April 15, 1969, North Korea shot down an unarmed U. S. Navy EC-121 electronic surveillance aircraft over international waters. The entire crew of thirty-one was killed.

The U.S. military reactions to each of these provocations included demonstrations of military capabilities, but retaliatory military violence was not used in either of them. In both cases firm words and naval task forces were dispatched rapidly to the scene, but armed retaliation was not undertaken.

In contrast, Cambodia's seizure of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez on May 12, 1975, prompted a quick and violent military reaction.

This paper examines some of the continuities and differences among these incidents in terms of causes, U. S. responses, and the impact of the military responses on the outcomes. Available sources indicate that one factor dominated these differences: the war in Indochina. Heavily engaged in Southeast Asia in 1968 and 1969, U. S. armed forces simply were not prepared to risk a simultaneous war over either the <u>Pueblo</u> or the EC-121. Political and public enthusiasm for a possible additional struggle in Korea, moreover, was low. These constraints were not operable at the time of the <u>Mavaguez</u> crisis, when both military forces and political support were available for a limited military action. Indeed, political sentiment seemed to favor a violent response that might redress, in some measure, the recent U. S. defeats in Indochina.

The curious thing is that, regardless of these differences, the U.S. military response in each of these three crises apparently had little impact on the immediate outcome, but was perhaps of greater significance for later incidents. The crew of the <u>Pueblo</u> was not returned any earlier in 1968 because of the U.S. show of force. The lack of a violent response to the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> may in turn have contributed to North Korea's willingness to take risks (such as shooting down the EC-121), but it did not seem to affect the negotiations over the <u>Pueblo</u> itself. The EC-121 crisis was

essentially over immediately: The crew died during the plane's destruction. The only option then open to the United States, an option it did not exercise, was a military retaliation. The lack of a violent response this time did not seem to affect the North one way or another. The U.S. response to the seizure of the Mayaguez was violent, out of all proportion to the incident itself. The ship and its crew would have been returned without this demonstration of military might. As suggested below, however, one benefit emerged, perhaps unintended, from this use of violence. The U.S. action was viewed by decisionmakers around the world as irrational -an advantage for a state dealing with erratic foes, such as North Korea, that might otherwise wish to foment crises. An illustration of a later outcome of the 1975 Mayaguez crisis is the murder by North Korean soldiers of two U.S. soldiers at Panmunjon in August 1976 (the first Asian crisis after the Mayaguez episode). It seems possible that the demonstrative U.S. action following that incident achieved added credibility because of the violent U.S. response to the seizure of the Mayaguez.

The Peublo

The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) waged a bitter war between 1950 and 1953. Since then, each side has feared and suspected the other. Premier Kim Il Sung, an intense nationalist, has stridently proclaimed his anti-United States foreign policy goals and proudly built his authority on the slogan of "chuch'e": autonomy and self-reliance. After 1953, North Korea continued to proclaim its intention to liberate South Korea from the grasp of U. S. imperialism. For its part, the United States maintained a defense treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK), and this relationship appeared threatening to North Korea.

This mutual apprehension increased during the Vietnam war because each saw that conflict as a reflection of the shared hostilities. In October 1966, Kim Il Sung delivered an uncompromising speech reaffirming his intention to reunify the peninsula. This speech ("Let Us Defend Independence") condemned both "modern revisionism" (the USSR) and "left opportunism" (China). Shortly thereafter, President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Seoul to declare his solidarity with South Korea. These reciprocal warnings were underscored by an increase in armed incidents in the Demilitarized Zone, and by subversive activities directed against South Korea. In 1966, there had been 50 incidents; in 1967, 729; in 1968, 761. (1) In 1967, more than 1,500 U. S. reconnaissance flights flew near the borders of North Korea. A "senior advisor for national security" said that the number of these flights during the preceding two years had "just increased and increased." (2)

The DPRK experienced a rapid increase in its defense budget, as it dramatically increased the number of incursions into the South. Moreover, it had staged a purge, which had the effect of promoting professional military men interested in armed conflict with the South. The typically fervent anti-United States, anti-South Korea rhetoric became even harsher. Meanwhile, relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) turned frigid, with Red Guard posters in the spring of 1967 calling Kim Il Sung a "fat

revisionist." There were even reports of "shooting incidents" on the China-North Korea border. (3) Ties with the USSR were correct, but apparently not warm. The North was embarking on a hard, independent course. By the end of 1967, with this background of military tension, it was evident that Korea had the potential to test the U.S. ability to react decisively in more than one military crisis at the same time.

On November 17, 1967, Pyongyang radio announced that it had "taken measures" against a group of more than one hundred fishing vessels that entered North Korean territorial waters. It made a similar broadcast, charging another incursion, on December 8, and reported on December 22 that North Korea seized "armed espionage boats disguised as fishing boats" during another mass "infiltration" into its waters by a South Korean fishing fleet. On January 6, 1968, Pyongyang radio announced:

The U.S. imperialist aggressor army, which has been incessently committing provocative acts lately on the sea off of the eastern coast, from 0600 hours this morning again dispatched many armed boats, mingled with fishing boats, under the escort of armed warships into the coastal waters of our side.

The broadcast concluded that the continuation of such "reckless aggression" would result in "100-fold" retaliation by North Korea. (4) Seoul radio reported on the same day that the North had seized five of seventy ships in a fishing fleet during this incident.

The <u>Pueblo</u> was preparing to sail from Japan for its mission on January 8. It was unlikely that this particular news would have halted the <u>Pueblo</u>'s sailing, however, because only South Korean ships had previously been bothered.

The attack on the <u>Pueblo</u> began at approximately 11:30 PM (EDT) on January 22. The <u>Pueblo</u> initially encountered one Soviet-style SO-1 subchaser, which carried a nineteen-man crew and mounted a fifty-seven-millimeter cannon. The subchaser was soon joined by another subchaser of the same type, four motor torpedo boats, and two North Korean MIGs, which patrolled the operating area. After it was seized, the <u>Pueblo</u> was escorted to Wonsan Harbor (North Korea), where it arrived at 6:30 AM (EDT) on January 23. (5)

An attack on the Pueblo had been unexpected for three reasons.

5.

(1) The <u>Pueblo's</u> sister ship, the <u>USS Banner</u>, had sailed along the coast of China, the USSR, and North Korea since 1965 without being fired upon. The <u>Banner</u> had operated off the coast of Wonsan in January 1967 for about thirty-six hours, and on one other occasion in the same year for eleven hours in the same general area where the <u>Pueblo</u> was later captured. In fact, when the <u>Pueblo</u> was seized, the <u>Banner</u> was on its way to patrol off Siberia. Infrequently harassed, it had not had to fire a single shot during its missions. Based on this precedent, there was no adequate military backup. The U.S. Fifth.Air Force was to be kept informed about the <u>Pueblo</u>, and a number of its F-105s were on two-hour alert on Okinawa, approximately 850 miles from Wonsan, but no naval units were allocated to these

missions. A further intangible, but salient factor that contributed to the lack of close and constant awareness of the <u>Pueblo</u>'s potential danger was summarized at 1969 congressional Hearings by Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, commander of the U. S. Naval Forces in Japan at the time of the crisis: "... had there been any reason to suspect an unlawful seizure after 150 years or more of no such seizures, I would not have ordered an unescorted AGER [auxiliary general environmental research] on the mission." (6) The <u>Banner</u> had received naval support on only two of its sixteen missions. The <u>Pueblo</u> traveled alone as well.

(2) It was also presumed that North Korea's foreign policies were under the strong influence of the USSR. The USSR operated its own intelligence ships, and had not seized any U. S. intelligence vessels. U. S. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer reported that the USSR at this time employed forty unarmed intelligence collection ships. Some, he said, "... occasionally have violated our territorial waters, but none has been attacked or fired upon by our forces nor has any of their crew been seized or killed. In fact, when these ships had been notified that they were in U. S. territorial waters and, in accordance with international law, were requested to leave, they did so."(7)

It was, therefore, considered unlikely that a Soviet ally would violate a tacit naval agreement with the United States. Consequently, the captain and crew of the <u>Pueblo</u>, as well as superior U. S. command authorities, were surprised when the ship was seized.

(3) Since Premier Kim's October 1966 speech, the North's accusations had increased in ferocity and in frequency. Hence, they had lost much of their impact. Radio Pyongyang elaborated on the charges on January 8: "This once again proves that the U.S. imperialist aggressors are further aggravating tension in Korea and running wild to provoke a new war ... thus causing a grave situation in which a war may break out at any moment." (8) The North Korean signals of willingness for action had been misread by Washington. Rear Admiral John Victor Smith, the senior negotiator for the UN command in Panmunjon, for example, had labeled these warlike messages "the usual communist garbage."

Rear Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, later explained Admiral Smith's remark on the grounds that "similar warnings had been issued on prior occasions and there was nothing to indicate that the North Koreans were referring to anything other than fishing vessels." (9) This evaluation, however, ignored the seizure of South Korean fishing boats in increasing numbers, the rapid increase of incursions into the South, and the raid by a team of North Korean commandos on the South Korean presidential mansion just before the seizure of the Pueblo.

The U. S. Military Response

The United States, almost totally preoccupied with the burdens of Vietnam, was not prepared to cope quickly with a second conflict. At the time of the seisure of the <u>Pueblo</u>, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier <u>Enterprise</u> and the frigate <u>Truxton</u> were 510 miles southwest of the port of

Wonsan, where the <u>Pueblo</u> was taken. Although there were fity-nine fighter aircraft aboard the <u>Enterprise</u>, only thirty-five were operational. Four F-4B <u>Phantoms</u> with a speed of Mach 2 and a range of more than 1,500 miles were on five-minute "alert." The alert F-4Bs, however, were intended to defend the carriers from air attack, and so were equipped with air-to-air "Sparrow" and "Sidewinder" missiles. It was estimated that it would have taken approximately three hours to refit these aircraft with air-to-surface missiles and send them off to the <u>Pueblo</u>; by that time dusk would have fallen. (10)

Two A-4 and F-4 Marine squadrons based in Japan were then receiving air-to-surface attack training with nonnuclear weaponry. It is conceivable that they could have reached the <u>Pueblo</u> during the two hours before it arrived at Wonsan, but these squadrons were not informed about the <u>Pueblo</u> until the next morning. (11) At the time of the <u>Pueblo</u>'s capture there had not been a "strip alert" by U. S. Air Force fighters, which would have provided the capability of a quick nonnuclear armed response. Similarly, they were unprepared to fight off the 450 Mig defenders. By contrast, in mid-January 1968, readily available (but nuclear-armed) U. S. land-based military aircraft in the immediate region were: seven fighter-bombers in Korea, eighteen on Okinawa, and sixteen in Japan.

Brigadier General John W. Harrell, commander of the U. S. Air Force in the Republic of Korea, stated a few days after the seizure that he had received "no instructions to prevent its capture or come to its rescue," (12) apparently because the forces under his command were not conventionally armed.

Because the U. S. planes on alert in South Korea itself were equipped with nuclear weapons, aircraft were requested from Okinawa. By the time these aircraft reached South Korea, darkness was about to fall, so the aircraft were not dispatched to the scene. South Korean aircraft, under UN and not U. S. command, were not asked to assist. Moreover, South Korean planes were not equipped with delivery capabilities adequate to the rapid response the situation called for. Moreover, Washington was probably reluctant to risk Seoul becoming as adventuresome as Pyongyang if encouraged to liberate the Pueblo.

Even if aircraft armed with conventional air-to-surface weapons had been available for use over the <u>Pueblo</u> before dusk, a question would be: What would be gained by the use of military power? A <u>New York Times</u> editorial of January 24, 1968, appreciated the risks of a military reaction:

Whatever the facts may prove to be, the incident does present, as the White House has observed, "a very serious situation." Such a situation must not be dealt with in passion, for it could lead to a sharp and dangerous new escalation of the Asian war.

President Johnson himself recalled:

. . . we know that if we wanted our men to return home alive we had to use diplomacy. If we resorted to military means, we could expect dead bodies. And we almost might start a war.

Similarly, the Pacific Command

. . . believed that use of our aircraft, instead of saving our men, would endanger their lives, and they conclude that the pilots of the aircraft would be taking an unacceptable risk, in view of the large number of North Korean jet fighters massed in the area around Wonsan, North Korea. (13)

The President's stress on diplomacy reflected an acknowledgment of the pressures already bearing on U.S. military response capabilities. The difficulty of mounting a swift response, the shortage of appropriate military force, and uncertainty about a North Korean reaction to a U.S. military strike were joined to another factor: Was the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> signaling an imminent invasion of the South?

Almost immediately, Washington ordered the dispatch of a large task force (77) to approach Wonsan. These ships were to include three cruisers (Providence, Canberra, and Chicago), five carriers (Enterprise, Ranger, Yorktown, Kearsage, Coral Sea), and eighteen destroyers. As this task force moved into the Sea of Japan, the USSR positioned a squadron of about a dozen vessels close to the U.S. ships-specifically Kotlin and Kashin class destroyers, tankers, and the trawler Gidrolog, equipped with Pueblotype electronic devices to intercept communications and radar. (14)

Because of this Soviet naval presence, the involvement of the USSR in the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis remained for the moment unclear. Although the purpose of the Soviet ships was uncertain to Washington, the United States noted with dismay that its requests to the USSR (transmitted by U. S. Ambassador Lewellyn Thompson) to intercede with North Korea were quickly turned aside.

In the first half day after the seizure, Washington was aware of two developments: conventionally armed planes could not reach the <u>Pueblo</u> before dark; and U. S. naval vessels were proceeding toward Korea. But the question, "Had North Korea acted without Soviet encouragement?" remained for the moment unanswered. Another factor under consideration was potential intensification of the fighting in Vietnam, which would place additional heavy demands upon the U. S. military.

In this context, President Johnson and the National Security Council had evaluated the options for military retaliation. After much discussion, the possibilities reduced to: (1) an attempt to storm Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the ship by force; (2) seizure or destruction of one or more North Korean ships in retaliation, or for potential bargaining power; (3) aerial bombing and sinking of the <u>Pueblo</u> at the Wonsan docks to deny to the Communists access to the intelligence gathering equipment on board; and (4) a naval blockade of Wonsan and perhaps other North Korean ports. (15)

Faced with the continual drain caused by Vietnam and a growing loss of support in the public and in Congress, the President was not willing to run the risk of increasing incidents and violence with North Korea (and perhaps, by extension, of gambling with the developing detente with the USSR). Nonetheless, Johnson decided to transmit a signal of warning to North Korea.

"He wanted to do something pretty quick," another former White House aide says, "but he was in the position of not knowing, not finding anything that looked like a very good thing to do." He talked to McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford. He telephoned Sam Berger, [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs], in the middle of the night. His message: Give us more ideas, more alternatives; think them out. (16)

The essence of these consultations, along with individual comments by important U. S. leaders, was widely publicized by means of official or "leaked" observations, a mechanism that allowed both the domestic audience and the targets (Pyongyang and its anticipated instructor, Moscow) to appreciate the range of choices available. The main thrust of those signals was that Washington would prefer a negotiated settlement to the incident, but did not totally rule out the use of force.

Viewing this crisis as a square in a larger chess board, President Johnson dramatically signaled U. S. determination to rely on a mixture of force and diplomacy for the <u>Pueblo</u> situation. He ruled out military power to retrieve the <u>Pueblo</u> because it ran a high risk of unacceptable consequences. His reluctance to use the military was reinforced by the expectation that heavy demands would shortly be placed on the U. S. military in Vietnam. A specific indication that Task Force 77 was not to be used with an operation connected with freeing the <u>Pueblo</u> was sent by General Earle Wheeler on January 24:

10:25 A.M.: It is desired that no show of force be deployed in area of <u>Pueblo</u> incident. Hold all forces south of 36-00N until further advised . . . 12:25 P.M.: JCS had directed . . . proceed no further north than present positions. <u>Higbee</u> remain in company of <u>Enterprise</u> and <u>Truxton</u>. Do not, repeat, do not, send <u>Higbee</u> to take position off Wonsan. (17)

General Wheeler's direction that "no show of force be deployed in area of Pueblo incident" was perhaps the most concise description of the objective assigned to Task Force 77: to demonstrate military capabilities, but not to use violence. The last part of this message referred to the first of the four military options, which had envisioned storming Wonsan harbor to bring out the Pueblo. Within half a day of the ship's capture, this option and the other military options that risked a possible second front had been ruled out because of stretched military capabilities and the anticipation of an enemy offensive in Vietnam. Once the crew of the Pueblo had arrived in North Korea, moreover, it was not known either where they were or precisely how North Korea would respond. As Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach noted: "The crew is expendable, but you don't want to expend the lives of 82 men and still not accomplish anything. That would be a disaster." (18) In short, the administration publicly underlined a prudent approach to the Pueblo crisis, combined with a demonstration of military strength.

This approach was highlighted when the President mobilised 14,787 Air

Force and Navy reservists on January 25. This was done without prior consultation with the Congress whose leaders, agreeing that a rapid, firm stance must be taken, expressed surprise, but no open irritation.

The military mobilization, however, did not affect the resolution of the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis. The troops mobilized were neither ordered overseas immediately nor even moved to bases for eventual deployment. Rear Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis would assert, "Our units were recalled without deployable equipment. They were not in a position to be immediately responsive." (19) In other words, these recently recalled reservists could not have gone to war. The mobilization was intended chiefly as a demonstrative military action. In part, the mobilization signaled the U. S. determination to both allies and adversaries (there were shudders of apprehension that the <u>Pueblo</u> incident might trigger a new war--in Paris the volume of gold trading quickly nearly doubled). The mobilization also signaled to the American audience the administration's concern about developments in Asia and its willingness to take serious measures to rectify the situation. There was also some suspicion that the Pueblo crisis simply provided an excuse fight the first military mobilization during the Vietnam wart just before an anticipated enemy offensive in Vietnam. In short, the prime military concern remained Southeast Asia.

Domestic Restraints

The declarations from Washington emphasized restraint, but did not preclude the possibility of violence. Clark M. Clifford, the President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, summarized the administration's position in a widely reported testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The President would like very much to get these 83 Americans out of the hands of the North Koreans and get them back. And I believe that he will make every effort along the diplomatic front to achieve that purpose. (20)

On January 26, after the option of a retaliatory strike had been rejected, President Johnson spoke on national television:

We shall continue to use every means available to find a proper and peaceful solution. . . . We have taken and are continuing taking certain precautionary measures to make sure that our military forces are prepared for any contingency. . . . I hope that North Korea will recognize the gravity of the situation they have created. . . . I am confident that the American people will exhibit in this crisis, as they have in other crises, determination and sanity. (21)

On the same day, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg spoke before the United Nations Security Council. "It is imperative that the Security Council act with the greatest urgency. This course is far more preferable to the remedies which the Charter reserves to member states. . . ." (22)

This was a reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits self-defense for unilateral military actions. It was a calm warning that the United States had not entirely ruled out the option of violence. This verbal caution, however, was given after the administration had rejected the use of force to free the <u>Pueblo</u>. The demonstration of the availability of a military option at this time apparently was intended to encourage Moscow to serve as a mediator in the crisis. The State Department had announced on January 23 that an "urgent request" for the release of the <u>Pueblo</u> had been sent to North Korea through the USSR.

Opinion in the United States was divided, but the balance seemed to favor the doves over the hawks. Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, assessed the <u>Pueblo</u> capture as "amounting to an act of war." Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed, saying that the seizure was "in the category of actions to be considered as an act of war." The House Republican minority leader, Gerald R. Ford, declared that if diplomacy fails: "the United States must take whatever military action is necessary" to recover the vessel and crew. (23)

More moderate voices were heard as well. Senator Mike Mansfield cautioned:

We should keep our shirts on We should not let our emotions take over We should not take military action now The government should make the necessary protests and objections through China and the Soviet Union (24)

Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urged: "We should be very careful in this instance not to jump to conclusions until we know all the facts." (25) "All the facts" apparently referred to the U.S. military experience in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. Fulbright also continued to hope that the USSR would persuade North Korea to return the <u>Pueblo</u>. The <u>Pueblo</u> had been seized while the Foreign Relations Committee was trying to decide whether to conduct a formal hearing into the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Senator Fulbright declared that the government had "deceived" the public about ships in the 1964 incident: They were engaged in electronic intelligence work, as, admittedly, was the <u>Pueblo</u>. Another member of this committee, Senator Wayne Morse, pursued the comparison between 1964 and 1968: "The <u>Maddox</u> was a spy ship under instruction to stimulate the electronic instruments of North Vietnam, they were carrying out a spying activity." (26)

This cloud of gathering suspicion about the 1964 incident inhibited an unambiguously forceful response in 1963. Moreover, in 1968, North Korea had seized a functioning electronic intelligence ship while a draining war continued in nearby Indochina. The willingness of the American people, therefore (as expressed by their elected representatives), to support a military reaction was diluted because of gathering doubts about the causes of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Would the capture of the Pueblo duplicate the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which had led to the intense involvement in Vietnam?

The American public was willing to use force to regain the <u>Pueblo</u>'s crew, but opposed to a prolonged conflict on a second front in Asia. The first Gallup Poll after the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> (February 1, 1968) showed that forty percent of those responding to the poll favored using force to regain the <u>Pueblo</u>; only three percent felt that the United States should declare war against North Korea. The Harris Poll in the first week of February 1968 summarized its findings on the public attitude toward the crisis: "It is clear that the American people are prepared to back military action in Korea, but they do not feel the <u>Pueblo</u> incident justifies another war." (27)

Negotiations

At first, Moscow refused to help gain the release of the <u>Pueblo</u> or its crew. President Johnson had been surprised by Moscow's brusque rejection of the request, particularly since the USSR had itself frequently deployed such ships on similar missions.

For years both the United States and the Soviet Union had been employing intelligence-gathering ships, as well as planes, and the ships occasionally wandered off course. In 1965 there were two separate incidents of Soviet vessels entering U. S. waters. We did not make a big issue of the infringements. We merely ordered them to leave. (28)

Despite the initial rebuff, Washington continued to request Moscow's assistance. Meanwhile, several factors worked together to create a climate for more favorable response: the decision not to retaliate; the demonstrations of U. S. military preparedness; and appeals to the USSR as a partner in the use of unarmed naval intelligence collectors. At the same time, Washington realized that Moscow did not completely control Pyongyang's decisions, and was displeased with the North Korean action.

At the time, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had been visiting India for talks with Indian Prime Minister Indian Gandhi. On January 26, an Indian spokesman reporting on the talks stated:

Mr. Kosygin described the <u>Pueblo</u> incident as a routine matter of one country's ship straying in the territorial waters of another country and said that it should be treated as such. . . . The Soviet position is to defuse the matter and not to attach great importance to it. (29)

Reporters attached to Premier Kosygin's delegation wrote:

Russian officials in Premier Kosygin's entourage indicated today that the Soviet Union is interested in freeing the U.S.S. <u>Pueblo</u> despite the negative signals Moscow has been transmitting . . . there is a gap between Soviet actions and Moscow's first response to American requests for help. (30)

On January 28, 1968, The Washington Post, again in a dispatch from New Delhi, reported that "well-placed Russian sources" suggested that the ship could be traded for confessions from the crew and an exchange of prisoners between North and South Korea. If these were accurate sentiments voiced by Soviet officials in an effort to mediate, they would have been peneficial. It should be noted, however, that the USSR quickly denied the validity of these stories.

The Soviet position was repeated publicly in <u>Pravda's</u> authoritative "Observer" column on February 4:

It is clear that attempts to achieve something from a sovereign Socialist state, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, can have no chance of success if accompanied by threat and pressure. Now it is especially important that the United States take no rash steps that would further complicate the situation.

Interestingly, three days after the ship's capture, the North Korean negotiator at the Mixed Armistice Commission at Panmunjom stated:

All you have to do is to admit military provocations and aggressive acts committed by your side, apologize for them and assure [this Conference] table that you will not re-commit such criminal acts. (31)

While this speech was vague and did not promise release of the crew, it did suggest some flexibility. This less-than-rigid posture was again implied when Jun Im Chol, Vice President of the Korean Red Cross, predicted that the <u>Pueblo</u> would not be returned "under any circumstances." (32) Again, no mention of the crew was made; reference had been made to the ship, but not the crew.

Among other things this delicate Soviet stance indicated to Washington that part of the reason for the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> had been Korea's wish to demonstrate an activist stance distinct from those of the USSR and China. Commander Bucher's "confession," for example, issued shortly after the ship's capture, acknowledged that U. S. intelligence vessels had also sailed off of the coasts of China and the USSR. This statement allowed North Korea to portray itself as being in the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle. Recognizing intrabloc disagreement on tactics, Washington avoided harsh verbal attacks on the USSR, and continued to seek its assistance as a mediator for the crew's release. President Johnson commented that, after a few days, "in spite of their initial rebuff of Ambassador Thompson's request, the Russians were now urging us to act with restraint and we believed that they could be helpful." (33)

Interestingly, there had been an analogous situation less than half a decade before the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u>. A U. S. military helicopter with two pilots had been downed just north of the 38th Parallel on the Korean peninsula on May 17, 1963. In March 1964, the United States apologized, claiming that the violation had been caused by navigational error, but Washington refused to admit spying. On May 16, 1964, the pilots were

released when the United States signed a statement prepared by North Korea acknowledging espionage. It declared that the helicopter had been "captured by the self-defense measures of the People's Army while committing military espionage acts after deliberately intruding. . . ." (34) Immediately after the pilots were freed, the United States denounced the signed document as "meaningless."

The helicopter case provided a model of an incident in which retaliatory force was withheld over a time span-about the same as the detention of the <u>Pueblo</u>. As in the <u>Pueblo</u> episode five years later, North Korea had demanded an admission of spying by the United States. In each case, after almost a year's refusal, Washington signed a paper of acknowledgment, which it immediately declared to be false. Therefore, during the 1963 negotiations over the release of the <u>Pueblo</u>, both Pyongyang and Washington had a precedent to pursue, one that was haltingly, but closely, followed. It is interesting that the experience of the helicopter's capture and release was recalled almost immediately after the <u>Pueblo</u>'s seizure. (35)

In a public speech a week after the seizure, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party rejected a military solution for the release of the <u>Pueblo</u> crew, but referred to "the method of previous practice." Washington responded quickly. Thereupon, Pyongyang agreed to hold private talks. A statement was drafted by Ambassador Berger, Under-Secretary Katzenbach, and Secretary of State Rusk. (36) These sequestered discussions were more restrained than the vitriolic open distribes that usually characterized U. S.-Korean negotiations. The private meetings began on February 2 at Panmunjom. North Korea insisted that the United States had committed the "criminal act of espionage" and demanded that the United States admit the correctness of this charge, apologize for the intrusion, and promise not to repeat this criminal action. This acknowledgment, roughly parallel to both the 1964 concessions and the demands of North Korea throughout 1968, was largely the agreement that did accompany the freeing of the crew, eleven months later.

North Korea's implied call for talks based on the 1963-64 pattern came one day after the beginning of the Tet Offensive. A "second front" seemed even less desirable to both sides, the United States because of the intensified involvement in Southeast Asia, North Korea because of its fear of a U. S. military strike. More than a year after the release of the <u>Pueblo</u> crew, the senior North Korean delegate at Panmunjom commented on North Korea's fear of an attack shortly after the <u>Pueblo</u>'s seizure: "We came near to it . . . for a period of two or three months, the entire people of the southern part [of North Korea] lived in a state of constant alert . . . "(37)

In February, it appeared that fruitful negotiations were developing. Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford regretted that:

The Johnson Administration apparently is getting ready to "confess" to North Korea. This comes as a shock to members of Congress who have relied upon earlier statements by the Administration and by our Ambassador to the UN, Arthur T. Goldberg, flatly asserting that the <u>Puetlo</u> had not intruded upon the territorial water of North Korea. (38)

To some degree, this limited progress was aided by military actions. On February 2, 1968, Hungary nad advised the United States that if it wanted the Pueblo negotiations to succeed, it must move the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise farther out to sea. The value of stationing the Enterprise off the Korean coast lay ultimately less in its ability to carry out shelling and bombing of North Korea, and more in the opportunity to withdraw it in a negotiating exchange. After the private talks began between North Korea and the United States, the United States agreed to withdraw the huge aircraft carrier as a symbol of its earnest desire for the success of the talks. In this situation, the "show of force" operated two ways. It is probable that North Korea understood the symbolism of both emplacing, and then withdrawing, units of the armed forces as evidence of U. S. willingness to make concessions. The ship moved on February 7, but the Pentagon specifically said the carrier was not moved back to a station off Vietnam. For North Korea, fearful of a possible U. S.-ROK military strike, the request for the removal of the Enterprise was logical. Even after the Enterprise pulled back, the remaining U. S. naval presence was still impressive. It included the Yorktown (CVA), Ranger (CVA), and the cruisers Canberra and Chicago. Moreover, the Enterprise had not actually been near North Korea, but had cruised between Japan and South Korea. By February 20, the Enterprise was in Subic Bay, the Philippines.

In the first week of February 1968, as North Korean and U. S. representatives met at Panmunjom, Seoul worried about an agreement being reached without its knowledge or consultation, because it had been excluded from the talks. On February 11, 1968, the major Seoul newspaper, <u>Dong-A Ilbo</u>, stated:

The United States must realize that connivance with the Communists over the recent intrusion of a North Korean commando unit into Seoul in exchange for the release of the U.S.S. <u>Pueblo</u> and its crew will result in the fall of U.S. prestige as well as the loss of confidence by Koreans in the U.S.

The South Korean National Assembly then adopted a strong resolution condemning private negotiations between the United States and North Korea. South Korean Premier Chung Il Kwon met with U. S. Ambassador William J. Porter and General Charles Bonesteel, commander of U. S. forces. Premier Chung's demands were that the problem of infiltration from North Korea take precedence over the <u>Pueblo</u>, that South Korea be included in all negotiations, and that there be an increase in U. S. aid to Seoul. At this time, South Korea announced a military mobilization of its own. In addition to its potential defensive function, the mobilization served as a signal to Washington. Beginning in 1965, South Korea had sent more than 47,000 troops to Vietnam to support the U. S. position. South Korean on-line capabilities were therefore limited. Would the United States fulfill its treaty obligations to its loyal ally? Or should South Korea withdraw its troops from Vietnam to prepare its own defense?

On February 11, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance, President Johnson's special envoy, arrived in Seoul to explain the U.S. position on

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the <u>Pueblo</u> negotiations. The communique issued at the end of the talks said that North Korean actions "seriously jeopardize the security of this area and if persisted in, can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea." If such aggressions were to continue, "the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Security Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States." This diluted the earlier South Korean request for an automatic military response to any North Korean infiltration. On the other hand, Vance agreed that U. S. military assistance to South Korea should increase markedly, while private negotiations and priority to the <u>Pueblo</u> continued. (39)

The North Koreans had put up an intriguing photo display in Panmunjom in the first half of February. Alongside pictures of the <u>Pueblo</u> crew were photographs of the two U.S. helicopter pilots who had been shot down in 1963, with their letter of apology and the acknowledgment from the U.S. government that they had been "spying." (40) This could be seen as a hint of the solution to the negotiations, the one that was eventually adopted.

On February 19, Washington publicly acknowledged that two U. S. planes had violated China's airspace. This unusual statement could be interpreted as a further indication of willingness to bargain. At the end of February, the United States suggested submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. North Korea rejected this proposal in early March because the United States would not first admit "espionage."

On May 8, Pyongyang presented a long written list of accusations concerning both the <u>Pueblo</u> and U. S. foreign policies, at Washington's request. U. S. leaders were divided about its acceptance. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke felt that it "was so outrageous that you could sign it. I felt that we were taking a worse beating by keeping those men over there than we would by signing something right away, undergoing some momentary pain and getting them back." Others, such as Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, agreed that the North Korean statement could and should be signed. (41)

North Korea had said, however, that agreement to its document would not be sufficient to secure release of the crew. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow therefore advised against signing the document. Moreover, South Korea implicitly exercised an inhibiting influence through its obvious bitterness at the prospect of a "deal" between Washington and Pyongyang.

On May 28, the U. S. negotiator at Panmunjom offered a partial repeat of the device that had resolved the 1964 crisis: signing a "receipt" (a technique called an "overwrite") once the men were produced. North Korea rejected this because the United States would not admit that the <u>Publeo</u> had been on an espionage mission. About six months later, as noted above, North Korea accepted a compromise: The United States would sign the North Korean document acknowledging spying and simultaneously issue a statement denying the same charges.

Each participant wished to end the negotiations successfully. Pyongyang wanted this result because it realized that it might not be able to depend

on Soviet military support. Furthermore, as the United States explicitly reminded it, if the talks were not successfully concluded by the end of December, North Korea would then have to negotiate with a new and perhaps tougher opponent: President Richard M. Nixon.

At the Panmunjom meeting on December 17, the United States presented two alternate positions: an "overwrite" and a "prior repud ation" scheme. In both, the United States would have signed the document; one would include the denial in the document, the other would involve refuting the paper after release of the crew. The U.S. negotiator threatened that the United States would be forced to withdraw from the negotiations if North Korea did not agree to one of these proposals. "There would be no further meetings. The North Koreans would have to deal with the Nixon Administration." (42)

Mr. Nixon himself had signaled a rigid image, and this point of view had been beamed to Korea in the Korean language. Part of his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in May 1968, for example, read:

When respect for the United States of America falls so low that a fourth rate military power like North Korea will seize an American naval vessel in the high seas, it is time for new leadership to restore respect for the United States of America. (43)

Later in the presidential campaign, Nixon said of the <u>Pueblo</u>: "What we should have done was to bring in the power to defend that ship or get it out of those waters."

The crew of the Pueblo was released on December 23.

Evaluation

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The deployment of a task force in the Sea of Japan did not persuade North Korea to release the Pueblo's crew at an early date. Indeed, the reverse may have been the case: The deployment of the force without an actual strike at North Korean targets proved that the strongest power in the world could be successfully challenged. North Korea viewed the fact that it had seized the Pueblo and suffered no retaliation as a victory. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had declared that the abduction was "an act of war." (44) President Johnson had quickly sent a sizable naval force toward the crisis area. But U. S. bombs were not dropped, neither landing nor invading forces were dispatched, and the naval forces did not closely approach the coastal waters of North Korea. The United States' "bluff" had been called. The threat of using military force was conveyed by harsh verbal demand and the movement of military forces. But as it became evident that violence was not to be used, North Korea -- which at first had expected an attack--became more confident during the negotiations. These negotiations began and ended with the same North Korean demands: demands that were eventually met. This lesson, moreover, that the U.S. show of force was only demonstrative -- was most probably an important factor in North Korean planning for its next confrontation with the United States. This same example was undoubtedly appreciated by the Communist military in southeast Asia.

This is not to say that a more satisfactory outcome, from the U.S. perspective, would have resulted from the use of violence against North Korea. The probable results of a retaliatory strike were grim: death of the crew, continued conflict of an indeterminate nature between the United States and North Korea, and increased hostilities by the North against South Korea.

On the positive side, the incident did strengthen communications and tacit understanding between Moscow and Washington. Moscow was reassured when the United States did not lash out militarily at North Korea, even as Washington demonstrated that it had the capability to do so. At the same time, as a consequence of the <u>Pueblo</u> episode, both superpowers came to understand that the USSR was not responsible for the military adventures of North Korea. Pyongyang learned that it could not depend on either China or the USSR for automatic military assistance.

The EC-121

President Johnson's initial reaction to the <u>Pueblo</u>'s capture had been to search for a response in proportion to the provocation. Similarly, when North Korea shot down an unarmed U. S. Navy reconnaissance plane, with thirty-one men and six tons of electronic equipment on board about ninety miles off the North Korean coastline on April 15, 1969, President Nixon's first inclination was a "quick, clean" military retaliation. There had been 190 similar missions in the same area in the three months before this crisis. All of these flights took place without threats from North Korea. (45) Consequently, the destruction of the EC-121 was unexpected and sudden. According to those who were with him at the time, the President "fumed when his military advisors failed to come up with what he considered practical ways to retaliate." (46) An unnamed administration official commented at the time: "Had sufficient force been available to stage the raids after the President tentatively made up his mind to respond, I believe the attacks would have been ordered." (47)

In sum, the "lessons" of the <u>Pueblo</u> had not been implemented: There had not been an escort for the EC-121 intelligence plane (again, because similar U. S. missions in the same area had not been fired upon), and there had not been enough conventionally armed aircraft on "strip-alert" to come to the EC-121's assistance even if there had been adequate warning.

The puzzling problem for Washington was: If other planes had not been fired upon, why was this plane shot down without warning? The event occurred on Premier Kim Il Sung's fifty-seventh birthday, perhaps not a coincidence, but certainly not the sole cause. Another reason for this incident may have been the airlifting of 1,200 United States combat troops from North Carolina to South Korea in mid-March. The operation, called "Focus Retina," transported this force to participate with South Korean soldiers against a "surprise attack from a third country." Everyone undoubtedly understood that the "third country" was North Korea.

North Korea was likely to have understood the swift transfer of U. S. troops to South Koreaas a threat. In the week preceding the arrival of the 1,200 U. S. soldiers, there were three armed clashes, initiated by the North, in the demilitarized zone. Interestingly, the North Korean media did not mention "Focus Retina" until after the shooting down of the EC-121. But then, a month after the operation, it referred to the U. S. airlift as "very provocative." (48) It is conceivable that the attack on the EC-121 in April was the North Korean response to the U. S. operation in mid-March. Pyongyang may well have thought that the risk of a violent U. S. military response, given U. S. behavior following the Pueblo, was not very great.

President Johnson did not have a familiar precedent upon which to base his response. President Nixon, on the other hand, did have an analogy from which to work; one in which both the parallels and the differences were clear. Nixon drew on the <u>Pueblo</u> mainly as a lesson of what not to do. His moves and speeches indicate that the response to the <u>Pueblo</u> incident convinced Nixon not to bluster without action. Nixon thus avoided saber rattling, concentrating instead on diplomacy. As Henry Gimmel of the <u>Wall Street Journal</u> noted:

The big difference is that the previous Administration initially huffed and puffed up its crisis as if it intended to do something; it then appeared genuinely astonished at discovering it dared not. This Administration's initial reactions have exhibited no such illusions. . . . The reality, as the Nixon team judges it, is that popular toleration of even one war is in remarkably delicate condition. . . . (49)

There was another vital difference between the two Korean crises. In the case of the <u>Pueblo</u>, the lives of the crew were still at stake. In the EC-121 incident, it soon became apparent that the lives of the crew were no longer a consideration; rather, minimizing the consequences of the crisis through diplomatic channels was the central feature.

It seems evident that the failure of the United States to retaliate militarily following the seizure of the Pueblo strengthened the militant policy line of the more "hawkish" group within the North Korean leadership. Between 1967 and 1969, many leaders of the (relatively) "moderate" leadership were purged. The militants had argued for a closer alliance with the USSR, combined with an independent, highly nationalistic foreign policy. These two goals came into some friction when the USSR endeavored to remain apart from the Pueblo crisis. These more radical leaders, however, whatever the degree of help that the USSR had provided, could persuasively argue that the United States probably would not retaliate if there were another incident. After all, the same factors that restrained the United States in 1968 still obtained in 1969. The outcome of the second incident was less to the liking of North Korea, however. A dramatic demonstration of U.S. military capability (in the form of a massive naval exercise) combined with a blatant lack of support from the USSR weakened the position of the militants favoring additional challenges to the United States.

In fact, Moscow publicly criticized the shooting down of the EC-121. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, visiting Pyongyang shortly after the plane was shot down said that "collective action" was necessary to repel U. S. warships and planes. Diplomatic observers in Moscow read this as a reproach to North Korea.

Senior diplomats believe that the single-handed challenges by North Korea to the United States have caused profound doubts among Soziet leaders. While loyally supporting its ally in public, Moscow has also given signals that it does not want the incidents to lead to a confrontation with the United States in the Far East. (50)

Pentagon analysts said they believe that the USSR had "probably" warned the North Koreans against a repetition of the <u>Pueblo</u> and EC-121 incidents. These analysts also thought that the USSR would not support North Korea in future incidents. While no one wished to force a test of this hypothesis, it did encourage détente between the United States and the USSR because Washington now had somewhat more cause to trust the peaceful intentions of Soviet leaders. (51)

The U. S. Response

President Nixon's initial reaction to the shooting down of the EC-121 was to seek military options. Several sources suggest that he quickly started the machinery of government moving toward development and execution of such a response. Two North Korean targets were selected and a speech had been prepared to explain the retaliation to the public. The President believed that a "quick, clean" retaliatory blow might signal both Hanoi and Pyongyang that they were dealing now with a "tougher" administration in Washington, a signal that was particularly desirable because of the administration's plans to withdraw troops slowly from Vietnam. (52)

Before retaliation, however, military force had to be available. In response to this need, Task Force 71 was assembled. With 256 war planes, it was able to muster more firepower than the U.S. Mediterranean Sixth Fleet. Task Force 71 included four carriers (Enterprise, Ticonderoga, Ranger, and Hornet), three cruisers (Chicago, Oklahoma City, and St. Paul), and fifteen destroyers. (53)

On April 16, U. S. forces in and near Korea were placed on alert and readied for the contingency of any further incidents. At the same time, however, U. S. reconnaissance air activity was suspended until North Korea's military intentions could be clarified. The official U. S. negotiator at Panmunjom demanded neither an apology nor reparations. The United States did, however, ask North Korea to "take appropriate measures to prevent similar incidents in the future," and urged it to "acknowledge the true facts of the case." (54)

A fate similar to that of Task Force 77, formed during the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis, now befell Task Force 71. By the time it had been formed and entered the Sea of Japan on April 21, the original plan for retaliation

against North Korea had been reversed. As it had in 1968, Washington decided to risk neither a military struggle with North Korea nor the developing détente with the USSR. The rapid appearance of the fleet off the Korean coast did, however, vividly demonstrate U.S. military capabilities. Thus, it would appear that both task forces minimized the risk of immediate further consequences. At the same time, however, they signaled weakness to North Korea, which saw that it could initiate crises, and even kill Americans, without retaliation.

Following this decision, the deployment was soon drawn down. The Pentagon had attempted to minimize the additional cost that such a large task force would incur by explaining that many of the same vessels had operated off Vietnam and, therefore, that the cost to move and operate them off of Korea was about the same. Within a week of its dispatch, Task Force 71 was reportedly reduced to the Enterprise and seven destroyers. Senator Henry Jackson later stated that the withdrawal of the task force was caused by "cost effectiveness. It doesn't make much sense over a long term to require a whole fleet . . . to support air reconnaissance." (55)

Why Restraint?

Arguing against a military reprisal was the time needed to mobilize the necessary force. President Nixon also was concerned that the U.S. public might view a military retaliation for the EC-121 as hautingly parallel to the air strikes that followed the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident and led to the large-scale involvement in the Vietnam war. This same factor had argued against a military retaliation during the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis.

The major military options presented to the President were: (1) a limited air strike on the North Korean bases that had sent up the planes responsible for shooting down the EC-121; (2) a blockade of the North Korean coast; (3) an air strike on all North Korean air bases; (4) an attempt to lure a North Korean ship or plane outside of its territorial waters and then destroy it. (56) Each of these possibilities ran the hazard of provoking a secondary reaction from North Korea, China, the USSR, or a combination of these adversaries. This was considered less of a risk, however, after Moscow and Peking failed to demonstrate active military support for North Korea during the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis. The USSR, for example, could have sent additional military assistance in a noticeable manner to signal its active support for North Korea. It did not send such signals.

The President's military advisors, while in favor of some form of a tough response, were well aware of the attendant risks, which could result in another war. The President's civilian advisors also cautioned a restrained reaction. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, for example, was described as "not enthusiastic" about air strikes. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who had argued for a course short of retaliation, met half a day after the attack for a fifteen-minute talk with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. The State Department said that the meeting was "not in any way a protest," but rather an appeal for assistance. Secretary Rogers, in a careful speech (similar to the Johnson Administration statements of a year earlier, which were meant to signal cautious intent to various

audiences) before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, declared:

The weak can be rash; the powerful must be more restrained. Complexity in affairs should teach us the need to act responsibly, to constitute cooperation for coercion and to move from confrontation to negotiation on the issues that divide nations. (57)

This statement was an indication of Washington's recognition thatapart from a military strike, which ran the risk of a larger war-there was little it could do to influence or punish North Korea directly.

The administration was impressed by the strongly favorable response that followed the delay in retaliation; and each statement urging restraint reinforced the view the President had reached after careful deliberation (the reverse of his initial visceral reaction) that the moderate stance was the correct one. Senator Everett M. Dirksen, a Republican who had been even more critical of President Johnson's handling of the Pueblo than had been Mr. Nixon, commented on possible reaction to the EC-121: "I don't like to see the blood lust come so quickly." Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, a Democratic conservative on foreign policy said: "In our world today, with electronic spying, there are bound to be such cases. It is essential in this case, as in the Pueblo case, that we don't lose our cool and set in motion irretrievable action which could heighten the crisis." (It is noteworthy that both Dirksen and McGee were "hawks" in the context of the Vietnam war.) Perhaps the major exception to the general call for caution was Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee: "There can be only one answer for America: retaliation--retaliation--retaliation." (58)

The balance of public opinion favored restraint, however. On April 18, a New York Times editorial summarized this popular support for a policy of military caution:

When President Nixon speaks out for the first time at a news conference today on North Korea's shooting down of an American intelligence plane, he will be under no serious public pressures to alter his policy of prudent restraint. Most Americans appear convinced that illconsidered military reprisal will merely make a tragic situation much worse.

What the nation does expect of Mr. Nixon--and will incessantly demand--is immediate presidential action to fulfill his campaign promise that: "What happened to the <u>Pueblo</u> should and will be avoided in the future." (59)

At his nationally televised press conference of the 18th, President Nixon stated:

I have today ordered that these flights be continued. They will be protected. This is not a threat. It is simply a matter of fact . . . Looking to the future,

as far as what we do will depend upon the circumstances. It will depend upon what is done as far as North Korea is concerned, its reaction to the protest and also any other developments that occur as we continue these flights. (60)

Although it did not directly say so, this statement reflected Washington's changed perception of the USSR's role in Korea's crises. After Secretary of State Rogers met with Soviet-Ambassador Dobrynin at noon on the 15th, the USSR had offered naval assistance in searching for possible EC-121 survivors. At his press conference, the President described the U.S. military action as "restrained" because of the possibility that "other parties might be involved." This apparently was a reference to the defense treaties North Korea shared with China and the USSR; a factor that had also constrained President Johnson's employment of force in the Pueblo crisis.

There appeared to be little parallel between Washington's implicit suspicion that the USSR had been somehow involved in the <u>Pueblo</u> incident and any Soviet role in the EC-121 situation. In a dramatic departure from the reticent stance of the USSR during the <u>Pueblo</u> incident, on April 17, two Soviet destroyers quickly began to help in the search for the wreckage of the EC-121, at the same time as U. S. planes and ships. One Soviet destroyer retrieved a wheel and ladder from the EC-121 and laid them out on the deck. The debris was described by radio to a low-flying U. S. <u>Hercules C-130</u>, and the plane was invited to photograph the remnants of the EC-121. At the conclusion of this vivid demonstration of cooperation, the Soviet vessel radioed to the departing U. S. plane: "Soviet Destroyer, Red Banner Pacific Fleet, sends condolences in connection with the loss of your aircraft." (61)

At his press conference of April 18, President Nixon emphasized the nature of this cooperation, and removed any thought that he blamed the USSR for the EC-121. Again, this was in marked contrast to the early suspicion that the USSR was involved in the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis.

The President described the Soviet role in the plane incident as first

one of being of assistance to the United States in recovering the debris and looking for survivors. And we are most grateful to the Soviet Union for helping us in this report. Our intelligence—and of course no one can be sure here—indicates that the Soviet Union was not aware that this attack was to be made. North Korea is not a nation that is predictable in terms of its actions. It is perhaps more than any other nation in the Communist bloc completely out of control of either the Soviet Union, or for that matter, Communist China. . . It was completely a surprise attack in every sense of the word and, therefore, did not give us the opportunity for protective actions that I would have taken had it been threatened. (62)

This spoke simultaneously to various audiences. With the recognition that the USSR had not been the antagonist, and the suggestion that perhaps it had been saddled with an irrational Korean ally, a signal had been dispatched suggesting that cooperation in analogous situations in the future would be welcome. North Korea was warned not to attempt to repeat its action because U. S. military power, represented by Task Force 71, would be prepared for a quick response. Considering that North Korea had now successfully challenged the United States twice within fifteen months, however, this was a rather weak threat. A subdued, brief phrase told China that it was understood that Peking had not engineered the crisis. And finally, a message of reassurance was sent to domestic audiences that U. S. military forces would be protected in the future.

On April 22, the New China News Agency (NCNA) quoted a senior U. S. Defense Department official: "Russian willingness to render assistance has been astonishing. From the way they are doing things at present, they look like allies instead of opponents in the cold war." (63) NCNA then condemned the "servile compliance" of the USSR. It should be noted, however, that in 1969 China was emerging from the cultural revolution, which had intensified Chinese doubts about both Soviet and U. S. aggressive intentions. The Ussuri River crisis of March 1969 over the Soviet-Chinese border had also amplified China's fear of the USSR. An opportunity to encourage some change in Peking's foreign policy perceptions seemed more possible now than it had. Consequently, the President's recognition that neither China nor the USSR had investigated the incident provided a basis for further contacts with both countries.

The Nixon administration continued to balance adroitly the demonstration of its military capabilities with an improvement in several bilateral relationships. On April 17, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi had urged the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo not to embark on a retaliatory action. On April 17, Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato, commended the United States for responding to the EC-121 incident in a "cool, quiet and serious way." (64) On April 21, Washington officially notified the Japanese government that it would not use Japanese bases to protect U.S. reconnaissance planes. Tokyo then asked to have Task Force 71 moved from the Sea of Japan. Japan worried that it might be drawn into the hostilities if a crisis such as the EC-121 should occur in that area at some time in the future.

With a similar concern of becoming involved in a Korean-U. S. conflict, the USSR publicly requested (on April 20) the removal of the naval fleet from an area south of its major port city of Vladivostok. The U. S. response was to explain that the reinstituted reconnaissance flights needed protection, and emphasize that it was Korea (not the USSR) that had been responsible for the downing of the EC-121. (65)

The now smaller fleet was then moved to the Yellow Sea on April 26, and part of the protection for the reconnaissance planes was taken over by forces based in South Korea. The promise to South Korea of military aid of \$100 million, however, made at the time of the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis in January 1968 had been only half fulfilled by late April 1969. The F-4 fighters the United States agreed to make available in February 1968, were now scheduled for delivery in August 1969. Therefore, in order both to

reassure its South Korean ally, nervous about conflict with North Korea, and to provide security for its own reconnaissance flights, Washington was prompted to move rapidly on the year-old arms agreements. Twenty U. S. Air Force F-4 jets were added at this time to the 128 U. S. planes already in South Korea. Two more F-4 squadrons were also scheduled to replace the Air National Guard F-100 squadrons that had been mobilized after the <u>Pueblo</u>. These had been promised in 1968; the second Korean crisis assured their delivery.

A New York Times editorial provided a strong endorsement of the administration's overall policies toward the EC-121 crisis, while also questioning the degree of force used.

The withdrawal of task force 71 from the Sea of Japan and the deployment of a much smaller force southwest of Korea reflects prudent second thoughts in Washington.

... the original fleet of 29 vessels was far out of proportion to the requirements of its mission of protecting United States reconnaissance planes. Although this "surge" operation perhaps served a useful purpose in demonstrating how much American power used to be put into the area, on short notice, the long-term presence of such a formidable fleet would have been far too expensive and would have risked provoking the kind of confrontation it was designed to discourage.

. . . It should be possible to provide adequate cover for essential reconnaissance missions less provocatively and more cheaply, using land-based planes from augmented squadrons in South Vietnam. The North Koreans, after all, were brazen, but not necessarily brash in attacking an unarmed, unprotected American plane off their coast two weeks ago. They had good reason, especially after the <u>Pueblo</u> affair, to believe that the United States would be cautious. . .

If American forces should violate North Korean territory, the Koreans might very well react in a way that would precipitate a wider war. President Nixon's withdrawal of Taskforce 71 indicated that he is keenly aware of this danger. (66)

Results of the Two Korean Crises

The 1968 <u>Pueblo</u> and 1969 EC-121 crises may be viewed as separate acts in the same drama. In each, North Korea sought to demonstrate its ability to challenge U. S. military credibility apart from Soviet direction. It assumed that the achievement of this goal could be more easily attained because the United States had committed much of its military, economic, and public support to the Vietnam war. Particularly in 1968, Pyongyang expected that it could rely on the USSR for firm support. As a corollary of establishing its own autonomous, intensely nationalistic identity, North Korea sought to indicate to South Korea that it could

not depend on the United States for continued military assistance. North Korea had mixed success with these ambitions in 1968. The United States did not go to war over the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u>. It did, however, give to South Korea large-scale military aid and assurances of its support against threats from the North. Rather than undermining the alliance between the United States and South Korea, the two crises provoked by North Korea seemed to inject further life into the coalition.

At the same time, the USSR failed to use even symbolic military levers on North Korea's behalf. Nonetheless, North Korea had encountered only a demonstration of force by the United States. North Korea had affirmed an independent policy, and the United States had not responded violently. This gain had been offset, however, by North Korea's appreciation of an increasing lack of military support from China and the USSR.

These impressions were reinforced during the 1969 crisis. U. S.-Soviet cooperation developed into a dramatic, concrete reality. The United States, for example, did not propose a formal debate in the United Nations, which might have embarrassed the USSR by forcing it to defend the shooting down of the EC-121. Meanwhile, the USSR criticized North Korea for its lack of "collective action." Moreover, negotiations and political agreements between the United States and the USSR continued to progress. These developments gave North Korea cause to worry about the reliability of its Soviet ally.

Poth Washington and Moscow appeared satisfied that the ambiguity suggested by the mobilization and movement of armed force inhibited a confrontation into which each could conceivably have been drawn. An example of the unfulfilled possibilities of Washington's responses was given by President Nixon at his press conference on April 18, 1969:

I do not want to leave the impression that the announcement of the renewal of, and the continuation of, reconnaissance flights is the final action that can or will be taken here. Our action in this matter will be determined by what happens in the future. (67)

The demonstration of the <u>potential</u> use of military force in the 1968 and 1969 crises allowed two advantages. If it had any such thoughts previous to the incidents (which seems unlikely), North Korea was deterred from expanding them. Second, the incidents provided a "learning experience" for the USSR and the United States of how they could control the consequences of incidents neither of them wanted. This message was particularly noteworthy in view of concurrent events in Europe.

It was a curious coincidence that the EC-121 crisis took place at the same moment that Alexander Dubcek was ousted from the leadership of Czechoslovakia under Soviet pressure. The United States had announced that it would not stand aside for another armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. (68) It would appear that, to some extent, the EC-121 provided an opportunity for both states to reassure the other that they could cooperate.

A major negative consequence of not using military force in the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis was that it did provide an example that would not inhibit the Communist states in Southeast Asia from future uses of force. It may even have encouraged North Korea to take another strong step. The lack of retaliation in 1968 apparently encouraged North Korea to try again in 1969. The absence of violence in 1969, however, had quite the opposite effect: the incidence of subversion and violence across the demilitarized zone initiated by North Korea fell from 761 in 1968 to 134 in 1969. (69) Violence in Korea further diminished in the 1970s. It is not clear why these incidents diminished, but one suspects that Soviet behavior was crucial.

The Mayaguez

On April 17, 1975, all remaining U.S. personnel had left Phnom Penh just in advance of the victorious Cambodian revolutionaries; the same pattern was repeated in Saigon on April 30. Because of these two spectacular U.S. foreign policy defeats, U.S. decisionmakers came to fear that trust in its commitments to its allies had weakened. The USSR, China, and revolutionary movements of smaller countries envisaged a total U.S. withdrawal from Asia, while the confidence of the American public in its nation's foreign policy goals faltered.

The U. S. merchant ship Mayaguez was seized on May 12 by Cambodian gunboats while in a well-traveled shipping lane in the Guld of Siam on a voyage from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. It had a crew of thirty-nine, and it carried a cargo of both military and commercial goods. Of the 184 containers the Mayaguez carried, 107 contained nonmilitary material and 77 held such "military" items as clothing, furniture, and small arms destined for U. S. installations in Thailand. Almost immediately after the incident, President Gerald Ford announced that he "considered the seizure an act of piracy," and added that a failure to release the ship "would have the most serious consequences." (70) These phrases contained two familiar echoes: The emotional word "piracy" had been the term used by Washington to describe the seizure of the Pueblo and, it recalled the value of ambiguous threats employed by Presidents Johnson and Nixon during the two Korean crises. But this time the threat was not to be idle. After the loss of Saigon, President Ford was quoted as saying: "I have to show some strength in order to help us . . . with our credibility in the world."

(71) The day after the incident, "high ranking sources" told the New York Times that "the seizure of the vessel might provide the test of determination in Southeast Asia . . . the United States had been seeking since the collapse of allied governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia." (72) These brief quotations do not "prove" a cause and effect relationship between a worry about the loss of U. S. reliability and the nature of the response in the Mayaguez incident, but they certainly provide strong reason to suspect such a relationship. Moreover regardless of its genesis it was anticipated that the firm response to this crisis would warn adversaries and reassure allies and U. S. citizens as to the stability of U. S. commitments.

Placing the capture in a historical perspective, since 1950 123 U.S. commercial vessels had been fired upon and seized by Ecuador. Fines were paid to gain the ships' release. The pattern followed in these cases was described proudly by the U.S. Counsel General in Ecuador in the Department of State's Newsletter of April 4, 1974 as having "... centered on negotiations rather than retaliation." (73)

The U. S. Response

The U. S. government contacted China's liaison office in Washington and the Royal Cambodian Embassy in Peking asking for help. Prince Sihanouk and the Chinese Foreign Ministry returned the notes, as did the Cambodian Embassy. When asked about what China would do during this crisis, First Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in Paris at the time on a state visit, responded: "There is nothing we can do." (74)

This was a parallel to the <u>Pueblo</u> incident. In each situation, the United States had sought assistance from what was considered to be the major backer of the target state—a supporter which, presumably, should be able to control its "weaker" ally. In the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis, the USSR had not actively supported North Korea's position because of a distrust and displeasure with Korea's "adventure" undertaken without coordination with Moscow. These same elements were present in the relationships among China, Cambodia, and the United States, and may have hindered the developing "understandings" between Washington and Peking.

In 1968 the judgment had been to rely on Soviet and not Chinese intercession; in 1975 the decision of whom to ask for assistance was reversed. This seemed a logical choice. Phnom Penh Radio, in celebrating the Communist victory on May 12, 1975, for example, declared, "The victory of the Cambodian people is the victory of the Chinese people. The strategic unity between Cambodia and China which is the base of our friendship will last forever."

As in most such broadcasts, there was no mention of the USSR, and accounts by Western observers reported that the Soviet Embassy had been sacked by the revolutionaries. Consequently, it was reasonable for Washington to seek communication with Phnom Penh through Peking.

No casualties had been reported by the <u>Mavaguez</u>. While he was investigating diplomatic channels, President Ford also ordered surveillance of the ship. During this aerial observation, a P-3 <u>Orion</u> was hit by fire as it flew over the <u>Mayaguez</u> (considering that the Khmer Rouge had previously been the targets of U. S. aircraft, they now probably did not take the time to determine that the P-3 was only an observer plane, nor would they necessarily have been able to ascertain that fact). Surveillance established that the ship was anchored about a mile off Koh Tang Island, about thirty miles from the coast of Cambodia. The aircraft also reported seeing some of the crew being off-loaded onto small Cambodian boats. Efforts were made to stop these boats, because Washington feared that the crew might be taken to the mainland, where Cambodia would recreate the <u>Pueblo</u> situation: a lengthy detention with the seamen pictured in Cambodia's propaganda as "aggressors and spies." To prevent the transfer of the crew to the

mainland, U. S. A-7 aircraft fired alongside and in front of, but not directly at the small boats. Still, three Cambodian boats were sunk and several others were damaged. A problem, however, was to decide which Cambodian vessels had Americans aboard. "Every effort was made and in one case the ship that got in was allowed to go in because it appeared there were some Caucasians on board." (75) It should be noted that this demonstrated the constraints placed on violence, similar to the cautious U. S. military response to the <u>Pueblo</u> situation.

The <u>Coral Sea</u>, an aircraft carrier then on its way to Australia, and several destroyers were ordered to the area. In addition, 1,100 Marines were airlifted into Bangkok, Thailand. Based on Okinawa, they were moved to Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand in preparation for possible action. This move caused a very heated reaction by the Thais, who not only demanded that the United States not use Thai territory as a base of operations, but that the recently arrived Marines be withdrawn.

Two days after the ship's seizure, the destroyer Holt entered the area, followed by the Coral Sea, the destroyers Baussell and Wilson, the guided missile frigate Gridley, and the supply ship Vega. The aircraft carrier Midway was also ordered to the general area. The President, still not having received word of the crew's release, took two steps to set in motion further military action. He discussed the situation with the National Security Council for the fourth time in just over two days, and he met with bipartisan leaders of both parties in Congress to tell them of his plans.

At 7:15 PM, Phnom Penh sent its first message agreeing to release the ship, stating that the Cambodian government "will order the ship to withdraw from Cambodian water." The message was sent over Phnom Penh Radio, but in the Khmer language, which in Washington apparently raised some question as to whether it represented a definitive governmental position. This message was monitored by a Foreign Broadcast Information Service, translated, and then relayed to Washington. The translation was delivered by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger to the President at 8:15 PM. (76) It was later learned that the crew had been freed by the Cambodians before the attacks on Koh Tang Island, placed on a previously captured Thai boat, and told to return to the Mayaguez. Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary declared in September that Cambodia had decided to release the Mayaguez and crew after calling local commanders to Phnom Penh, but did not broadcast the decision until the following morning. Later that morning, the United States bombed Ream and Sihanoukville. (77) If this is an accurate recounting, the bloodshed that followed was not necessary to secure the Mayaguez's release. The release of the crew occurred about 8:00 PM on May 14.

A helicopter assault by approximately 200 Marines was begun on Koh Tang Island. Three of the helicopers involved were shot down, one on the beach, one just off shore, and the last, involving the loss of thirteen lives, several miles out to sea. The Marines encountered much stiffer resistance than they had expected and were unable to make the sweep of the island they had originally planned. Although there were only an estimated 150 Cambodians on the island, they were armed with 75 mm. recoilless rifles, Claymore mines, and rockets, in addition to small arms. The

Marines received heavy air support, with anywhere between twelve and twenty U. S. planes over Koh Tang at any given time during the incident. In fact, 479 sorties by both helicopter and fixed wing aircraft were flown during the crisis, of which 300 were of a tactical nature, as opposed to surveillance or rescue. At 9 PM, Marines from aboard the destroyer Holt boarded the Mayaguez with no resistance and searched the ship. They found no one. The official U. S. answer to the Cambodian offer to free the ship was that the United States would stop military action when the crew was free, since the ship had already been recaptured.

While the Marines were occupying both the <u>Mayaguez</u> and Koh Tang Island, the crew members were on their way toward the destroyer <u>Wilson</u>, which reported spotting them about 10:45 PM; thirty crew members were on board by 10:53 PM. As was later discovered, the crew had been held on Rong Sam Iem Island, about twenty nautical miles from Koh Tang. In short, U. S. intelligence had not been strong; it had not been aware of the precise movements of the crew between the ship, Koh Tang, the mainland, and Rong Sam Iem Island, nor of the size of the force on Koh Tang Island.

It was not until 11:45 PM that Schlesinger reported the retrieval of the crew to the President. The aircraft from the Coral Sea had already begun taking off to carry out strikes on the mainland, although they did not begin to attack until about 11:00 PM. In short, the attacks began after the crew was safely returned. The aircraft attacked in three waves, the first not dropping any ordnance, but "buzzing" Sihahoukville, the second attacking Ream airbase, destroying seventeen planes on the ground, damaging a hanger, and making craters in the runway. The third wave attacked a petroleum, oil, and lubricant installation near Sihanoukville at 11:50 PM, thirty-four minutes after the President had called for a cessation of operations. These raids were later justified as necessary to prevent reinforcement of Koh Tang and to deter the Cambodians from launching air strikes against the Marines on the island, in addition to proving that the United States was serious in its demands. Another important justification for the raids was the support and pride now being revived among the American people after the dual losses in the same area earlier in the year.

With the crew rescued, all that remained was to extricate the Marines from the island and go home. It was not until just after 7:00 the next morning that the Marines began to leave Koh Tang, and by 9:20 AM they were clear of the island and on board the <u>Coral Sea</u>. The entire incident, from the time the ship was seized until the Marines left, took only seventy-eight hours. The total number of American deaths was forty-one. (78) The Cambodians lost a total of eight boats, seventeen aircraft, the air field, and the installation (the casualties from bombings and strafing are unknown).

Domestic Pressures

The 1975 Appropriations Act for the Department of Defense contained a provision prohibiting the use of U. S. military forces in Indochina:

None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U. S. military forces in or over or from the shores of North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam, Laos, or Cambodia.

This would appear to be an explicit denial of the use of military force. But before the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, State Department legal advisors reportedly told the White House that such provisions did not specifically prevent the inherent right to protect American lives. They cited such precedents as the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. (79)

Because American lives were thought to be threatened, the President was able to respond under the War Powers Resolution of 1973. This act directs the President to "consult" with Congress "in every possible instance-before committing armed forces to hostilities or to situations where hostilities may be imminent." He must then report to the Congress in writing forty hours before initiating the action. Consultation is not "synonymous with merely being informed." Rather,

consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice... and ... their approval of action contemplated. For consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate, and all information relevant to the situation must be made available." (80)

It later became a question whether or not the President had "consulted" with Congress about his <u>Mayaguez</u> decisions. Regardless, during the week of the crisis, the sense of Congress supported the ship's retrieval and the crew's release, even if the use of force was unnecessary.

Members of Congress generally expressed approval of the President's action and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted a strong resolution of support this evening acknowledging the President's constitutional right to order military operations. (81)

Conservative members were the most outspoken in favor of violent retaliation. Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented: "We should retrieve the vessel any way we can." Senator James B. Allen: "I don't favor precipitate action, but it's a question of national honor. . . and if force is necessary, then force should be used." Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee: "The attack and seizure cannot be tolerated. . . . We must be as firm and as severe as necessary to protect Americans on board and to assure their safe return as well as the recovery of the ship . . . as well as the honor of our country." Senator James Buckley suggested that: "A failure by the United States to react swiftly and clinically will only invite further outrages against personnel and property of U. S. citizens. I therefore urge the President to order immediate punitive air and naval attacks on appropriate targets in Cambodia." (82)

On May 12, Senator Jacob Javils counseled patience with Cambodia, suggesting that it "may not realize what is involved in their reaction." There were several congressional protests, moreover, advanced by "moderates," that the President had not fulfilled the directives of the War Powers Resolution. Senator Hubert Humphrey, a sponsor of the 1973 Act, on the 14th (while military action was in progress), endorsed the use of force "if necessary," but added that "we want consultation," not merely to be informed after an act is taken. Senator Mike Mansfield stated on the same day:

I was not briefed . . . nor was I consulted before the fact about what the Administration had already decided to do. I did not give my approval or disapproval because the decision had already been made in both cases. (83)

House Republican Leader Hugh Scott also said on May 14 that he had only been "advised," not "consulted." But support was widespread in the Congress for the strong measures taken by the President.

It was apparent, therefore, that domestic pressure for some form of military action was greater in response to the seizure of the Mayaguez than to the shooting down of the EC-121. In the final hours of the Indochina war, even congressional doves seemed to feel the necessity to reassert U. S. prerogatives in an area of the world where only recently U. S. prestige had suffered such a severe setback. The call for an armed response to the Mayaguez was overwhelming, reflecting, perhaps, ten years of frustration and ultimately defeat in Southeast Asia, defeats that a nation unused to losing found hard to understand. Thus, the incentive to strike out with even so flimsy an excuse as the Mayaguez.

Related Events

As it had in the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis, Washington charged that the <u>Mayaguez</u> had been seized without any warning. Only in the narrowest of definitions, however, was this accurate. The Cambodian coast had recently seen similar incidents. On May 2, seven Thai fishing boats had been fired upon. The Korean Transportation Ministry then cautioned ships to avoid the area around Poulo Wai and Koh Tang islands. This warning had been passed on to the U.S. State Department. On May 7, a Panamanian freighter had been detained for one day. On May 13, another Panamanian vessel had been fired on and detained for two hours. At about this same time, the Swedish vessel <u>Hirado</u> was also fired upon, seized, and helf briefly. None of these cases, however, caused the U.S. government to issue warnings to U.S. merchant vessels in the area. (84)

The U. S. Defense Hydrographic Center had not issued a warning about the waters off Cambodia before the seizure of the <u>Mayagues</u> because, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained at a press conference on May 12, insurance companies had the responsibility to provide information about potential conflict situations on the seas or in shipping lanes. Carl McDowell, President of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters, replied that insurance firms had not received any information about the troubled Gulf of Siam. (85)

However, within five hours of the seizure of the Mayaguez, the Center issued a

"Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam including off-lying islands. Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island." (86)

Three additional factors may have helped to explain the seizure. First, Cambodia seemed to believe that the <u>Mayaguez</u> had a hostile intent. Cambodia's use of force against a ship sailing in waters that it claimed were its own territorial waters is easier to understand in this light.

Second, there is the likelihood that the seizure was conceived and executed by local authorities. Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary, in a September 1975 interview, claimed that Phnom Penh learned of the attack "through American broadcasts, because the American technology is able to convey information much faster than our armed forces can." The seizure, Sary said, occurred without prior order. After the event became known, the commander in Sihanoukville was ordered to Phnom Penh, where he was told to release the Mayaguez. Moreover, Secretary of State Kissinger stated at his press conference on May 13 that he was aware that the seizure might have been "the isolated act of a local commander." Thus, both sides were aware of the possibility of local causation. (87)

Information Minister Hoa Nim stated on Phnom Penh Radio on May 17 that the ship had been captured only to examine the cargo and crew. Because there were precedents of foreign ships being seized, searched, and released, the Cambodians looked upon the U.S. military action not even as a heavy-handed attempt to free the crew, but as an excuse to do further damage to Cambodian territory and possibly to destroy the new state.

Third, and most intriguing, one month after the capture of the Mayaguez, Vietnam seized Poulo Wai Island from Cambodia. This area had been contested by the two countries since before the Second World War. The continental shelf from which the Island rises is thought to be rich in oil. With this knowledge, it is also possible to view Cambodia's activities in the Gulf of Siam in the spring of 1975 as an attempt—at least in part—to demonstrate its own independence from Vietnamese territorial demands. (88)

Outcomes

On May 17, at the conclusion of the crisis, Kissinger declared that the event reminds the world that

There are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed. . . . We believed that we had to draw a line against illegal actions and secondly, against situations where the United States might be forced into a humiliating discussion about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen for a very extended period of time . . . make clear that the United States is prepared to defend these interests, and that it can get public support and congressional support for these actions. (89)

This provided an implicit reminder that an incident such as the <u>Pueblo</u> would not be allowed to recur. It communicated this message to the American people and to an international audience of friends and adversaries. It emphasized that the dramatic losses in Southeast Asia would not be permitted to weaken U.S. determination to protect is nationals and their property.

The next day, Kissinger left for a round of conferences in Europe. President Ford was scheduled to visit these same allies shortly thereafter. These were to be the first high-level meetings with the European allies after the Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The rapid, intense military response to the seizure of the Mayaguez preceded the Kissinger and Ford trips as a demonstration of the will and strength of the United States.

The President, appearing on both American and British television on May 24, 1975, emphasized this message. The U.S. response to the Mayaguez crisis

. . . should be a firm assurance that the United States is capable and has the willingness to act in emergencies, in challenges, I think this is a clear indication that we are not only strong, but we have the will and the capability of moving. (90)

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger echoed the theme that the U.S. response in the <u>Mayaguez</u> event would signal continuing American self-confidence.

American action must be firm when necessary and when important issues of principle are involved . . . in all likelihood the U. S. commitments to Northeast Asia, to Korea as well as to Japan, will be perceived as something no one should challenge . . . As long as we are bound by the treaty, of course, it would include Taiwan. (91)

These clear statements by the President and the secretaries of State and Defense, provided evidence to allies--particularly those in Asia (Taiwan and South Korea), which feared a repeat of the U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina — that U.S. will and capabilities could be relied upon.

This signal had also been sent to opponents. The administration's domestic popularity rose moderately as the general public felt relief that after the long "tunnel" of Vietnam, an American victory of sorts, had been won. The Gallup polls of June 1975, for example, indicated support for the Mayaguez action; 51 percent approved, 33 percent disapproved, and 16 percent had no opinion. (92)

On April 16, at the end of the crisis, Senator Barry Goldwater seemed to have summarized this sense of tatharsis:

This one act of Ford could be the act that elects him. You know I haven't always been solidly with him, and I've opposed him as much as I've backed him, and I've had serious doubts about his leadership, and they were dispelled. It was the kind of decision it takes a strong man to make. (93)

An ironic example of the "ripple-effect" of this crisis was that it assisted the establishment of relations between Thailand and the People's Republic of China. The Thai ambassador to the United States, Anand Panyarachun, had been recalled to Bangkok as a protest against the U. S. use of the air base at Utapao to support the <u>Mayaguez</u>. He subsequently headed a delegation to Peking to "lay down all necessary ground work" for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

At least in the short run, however, the <u>Mayaguez</u> itself could only serve as a symbol to Thailand, not as the single cause for a basic change in policy. Anand, for instance, was careful to explain:

I don't think that the basic agreements that we have entered into with the United States need to be changed. . . . I think that in this country there is a very large reservoir of goodwill and friendship toward the people of the United States and toward the American nation. . . and these basic points will not be affected by a review. (94)

He emphasized that the Thai diplomatic move was intended to fit Thailand in with the rapidly changing circumstances in the region. "We are not deserting one friend in order to have new friends. We are not deserting anybody and we are not going to undermine any old friendship," he declared. The current review is to "remove some of the fat without affecting the meat," he said, "and I think that if the United States looks at our review questions is this light it will see that this is not an anti-American an attempt either by the government or by the people measure nor anti-American storm." (95) It would appear that the to raise ar ith its apparent gains in credibility for the United avagues inch itant flexibility of Thailand, encouraged a more States and the in Rest Asia. flexible arrang

Washington apparently thought that Thailand could now open relations with China, while still maintaining confidence in its U. S. military alliance. It also might seem, however, that the intense and abundant use of military force was in the long run counterproductive. The massive

use of power against a weak country may have reinforced the image of an arrogant United States. This, in turn, might conceivably raise doubts about the value of U. S. commitments. Thailand's reaction may serve as an example. An unnamed Thai "Foreign Ministry official" called the U. S. sinking of the Cambodian gun boats "an act of madness... taken with no thought for the consequences to Thailand." (96)

Messages of congratulations from other allies were couched in cautious terms. The West German Foreign Ministry noted that it had "a certain interest in seeing the American trend to dejection and discouragement in foreign affairs come to an end." The Japanese deputy foreign affairs minister said that the U.S. operation was a "joint action for the rescue of Americans from piracy." The public reaction in the United Kingdom was generally favorable, but some officials had privately expressed disquiet over what they considered a precipitate use of force. (97)

In summary, the expense, both in terms of lives lost and the finances necessary to mount the military forces; the weak intelligence (not learning where the crew was held); and the inordinate use of power-added up to a bottom line of mixed gains and losses. Domestically, this use of force was popular; it was viewed as a partial vindication for the earlier losses in Indochina. In terms of the credibility of U.S. foreign policy among American allies, however, this intense application of military force probably has been appreciated externally as a spasmodic reaction born of failure. Consequently, trust in U.S. commitments may have been strained, rather than advanced. The question among allies may have been: "Is it necessary for one of my neighbors--or myself--to suffer severe losses before the United States will honor its commitments."

Evaluation

In these three cases, U. S. options, particularly those involving the use of military force, were limited. In 1968, conventionally armed forces needed for an immediate response were not available. This physical limitation was reinforced by the fact that energies and attention were directed toward Vietnam. These physical restraints were also present during the EC-121 crisis, and indeed were strengthened by the desire to avoid a wider incident that might have affected the improving U. S. relations with China or the USSR. Improving relations with both states, of course, was a key feature of the new Nixon foreign policy. Residual domestic opposition to the U. S. involvement in Vietnam also restrainted the President's choices.

In 1969, as the USSR readily responded to Washington's request for assistance in searching for the EC-121 debris, the presence of U.S. force in the area encouraged the two major countries to speak to each other as "military equals." Each shared the problem of a highly nationalistic and headstrong ally; each sought to assure the other of its own desire to avoid war. The presence of a U.S. fleet in the area, which was moved away from the coast of the USSR, apparently at Soviet request, provided a new step in the great powers' "learning process." In this

sense, the U.S. Fleet -- and the accompanying Soviet ships and planes -- was highly functional.

The later <u>Mayaguez</u> crisis was at the other end of the continuum. It appears likely that the crew would have been released without the degree of military force that was used. This dramatic use of U. S. military power seems to have been motivated mainly to signal audiences beyond Phnom Penh of U. S. will and military strength.

The results of each of the first two crises served as lessons learned for the later two. A lesson from the <u>Pueblo</u> was not to allow the crew onto the mainland. Once the crew of the <u>Pueblo</u> was removed, military action was useless. President Ford was well aware of this. The <u>Pueblo</u> was also a lesson in the frustration that results from not being able to mobilize force quickly during a crisis.

In contrast to the <u>Pueblo</u> and the EC-121 crises, the <u>Mayaguez</u> incident occurred at a time when Washington could call on much of the military establishment, if need be, without worrying about diverting resources from a second crisis. Presidents Johnson and Nixon, on the other hand, had only limited men and material available, and had serious concerns about beginning a new war, when large numbers of U. S. military personnel were still involved in Southeast Asia. U. S. options and tactical machines were taxed to the fullest as a result of the Vietnam war.

The Pueblo and EC-121 incidents both occurred close to shore and close to Korean air bases. Furthermore, they occurred in an area very close to the USSR, China, and Japan, an area fraught with political tension. The Mayaguez occurred in the Indochina area, a region where there was considerable residual U. S. military strength (especially in Thailand). The Vietnamese, although noting the U. S. "imperialism" of the act, did not become involved. Thus, President Ford was acting in a region in which the United States could use quick and effective force without the threat of massive retaliation. Johnson and Nixon were caught in an area that was politically volatile (Korea) and had the potential to create a major outbreak of violence. The Mayaguez concerned Cambodia, where a new regime was not prepared to respond rapidly to the U.S. retaliation. The Pueblo and EC-121 involved North Korea, a stable Communist regime that was technologically and politically capable of quick reaction to U. S. pressure. Ford's Cambodian adversaries were weak. Johnson's and Nixon's Korean adversaries were strong. In none of these three crises did the USSR or thine give military assistance. But this "lesson" was evident only after the Pueblo crisis.

The <u>Pueblo</u> was much closer to the coast than the Mayaguez, which meant that there was more time to do something about the <u>Mayaguez</u> before it reached the coast after being seized. The <u>Pueblo</u> proceeded to Wonsan at approximately 15 knots. As such, with the few stops that Commander Bucher made, it could have taken some two hours to reach Wonsan, or longer. Had conventionally armed aircraft been on "alert," it is conceivable that the <u>Pueblo</u> could have been helped.

The Mayaguez originally seemed to be heading for Sihanoukville, but stopped short of the coast at Koh Tang Island. This allowed the

United States enough time to get aircraft into the air and strafe the ship to keep it stationary. Both incidents occurred at about the same time of day, yet the reconnaissance flights over the <u>Mayaguez</u> continued despite the darkness. It might be suggested that the United States responded to the <u>Mayaguez</u> incident with greater efficiency; it might be the case, however, that the military, or Washington, was simply more determined to act.

It is noteworthy that there had been a conspicuous lack of protection in each of these cases. The <u>Pueblo</u> sailed alone, with neither an escort, nor readily available, conventional armed planes on "alert" in a nearby location. The EC-121 had been in the similar situation of lacking a guard. Also paralleling the reason for the <u>Pueblo's lack of an escort</u>, in the three months before the shooting down of the EC-121, 190 similar flights had flown in the same general area without a shooting incident. Therefore, it was felt that this EC-121 did not need protection. The <u>Mayaguez</u>, a commercial ship following a normal sea lane of transport, did not consider itself in need of protection. It, too, however, was in an area that had witnessed contest and seizures.

After the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis, less fear was felt in Washington of a Soviet or Chinese intervention in support of North Korea, because such help had not been offered during the <u>Pueblo</u> or EC-121 crises. During the <u>Mayaguez</u> crisis, neither China nor the USSR offered military assistance to Cambodia.

The U. S. military reaction to all three crises demonstrated the inapplicability of the concept of proportional response to aggressive acts. (98) During the 1968 Korean crisis, Washington did not have the available conventional force needed to alter the target's immediate behavior. In 1969, it similarly lacked a conventional nearby force for instant response. The pause caused by this unavailability allowed time for both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to be praised for their "restraint." Consequently, the longer the hesitation before military retaliation, and the more the U. S. government was assured by its allies and public that it had taken the proper course of patience, the less likely a military response became in both incidents.

In the <u>Mayaguez</u> situation, the proportionality principle was discarded altogether. It would appear that force well <u>beyond</u> that which was needed was employed. Domestically, this led to an infusion of confidence (though perhaps only temporary). Of more importance in foreign policy, the failure to utilize flexible response had other, apparently beneficial, results. The People's Republic of China saw evidence that even as the U. S. armies were leaving Southeast Asia, U. S. military power would be available to help balance Soviet power in the area. At the same time, the USSR may have been assured that the United States could be relied upon to counter China's plans to dominate its southern flank.

The smaller countries in Asia, however, may have felt unsettled by what could be considered the United States' hasty resolution of a minor situation. Would the United States turn 180 degrees in another crisis affecting Taiwan or South Korea and refuse to become involved militarily?

A partial answer may have been provided in August 1976, when North Korea challenged the United States with a violent attack on its soldiers at Panmunjom. North Korea did not suffer military retaliation, although force was available for this purpose. The United States did show force, but did not use military violence. President Kim Il Sung, however, in his first direct message to the United States since 1953, avoided the intense rancor usually present in North Korean propaganda. The retaliation by the United States for the seizure of the Mayaguez did not prevent the 1976 incident, but it apparently helped to prompt a conciliatory North Korean response soon after: proposals of private talks with the United States and division of the Panmunjom negotiating site, which had previously been proposed by the United States.

Violence had not been used by the United States during the <u>Pueblo</u> and EC-121 incidents. It had been used abundantly in the <u>Mayaguez</u> crisis. Perhaps the 1976 Korean event suggests the ineffectiveness of the 1968 and 1969 responses-lack of military retaliation accompanied by military movements. While it is to be hoped that the <u>Mayaguez</u> reaction can be avoided in the future, it should be recognized that a benefit of that reaction was to bolster the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments—to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, each of which maintains defense agreements with the United States—and to caution potential U.S. adversaries.

Footnotes

- 1. Ralph N. Clough, <u>East Asia and U.S. Security</u> (Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 163.
- 2. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The Truth of the Pueblo Affair (Corward-McCann, 1970), p. 183.
- 3. New York Times, November 23, 1970.
- 4. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (January 8, 1968), FE/2663/A3/6.
- 5. Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Doubleday & Co., 1970), pp. 178-83.
- 6. Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services (GPO, 1969), p. 735.
- 7. Ibid., pp. 635-36.
- 8. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (January 9, 1968), FE/2664/A3/16.
- 9. Ibid., p. 638.
- 10. Ibid., p. 896.
- 11. Ibid., p. 900.
- 12. Washington Post, January 29, 1968.
- 13. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (Popular Library, 1970), p. 536.
- 14. New York Times, January 25, February 8, 1968.
- 15. Ibid., January 25, 1968.
- 16. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 259-61.
- 17. Ibid., p. 239. Armbrister previously recounts that the destroyer Higbee was to have been assigned to enter Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the Pueblo crew:
- 18. Ibid., p. 259.
- 19. Ibid., p. 263.
- 20. New York Times, January 26, 1968.
- 21. New York Times, January 27, 1968.
- 22. Ibid.

- 23. New York Times, January 24, January 25, 1968; Washington Post, January 25, 1968.
- 24. New York Times, January 25, 1968.
- 25. Ibid.
- 26. New York Times, February 22, 1968.
- 27. Cited in New York Times, February 11, 1968.
- 28. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 534. The captains of these two ships appeared in an Alaskan court and pleaded "no contest" to the charge of violating U. S. territorial waters. In these unrelated trials, one ship paid a fine of \$5,000, the other, a fine of \$10,000.
- 29. Washington Post, January 27, 1968.
- 30. Ibid.
- 31. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (January 31, 1968), FE/2685/A3/7.
- 32. <u>Washington Post</u>, February 1, 1968. This statement was made in Colombo, Ceylon.
- 33. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 536.
- 34. New York Times, May 17, 1964.
- 35. Washington Post, January 24, 1968.
- 36. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 274.
- 37. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (University of California Press, 1973), p. 985.
- 38. New York Times, February 6, 1968.
- 39. New York Times, March 20, 1969.
- 40. Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 1968.
- 41. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 298.
- 42. Ibid., p. 335. According to Armbrister, this emphatic position was suggested by Nicholas Katzenbach, and sent to the U.S. negotiating team at Panmunjom and then presented to the Koreans.
- 43. New York Times, August 8, 1968.
- Щ. New York Times, January 25, 1968.

- 45. Transcript of President Nixon's Press Conference of April 18, 1969, New York Times, April 19, 1969.
- 46. Ibid., May 6, 1969.
- 47. Ibid.
- 48. British Broadcasting Corporation, <u>Summary of World Broadcasts</u> (April 17, 1969), FE/3052/A3/1.
- 49. Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1969.
- 50. New York Times, May 15, 1969.
- 51. Ibid., April 24, 1969.
- 52. New York Times, May 6, 1969; Marvin and Bernard Kalb, <u>Kissinger</u> (Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 94. This source says that both President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger initially agreed with the military recommendation. President Nixon requested that Kissinger ask for the suggestion of each member of the National Security Council. The Kalbs believe that Secretary of State William Rogers' position—a cautious, non-military retaliation—was shared by most of the advisers, and eventually accepted by Nixon and Kissinger.
- New York Times, April 24, April 26, 1969. Task Force 71 was originally intended to include twenty-three warships; General Wheeler's April 25th testimony gave the figure as twenty-nine. Pentagon information sources placed the goal at forty vessels, to include at least three attack aircraft carriers, one antisubmarine carrier, three cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, and at least five submarines. The actual deployed taskforce consisted of four carriers, three cruisers, and fourteen destroyers.
- 54. New York Times, April 18, 1969.
- 55. Ibid., April 28, 1969.
- 56. Ibid., April 17, 1969.
- 57. Ibid.
- 58. Ibid., April 16, 1969.
- 59. Ibid., April 19, 1969.
- 60. Ibid.
- 61. Ibid., April 20, 1969.
- 62. Ibid., April 19, 1976.

- 63. British Broadcasting Corporation, <u>Summary of World Broadcasts</u> (April 23, 1969), FE/3055/A2/1.
- 64. Facts on File, April 17-23, 1969, p. 235.
- 65. New York Times, April 27, 1969.
- 66. Ibid., May 1, 1969.
- 67. Ibid., April 19, 1969.
- 68. "The Nixon Administration has warned the Soviet Union that any violent repression by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia will once again interrupt progress toward strategic arms limitation talks, diplomatic sources said today." Ibid.
- 69. Clough, East Asia and U. S. Security, pp. 163-64.
- 70. New York Times, May 13, 1975.
- 71. Washington Post, May 26, 1975.
- 72. New York Times, May 14, 1975.
- 73. U. S. Department of State, Newsletter, April 4, 1974.
- 74. New York Times, May 16, 1975.
- 75. "Seizure of the <u>Mayaguez</u>," <u>Hearings Before the Committee on International Relations and Its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs</u> (GPO, 1975), p. 9.

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- 76. Ibid., p. 37. These are Washington, D. C., times, given in the Congressional testimony.
- 77. New York Times, September 9, 1975.
- 78. "Seizure of the Mayaguez," pp. 127, 129, and 131.
- 79. New York Times, May 14, 1975.
- 80. "War Powers: A Test of Compliance," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, 94 Cong. 1 sess. (May 7 and June 4, 1975); "Legislative History of the Consultation Provision of the War Powers Resolution," pp. 46-47.
- 81 . New York Times, May 15, 1975.
- 82 . Ibid., May 13, 1975.
- 83. Ibid., May 16, 1975.

- 84. For the Department of State': explanation of why these warnings were not sent, see System to Warn U. S. Mariners of Potential Political/Military Hazards: S. S. Mayaguez, A Case Study (Department of State, Defense, and Commerce, February 11, 1976), p. 11.
- 85. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, <u>United States Foreign Policy</u> and World Order (Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 540, Fn. 132.
- 86. The conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam has been long standing. For an example of a battle over these same islands, see New York Times, March 2, 1956. For an assessment of the oil deposits in this area, see the Far Eastern Economic Review (September 20, 1974).
- 87. Ieng Sary's quotation is in Newsweek, Far East edition (September 8, 1975). Secretary Kissinger, at his May 13, 1975, Press Conference, also commented: "I am not inclined to believe that this was a carefully planned operation on the part of the Cambodian authorities."
- 88. Cited in James Nathan, "The <u>Mayaguez</u>, Presidential War, and Congressional Senescence," <u>Intellect</u> (February 1976), p. 361. Also see Nathan and Oliver, <u>United States Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 527-32.
- 89. New York Times, May 18, 1975.
- 90. Ibid., May 25, 1975.
- 91. U. S. News and World Report (May 26, 1975).
- 92. The Gallup Opinion Index, June 1975, p. 2.
- 93. New York Times, April 17, 1975.
- 94. Bangkok Post, June 9, 1975.
- 95. Ibid.
- 96. Washington Post, May 15, 1975.
- 97. Facts on File, May 17, 1975.
- 98. New York Times, April 17, 1969; Michael Hamm, "The Pueblo and Mayaguez:
 A Study of Flexible-Response Decision-Making," Asian Survey, (forth-coming).

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Chapter XV

USES OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

By Faith Thompson Campbell

The purpose of this chapter is to provide added perspective on the United States' political uses of the armed forces by examining Soviet practice. For this purpose the thirty years covered by the study have been divided into six periods, characterized by a different Soviet foreign policy approach and/or by a significantly different Soviet strategic position relative to the United States. These periods are 1946-1948, 1949-1953, 1953-1956, 1957-1962, 1963-1968, and 1969-1975. Soviet goals and methods in utilizing their armed forces for political purposes have changed as their broader policies and strategic capabilities evolved; trends in goals and methods may signal future behavior.

As in the rest of the study, only those uses of force are considered which included physical changes in the disposition of one or more components of the uniformed military services, taken as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authority to influence specific behavior of individuals in other nations without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. In the Soviet context, "national authority" is defined as the Politburo of the Communist Party. Lack of data precludes examination of the impact of Soviet uses of force on domestic audiences, however.

Strict application of this definition has eliminated many individual actions by Soviet military units which might otherwise be of interest. Among these are the more than forty cases in which aircraft were shot down within Soviet territory or along its borders; they are considered to have been acts of self-defense similar to American military actions in the Korean demilitarized zone or along the perimeter of Guantanamo. Seizures of Japanese fishermen in the disputed waters north of Hokkaido are likewise omitted. These actions certainly had political impact in that the West saw them as evidence of Soviet aggressiveness; particularly, as in several cases the Soviets would seem to have acted with unnecessary violence. But Soviet purposes in these cases are presumed to have been only to defend their territorial sovereignty. Another group of Soviet military actions: reconnaissance flights, ship and submarine patrols, and surveillance of Western military maneuvers, are considered to have been normal military operations and hence are also excluded. The

establishment of a Soviet military presence is considered politically significant, but subsequent changes in that presence are not. Nor does a withdrawal of Soviet forces at the demand of a host country or another power meet the definition of a political use of force. Finally, the transport of military supplies and advisors to foreign nations or revolutionary movements by merchant ships and planes bearing Aeroflot markings piloted by crews in civilian clothing is considered to have been a form of covert support and, like its American counterpart, is not included in this analysis.

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The closed nature of Soviet society makes it very difficult to obtain reliable data, particularly with respect to Soviet foreign and military policies. There was no access to such official records as the fleet and divisional histories utilized in the study of American uses of force. Further, Soviet officials rarely discuss uses of force in public statements or memoirs, and when they do they give few details. For example, Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev once said that Soviet air force units had been sent to the People's Republic of China to protect it from Taiwan, but he mentioned neither the size of the force nor when it was deployed. (1) A search of available sources failed to cast any light on this matter. Similarly, Soviet and foreign media provide only limited coverage and that must be evaluated in light of the sources' potential motivation for revealing the information. Some may wish to exaggerate Soviet military involvement in order to arouse oppostion by their own citizens or an ally, such as the United States. Others, to the contrary, may try to minimize such involvement in order to leave the door open for a compromise with the Soviets. An example of the former may be the reports which appeared in 1949 and 1951 that Soviet submarines were transporting supplies to the Hukalahap rebels in the Philippines. (2) Since such a supply effort would have deviated sharply from Soviet practices under Stalin-particularly because the Huks were not under Soviet control it seems unlikely that it actually occurred. Thus, one must proceed on the assumption that some instances of Soviet political use of their armed forces have not been reported publicly and thus are not included here, while other alleged incidents may not actually have taken place. For this reason, I do not in this chapter attempt a systematic analysis similar to that undertaken for the United States. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of Soviet behavior, a discussion of some more important examples, and an analysis of apparent trends. While all attempts have been made to be inclusive, the result must be viewed as less than definitive.

Consolidation in Europe: 1946-48.

During this three-year period, the Soviet Union was presented with an unparalleled opportunity to realize long-standing objectives of Russian foreign policy. The disintegration of the pre-war political systems of many of the states bordering the Soviet Union made possible a complete reorganization of political alignments. The first Soviet priority seems to have been to establish a buffer zone between its territory and the West and its empires. The benefits of such a zone were seen as being not just military, but also political in the sense of extending Soviet influence and reducing its isolation, and economic in the sense of providing raw materials and investment capital (in the form of war reparations and captured stocks and facilities). The type of control which the Soviets might have hoped to gain varied with conditions in the countries concerned. The nations of Eastern Europe were the most vulnerable because their political leaders had either been ousted by German occupiers or discredited by their collaboration. Most important, the nations of Eastern Europe were not occupied by the Soviet Army and their Communist parties, and with the exceptions of Yugoslavia and Albania, were under firm Soviet control and would be dependent on the Soviet Union for their rise to power. The Soviets also had a strong ideological motive for promoting a socialist revolution in their zone of Europe: since the collapse of the shortlived German and Hungarian Socialist Republics after World War I, the Soviets had been sensitive to the charge that the economically and socially backward Soviet Union could not build socialism alone. Stalin had proclaimed that socialism was possible in one country, but there were still doubters. And it was certain that allies would be helpful even if they were not essential. In addition, the expansion of socialism to these European states would give the impression of progress, an impression that the Soviet people might regard as suitable reward for their years of sacrifice.

Conditions in the other border countries were not so conducive to Soviet aims. Korea and China had also suffered occupation and disintegration and were partially under Soviet occupation. But while some leaders of the Korean Communist Party could apparently be controlled by Soviet overseers, the Chinese leaders were not nearly so malleable. Iran, too, was partly occupied by Soviet troops and weakened by ethnic divisions; by 1946, the Soviets were already promoting leftist parties there. Turkey, on the other hand, had retained both its sovereignty and unity. Pressure on that country would have to come from the Soviet Union directly.

In all of these nations, with the exception of Turkey, the Soviet Union used its armed forces in attempts to assist pro-Soviet forces to take control. In so doing, it generally avoided direct confrontations

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with the Western powers. This caution was probably a result of their strategic military inferiority. The one exception, the Berlin blockade, probably developed further than Stalin had anticipated. Moreover, the West's firm response to that particular Soviet initiative was probably a major cause of the more subtle approach followed by Stalin during the next three years.

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All told, a search of open sources rewealed fifteen incidents in which Soviet armed forces were used for political objectives during the 1946-48 period. These are listed in Table XV-1; six occurred in occupied Eastern Europe, four in Germany; two in the Far East; and three were directed at either Turkey or Iran.

In Eastern Europe the manner in which Soviet armed forces were used varied from country to country. In Poland, the establishment of a Communist-led coalition had already progressed quite far as early as 1944. Consequently, all Soviet troops were withdrawn prior to 1946. In Yugoslavia, the native Communists won power during the war without substantial Soviet assistance. Soviet troops withdrew from Czechoslovakia following the end of the war, allowing the formation of a genuinely democratic regime.

In Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, the Red Army played an active role in attempting to intimidate non-Communist political leaders, thereby assisting the Communists to gain power. Withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from these countries was delayed after signature of the peace treaties in February 1947, presumably so that the Red Army's influence might still be felt. (3) The most blatant interference by Soviet troops in domestic political affairs was their use to arrest Bela Kovacs, leader of the Smallholders' Party, after the Hungarian Parliament refused to revoke his immunity. Kovacs' trial for subversive activities helped to discredit the coalition government and thus to promote full Communist control. (4)

The role of the Soviet army in the later Communist triumph in Czechoslovakia was less direct. Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin reportedly threatened President Benes during the crisis and Soviet troops in East Germany may have staged movements near the border in support of those threats. (5) But, by far, the more important factors in the take-over were the Czechoslovak Communist Party's control of the army, police, and unions.

In the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria, tactics similar to those used in the rest of Eastern Europe were applied. Because the Western Allies had representatives and military forces in Germany and Austria, however, their opposition to these measures was more effective than elsewhere. Indeed, resulting clashes between the occupying powers came, in Germany at least, to overshadow the original local issues. Berlin, while an island of Western influence in the Soviet sector, was extremely vulnerable to Soviet pressure, and became the focal point of these disputes.

Table XV-1
Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1946-48

Beginning Date	Target <u>Netions</u>	Action
January 1946	China	Occupation of Manchuria
January 1946	Korea	Occupation of the north
Merch 1946	Irea	Delay withdrawal of troops
March 1946	Turkey	Mass troops on border
1947	Austria	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
January 1947	Germany	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
February 1947	Rumania	Delay withdrawal of troops
February 1947	Bulgaria	Delay withdrawal of troops
February 1947	Kungary	Delay withdrawal of troops
August 1947	Iran.	Mass troops on border
January 1948	Germany	Interdict transit to Berlin
February 1948	Germany	Ownrflights
February 1948	Czechoslovakia	Maneuvers on border
April 1948	Germany	Interdict transit to Berlin
June 1948	Cottomy	Blockade of Berlin
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Escalation of Soviet pressures on Berlin coincided with the coup in Czechoslovakia and then-secret clashes between Moscow and President Tito of Yugoslavia. Thus, the pressure on Berlin was probably part of a general move to consolidate the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. Although the Soviets halted rail transportation from Berlin in January, the first concerted pressure came in March 1948. The Soviet representative left the Allied Council in a dispute over joint administration of the city. Prolonged and deliberate harassment of truck and barge traffic and inter-zone commuters soon followed. There were concurrent increases in Soviet air activity over the city, Army maneuvers nearby, and even the deployment of Soviet tanks inside Berlin. The blockade was ended without resolution of the precipitating issues, however, at the end of April.(6)

In June, perhaps encouraged by the Allies' lack of forceful response to the April blockade, the Soviets repeated the tactic. They began cautiously, closing a few cross-points on 9 June; by 18 June, citing the currency reform then being instituted in the Western zones, they had blocked all surface traffic. At the same time, both Soviet air units stationed in Germany and border guards were reinforced. The following day, the West initiated the now famous air lift and alerted troops in the area. The Soviets tried to counter the airlift by increasing their own air activity over Berlin and threatening several, usually British, transports, particularly in the fall, at the time of the United Nations Security Council debate of the Berlin issue. They also staged paratroop maneuvers involving live bombs in one corridor, and held artillery practice near the airports. Tensions eased in November when Soviet troops dispersed to winter quarters, but the blockade remained in force until late April when Tass broadcasted an offer to end the blockade if the West ended its counter-blockade of materials intended for the Soviet sector. Bus connections to some cities in the Western zone were re-established a few days later, and by May 12th, sector barriers had been removed and electric power restored.(7)

In short, this Soviet attempt to gain political advantages through the application of military force failed; indeed, it backfired rather importantly. Not only did the blockade fail to bring about the ouster of the Allies from Berlin but it seems to have contributed substantially to Western suspicions and fear of Soviet objectives, and, as a result, to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, American rearmament, and deployment of American strategic bombers and troops to Europe. (8) Recognition of this failure was probably a major factor leading to a Soviet reappraisal of the role of military power, leading to distinct changes in the ways they utilized military force, beginning in 1949.

The political situation in North Korea following the war closely resembled that in Eastern Europe. After forty years of Japanese domination, Korean political groups were poorly organized, if existent at all.

There was a power struggle between the nationalists, the "old" Communists, and the Soviet candidate -- a guerilla leader, Kim II-song. The reasons for Kim's eventual success in this struggle are a matter of some dispute, but they probably included his political skill, the mistakes of the "old" Communists, and behind-the-scenes help by the Soviets. Whether the Soviet army took an active role in Korea as it did in Hungary, for example, cannot be determined. But regardless, by mid-1946 Kim's domination was so complete that the Soviets withdrew all but 10,000 of their occupation troops. The remaining forces were pulled out in 1948.(9)

In China, at the end of World War II, the Soviets encountered a more complex situation. Neither the Nationalists nor the Communists were strong enough to gain control of the entire country. The United States' policy was to prevent any one country from dominating China; and American troops were on the ground to enforce that policy. Stalin decided to seize strategic and economic prizes while remaining neutral in the political struggle. Taking advantage of their physical control of Manchuria, the Soviets pressed the Nationalists for concessions on the use of the railroads and naval facilities at Port Arthur and Dairen. At the same time, they stripped factories of usable equipment. These actions provided the Soviets with useful economic resources, and also slowed the future growth of the Chinese economy, thus delaying its ability to challenge the U.S.S.R. With few exceptions, the Soviets cooperated with the Nationalists during this period. At the Nationalists' requests, they delayed their withdrawal from Manchuria until February 1946. They then delayed another month because of "technical difficulties" when the Nationalists refused to allow the extension of American-sponsored truce teams into Manchuria. But when they did withdraw in March, the Soviets turned the cities over to the Nationalists as promised. Nor, according to Lin Piao, did they supply military equipment to the Communists. The Soviets were active in promoting their own immediate interests and indifferent to the fate of the revolution. Reasons for this stance include Stalin's distrust of Mao, his skepticism about that leader's ability to win, fear of a strong American reaction, and possibly an inability to think beyond Manchuria. (10)

Soviet goals in Iran were similar to those in China, in that they were primarily strategic (i.e., access to the Persian Gulf) and economic (i.e., control of oil deposits). The opportunity to extend Soviet influence in Iran first arose in 1941 when a joint Soviet-British occupation of the country was established to protect the oil fields and the Southern supply route for land-lease aid to Russia from German attack. At first, the Soviets attempted to gain political influence through the Marxist Tudeh party. When this route was closed by the Majlis

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(parliament) in 1944 the Soviets turned to the nationalist aspirations of the Azerbaijani and Kurdish inhabitants of the areas under Soviet administration, as a potential means of influence. An Azerbaijani government was formed in Tabriz under Soviet protection in November 1945. The Kurds, acting without prior Soviet approval, set up their own government in Mahabad two months later. They soon received small arms, at least, from the Soviets.(11)

According to the Soviet-British-American agreement governing the wartime occupation, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Iran by March 2, 1946. While the British and American troops left before that date, the Soviets announced that some of their forces would remain in the country until internal unrest had been calmed. Only on March 25, the day the Iranians formally raised the issue before the United Nations Security Council, did the Soviets agree to withdraw the troops within six weeks. Later Soviet negotiators promised to withdraw their troops by 6 May and to regard Azerbaijan as an Iranian internal affair.(12)

This attempt to placate the Iranians and the West did not pay off. In October, Iranian Prime Minister Qavam curbed the <u>Tudeh</u> party and moved to crush both the Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics. Many of their leaders were executed. The final act of the drama occurred in the Summer of 1947, when Soviet troops were concentrated on the Iranian border in a vain attempt to dissuade the <u>Majlis</u> from rejecting a joint Iran-U.S.S.R. oil company to seek petroleum in the disputed provinces. (13)

The Soviet Union also failed in its attempt in March 1946 to force Turkey to revise the Montreux Convention governing passage through the Dardanelles and to cede the eastern provinces of Kara and Ardahan. Soviet military pressure in support of these demands took the form of the movement of some 60,000 troops from northern Iran toward the Turkish border. (14) American demonstrations of support for Turkey, such as port visits by U.S. Navy warships and the promulgation of the Truman doctrine apparently discouraged further Soviet attempts to pressure Turkey.

Caution and Moderation: 1949-53

The early period of political assertiveness, in which caution was exercised only when the West manifested armed opposition, was followed by one in which political objectives also were more temperate; this period, which began in 1949, ended with Stalin's death in March of 1953. Among the factors leading to this moderation were the several failures of the earlier period. The Berlin blockade did not extend Soviet influence in Central Europe, nor did labor unrest bring Communist victories in France or Italy. Pressures against Greece, Turkey, and Iran met with firm resistance and new American involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Communist victory in China owed little to Soviet assistance.

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The result was a less militant policy aimed chiefly at reducing rather than countering the West's military superiority. The Soviets allied themselves temporarily with anti-war intellectuals of the West in seeking dissolution of the American atomic arsenal and prevention of West German rearmament. But this willingness to exploit common interests with Western non-Communists did not carry over to greater tolerance for diversity of views within the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, the period 1949-53 saw great stress on ideological and political subservience to Soviet commands, bloody purges of leaders considered untrustworthy, and strong economic and military pressure on Yugoslavia to return to the fold. The reasons for this harsh treatment of the Eastern European regimes were primarily Stalin's determination to prevent another Tito-like defection and his fear that the new inexperienced Communist leaders could not implement a policy of collaboration with non-Communists without undermining their own power. Soviet authoritarian behavior in Eastern Europe, however, doomed efforts to portray the Soviet Union to the West as a reasonable and trustworthy power. The Chinese Communist victory and the North Korean attack on South Korea further greatly alarmed the West. As a result, the more moderate policy did not bring about reduced tensions.

Soviet strategic inferiority continued throughout this period. While the U.S.S.R. exploded its first atomic device in 1949, it lacked any serious means of delivering a bomb to the United States until the mid-1950s. To avoid the consequences of this inferiority, the U.S.S.R. threatened massive stomic and conventional retaliation against Western Europe, should the U.S. attack Soviet territory. Soviet defense efforts concentrated on air defease, and the ground and naval systems suitable for a European War. (15)

In consonance with this broad policy, Soviet political uses of the armed forces during this period were generally on a small scale, cautious and aimed more at consolidating previous gains than at reaching for more. There seem to have been 14 such incidents; they are listed in Table XV-2.

Most of the incidents took place in Europe. Of these, only the two in which the Soviets implicitly threatened to overthrow Tito involved forces of any size; symbolic threats to Berlin and minor assistance to the Eastern European regimes constitued most of the incidents. Several of the five incidents outside of Europe which were uncovered during our search, may not actually have occurred. And in those two which clearly did occur, the small-scale efforts to pressure Iran into granting economic and political concessions, the Soviets relented rather quickly.

The most obvious exception to this general rule of caution was Korea. Believing that the North could take control of the entire peninsula easily, Stalin approved Kim Il-song's plan to attack in 1950,

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The most obvious exception to this general rule of caution was Korea. Relieving that the Morth could take control of the entire penicenta easily Scalan approved Kim II-song's plan to attack in 1950,

but was careful to keep the Soviet Union's direct participation in the war to a minimum. Two Soviet ships were reported off the South Korean coast the day the North Koreans attacked, but it is unclear whether the ships were merely monitoring the attack—in which case their presence was military rather than political—or whether they were intended to intimidate the South Koreans or provide communications or other assistance to the North. A related and perhaps riskier Soviet presence, was the reported deployment of four Soviet divisions to Northeast China in January 1951, two months after Chinese intervention in the war. The presence clearly was intended to discourage any attack on China by United Nations forces. Overall, though, the invasion of North Korea was more the result of a miscalculation than a departure from Stalin's generally prudent policies. (16)

The Soviets were more circumspect in pressing again for concessions in Iran. The opportunity arose in March 1951 when the Majlis voted to nationalize the oil industry; labor unrest (blamed on Communist agitators) complicated the situation. In mid-April, following the death or injury of several British oil company employees, the British reinforced their Persian Gulf fleet and, after the Iranian Senate voted for immediate nationalization and Mossadegh, a well-known leftist, became Prime Minister, the British alerted a brigade of paratroops and reinforced their Mediterranean fleet as well. British troops were actually deployed to the area near the end of May.(17)

It was at this point that the Soviet Union entered the controversy. On the same day that British paratroops were deployed, the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany was reported to say that the U.S.S.R. would resist injection of foreign troops into Iran. In early June an "unusual" massing of Soviet troops was reported on the border. The dispute continued throughout the Summer with the British taking additional military preparations, the U.S. attempting to mediate the conflict, and the Soviets simultaneously pressing the Iranians for concessions on their mutual border and deploring British imperialism. The Soviets might have made one more attempt to take advantage of Iran's awkward situation. At the beginning of August a ship approached the Caspian Sea port of Astara and was fired on by Iranian border guards. An Iranian-Soviet border agreement was signed in November. (18)

Soviet intentions with regard to Iran are far from clear. They were certainly opposed to increased British influence or military presence in the area and made some attempt to portray themselves as merely interested in countering British aggression. Indeed, the Soviet stance may have given the British pause. But by simultaneously pressing Iran for border concessions the Soviets undermined any gratitude they might thus have won. In any case, it is doubtful that the Iranians would have forgotten past Soviet actions, particularly the delay in withdrawal

of the occupation troops in 1946. Thus, this early Soviet attempt to take advantage of the collapse of colonialism failed.

In Europe, by 1949, the Soviets had not only exhausted opportunities for extending their influence but faced several problems of their earlier successes. One was the new Western alliance--NATO--which threatened to rearm West Germany. The other was Yugoslavia's successful defiance.

Soviet armed forces were also used in Europe occasionally during this period to supplement normal political methods of shoring up satellite regimes. Some of these incidents were so petty as to be ludicrous: for example, escorting a Hungarian athletic team in Austria to prevent defections, and shooting down propaganda balloons over Czechoslovakia. Some assistance was more substantial; Soviet jets intercepted emigre planes trying to drop guerrillas and leaflets during a period of unrest in Albania in March 1951.(19)

Ulam suggests that Soviet fear of German rearmament was sufficiently strong between 1950 and 1954 and they were seriously interested in negotiating a settlement of the German question; perhaps being even willing to sacrifice their East German clients in the process. Mitigating against adoption of such a policy, however, was their concern that acceptance of a unified neutral Germany outside the satellite system would stimulate the people of the other Eastern European countries to demand similar autonomy. (20) Soviet policy—makers probably never resolved this conflict for themselves. In any case, Western suspicion stemming from the post-war negotiating experience, plus the Soviets' use of military pressure in conjunction with diplomatic initiatives in Eastern Europe during this period, combined to block any settlement along these lines. Despite the policy's failure, its implementation bears examining.

To express their opposition to the Western decision to grant
West Germany internal autonomy, the Soviets began searching trucks
travelling to and from Berlin in January 1952. In March, this
harassment was supplemented by cutting the transmission of electric
power to the city.(21) Co-incidentally, the Soviets proposed a Big
Four conference to discuss a peace treaty, reunification, the rapid
withdrawal of occupation forces, and the establishment of such German
armed forces as were "necessary for the defense of the country."
In return, Germany was to pledge not to enter any coalition or military
alliance directed against "any power which took part with its armed
forces against Germany." The West feared that the Soviets' aim was
to undermine the on-going negotiations over the European Defense
Community; so an exchange of notes that Spring brought no serious progress.(22)

Consequently, the Soviets stepped up the military pressure. In mid-April they reinforced the occupation forces in East Germany.

As May 25--the date of self-government--approached, there were intensified air maneuvers and intermittent re usals to allow the Allied military commands to patrol the highways linking Berlin and West Germany. The East Germans did their share by cutting West Berlin's telephone connections with both East and West Germany for several days and tightening restrictions on West Berliners' activities in the Eastern zone. (23)

Understandably, the West found these actions threatening, and reacted accordingly. The second time the Soviets blocked a highway patrol, Secretary of State Dean Acheson pledged that the United States would defend its position. The Western military commandants conferred on the issue and sent notes to their Soviet counterpart on these occasions. Acheson reiterated this stance during a radio speech on 2 June. The British interfered with the operation of the Soviet radio station located in their sector. Allied conferences continued through June, at which time Acheson implied that the United States would use military measures if the Soviets tried to occupy or blockade Berlin. (24)

The Soviets continued to make demonstrative shows of force after the Federal Republic was granted self-government so as to indicate its opposition to German rearmament. In August, the Soviets renewed blocking Western patrol's of the Autobahn. The Soviets staged maneuvers along the Elbe at the end of September, but these were probably routine. In October, coinciding with the Soviet Party's Nineteenth Congress, the military pressure took a more serious form. Two Soviet planes fired on an unarmed American hospital plane in the corridor on 8 October. At the end of the month, Soviet troops turned back two trainloads of American military equipment intended for Berlin; this was the first such action since 1949. Two weeks later, however, a second American train, carrying tanks, was allowed through to Berlin. (25) Despite continued actions like these, steps toward German rearmament went forward. Whether Stalin was actually prepared to blockade the city over the issue of rearmament will never be known; his death in March 1953 lead to a new conciliatory approach.

The second challenge to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was Tito's defiance—particularly galling to Stalin personally, and an example which he feared would encourage other Eastern European leaders to seek greater freedom for themselves. Consequently, when economic and political measures failed to bring the Yugoslavs to heel, Stalin turned to military threats. In August 1949, already tense relations between the two countries were exacerbated by allegations that Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia were inciting rebellion. Tito offered to negotiate, but pledged to fight if necessary. Shortly afterward, three Soviet mechanized divisions were reported on the Yugoslav borders. At least one Soviet warship intruded into Yugoslav waters on the Danube. Soviet military pressure escalated when Soviet

troops staged maneuvers in Hungary near the vulnerable northern Yugoslav plain. A month later Soviet forces in Hungary and Rumania reportedly were reinforced. The threat of war gradually dissipated, even though the issue was not resolved. Doubtless the evident Yugoslav determination to fight, coupled with the threat of possible American intervention, made ousting Tito appear too risky to Stalin. (26)

Two years later, the Soviets tried again to oust Tito. No specific event seemed to trigger this incident; it was probably part of the general attack on independent-minded leaders which was proceeding in some of the satellite states. Border incidents occurred and there were reports of 600,000 troops concentrated on Yugoslevia's borders in January 1951; at this time, however, only East European forces were involved.

Tensions continued high through the Summer. In September came the first mention of direct Soviet involvement. It took the form of the movement of Soviet bombers painted with Yugoslav markings to hear the borders and joint Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers. But again, the Soviets did not carry out their threat, and the crisis passed. In October, Soviet forces in Austria were withdrawn from the Yugoslav border area. (27) It is unlikely that the Soviets had seriously considered an invasion of Yugoslavia at this late date since those factors which had dissuaded them in 1949, Yugoslav determination and the possibility of American intervention, had increased in the interval. They may have hoped that Yugoslavia's virtual economic collapse between 1949 and 1951 had undermined the people's will to resist, but if so, they once again had misjudged their opponents.

Reassessment: 1953-56

Stalin's death in March 1953 led to a period of factionalized leadership and intense rethinking of nearly all aspects of Soviet policy which lasted through 1956. In foreign policy a new approach was seen almost immediately. Efforts to change the previously belligerant Soviet image took the form of a friendlier attitude toward individual Westerners, reduced anti-Western rhetoric, increased diplomatic contacts, and proposals for summit conferences. The new leaders also showed interest in the progressive intellectuals of the third world as potential ellies against imperialism, as seen in Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's visit to India and the decision to provide arms and financial aid to Nasser's Egypt.

Strategically the Soviet Union continued in a highly vulnerable position. It exploded a nuclear bomb in 1953, but managed to build only a few long-range delivery systems by 1956. Soviet leaders' awareness of

this vulnerability was shown by their debate over the inevitability of war between socialist and capitalist states. Prime Minister Malenkov, in particular, stressed the dangers of mutual destruction, while Khrushchev spoke of the reduced likelihood of war now that the Socialist camp's strength was sufficient to deter capitalist counter-revolutionary wars.

The focus of Soviet political uses of force during this period was again in Europe. These covered a full-range from symbolic acts, primarily ship visits to Western European ports, intended to help normalize relations with those countries, to brutal uses of overwhelming force to contain change in Eastern Europe. These latter challenges to Soviet control grew out of the reassessment of socialist practices which followed Stalin's death and doubtless played a role in curbing Khrushchev's own "reformist" tendencies at home. In keeping with the importance the Soviets have always at ached to the ideological and political loyalty of these regimes, these large scale uses of force were carried out despite resulting setbacks to the other Soviet foreign policy objective of improving relations with third world and Western nations.

All told, there were 17 incidents during this period, as listed in Table XV-3. Fourteen were in Europe; of which eight were designed to improve relations, four concerned the control of Eastern Europe, and two again pertained to Berlin. Two other incidents involved Soviet relations with China. The remaining incident—a massing of Soviet troops in the southwest portion of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the Suez crisis—presaged the growth of Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

Soviet attempts to improve relations with Western Europe began quickly after Stalin's death. Pressures on Berlin ceased almost immediately; and soon, Soviet armed forces were involved in small demonstrative acts to dramatize the new policy. These included the surprise visit of a cruiser to Great Britain during Queen Elizabeth's coronation (June 1953), a visit to Sweden in 1954, and visits to the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Denmark in 1956. These were the first vicits by Russian warships to the West since the October Revolution. (28) There were also visits to communist states: Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania in 1953, China in 1956, and most significantly—because of its demonstration of a sharp change in policy—to Yugoslavia in May 1956. The latter reaffirmed the new Soviet leadership's acceptance of Yugoslavia's political and ideological autonomy. (29)

Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West occasionally took more substantive form: the withdrawal of troops from positions occupied since the war. The largest such withdrawal, that from Austria, seems to have been meant to demonstrate to the West at large that the new leaders were willing to compromise and to the Germans

Table XV-3

Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1953-56

Beginning Date	Target Nations	Action
1953	Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania	Port visits
April 1953	Great Britain	Port visit
June 1953 .	Germany	Crush uprising
July 1954	Sweden	Port visit
September 1954	Germany	Harrass air traffic
October 1954	China	Withdraw from naval base ,
May 1955	Austria	Withdraw all troops
October 1955	Finland	Withdraw from naval base
October 1956	China	Port visit
May 1956	Yugoslavia	, Port visit
May 1956	Germany	Withdraw some troops
July 1956	Netherlands, Denmark	Port visit
October 1956	Poland	Maneuvers
October 1956	Hungary	Control rioters
November 1956	Hungary	Crush uprising
November 1956	Germany	Harrass traffic
November 1956	Egypt	Maneuvers and troop movements

specifically, the benefits they might enjoy if they accepted Soviet offers of reunification in exchange for neutrality. The Soviets had proposed four-power peace talks on Austria even before Stalin's death, but the new Soviet leadership took a number of unilateral actions to promote a settlement. These included re-establishing diplomatic relations with the Austrian Government, reducing restrictions on travel and communications across zonal boundaries, and—in the Fall of 1953—a partial withdrawal of occupation forces. Talks on Austrian re-unification were revived in the Spring of 1955, and agreement reached quickly. Soviet troops began to leave immediately after signature of the Austrian State Treaty in May; all occupation forces had left by mid-October.(30)

The Soviet withdrawal from Austria was a partial success insofar as it contributed to a relaxation of Cold War tensions. And while the withdrawal did not entice West Germany from its alliance with the West, the concommitant neutralization of Austria, along with Lichtenstein and Switzerland, created a neutral band which split the northern and southern NATO countries. (31) On the other hand, the Soviet withdrawal from Austria greatly increased pressures in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary, for reduced Soviet control. The formal ending of the occupation of East Germany in the Summer of 1956, and withdrawal of an estimated 30,000 troops, including two air divisions with 70 to 89 fighter planes, may partly have been an attempt to ease this pressure. The latter withdrawal was strictly a symbolic one, in that about 400,000 Soviet troops remained "temporarily" in the country. (32)

Despite the new Soviet leaders' apparent intention to reverse their bellicose image, the largest and most important applications of Soviet armed force during this period were brutal impositions of Soviet will on the people of Eastern Europe. With Stalin's death and change in the Soviet political system, came demands in these countries for changes in current political practices. When these internal conflicts seemed to threaten the stability of certain regimes and Soviet hegemony, the Soviets reacted strongly. These actions were graphic proof of the overriding importance which even the new Soviet leaders placed on retaining their post-war gains in Europe.

The first challenge came in Berlin only months after Stalin's death. Worker protests over economic issues on 16 June spread overnight to the rest of East Germany and assumed anti-Soviet overtones. Two Soviet armored divisions quickly restored order. The quick reaction could be attributed to the nature of the distrubances, and their location close to large contingents of Western troops and the then open border with West Berlin. Soviet troops gradually turned the city over to East German police and martial law was lifted on 11 July. (33) Worker riots in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia that same June, and in Poznan,

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Poland three years later did not elicit similar Soviet military actions, probably because they did not seem to challenge Soviet domination, nor threaten to get out of control.

The Polish developments were of great concern to Soviet leaders, but a number of factors put the Poles in a more favorable position than the Hungarian and Czech reformers who subsequently were brought to heel Boleslaw Bierut, the Polish leader most directly implicated in the discredited Stalinist policies, died in March 1956. His successor was Edward Ochab, a skillful politician who realized the need for change. The popular choice seemed to be Wladyslaw Gomulka -- a reformer, but still a loyal and pragmatic Communist. During the Spring, Ochab led the Party toward positions first advocated by Gomulka in 1948. By June, both he and more liberal reformers were negotiating with Gomulka over the terms under which he might return to power. This process was speeded by the Poznan riots and Ochab's consequent concessions. By these policies, Ochab retained control over the Party and the democratization process, but only temporarily. In October it was announced that Gomulka would attend the Eight Central Committee Plenum on the 19th; it was widely assumed that he would then be elected First Secretary. (34)

While the Soviets initially had been sympathetic to at least some aspects of the Polish reforms (after all, they were themselves undergoing de-Stalinization), they were alarmed by the Poznan riots. The prospect of Gomulka--ousted at Stalin's insistence in 1948 for advocating a separate Polish road to socialism -- resuming leadership of the Party was even more alarming. Bulganin and Zhukov pressed for stern measures and reminded the Poles of their dependence on the Soviet Union for defense against Germany. Bulganin added that the Soviets would not allow a weakening of ties among the socialist countries "under the slogan of so-called national characteristics."(35) On the night of October 18, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Molotov, Mikoyan and Kaganovich--all members of the Politburo--plus Marshall Konev and General Antonov flew uninvited to Warsaw and demanded to meet the Polish leaders. At the same time, an unknown number of Soviet troops began moving toward Warsaw from their bases in southwest Poland. Two Soviet ships appeared off Gdansk, but were refused entry. (36)

With skill, Ochab announced the Soviet leaders' arrival to the Central Committee and proposed that it immediately co-opt Gomulka and three other individuals. This action taken, he then suggested that the Politburo and Gomulka meet the Soviets. He also had Gomulka's appointment announced over the radio. Meanwhile, the Polish people were prepared for action. The previous night, workers in Warsaw had foiled an attempt by the hard-line Natolin group and Defense Minister Rokossovsky to block the Central Committee meeting. These same workers were now ready to fight the Soviet army. Indeed, the Polish Internal Security Corps had blocked the road from Poznan to Warsaw to

prevent Soviet troops in East Germany from intervening. And the Polish Air Force kept a watchful eye on Soviet movements.(37)

In this historical meeting with Polish leaders, the Soviets were at first quite truculent, calling Gomulka a traitor and demanding retention of Rokossovsky as Defense Minister and an end to both anti-Soviet press reports and the democratization movement. Gomulka turned them around, however, by offering a carrot and a stick. On the one hand, he professed his and Poland's loyalty to Socialism. But on the other, he threatened to broadcast the Soviet demands. A compromise was struck, and the Soviet leaders left immediately, early in the morning of 20 October. (38)

The Soviets remained suspicious, however. Although Soviet troops were withdrawn from the vicinity of Warsaw immediately, they staged maneuvers in Poland for the next several days. Still, Gomulka kept his bargain and thus calmed Soviet fears. Troop movements in Poland in early November were probably strictly precautions in case the Hungarian revolt spread. (39)

Poland's success in avoiding Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's fate stemmed from several factors. For one, Ochab and Gomulka were more skilled at containing the democratization movement than the Hungarian leader--Nagy and their goals fell short of the fundamental reforms sought by the Czech leader--Dubcek. This made it easier for the Poles to reach and implement a compromise with the Soviets. The result was that Soviet confidence in Gomulka grew, while the opposite happened with respect to Nagy and Dubcek. Second, it seemed likely that the Polish Army would put up stiff resistance to a Soviet invasion. Hungarians fought, but the Hungarian Army did not play a major role. The Czechoslovaks never showed any sign of resisting an invasion militarily. Third, in 1956 the Soviets had cause to fear both revolts in other Eastern European states and military responses by the West. In 1968 the other socialist regimes were in firm control; indeed, most supported the invasion. Further, in 1968 the Soviets were confident that the United States would not act. (40)

The situation in Hungary was quite different. The more brutal nature of Stalinist repression in that country earlier led to greater and more deeply felt demands by the people. Unlike the Poles, the Hungarians were not fortunate enough for their Stalinist Party leader-Matyas Rakosi-to die naturally. Having been responsible for the purges, he stubbornly resisted any reforms. He clung to power by persuading the Soviets that his rival, former prime minister Imre Nagy, would betray Communism. When Khrushchev launched his own de-Stalinization campaign at the Twentieth Congress in February 1956, Rakosi's position finally became untenable. But it was only in July, and after the persistent urging of Yugoslavia's Tito, that Rakosi was dumped; only to be replaced by Erno Gero, a close collaborator of Rakosi and thus

anathema to the public. Gero opposed democratization as strongly as Rakosi; during the Fall he waited for an opportunity to crush the opposition. Thus, when Hungarian students planned a demonstration in support of the Polish workers, Gero acted to exacerbate tensions. When rioting broke out, however, he found that the security forces were unwilling to fire on the crowds. At that point, perhaps at Gero's request, Soviet tanks entered the city. All told, four Soviet divisions were engaged throughout the country. Meanwhile, Nagy was appointed Prime Minister and began to seek a political solution to the crisis.(41)

The first Soviet intervention thoroughly aroused the Hungarian public. Beleatedly perceiving this, the Soviets withdrew their forces from Hungarian cities on October 28. While the Soviet troops marked time in the countryside and in neighboring states, Nagy and Gero's successor as Party secretary, Janos Kadar, conferred with Soviet representatives. Meanwhile, however, the divided Soviet Presidium was becoming more alarmed by the rise of non-Communist political forces, and the escalating demands, particularly that for abrogation of the Warsaw Pact. These fears were exacerbated by reports of student unrest in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, both of which have large Hungarian minorities. Under these pressures, and seeing the West preoccupied with the Suez crisis, the Presidium apparently decided to intervene on November 1, 1956.(42)

Soviet units in Hungary were rapidly reinforced to between eight and eleven divisions, seven of them armored. Following a request for Soviet assistance by Party Secretary Kadar, a full-scale ground and air attack was launched. Resistance lasted for 10 days, but was finally crushed. On November 21, as Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy under a pledge of safeconduct, he was seized by Soviet troops; he was later tried and executed. (43)

Thus, in Poland, the Soviets demonstrated a flair for the demonstrative use of force in conjunction with diplomacy (of a sorts), which resulted in a satisfactory outcome. In Hungary, on the other hand, these preliminary maneuverings proved unable to bring about a satisfactory result from the Soviet perspective; they resorted to a brutal and direct use of the armed forces to ensure the loyalty of Eastern Europe. One suspects, however, that in both cases it was the specifics of the situation—not the alacrity with which the Soviets used the armed forces politically—which brought about the result.

The final Soviet political use of the armed forces during this period may have been connected with the turmoil in East Europe. On the other hand, if it occurred as reported, it more likely was connected with the co-incident Suez crisis, and Khrushchev's threat to attack Britain and France. As the British and French expeditionary force was built-up prior to the Suez invasion, one source reports that the Soviets concentrated an estimated 35 divisions, including

mechanized and armored units, paratroops, and units trained in desert warfare in the Kiev and Odessa military districts. (44) It is not clear, however, how these forces were expected to be moved to the Middle East—given Soviet lift capabilities at the time; nor, how they were connected with Khrushchev's specific threat, which was to rain rockets on London and Paris.

Posturing: 1957-62

Among the costs of the brutal repression of Hungary, was destruction of the post-Stalinist leadership's attempt to ease tensions with the West; after 1956, the Soviets had to rebuild their foreign policy on totally new ground. They adopted two approaches: one was a pose of military superiority (which was given some credibility by the launching of the first Sputnik in 1957), combined with greater assertiveness in Europe—again focussing on Berlin. The second was a new interest in the Third World, particularly the Middle East, where the Soviets began to take advantage of conflicts between nationalist Arab states and their former colonial mentors. The major goal of both approaches was to portray the Soviet Union as the leader of the ascendant Socialist Bloc. Soviet armed forces played important roles in both types of events.

Despite their bluster, during this period the Soviets repeatedly had to back-down when their demands were challenged by the West. The reason was their continued strategic military inferiority. To the degree there was choice in the matter, Khrushchev apparently accepted that inferiority because of the expense of trying to overcome it, and his conviction that the United States would not attack the Soviet Union unless mightily provoked. He chose to bluff in his twin goals of humiliating the West by forcing it out of Berlin and gaining influence in the Third World by protecting sympathetic leaders from American threats. For military protection he relied, as had his predecessors, on the concept of hostage Europe; a policy which necessitated only preserving Soviet local superiority. After repeated rebuffs on Berlin, Khrushchev did try to improve the Soviet military position by the desperate measure of installing medium and intermediate range missiles in Cuba. Had this latter move succeeded, the Soviets would have drastically curbed the U.S. strategic advantage at low cost. However, the same strategic inferiority which made the Cuban opportunity so attractive made defense of the initiative too risky once the missiles were discovered.

All told, eleven political uses of Soviet armed forces during the 1957-62 period were identified. Six took place in or near Berlin; two of these reached major crisis proportions. One more took place in Europe—a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, East Germany,

and Rumania. One possible incident was in China, one in Cuba; and the others took place in the Middle East. All are listed in Table XV-4.

The test of Soviet policy during this period clearly was Berlin. The purpose of their actions here—military and political—was to force the West to leave the city, thereby damaging American and NATO's prestige, and bolstering the Ulbricht regime in East Germany.

Minor incidents occurred in August 1957 and January 1958, but it was not until later that year that the situation became serious. In November 1958 Khrushchev issued an ultimatum that the Allies sign a peace treaty, withdraw their troops, and establish Berlin as a "free city" by June 1, 1959. Initially, Soviet armed forces were used to harrass traffic to Berlin in support of this policy. In 1961 this campaign was escalated across a broad range of pressures. The timing of the escalation was dictated, in part, by the domestic crisis within East Germany, symbolized by the massive flight of refugees to West Berlin. In July, Khrushchev announced a military build-up; followed immediately by an air show at which Soviet military hardware was displayed. (45)

At the beginning of August, Warsaw Pact members announced that they would sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic in 1961 that would give it control over traffic to Berlin. The increase in international tensions boosted the number of refugees fleeing East Germany to 1,900 per day. Finally, on 12 August, East German officials sealed the border to stop the exodus, but did not interfere with Allied access. Two Soviet divisions were reported to have encircled the city, presumably to deter any Western attempt to reopen the border. Other military steps also were taken to indicate Soviet resolve. For the first time since 1936, Western military attaches were invited to observe Soviet infantry maneuvers; these exercises, including the simulated use of nuclear weapons, were staged near Moscow. Also, Soviet tanks were reported to be in Berlin near crossing points, and a previously planned Soviet troop cut was cancelled at the end of the month. Next in the gradually escalating campaign, Khrushchev announced the resumption of nuclear testing; the series, begun immediately, included a "supermegaton" bomb. In September some Western aircraft in the corridors were harrassed, and fleet exercises were held in the Barents and Kara seas. (46)

The crisis reached its peak at the end of October when for one day Soviet and American tanks faced one another across the Friedrichstrasse crossing. Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Poland in November and intermittent harrassment of Allied traffic to Berlin kept tensions high, but the crisis finally eased in January 1962 as both sides withdrew their tanks from the immediate border areas. A series of incidents in

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Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1957-62

Beginning	ere to the series of the set of the	Reducing Property of the Park
<u>Date</u>	Target Nations	Action Services Control of the Contr
1958	China	Deployment of air defense units
August 1957	Germany	Harrassed traffic to Berlin
September 1957	Syria	Port visit
1958	Hungary, East Germany, Rumania	Withdrew some troops
January 1958	Germany	Harrassed traffic to Berlin
July 1958	Egypt, Iraq	Army maneuvers on Soviet territory
February 1959	German y	Harrassed traffic to Berlin
September 1960	Germany	Harrassed traffic to Berlin
August 1961	Germany	Military maneuvers and re- inforcement
July 1962	Cuba	Emplaced missiles
September 1962	Germany	Harrassed traffic to Berlin

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the air corridors briefly revived tensions, but talks continued and the atmosphere relaxed once again in April.(47) As in previous Berlin crises, the issues were not resolved.

Thus, once again, the Soviet Union's orchestration of military and diplomatic initiatives had failed. This time, however, Soviet leaders apparently accepted the fact that new attempts to oust the West from Berlin would be futile, so long as Soviet military power remained inferior to that of the West. At least temporary renunciation of pressure on Berlin was made easier by the stabilizing effect the closing of the Berlin escape route had on the Democratic Republic. The Soviets continued to harrass traffic to and from the city occasionally to express irritation at Western policies, particularly when meetings of West German political organizations were held in the city. But never again did these pressures reach near the peaks of 1958-62.

The 1957-62 period also witnessed the beginning of serious Soviet military involvement in the Middle East. The initial steps were small and symbolic. Of course, Soviet military aid to Egypt was begun in 1955, and to Syria in 1956. A different sort of action was taken in September-October 1957, when a Soviet warship visited Latakia at a time when Syrian leaders feared an invasion by Turkey. This is the first publicly recorded visit of a Soviet warship to a Middle Eastern nation. The Syrians apparently regarded it to be helpful in deterring the feared attack. (48)

A second Soviet action of a similar nature--strictly symbolic-occurred following the landing of American troops in Lebanon in 1958. Nasser, visiting Tito in Yugoslavia at the time, feared that the American action (and a simultaneous British landing in Jordan), were part of a still broader Western counter-revolutionary campaign aimed initially at the newly installed revolutionary government in Iraq and, perhaps, eventually at himself. Consequently, he flew to Moscow and asked Khrushchev to restrain the West. Khrushchev obliged with public condemnation of the landings and a warning that the Soviet Government could "not remain indifferent to acts of unprovoked aggression in a region adjacent to Russia's borders.' Simultaneously, he announced imminent maneuvers on the Turkish border. According to Egyptian sources, Khrushchev stressed to Nasser that the maneuvers were only meant to symbolize Soviet support and that he was not willing to confront the United States over the crisis. (49) Indeed, Khrushchev sought to minimize East-West tension by calling for a summit meeting with Eisenhower, MacMillan, DeGaulle, and Nehru.

Overall, this attempt to use a military demonstration to bolster Soviet relations with Egypt must be assessed as a failure; it failed because Khrushchev was willing to assume only limited risks. It is doubtful that the United States paid any attention to the maneuvers. In fact, it is quite likely that Khrushchev did not believe a real threat to Egypt existed, which made him all the more unwilling to act

rashly and thus possibly precipitate American reprisals. The Soviet leader's caution, however, disappointed Nasser and undermined his faith in Soviet military might. (50) This incident was the first of many Egyptian dissatisfactions with Soviet assistance which eventually led to the disruption of relations in 1972.

The last Soviet political use of the armed forces during the 1957-62 period was the installation of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) in Cuba. This event was a culmination not just chronologically, but symbolically as well, for it represented an extreme bluff, and its outcome proved the failure of Khrushchev's policies.

It was widely agreed that Khrushchev's primary motive in deploying missiles to Cuba was to improve the Soviet strategic position relative to that of the United States as quickly and as inexpensively as possible. Presumably, such a change in the strategic balance would support the application of new and greater pressure on the West in Berlin. The missile deployment began in July. In August, over thirty ships arrived at Cuban ports bearing technicians, surfaceto-air missiles, patrol boats, and IL-28s. The missiles themselves began to arrive around September 10, 1962. Contrary to Soviet expectations, however, the United States responded firmly once it discovered the construction of the missile sites. The combination of a "quarantine" of Cuban ports, a threat to invade the island, and an alert of U.S. strategic forces placed the onus of starting U.S .-Soviet hostilities on Soviet leaders. Khrushchev had not intended to initiate a war and he knew that Soviet strategic forces could not protect the country from catastrophic damage; nor could Soviet conventional forces interfere with American operations in the Caribbean. He was therefore forced to accept the American demands and remove the missiles from Cuba. The result was a major loss of Soviet prestige and influence around the world. (51)

Overall, then, in Europe, in Cuba, and in the Middle East, the 1957-62 period was one in which the Soviet Union tried to assert itself for various purposes, but met frustration because of its underlying military inferiority. The lesson was clear: if the U.S.S.R. was to be able to take advantage of the political opportunities presented by the break-up of the colonial governments, this inferiority had to be overcome.

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Reconsolidation: 1963-68

While in many ways Brezhnev's and Kosygin's foreign policy was an elaboration of initiatives taken by Khrushchev, in the military-strategic realm they made their own mark. Rejecting continued strategic inferiority, they were willing to pay a heavy price to attain parity. Soviet military expenditures have increased annually from 1965 through the time this chapter was written. The build-up stressed strategic delivery vehicles and air defense forces, accompanied by a naval modernization program which increased both the Soviet Navy's reach and its firepower. This improving strategic position presumably increased Soviet leaders' confidence in their ability to challenge the United States militarily and also provided them with the wherewithal to support a military presence far from the Soviet Union. (52)

Probably because of this relative increase in Soviet military power during the 1963-68 period, Soviet political uses of the armed forces were extended to some of those areas in which they previously had been involved only diplomatically. The major incidents still took place in Europe, largely because of the perceived need to respond to the challenge of liberalization in Czechoslovakia. The military threats and, finally, actual invasion of this country, plus co-incident threats against Yugoslavia and Rumania, showed once again the overriding importance which the Soviets attached to the ideological conformity of the Eastern European regimes and their willingness to risk other goals to assure it. A second focal point, however, was the Middle East. A permanent naval presence was established in the Mediterranean during the Summer of 1964 and there followed port visits to a growing number of littoral states. Despite increased Soviet naval activity around the world, their naval activity has consistently been focussed in that sea. Naval deployments were initiated in other areas during the same period. (53) Still, although Soviet armed forces were utilized for political objectives outside of Europe during this period, the Soviets continued to avoid confrontations with the United States. Their improving military position was not yet sufficient to overcome habitual Soviet caution.

All told, 26 incidents were identified in which Soviet armed forces were used for political objectives during this period; they are listed in Table XV-5. More than one-half took place in Europe, centering either on Berlin or Czechoslovakia. Another seven took place in the Middle East. The remainder occurred in various locations, including Africa, off the coasts of the United States, and in the Far East.

Perhaps the most dramatic change in Soviet military activity during the 1963-68 period concerned the Soviet Navy. Although quantitatively large, the Soviet Navy had almost always operated close

Table XV-5

Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1963-68

Beginnin	<u> Date</u>	Target Mations	Action
	1963	United States	Patrols by naval vessels
March	1963	United States	Overflight
April .	1963	Germany	Harrass air traffic to Berlin
Mey	1963	Germany	Harrass traffic to Berlin
October	1963	Germany	Harrass traffic to Berlin
July	1964	Mediterranean	Establish naval presence
August	1964	Compo	Airlift arms
April	1965	Germony	Harrass traffic to Berlin
August	1966	Rayot	Port visit
November	1966	Algeria	Port visit
	1967	Spain	Port visit
May	1967	Egypt	Naval reinforcement
July	1967	Reypt	Port visits
November	1967	Yesen	Combat support
	1968	Indian Ocean	Establish naval presence
January	1968	North Korea	Naval reinforcement
March	1968	Czechoslovakia	Mass troops
April	1968	Germany	Harrass traffic to Berlin
May	1968	Czechoslovakia	Mass troops
June	1968	Czechoslovakie	Exercise
July	1968	Czechoslovakia	Delay troop withdrawal
July	1968	Czechoslovakia	Exercise
August	1968	Czechoslovakia	Exercise
August	1968	Czechoslovakia	Occupation
August	1968	Rumania, Yugoslav.	
November	1968	Morocco	Port visit

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to home. Then, during the Cyprus crisis of 1964, Soviet warships were deployed to the Mediterranean; a Soviet combatant presence has been maintained there ever since. Also in 1964, the Soviets began to visit ports along the Mediterranean littoral on a regular basis: The first visit to Egypt occurred in 1964, to Algeria in 1966, to Spain in 1967, and to Morocco in 1968. The Soviet Navy was extended to other regions as well. Regular patrols off the U.S. coasts by naval intelligence ships were established in 1963. That same year, Soviet aircraft overflew a portion of Alaska after a Soviet merchant ship was fired on when it strayed onto an American gunnery range. In 1968, a small Soviet naval presence was established in the Indian Ocean; a steady series of visits to Indian, Somali, and Iraqi ports followed. (54)

The mid-1960's also marked the beginning of increasingly frequent Soviet military involvement in Africa and the Middle East. The first such intervention came in the Congo. The United States had provided military transports, crews and guards to then Congolese President Moise Tshombe in August 1964; shortly afterward, Soviet transports were reported to be delivering arms to rebels led by Antoine Gizenga. This supply effort apparently continued through December. After American and Belrian forces attempted in November to rescue white hostages held by the rebels in Stanleyville, the Soviets are reported to have escalated their involvement. Nine Soviet fighter aircraft are said to have been flown to Algeria for eventual delivery to the Congo. Although the civil war in the Congo dragged on, there were no further reports of Soviet military involvement. (55)

During the June 1967 war, the direct support offered to Egypt by Soviet armed forces, despite the two countries' by now long and close relationship, was on the order of that offered in 1958: minimal and symbolic. Still, it was the Soviets' first--even symbolic--attempt to use their navy to defend a client's interest ashore. The reinforcement of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet in 1967, limited to about ten ships, began shortly after Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in May. The Turkish Government was informed of upcoming transits through the Dardanelles on 22 May. The first ships, both supply vessels, began their passage on 31 May; others entered the Straits on 3 June. This brought the Soviet Mediterranean squadron to a strength of between 30 and 40 ships. Of these, a small number shadowed American and British ships in the area while the others held apparently routine exercises in the Ionian Sea. The day before the war broke out, the one cruiser and ten other ships were located 100 miles north of Crete. Thus, Soviet naval actions do not seem to support Tass' pledge that any Israeli agression would be met "not only by the united strength of the Arab countries, but also resolute resistance to aggression on the part of the Soviet Union ... " The Soviet Navy apparently took no further action as Arab armed forces collapsed before the Israeli onslought. It has been reported, however, that the Soviets did alert their paratroops late in the war, presumably to back up their threat to

take any necessary actions, including military measures, if Israel did not halt its advance on the Golan Heights. The role of this Soviet threat in bringing about the cease-fire later the same day is a matter of some dispute. (56)

Equally unclear is whether the Arabs had expected more substantial Soviet support during the war. Most analysts feel that while the Soviets encouraged an increase in tension carlier in May, they became concerned and tried to moderate Arab actions once the crisis reached serious proportions with the closing of Aqaba. According to some sources, the Soviets pledged to neutralize U.S. armed forces, but not to take part in military operations themselves. This may have been the maximum Soviet commitment. Other sources indicate that the Arabs expected the Soviets to act so as to avoid a confrontation with the United States and therefore never expected substantive assistance. (57)

Because the Soviets were eager to maintain their close relations with progressive Arab regimes, they continued to manifest low-level demonstrations of support after the war ended. Most important were a series of lengthy port visits, beginning with that of twelve ships to Alexandria and Port Said on 9 July, and continuing into December. Of particular note was the visit of eight ships, including two submarines and a command frigate, to Port Said and Alexandria following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer <u>Filat</u> in October. The visit seems to have been intended to discourage Israeli reprisals, but it was only partially successful. The Israelis shelled the oil refinery at the southern end of the canal; had the Soviet ships not been in the Mediterranean ports, they might have conducted a more costly raid. Simultaneously with these port visits, the Soviets made up Egyptian losses during the war through a "massive" airlift of supplies. (58)

Soviet assistance to the progressive Arab cause took a more direct form in a location further removed from the Soviet-American confrontation. In 1967, Nasser removed Egyptian forces from Yemen, where they had been aiding the Republicans against the Saudi-assisted Royalists since 1962. The Republicans' position was not promising at that time, despite the help of as many as 75,000 Egyptian troops, and Nasser could no longer afford to maintain so-large an Egyptian force there at a time when the confrontation with Israel was worsening. It was at this point that the Soviets reportedly offered direct aid to the Yemeni Republicans, allegedly in exchange for a military base. In November, the first Soviet planes were reported in the country. In addition to flying combat missions, the Soviet armed forces were reported to have flown to Yemen one squadron of MIG-19 fighters plus an estimated 10,000 tons of equipment and an unknown number of Ilyushin bombers. (59)

Actual Soviet participation in the Yemeni civil war was on a small scale and quite brief, but it was apparently crucial in turning the tide against the Royalists. In addition, it marked one of the first occasions when the Soviets actually performed combat roles outside of Eastern Europe. The Soviets apparently saw their role as one of substituting temporarily for Arab forces, which were distracted by their loss to Israel, in order to assure continuation of the progressive's struggle.

Soviet armed forces in East Asia, on the other hand, were conspicuous in their absence from the "progressive's" struggle, notably in Indo-China. Reinforced Soviet naval forces were deployed to the Sea of Japan following the U.S. naval build-up there that followed the seizure of the <u>Pueblo</u> in 1968, but this seems to have been a symbolic step rather than a serious effort to deter the threatened American retaliation. (60)

Soviet forces actually engaged the military forces of another Communist state—China. Soviet forces on the Chinese and Mongolian borders were reinforced beginning in 1966, and border clashes reportedly took place in both 1967 and 1968. Too little is known concerning these alleged incidents to say much more, however. (61)

In Europe, Soviet political uses of the armed forces were of a more traditional nature. There were intermittent Berlin incidents intended to stress the Soviet contention that the city was not an integral part of the Federal Republic. These included harrassment of civilian and military traffic and aircraft before President Kennedy's visit in 1963, and before planned meetings of the Bundestag in Berlin in April 1965 and March 1968. (62)

Other Soviet political uses of force in Europe were directed at the perpetual problem of controlling the Eastern European regimes. The massive size and overwhelming nature of the operation ultimately carried out against Czechoslovakia demonstrated once again the overwhelming importance which the Soviets ascribe to maintaining political and thus ideological control over this region.

It was the ultimately successful campaign to force the resignation of the conservative Czech President and Party First Secretary, Antonin Novotny, which led to conflict with the Soviets. The latter were quite displeased by revelations of Soviet manipulation of the Czech security organs and police which came out in the reformers' discussion of Novotny's role in the purges. Moreover, they were suspicious of proposed changes in the role of the Party and the evident new assertiveness of the Czech public. Finally, the Czechoslovak Government had the temerity to suggest that it would seek a more independent voice in foreign affairs. The Soviets, East Germans, and Poles expressed grave concern over these

developments to Alexander Dubcek, Party First Secretary and leader of the reform movement, during a meeting at Dresden on March 23, 1968—the day after Novotny resigned. The import of their statements was emphasized by joint Soviet-East German maneuvers organized at short notice, on the Czech border. (63)

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Dubcek attempted to reassure his allies, but pressed on with the reforms. Particularly disturbing to the Soviets during this period was the increasing role which the Czech public was playing in the process through a now relatively free press and by organizing political clubs. Consequently, the Soviets tried again—in May—to curb the reforms through military pressure. Soviet troop movements on the Czech border accompanied an attack in <u>Izvestiya</u> on democratization as a subversive doctrine promoted by the United States to weaken communism. A few days later <u>Sovietskaya</u> Rossiya attacked Thomas Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's first president—revered by the reformers, for allegedly plotting to murder Lenin in 1918. (64)

As the Czech public grew angrier at Soviet interference, liberals in the Party pressed for further changes. The May 29 Central Committee Plenum ousted Novotny from the Central Committee and began an investigation of his conduct. It also scheduled an extraordinary congress for 9 September at which it was expected that the reformers would elect a solid majority of the Central Committee. The Soviet response again involved military action, this time representing a major escalation of pressure. Czech leaders had previously reluctantly agreed that the Warsaw Pact could hold a small-scale staff exercise on Czech soil, but when the units began to arrive on May 29th, the day the Plenum met, it became clear that both tanks and thousands of troops would be involved. By the middle of June, when the exercises were to begin, an estimated 6,000 to 24,000 Soviet and Polish troops were in the country; this was, then, an occupation in all but name. Attacks in the Soviet press once again underscored the signal which Soviet leaders were attempting to send. (65)

This major Soviet intervention proved to be a serious mistake since it did not force abandonment of the reforms but thoroughly aroused the people and made Dubcek and the other leaders aware they were totally dependent on popular support to enact even minor reforms. The liberal manifesto "Two Thousand Words" appeared on June 27th. It recognized the role of the Party in initiating reform and called for public trust in the new national leaders, but it also urged popular actions to encourage regional and local political organs to conform to the new norms of political behavior. The manifesto was no more radical than other articles which had already appeared, but its timing and the large number of people who signed it made it a focus of controversy. Czech Party leaders publicly

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condemned it, but took no action against its writer or publishers. Indeed, there were reports that Dubcek privately expressed support for its contents. (66)

The Soviets interpreted the publication of "Two Thousand Words" as a serious attack on Party rule; more importantly they perceived the Czech leaders' toleration of its publication as a sign of either weakness or treason. Not surprisingly, they stepped-up the military pressure. The maneuvers then being staged in Czechoslovakia were over by the end of June, but "technical difficulties" prevented the withdrawal of the participating troops. Simultaneously, the Soviets demanded that the Czechs meet once again with their Warsaw Pact allies to discuss the issues; Czech leaders insisted on bilateral discussions. As a result, representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria met in Warsaw on 15 July, while an estimated 8,000 Soviet troops remained in Czechoslovakia. The meeting resulted in a letter to the Czechoslovak leadership pointing to the rise of reaction as a danger to that country and the entire socialist system. (67)

At this point, the Czech leadership made a major concession to the Soviets by ousting General Prhlik from his post as head of the Party's military section. But they were not willing to compromise on any of the fundamental aspects of democratization, and once again Soviet military pressure was increased. Large-scale exercises of support troops in the western regions of the USSR were given unusual publicity. Tactical air and anti-aircraft units joined the maneuvers, which soon stretched from the Baltic to the Caspian seas. When the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders finally met at Cierna-nad-Tisou near the end of July, Soviet troops in Germany, Poland, and Hungary were reported to be on the move. (68)

In the tense negotiations that followed, both delegations had to deal with disagreements among themselves as well as the issues on the table. Apparently, Dubcek did promise to curb some developments which threatened Party control, but there was no precise agreement on which aspects these were.

Following a later conference at Bratislava, at which the other signatories of the Warsaw letter were associated with this solution, the last Soviet troops left Czechoslovakia, and the Soviets settled down to watch how Dubcek carried out his commitments. (69)

But the Czech leaders moved only slowly. Meanwhile, the pressures for action within the Soviet Politburo increased. Ukranian and Baltic Communist Party leaders, the KGB, the Warsaw Pact command, and such ideologists as Mikhail Suslov pressed for a stronger stand against the reformers. Polish and German officials added their voices. Those arguing within the USSR for an invasion feared the upcoming Party Congress in

September; their argument was surely strengthened when the draft Party statute was published on 8 August, just as the joint exercises in Poland and Germany ended. (70) The statute proposed to grant unprecedented rights to minorities within the Party. It would have required secret ballots for elections at all levels and placed limits on the number of terms an individual could serve in one position. The final straw may have been the enthusiastic welcomes given to Rumanian leader Ceausescu and Yugoslavia's Tito when they visited Prague that August; these leaders' evident popularity may have led the Soviets to fear formation of a pro-reform anti-Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe.

Once again, exercises were held near Czechoslovakia's borders, this time a joint maneuver of Soviet, German, and Polish troops beginning on 10 August. On the 16th, immediately following Ceausescu's visit--and talk of improved ties with the West--Hungary joined the exercise. (71) On the night of 20 August, the Soviet leaders finally acted decisively--an estimated 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. They were reinforced to an estimated 400,000 within days. (72)

Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak situation was clumsy in the extreme and indicated their inability to adequately analyze the situation early-on, or to use their many resources skillfully to promote their goals. By resorting to even demonstrative force early in the dispute, they increased the Czech leaders' dependence on popular support while creating anti-Soviet feelings. Soviet leaders failed to perceive that even in August, Dubcek could not accept their demands, as had Gomulka in 1956, because his own base was not sufficiently secure. And in making the decision to invade, the Soviets did not understand that popular opinion in Czechoslovakia precluded collaborators coming forward to legitimize the occupation and help to realize its political goals as they had in Hungary. Still, given the extremely high priority given by Soviet leaders to the stability of subservient regimes in Eastern Europe, the price of this use of the armed forces for political objectivesdisunity in the world Communist movement, at least temporary strengthening of NATO-was probably well worth paying. There was a coda to the occupation of Czechoslovakia; one which also involved the use of the armed forces for political objectives, The decision to use force in dealing with Czechoslovakia seems to have reduced the inhibitions which earlier had moderated Soviet responses to other undesirable behavior by East European countries. Before 1968, the Soviets had sought to compromise on issues relating to Yugoslav neutrality, and even on Rumania's rejection of closer ties with both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Immediately after the invasion, however, Soviet forces were used to threaten both nations rather directly. The immediate reason for the incident was Rumania's and Yugoslavia's support of the Czech reforms and condemnation of the invasion; but the Soviet threat was probably also intended as a warning to those nations to curb their own deviations from Soviet-prescribed socialist norms. The pressure took the form of the deployment of an unknown number of Soviet troops on the Rumanian borders,

later joined by troops on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, and a buildup of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. The latter was probably connected to Western naval deployments and counter-threats. (73)

Rumania and Yugoslavia responded to these threats by intensifying efforts begun immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia to cally popular support at home and international support abroad. They were backed by American warnings to the Soviets concerning the risks of such actions. And, while both Ceausescu and Tito rejected Soviet justifications of the Czech invasion, they each made concessions in order to mitigate tensions. (74)

Military Expansion: 1969-75

Since 1968, the Soviets have operated from a position of near strategic parity. As a result, they have been more willing to pursue more cooperative relations with the West. On the other hand, they have pursued the opportunities for expanding their influence abroad which have arisen as a result of conflicts in the Third World.

Political uses of Soviet armed forces since 1969 have followed this pattern. Soviet forces in Europe have been used occasionally to insure the perpetuation of a divided Germany and to limit Yugoslav and Rumanian foreign policy initiatives thought harmful to the Soviet Union. One innovative use of force in Europe was to support Turkey during the 1974 Cyprus crisis in the hopes of improving relations with that country. In the Middle East, the Soviets escalated their military role significantly; among the frequent actions, they assumed more combat roles in the alert of airborne troops during the 1973 war. In the last case, especially, the importance of the Soviet action was underscored by the fact that it was undertaken with the knowledge that a confrontation with the United States would result. In short, the Soviets have been more assertive than they were in the past. An even starker increase in Soviet political uses of force has taken place in Africa; whereas before 1969 there had been only one minor use of force, since 1969 there have been eight African incidents, including combat operations in the Sudan and a massive supply effort to Angola. In South Asia the Soviets bolstered already friendly relations with India by maintaining a symbolic naval presence during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and by later carrying out a mine-clearing operation in Bangladesh. In East Asia the Soviets have continued to be sparing in the application of force probably as the result of the conflict with China. The Soviet naval forces deployed off Vietnam during the American mining operations of 1972 was strictly a gesture, although this did contrast with the earlier absence of overt Soviet support to that country. The Soviet response to North Korea's downing of an American reconnaissance plane in 1959 was very mild; they seemed to go out of their way to indicate no

involvement with North Korea. In 1969, the Soviets initiated periodic naval deployments to the Caribbean, including on at least two occasions, the deployment of strategic submarines. Incidents of Soviet political uses of its armed forces between 1969 and 1975 are listed below in Table XV-6.

All told, there were 32 incidents during this period. Aside from the continuing shift from Europe to Africa and the Middle East, their most interesting characteristic is that instead of using their forces just to preserve or restore the status quo, the Soviets now consider the political use of the armed forces to promote actively the expansion of their interests. One sign of the increased Soviet assertiveness is their greater willingness to take on combat roles as in Iraq, Egypt, and the Sudan. While the most recent uses of Soviet forces have tended to be more assertive than those in the past, it would be incorrect to suggest that all, or nearly all Soviet actions during this final period have been aggressive. Although the Soviets are now more willing to apply their military power far from home, and to risk confrontation with the United States, they still tend to be cautious and to try to avoid damaging the fabric of U.S.—Soviet relations.

In Europe, uses of force followed familiar patterns, but there were few incidents and they were relatively minor in nature. By this time Berlin had declined in importance as a symbol of the relative strength of the two superpowers; still, the Soviets continued to emphasize their determination to preserve the division of Germany and Berlin by exerting military pressure when the Federal Republic attempted to hold official functions in the city. Examples include disruptions of ground and air traffic before the 1969 West German presidential election in Berlin and a visit by Chancellor Brandt and President Heinemann in 1971. (75) The most important Soviet political use of its armed forces in Europe during this period was a Warsaw Pact exercise in East Germany in October 1970, shortly after signing the Soviet-West German Non-aggression Treaty. Involving 100,000 troops from all member countries, 30,000 of them Soviet, it was the largest such exercise ever held. It was also the first major exercise commanded by a non-Soviet, General Hoffman of the German Democratic Republic. East European sources stressed that the exercise was intended to demonstrate that East Germany was an integral part of the Eastern bloc and that Warsaw Pact members were united in their determination to defend that status. (76) Since this principle was accepted by the West in the fourpower Berlin agreement of 1971 the Soviets have not since felt compelled to use force demonstratively to assert the idea.

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet leaders appear to have become more willing to use military forces to coerce the Eastern European countries. One probable reason is that having survived the consequences of the invasion, the use of force is regarded with less trepidation. Another is that the targets of military threats presumably

Table XV-6
Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1969-75

Beginning	Date	Target Nation	Action
	1969	Italy	Port visit
February	1969	Germany	Harrass traffic to Berlin
February	1969	Ghana	Naval deployment
April .	1969	Korea	Naval deployment
July	1969	Caribbean	Establish naval deployment
October	1969	Germany	Harrass air traffic
December	1969	Hungary	Disaster relief
February	1970	Egypt	Deploy air defense units
April	1970	Somalia	Port visit
September	1970	Middle East	Naval deployment
October	1970	Germany	Maneuvers
December	1970	Guinea	Naval deployment
January	1971	Germany	Harrass traffic to Berlin
January	1971	Sudan	Combat air missions
May	1971	Sierra Leone	Port visit
August	1971	Rumania, Yugoslavia	Maneuvers
December	1971	India	Naval deployment
January	1972	Somalia	Port visit
April .	1972	Bangladesh	Clear mines
May	1972	Vietnam	Naval deployment
	1973	Yemen-Oman	Transport foreign troops
April	1973	Iraq, Kuwait	Port visit
April .	1973	Morocco, Syria	Transport foreign troops
October	1973	Egypt, Syria	Airlift supplies, alert, Naval deployment
	1974	Guinea	Naval patrols
	1974	Iraq	Combat air missions
June	1974	Egypt	Clear mines
July	1974	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	Naval deployment
August	1974	Rumania	Maneuvers
	1975	Angola	Airlift supplies, maval deployment
enthralie en	1975	Morocco	Naval deployment
September	Company of the Compan	Norway	Missile tests

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view such threats as being more credible and thus the need to carry the threat out is less likely to occur. Finally, Soviet concern about the potential disruptive influence of China probably increased following the border clashes in 1969, and added to their determination to prevent China from gaining allies among the East European states. This threat appears to have peaked during the summer of 1971. Rumanian leader Ceausescu and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac both visited Peking in June. At the beginning of July President Nixon's visit to Peking was announced; it soon became known that Rumania had helped to arrange the rapprochement. In addition, an official Chinese delegation was scheduled to visit the Balkans in August. In response, the Soviets applied a variety of pressures against Yugoslvaia and Rumania. In June, Yugoslav exiles in Moscow became active after years of quiet. Croatian nationalists inside and outside Yugoslvaia also became active; ties between them and the Soviets are widely suspected, but unproved. More direct pressures were initiated in August. Following a meeting of Warsaw Pact members (minus Remania), Soviet, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak troops took part in maneuvers near the Rumanian border. Exercises were rumored to bent taking place in Bulgaria as well. A media campaign against Rumanianand Yugoslav-Chinese ties accompanied these troop movements. (77)

The Soviets did not wish to frighten Yugoslvaia into closer ties with the West, however--Tito had been improving relations with the United States and was scheduled to visit America that Fall. Brezhnev initiated a visit to Belgrade in late September. The visit was announced at the height of tensions on 7 August; by the time it took place, the hints of military intervention against both Yugoslvaia and Rumania had abated.

The limits within which Rumania might deviate from Soviet policy remained unclear, this resulted in speculation over whether specific Soviet actions were aimed at curbing perceived excesses. For example, in the summer of 1974, reports of "pressure" on Rumania coincided with Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria. Some Western observers, however, believe that the Soviets pressed Rumania to participate in that and other Pact exercises—an interpretation different than using the maneuvers to intimidate Rumania in disputes over other aspects of policy. (78)

Recently, the Soviets have demonstrated increased interest in parts of Europe beyond their traditional sphere of action. One such case, in which Soviet armed forces were used, was the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Soviet cruisers and destroyers moved toward the island on 16 July, shortly after the Greek sponsored coup that ousted President Makarios. The United States' Sixth Fleet was also concentrating in the area. The Soviets publicly supported the deposed Cypriot leader, while expressing their willingness to cooperate with Turkey in defending the island's integrity and independence. When the Turks concentrated forces across the strait from Cyprus and threatened to invade, the

Soviets reportedly alerted 40,000 airborne troops and reinforced their naval forces in the area. There were also reports of major troop movements in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the Soviets seemed surprised when the Turks did invade the island; they then expressed cautious approval of the action while calling for the immediate return of Makerios. (79)

The Soviets were no doubt sincere in wishing Makarios to be restored to office. The initial Soviet naval deployments and diplomatic moves were probably intended to discourage further actions by Greece, then ruled by a vehemently anti-Communist junta, to take over the island. But the Turkish invasion complicated the situation. On the one hand, the Soviets were surely pleased to see two members of NATO on the brink of war; and they also recognized an opportunity to improve relations with Turkey. On the other hand, a Turkish occupation of Cyprus might doom Makarios' hopes to return and bring about an American intervention. Soviet military actions reflected this ambiguity. The naval presence and troop alert expressed interest in the outcome of the crisis without siding with any participant. Maneuvers in Bulgaria could be seen as threatening either Greece or Turkey but in light of the Soviet diplomatic position they were probably intended to please the Turks by seeming to dissuade a Greek attack on Turkey; something Greece could not seriously contemplate anyway. Because of American hostility, the Turks were probably grateful for Soviet expressions of sympathy. And the Turks' incomplete occupation of Cyprus has led to intermittent Greco-Turkish tensions which have weakened NATO and distracted the United States. Makarios is also aware that the Soviets were more staunch in his cause than were the Americans. So the Soviets have probably gained influence in Turkey and Cyprus as a result of the crisis, but their own military actions at the time may have been almost incidental to this result.

Another possible use of armed forces in Western Europe was a series of missile tests conducted in the Barents Sea in September 1975. The tests immediately preceded Norwegian-Soviet talks on the disputed continental shelf near Spitzbergen, and the Norwegian Government perceived the tests as a means of putting pressure on them. One cannot be certain that there was a political objective behind the tests, however, because the Soviet response to the Norwegian protests was almost defensive and because the Soviet position in the ensuing talks did not harden. (80)

In the Pacific, the Soviets continued to use their armed forces for political objectives only infrequently. In fact, in one of the few incidents in the region, they seemed to repudiate an earlier commitment to North Korea. In contrast to the symbolic interposition of Soviet naval forces between an American force and North Korea during the <u>Pueblo</u> crisis the preceding year, in 1969 the Soviet response to the Koreans' downing of an American espionage plane was to help search for the wreckage. The Soviets'

motive was probably to demonstrate that they had neither encouraged nor applauded this action by the Koreans. As a bonus, perhaps, they may have hoped to gain knowledge about American espionage techniques by retrieving the equipment. (81)

Soviet intentions with regard to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese harbors in May 1972 are more difficult to ascertain. Soviet naval forces stationed in the South China Sea prior to the mining did not interfere with the operation, but the reinforcement of this previously small deployment in itself stood in sharp contrast to the lack of Soviet military response to American escalations earlier in the war. During April, as North Vietnam's Easter Offensive made rapid progress, the United States stepped up its attacks. There were reports in the middle of the month that American leaders were planning to mine the harbors but feared the Soviet reaction. After a meeting with high Democratic Republic of Vietnam officials on May 1 Soviet President Podgorny criticized American actions and promised aid to North Vietnam. Perhaps in support of this statement, the number of Soviet supply ships sailing for Vietnam was doubled and two minesweepers deployed from Vladivostok. Mindful of these developments, the United States took actions to reduce Soviet alarm when it did mine the harbors on 8 May. President Nixon's announcement made it clear that the mines would not be activated for three days to allow ships to leave the ports; he then specifically assured the Soviets that the mining was not aimed at them. National Security Advisor Kissinger met privately with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to explain the American position. (82)

Immediately after the mining, the two minesweepers moved closer to Vietnam. Shortly afterward, a Soviet naval task group returning from the Indian Ocean was diverted to a point 250 nautical miles southeast of where the U.S. carriers operated in the South China Sea. This force was then reinforced to a total of one cruiser. several destroyers, a guided-missile frigate, and four nuclearpowered submarines armed with surface-to-surface missiles. The first public Soviet comment on the mining was delayed until May 11, when a statement demanding that the United States immediately end the blockade and the bombing, but not mentioning the imminent summit conference, was released. American observers thought that it was the mildest possible statement under the circumstances. Meanwhile, some Soviet merchant ships were withdrawn from North Vietnamese harbors before the mines were activated, and others headed for Haiphong were diverted. In short, the naval deployments were strictly an empty gesture. (83) The Soviets apparently did not wish to disrupt detente with the United States so soon after the Sino-American summit.

So far the Soviets have taken advantage of the recent establishment of their presence in the Indian Ocean only twice; both were part of their effort to bolster ties with India and Bangladesh in order to help contain China.

As tensions rose over East Pakistan in August 1971, the Soviets signed a twenty-year friendship treaty with India. When ratifying the treaty, the Soviets warned that they would take "urgently effective measures" to protect India from attack. During the Fall the Soviets urged India not to intervene in the Pakistani civil war, but at the same time supplied military equipment to India and put diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to accept a political solution. Soviet behavior once India entered the war on December 10 was even more direct. The usual Indian Ocean naval force of one guided-missile destroyer and a minesweeper was doubled in size on December 5, when the Indians already were clearly winning the war. A few days later the force was further reinforced by a missile-equipped cruiser, another destroyer, and a conventionallypowered missile-equipped submarine. These early naval deployments were probably precautions to discourage British intervention, insofar as there was a British task force in the vicinity. (84)

Further Soviet naval reinforcements occurred in the middle of December following the gathering of a large American task force, led by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, near Singapore, and Chinese troop movements on the Indian border. This time an anti-carrier task group consisting of one Kresta-class cruiser, one Kashin-class destroyer, and two submarines left Vladivostok on December 12 and arrived in the Indian Ocean on the 18th, a few days after the Indian victory. This time, the Soviets' motive was probably to offset any American threat to intervene against India. The Soviets also may have provided direct assistance to the Indian war effort. A Soviet TU-114 is reported to have served as an airborne control center for Indian air operations against Pakistan. (85)

Subsequent to the war, the Soviets offered to help Bangladesh clear its harbors of mines and other debris. They apparently were eager to conduct this operation in order to display technical prowess, to demonstrate the peaceful contribution of the Indian Ocean Soviet naval deployment, and to increase their political influence in the new nation. Although the Bengalis were reluctant to accept the Soviet offer, they did so after the United Nations proved unable to assume the task. All told, the Soviets sent 22 ships to Bangladesh between mid-March and the beginning of May 1972. Although progress in both salvage and minesweeping operations was rapid at first, when the Soviets could take advantage of earlier work by the Indians, it soon slowed. The delays, combined with the crews' isolation from the local population, led to press suggestions that the Soviets were stalling in order to obtain a naval base; the real reason for the delay was probably the relative unsophistication of Soviet technology. The task wasn't completed until the Spring of 1974,

by which time the Soviets had long since lost their enthusiasm for the project. (86)

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Also during the post-1969 period, the Soviets re-established the military presence in the Caribbean which they had been forced to abandon during the Cuban missile crisis. The initial naval deployment took the form of a visit by seven ships to Cuba and Martinique in July-August 1969. Soviet ships have returned often since that first visit. Additionally, a submarine base was constructed at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. Although use of the base was halted in the Fall of 1970 when the United States objected that it violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement which ended the 1962 crisis, Soviet submarines have often visited Cuba since, and there has been a gradual escalation in both the type of submarines and the services extended in Cuba. Whether this gradual pressure against the previous agreements was intended merely to improve the Soviet strategic position or to pose a challenge to American hegemony in the area is difficult to determine. Still, the pattern of previous visits would indicate that another submarine visit should have taken place in April 1976; the fact that none did could support an interpretation that earlier visits were intended to pressure the United States over particular issues, such as the SALT mego tiations, which no longer were relevant. (87)

It was Africa, however, in which the Soviets made the most dramatic increases in political uses of the armed forces. Some of these incidents were simply efforts to protect Soviet maritime resources; for example, following Ghana's seizure of two Soviet trawlers on charges of arms smuggling in October 1968. After protests and economic sanctions failed to win the crews' release, the Soviets dispatched two missile cruisers and a submarine to the area in February 1969. The presence of these ships off-shore may have been a factor in the Ghanaian decision to release the crews. In a similar incident, a Soviet destroyer appeared off the coast of Mauritania after Morocco seized a Soviet trawler carrying supplies to either Angola or the Spanish Sahara, which had just been annexed by Morocco. (88)

In other incidents in Africa, Soviet armed forces were used to assist friendly governments. Such support varied from port visits to signal the legitimacy of client regimes, to actual combat. Among the former was a visit by two Soviet warships to Somalia in April 1970; departure of the ships was delayed for three weeks until instabilities within the Somali political system were worked out. Similarly, in May 1971 a visit by a destroyer to Sierra Leone helped to legitimize the Stevens regime after a period of instability. More substantive assistance was offered to Guinea. Soviet naval units patrolled off the Guinea coast from December 1970 through the Summer of 1974, following a Portugese-sponsored commando attack on that country. In 1974 the Soviets actually seized a ship carrying

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individuals accused by Guinea of assassinating their ally--PAIG leader Cabral. The one reported example of Soviet combat operations in Africa occurred in the Sudan. Soviet advisors reportedly took part in ground operations by government troops against rebels in the South in September 1970. In early 1971 Soviet pilots reportedly flew helicopters in the combat zone and possibly helped other Sudanese allies on bombing missions. The Soviet role ended that Summer when Sudanese leader Nimeiry expelled Soviet diplomats for alledgedly planning a coup which had ousted him briefly. (89)

The most significant use of Soviet armed forces in Africa, however, was the assistance provided to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1975 and 1976. Soviet actions in Angola consisted largely of a large-scale supply effort, transport of Cuban troops to the region, and the maintenance of a naval presence off-shore during a crucial stage of the conflict.

Both superpowers had provided covert assistance to the various Angolan independence movements for several years. In early 1975, when it became obvious that Portugal would soon leave its colonies, this aid was increased. The American decision to step up support to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (WNLA) was taken in January 1975, at a time when the three major factions appeared to be nearing agreement on the makeup of a transition government.

The first step-up in Soviet aid reached the MPLA in March. Shortly afterward, fighting broke out between the two factions. Over the next months Soviet equipment continued to arrive in Soviet, East German, and Algerian merchant ships. Probably reacting to FNLA reverses, on July 17 the U.S. Government's Forty Committee -- charged with approving American covert programsagain stepped-up U.S. assistance by approving direct shipmen to of up to \$14 million worth of arms to both the FNLA and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and encouraging Zaire and Zambia to increase their own aid to these Angolan factions. It is not known whether the United States also encouraged South Africa to participate, but South African troops appeared in border areas for the first time in August. The first Cuban troops arrived in Angola that Fall. At first, the Cubans were flown to Angola in their own planes, later in Soviet transports. The Soviets also stepped up their own supply efforts in the Fall, and began to airlift armaments. After independence (November 11) they flew directly to Luanda, the MPLA-controlled capital. (90)

With the withdrawal of the last Portugese troops at independence, the struggle for control of the new country intensified and each of the outside parties increased its own level of involvement. Cuban reinforcements arrived steadily reaching an estimated 7,000 by the end of the year. South Africa moved its troops from the border areas deep into the country to help UNITA.

American arms shipments through Zaire reached an estimated \$32 million by December. The U.S. also opened a diplomatic campaign against the Soviet intervention; both Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford warned that American-Soviet relations would be threatened and the budding reconciliation with Cuba aborted unless both countries withdrew. Kissinger also met privately with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin several times on the subject. Continued American verbal protests were undermined, however, by the Congressional cutoff of funds for covert assistance in January. (91)

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The Soviet naval involvement began in December, when they deployed an Alligator-class LST, reportedly with the usual complement of 100-150 troops, to the Point Noire, Congo area. This ship may have provided command assistance to the MPLA. In early January, with MPLA forces advancing against both the FNLA in the North and UNITA in the South, the Soviets deployed more ships to the area. The LST was still operating off the Congo; a Kotlin-class destroyer and an oiler moved separately toward Angola off the coast of Gabon. A Kresta-class cruiser also moved to the area independently visiting Conakry on January 11. The reason for this naval activity is a matter of speculation. Some believe that it was intended to discourage further South African involvement in the civil war. (92) More likely, it may have been an attempt to influence the proceedings of the Organization of African Unity, which met on the Angolan crisis from 10 to 13 January.

By January 15, when the MPLA attacked the National Front's last major town in the north, the Soviet ships were reported to be moving away from Angola. The cruiser and two oilers were still near Conakry, where they were joined by the destroyer; the LST and another oiler were moved out of the Gulf of Guinea; and a fourth oiler was moving north of the Spanish Sahara. The reasons for the withdrawal of the ships cannot be determined definitively. American political pressure, particularly charges of colonialism and leaks to the press about the ship movements, may have been sufficiently embarrassing. There were probably American submarines in the area, and the delayed Atlantic transit of the carrier Saratoga may have worried the Soviets that the Americans were preparing to use military force, despite earlier disclaimers. In any case, the Soviet retreat did not affect the situation in Angola since the MPLA was already on the verge of victory. (93)

At the same time they withdrew their naval forces, however, the Soviets' involvement increased in another and more crucial area. When U.S. political pressure forced governments in Barbados, Guyana, and the Azores to refuse permission for the Cubans to continue refueling their troop transports, the Soviets provided long-range IL-62 transports to ferry the troops to Angola. The airlift ended only in the third

or fourth week of January when there were already at least 11,000 Cuban troops in the country. (94)

Speculation on Soviet motives for becoming so deeply involved in the Angolan civil war tend to emphasize such political goals as flanking Chinese-supported regimes in Zambia and Mozambique, countering American gains in the Middle East and Portugal, scoring a foreign policy success before the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, or gaining a foothold in Southern Africa in anticipation of further unrest there. While none of these factors can be discounted, another must be given considerable weight: the Soviets had supported the Popular Movement for years and presumably were not willing to stand by while it was defeated by forces overtly supported by the United States. It should be kept in mind that Soviet assistance, substantial though it was, did not go as far as the combat roles assumed by Soviet military personnel in Yemen and the Sudan. The possible use of the LST as a command ship had precedent in use of a Soviet command aircraft during the Bangladesh war. The transport of Cuban troops had precedent in the ferrying of Moroccans to Syria in 1973. Thus, Soviet behavior in Angola was an indication of a more aggressive policy mainly because of their persistence in the face of strong American protests, not because of what specific actions were taken. And even in Angola, the Soviets did show sensitivity to American pressure, perhaps, by withdrawing their warships from the vicinity.

The relatively long history of Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs reached a new intensity during this final period as well. Following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, the Soviets escalated their support to several Arab nations in order to maintain their credibility as supporters of progressive and revolutionary movements in the Third World. The new nature of Soviet involvement was clearly seen in the decision to deploy Soviet air defense troops and sophisticated defensive systems to Egypt in February 1970. Although there is some dispute, most observers believe that these forces were sent to Egypt after Egyptian-manned air defenses proved unable to halt Israeli deep penetration air strikes. The Soviets tried to mitigate the American reaction to the unprecedented step of providing "superpower" combat units on the ground in the Middle East by sending at least one note assuring the U.S. that the new systems would be installed only in populated areas for defensive purposes. Indeed, the first missiles, installed by late February, were located near Alexandria, Cairo, and other areas beyond the immediate Canal battle area. The Soviet build-up continued, however, reaching 5,000 to 10,000 troops by April. (95)

In early April the first reports surfaced that Soviet pilots were flying combat missions in fighter aircraft in the Egyptian interior. Also, new Soviet-manned surface-to-air missiles were

reported to be operational by the end of April. Faced with greater threats to its aircraft, plus the risk of fighting Russians, Israel stopped the deep penetration raids. While this step seemed to satisfy the originally stated purpose of the Soviet intervention, and the intensity of Soviet activity did fall off for a time, by the end of June it was clear that the Soviet military involvement was again increasing. In July, Soviet-manned surface-to-air missiles were installed within 20 miles of the Canal, and at the end of the month there were clashes between Soviet and Israeli planes. By the end of September an estimated 500-600 missile launchers had been installed within 50 miles of the Canal. This escalatory process was stopped only after the American-sponsored cease-fire agreement was reached near the beginning of August. (96)

After Nasser's death in October 1970, Soviet-Egyptian relations became more complex. As a result of these strains, around March 1971 some Soviet air defense troops were reported leaving the sites near the Canal. Following several new disagreements, in July 1972 Sadat ordered Soviet troops and advisors to leave the country; by October there were only about 300 advisors in the country. (97)

While the use of Soviet troops in combat in Egypt was not totally unprecedented, it did strain Soviet-American relations to a greater extent than the Soviets had willingly chosen to do in the past. Moreover, the use of organic combat units (i.e., fighter squadrons) was a new step. By taking these risks, the Soviets showed the depth of their commitment to Egypt and other progressive Arab states. But the Soviet action also indicated the limits of such commitment, for the troops were used to reduce Egyptian vulnerability to Israeli air strikes and to restore the military balance on the Canal, but not to further the Egyptian goal of retaking Sinai. And the Soviets continued to refuse the kind of assistance on which such Egyptian actions depended; resulting, in the end, in their explusion.

Soviet diplomatic and military actions in the Jordanian crisis of 1970 were more limited, and constituted primarily a damage-limiting operation intended to make a U.S. or Israeli intervention less likely. The Soviets established a naval presence to signal their interest in the outcome of the crisis, but worked diplomatically to minimize the danger of this regional conflict turning into a more serious East-West conflict. At its peak, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron grew to some 70 ships. Twenty of these were located in the vicinity of the American fleet, but they did not interfere with U.S. operations. (98)

The October 1973 war brought a new, if temporary resurgence of Soviet military involvement in the Middle East. During the Summer of 1973, the Soviets apparently stepped up their supply of arms to Egypt, which had continued after the expulsion of Soviet advisors, and in particular provided new weapons, such as the Scud surface-to-surface missile and TU-16 bombers, which increased the strategic threat posed by Egypt to Israel. Still, the Soviets refused to sell several types of weapons which the Egyptian military thought was necessary, and kept the supply of ammunition and spare parts

so low that a major war could not be sustained. Only in the Fall were these restraints lifted and thus the war made possible. (99)

Once the war began on 6 October, the Soviets rapidly intensified the resupply effort. New arms began to arrive by air on October 10. By October 12 this airlift has reached 60 to 90 flights per day to Syria and Egypt. The United States, meanwhile, had alerted the Sixth Fleet and soon began to resupply Israel. (100)

The Soviets supported the continuation of the war not only by supplying military hardware, but also diplomatically. Only when Israel had repulsed both the Syrian and Egyptian offensives and were attacking toward Damascus and across the Suez Canal did this policy change. Fearing catastrophic Arab losses, for which they would share the blame, and disruption of detente with the United States, Kosygin travelled to Cairo on October 16 to persuade Sadat to accept a cease-fire. At the same time the Soviets strove to prevent an Arab collapse. Soviet personnel drove tanks from the Syrian ports to Damascus to make up for Syrian losses and established air defense and destroyer patrols off-shore to protect the supply effort. Soviet personnel may also have helped Egyptians to fire several surface-to-surface missiles against Israeli troop positions just before the ceasefire on October 22; this action was probably intended as a warning to Israel that should the proposed cease-fire be rejected, home territories would be threatened. (101)

From early in the war, the Soviets were prepared to intervene on a larger scale if necessary: three airborne divisions were alerted by 10 October. As the Israelis advanced, pressure on the Soviets to intervene mounted; it became particularly acute when the October 22 cease-fire broke down and the Third Egyptian Army of the Canal seemed doomed. By this time the number of Soviet divisions on alert had reached seven (50,000 men). The Soviet supply airlift was phased-down on 22 October perhaps to prepare for a troop lift. On October 24 Egyptian President Sadat requested that American and Soviet forces be sent to police the cease-fire. When the United States refused, the Soviets threatened to intervene unilaterally to stop the Israeli advance. The United States responded with a world-wide alert of its armed forces for several hours. But the combination of Soviet and U.S. pressures brought a new cease-fire without direct U.S.-USSR intervention. (102)

Soviet use of force during the October 1973 war was effective in promoting the interests of the more militant Arab regimes. The initial supply effort before and during the war probably mitigated some of the Arab resentment at earlier Soviet restrictions on arms deliveries. The initial Arab successes, made possible by Soviet help, did put the Arabs and Israelis on a more equal psychological

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and political footing for the next round of negotiations. The later Soviet actions designed to prevent a total Arab collapse also were successful. But despite these successes, Soviet influence in the country of primary concern, Egypt, did not grow. The Soviets must have found this outcome the more frustrating since they had taken unprecedented risks on Egypt's behalf. It is not clear whether this experience will discourage them from making new major commitments to others, however.

The rapid loss of Soviet influence in Egypt was highlighted by the minor role played by Soviet forces in the clearing of mines and sunken ships from the Suez Canal in 1974. An Egyptian-American agreement to proceed with the mine-clearing was announced on March 18. Only at the end of May were the Soviets invited to participate by clearing the Gulf of Suez. A Soviet task force left Vladivostok for Suez immediately. It included five mine-sweepers, a repair ship, one Kashin-class destroyer, and the helicopter carrier Leningrad. This last ship came along primarly to emphasize the quality of the Soviet and American minesweeping forces. The latter depended upon helicopters for minesweeping, while the Soviet Navy still used special minesweeping ships. (103)

The political rewards from this largely symbolic operation were apparently minimal. In contrast to its treatment of American and British efforts, Egypt did not publicize the Soviet contribution. Perhaps because of this snub, the Soviets apparently tried to win Israeli gratitude by clearing all the mines from the Israeli side of the Gulf and hinting Soviet support in the Geneva negotiations for Israeli access to the Canal. These small gestures did not result in any noticeable improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations, however. (104)

Both before and after the 1973 Middle East War, the Soviets also intensified their relationship with other "progressive" Arab states. In 1973 they transported Moroccan troops to the Syrian front and South Yemeni troops to Oman to assist the Dhofar rebels. (105) The Soviets also abandoned their traditional neutrality in the Persian Gulf in siding with Iraq in its territorial dispute with Kuwait. (106) In late 1974 the Soviets reportedly went so far as to fly combat missions for Iraq against Mustafa Barzani's Kurds. They had previously avoided becoming involved in this conflict in order to maintain good relations with Iran. But that Fall open Iranian and covert American aid to the Kurds reached substantial levels. (107)

Conclusions

As this examination has shown, Soviet political uses of the armed forces have varied with both circumstances and relative Soviet strategic power. The disintegration of individual political systems and the international order which resulted from World War II presented the Soviets with a unique opportunity to impose Sovietcontrolled regimes along their borders. In their attempt to do so, they did not hesitate to introduce armed forces to political situations, although they retreated from these steps whenever they met determined, armed opposition. Most of these opportunities had been exhausted by 1950, as the American response to the Communist attack on South Korea indicated. For the next several years, the Soviets sought to protect their gains in Europe against both American military superiority and discontent within Eastern Europe. Failures in this policy, which reached disastrous proportions in Hungary in 1956, spurred Khrushchev to initiate another period of Sowiet expansionism in 1957. Unlike earlier and later expansionist periods, however, in this period Khrushchev tried to create opportunities rather tham merely respond to propitious circumstances; moreover, he moved beyond the goals that Soviet military power could support. While Khrushchev failed whenever he directly confronted the West, his policy of friendship with the former colonies has provided a foundation upon which his successors have continued to build.

Brezhnev and Kosygin have approached defense problems in a more mature and patient manner. This policy has drawn Soviet attention away from Europe. It has also involved the Soviets in more frequent military operations, particularly in the Third World. Until the Soviets achieved strategic parity around 1969, however, they continued to exercise great caution in these actions particularly so as to avoid confrontation with the United States.

Since 1969 the Soviet political uses of their armed forces have been more assertive in several ways. First, Soviet military forces have been used farther from home, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, in contrast to past interventions which were almost exclusively intended to help friends and allies survive a challenge by an internal or external foe, more recent Soviet operations have sometimes been aimed at helping friends gain new advantages. Examples include the Indo-Pakistani War (1971), support for Iraqi claims against Kuwait, and the transport of Moroccan and South Yemeni troops to theaters of conflict in 1973. Third, the Soviets have sometimes been willing in more recent years to accept a confrontation with the United States as a by-product of their support for a client. In the crises over Angola and the Egyptian War of Attrition against Israel

the clash was primarily political. But in the October 1973 war, a military confrontation resulted.

Fourth, the depth of Soviet commitment to its Third World friends has increased. Before 1968 Soviet armed forces assumed combat roles only once, in Yemen. Since 1968, Soviet military personnel have participated in three conflicts: the War of Attrition, the Sudanese civil war, and the Iraqi war against the Kurds. And in October 1973, Soviet military units came very close to combat roles. Soviet participation in combat operations has two interesting features. It has been restricted to fields requiring technological proficiency such as air defense; the Soviets have so far avoided introducing ground forces into others' conflicts. And it has been on behalf of leftist Arab regimes.

In other respects, Soviet operations since 1968 have been more cautious than those of the past. In contrast to the 1957-1962 period, when Khrushchev deliberately provoked confrontation with the United States, in recent times the Soviets have used force with caution and sought to avoid such clashes whenever possible. Further, the Soviets have rarely been the only superpower involved in the crisis; more typically they have responded to others' ongoing or likely intervention. Finally, the Soviets have almost never instigated the crisis in which they have intervened since 1968; even in the Middle East, where the Soviets have encouraged Arab hostility toward Israel, tensions have grown more fundamentally out of local issues. This again contrasts with the Soviet role in earlier political crises in Eastern Europe and Germany.

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Chapter XVI

CONCLUSIONS

On approximately three dozen occasions since World War II, the ever changing but relatively placid stream of world events has been punctuated by dramatic confrontations—points at which world tensions, which usually rise or fall only in small increments, increased sharply. The trappings of these crises have become familiar to all: late-burning lights at the White House, the Pentagon, and the Department of State; hastily—called press conferences at which ominous sounding prepared statements are read by bleary—eyed officials; and, inevitably, briefing charts showing the movements of elements of the armed forces. These movements and other changes in the readiness of the armed forces have become the idiom of crisis diplomacy. They serve to better prepare the armed forces should they be called upon to protect U.S. interests in whatever situation is at risk; but also, they are used to reinforce, and sometimes to substitute for, diplomacy: to warn, to re-assure, and generally to signal U.S. policy intent.

In roughly 180 less serious incidents as well, as was described in chapters three and four, the United States has made use of its armed forces to protect American interests abroad and to secure various foreign policy objectives. What has been the result of this military activity? By and large, are the prospects for success in such ventures good enough so that policymakers should consider use of the armed forces an important option in these situations? Or should they view such uses of the armed forces with great caution—because the military activity often fails to meet its objectives and because sometimes it backfires? More to the point, under what circumstances are discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives most likely to succeed, and when are they more likely to fail?

In this study, two approaches were used to answer these questions: an aggregate analysis of a representative sample of all 215 incidents (chapters five through eight) and detailed case studies of thirteen separate incidents (chapters nine through fourteen). Here we summarize and discuss the most important conclusions. Before doing that, however, it is prudent to remind readers of several cautions.

First, it should be remembered that we have examined but one way in which the armed forces can, and have been used in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Indeed, in one sense at least, the fact that a discrete political use of the armed forces—such as those described in the study—took place, is indicative of failure in more fundamental political purposes of the acquisition and operation of military forces. It is mainly when something unexpected and adverse happens, when the positive long-term political effects of the maintenance and deployment of the armed forces break down, that decisionmakers turn to discrete military operations

in attempts to mend the disrupted fabric of foreign relations.

Secondly, there is no intention in this study to attribute a cause and effect relationship between a single military operation and any specific decision by a policymaker in a foreign nation. As has been noted in earlier chapters, and as is made obvious by the case studies, it is simply impossible to determine why—specifically—a certain decision was taken. Thus, although we can point out the co-incidence between, on the one hand, certain types of military operations in certain kinds of situations and, on the other hand, outcomes that are predominantly favorable from the U.S. perspective, we cannot say with certitude that similarly favorable outcomes may not have occurred in the absence of any military operations, or in the face of a markedly different sort of military operation.

Thirdly, we should remind ourselves again of the uncertainties in the data upon which the study is founded. There are deficiencies in the amount and type of information which is routinely collected about these sorts of military operations. The problem is not one of access; we doubt that most sections of the study would have been significantly more accurate if they had been founded on classified data. It is simply a question of the precision and completeness of the data that were originally recorded. Thus, in some cases, arbitrary judgments were necessary that preferably would have been avoided. Still, despite this caveat, we believe that the information upon which the study is based is precise enough, and sufficiently complete, so that the conclusions deserve serious contemplation.

The Essence of the Matter

The first thing that should be said is that discrete uses of the armed forces are often an effective way of achieving near term foreign policy objectives. When the United States engaged in these political—military activities, the outcomes of the situations at which the activity was directed were most often favorable from the perspective of U.S. decisionmakers—at least in the short term. In an overwhelming proportion of the incidents, however, this "success rate"—the relative number of outcomes which were positive from the perspective of U.S. decisionmakers—eroded sharply over time.

Thus, it would seem that discrete uses of military forces for political objectives serve mainly to delay unwanted developments abroad. This is not to gainsay the value of "buying time," of keeping a situation open and flexible enough to prevent the occurrence of a detrimental <u>fait accomli</u>. Still, it should be recognized that these military operations cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions—diplomacy, close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and perceptions—which can form the basis either for sound and successful

alliances or for stable adversative relations. What political-military operations can do, is provide a respite; i.e., a means of postponing adverse developments so that there is enough time to formulate and implement new policies which may be sustainable over the longer term. Or, in those cases when new policies which are likely to be successful over the long term cannot be formulated, the political use of armed forces may serve to lessen the consequences of detrimental events.

The amount of time which discrete uses of the armed forces have bought for U.S. decisionmakers, or the degree to which these operations have minimized adverse consequences, has varied widely.

In some cases, demonstrative uses of force have been more or less ineffectual. For example, David Hall points out in chapter nine that the U.S. gesture of support for Pakistan during the 1971 War with India was a relatively empty one, because the target actors recognized that the United States would not become militarily involved in the war under virtually any circumstance. Consequently, the deployment of the Enterprise taskforce to the Indian Ocean had virtually no effects on the decisions of either the immediate actors—India and Pakistan—or the indirect actors—China and the Soviet Union.

In other cases, a discrete political application of the armed forces has been associated with the creation of a situation which remained tolerable for a period of months or, in some cases, years. The Intervention in Iaos in 1962, the other case study by David Hall, was such an incident; the landing of U.S. Marines in Thailand was co-incident with the negotiation of a settlement which kept the peace in Iaos for a time. U.S. actions to oust the Trujillos from the Dominican Republic following Rafael Trujillo's assassination described by Jerome Slater in chapter eleven, and subsequent actions to support the new government, were of a similar character. They resulted in a more acceptable situation in the Dominican Republic for several years, but ultimately foundered in 1965.

Finally, in some cases, under very special circumstances, discrete political uses of the armed forces can result in the establishment of new international relationships, such that U.S. interests are protected for a decade or even longer. Several political uses of the armed forces in the 1940's had such a character. Displays of American military support for Italy prior to the 1948 elections seem to have contributed, along with such other instruments of policy as economic aid and covert support for democratic political parties, to the defeat of the Italian Communist Party. The dominance of the Christian Democratic Party which resulted from that election persisted until recently. Similarly, political uses of the armed forces during the Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961, as Robert Slusser describes in chapter twelve, helped to create stable conditions in Central Europe which—fifteen years later—look as if they will endure.

Essentially, what seems to happen is that a given framework of

relations among several countries, or a domestic political configuration abroad, is disrupted by something unexpected or at least unwelcome: A break-down in the normal course of world affairs occurs, such as a domestic upheaval, a new departure in a major power's foreign policy, or perhaps an unexpected armed clash between the military units of hostile states. Regardless of the cause, this development will often lead to an unravelling of the fabric of relations that had been established and maintained by existing policies. Under such circumstance, and mindful of the fact that even when favorable outcomes do occur they are likely to persist only over the short-term, a demonstration of U.S. military capability through a discrete operation of one sort or another can be effective. In essence, the U.S. military demonstration persuades the target that the course of better wisdom is to undertake policies other than those to which it previously seemed inclined.

These demonstrations can be particularly effective when an adversary --or any nation which the U.S. is attempting to influence in a coercive fashion--becomes fearful; that is, if the target finds the threat implied by the military action to be credible. Also, such a military demonstration can be particularly effective when the actor at which it is directed is not yet fully committed to the course from which the U.S. hopes to dissuade it. We will return to these distinctions later in the chapter. First, however, it is helpful to examine the mechanisms at work more closely.

In some situations, the insertion (even symbolically) of U.S. military forces may provide leverage to U.S. decisionmakers where previously there had not been any. After a U.S. military presence or operation has been established, foreign leaders may see a reason for considering the wishes of U.S. policymakers where previously they had no such incentive. U.S. Marines landed in Thailand and the threat of a U.S. intervention in Isos became a credible one, for example, the United States gained a decided edge at the negotiating table. In any case like this, the result is to lessen the potential U.S. loss. The foreign decisionmakers act to avoid those extreme choices which they fear would precipitate a violent U.S. response. Unless the United States is willing to turn its new military presence into a permanent operation, however, any such demonstrative action is likely to be successful only for a limited amount of time. The point is that during this interim period, policymakers have an opportunity to obtain a longer lasting diplomatic solution, one which closely reflects the realities of the situation. The intervention in Lebanon in 1958, described by William Quandt in chapter ten, provides a pointed example of this phenomenon.

Although President Eisenhower authorized the landing of U.S. Marines and other forces in Lebanon in August of that year, he recognized, or at least Secretary of State Dulles recognized, that an American-imposed solution in Lebanon would be unacceptable and therefore short-lived. Thus, the United States adopted a two-fold approach. On the one hand, a massive demonstration of American military power was staged, involving the landing of thousands of American troops. On the other hand, Deputy

Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy was dispatched to Iebanon where, recognizing the political realities of the situation, he negotiated a settlement which was probably more favorable to the actors that opposed U.S. policy than to the presumed American client, President Camille Chamoun. In other words, the U.S. military demonstration bought time such that new political arrangements could be reached which more realistically reflected the distribution of power among the competing ethnic and political groups in Iebanon. Without a realistic political solution, such as that negotiated by Mr. Murphy, the 1958 U.S. intervention in Iebanon would probably have failed. At the same time, without the leverage provided by the U.S. military presence in Iebanon, with its implicit threat of greater violence, Mr. Murphy may well have failed in his attempt to negotiate a realistic political solution.

A military demonstration also can ease domestic pressures on the President that demand more forceful action. In less serious incidents, these pressures, which can originate from many sources--ethnic groups, the Congress, friends and political associates of the decisionmakers, and Department of Defense uniformed and civilian officials, among others -- are directed to lower-ranking foreign policy managers. By postponing forecast adverse consequences of unexpected developments in international politics, the demonstrative use of force may partially ameliorate calls for more decisive action. The postponement permits more fundamental changes in policy which allow a rational accommodation to the new development; most fundamental changes in policy inevitably require time to gather support within the bureaucracy and sometimes to be explained to the Congress and the public. In the absence of the added time bought by the military demonstration, these fundamental changes in policy may be more difficult to bring about. Under such circumstance, the President's constituencies, or at least the President might fear that his constituencies both at home and abroad, may see him as bowing to foreign pressures.

This phenomenon too was demonstrated pointedly in the case of the intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Readers will recall that for many months during the Spring of 1958, President Eisenhower resisted a request from President Chamoun for American military assistance. An unexpected event—the coup in Iraq in July—made it impossible to avoid the request any longer. The President feared that further inaction, after the seemingly wholesale defeat of American elients in the Middle East, would have negative effects both for the perceptions of decisionmakers in foreign nations and on domestic opinion in this nation.

American support for the realistic solution to the Lebanese problem negotiated by Mr. Murphy would have been difficult to muster without the symbolism of American strength suggested by the military intervention. It is quite doubtful that such a change in American policy with regard to Lebanon would have been possible without the time and image provided by the military intervention. In this case, in the absence of the intervention, President Eisenhower may have feared the effects of such an apparent concession on opinion both at home and abroad.

Similarly, it will be recalled that following American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker negotiated an agreement which contained the possibility that Juan Bosch would be elected President the following year. Such a development was abhorrent to many American officials. The use of force, however, made it acceptable.

None of this is meant to imply that the gains provided by discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives are fraudulent. The amelioration of pressures for extreme actions is an important, and a very real phenomenon. Similarly, the provision of leverage to negotiators is quite obviously of great significance in international politics. We turn next to a discussion of the circumstances under which these desired outcomes are best attained.

Correlates of Success

Four groups of factors seem to influence the relative success or failure of political uses of the armed forces: U.S. objectives, the context of the incident, involvement by the Soviet Union, and the nature and activity of the U.S. military forces which become involved. Readers will remember, of course, that unless noted otherwise, these conclusions refer mainly to short term (i.e., six month) outcomes.

U.S. Objectives

The nature of U.S. objectives seems to be an important determinant of whether or not a political use of force is successful. The armed forces were most often used successfully as political instruments when the U.S. policymakers' objective was to maintain the authority of a certain regime abroad. Such was the case, for example, when naval movements and other activities were undertaken in support of King Hussein during the 1970 Civil War in Jordan. Indeed, mainten the of regime authority was the one type of objective which was 11 by to be sustained over the longer term. The armed forces were least often successful when the objective was concerned with the use of force by a foreign actor; illustrative are the many futile attempts during the early- and mid-1960s to convince the North Vietnamese to cease military activity in South Vietnam and Laos. Somewhere between these two was the success rate pertaining to objectives which might be categorized as "the provision of support to third parties." U.S. armed forces sometimes were, but often were not successful in these cases, such as the many incidents in which U.S. military activity was undertaken in order to persuade the Soviet Union to cease supporting hostile political initiatives by East Germany.

Perhaps more significant, however, is the mode in which the armed forces are used as a political instrument. It is evident that discrete

uses of the armed forces for political purposes are most often successful when the U.S. objective is to reinforce, rather than to modify, the behavior of a target state. This stands to reason. It fits not only with the findings of behavioral psychology, but more importantly with common sense. Chairman Khrushchev, no doubt, found it much easier not to follow through on the various threats he made concerning Europe and the Middle East, than he did to withdraw Soviet missifes from Cuba; just as deterring the outbreak of violence is usually an easier task than bringing violence to a satisfactory end.

Human behavior is difficult to change. Individuals tend to be more aware of the risks of change than they are of the dangers of continuing to maintain their prevailing course. After all, policies being pursued at any one time are known entities; even when their risks are evident, the dangers of change will often appear more threatening. More to the point, no one-least of all the head of a nation-likes to be told publicly what it is he should be doing. In fact, political leaders will not remain leaders for long if they are dictated to too often. Thus, national leaders will resist demands for policy modifications most strenuously when such demands are made publicly, as is more often than not the case when military power is used demonstratively.

In short, whether a military demonstration was made in order to coerce a hostile target state to change its behavior, or if it was made in order to encourage a friendly target state to change its behavior, the result was similar; these actions were not successful very often. On the other hand, when U.S. policymakers made demonstrative use of the armed forces to coerce a hostile target state so that it continued to do something (e.g., stay at peace), or when it made a demonstrative use of military force so as to encourage a friendly state to remain on the same course of behavior, these military demonstrations were successful relatively more often.

Consider, for example, the starkly different outcomes of the Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961, and the several incidents in Southeast Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the former, the United States sought essentially to assure allies and to deter certain action by the U.S.S.R. and East Germany. Both types of objectives required that the targets not change their extant behavior. These incidents, of course, worked cut favorably from the American perspective. Not so favorable, especially over the longer term, were the outcomes of the Southeast Asian incidents, in which the United States sought to compel various Communist actors to stop using force, and to induce the Government of South Vietnam to behave differently. Here, both types of objectives required change on the part of the target states, and few were achieved.

Another caution is due at this juncture. To some extent, the conclusion as to the greater relative success when the U.S. objective was to reinforce, rather than to modify behavior, is the result of a simple fact. In many of the incidents, although U.S. decisionmakers may have though

--or feared--that a target state was prepared or intending to change its behavior, and thus made demonstrative use of the armed forces to reinforce existing behavior, in actuality, the target state may have had no such intention. Thus, in these cases, although it appears that the demonstrative use of military force was successful, this is more appearance than reality. A good example, perhaps, is the U.S. military activity which followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, which Philip Windsor documented in chapter thirteen. One objective of that military activity was to deter a Soviet invasion of Rumania. No such invasion occurred; hence, the military demonstration appears to have been successful. The question is, however, whether Soviet leaders ever seriously contemplated such an invasion. This is not to discount the importance of the U.S. military activity. As Windsor points out, U.S. policymakers had other important objectives in mind as well. Still, the proportion of successful "reinforcement" outcomes which are accounted for by the "unreality" of the feared target state behavior may be high. Unfortunately, that proportion is impossible to determine empirically.

It should also be observed as concerns the consequences of the nature of U.S. objectives, that political uses of the armed forces are most successful when U.S. objectives are complementary, at least loosely, with prior U.S. policies. Based on both the case studies and the aggregate analysis, it seems evident that the purpose of demonstrative uses of force must fit within a fundamental framework of expectations held by decision-makers both in this country and abroad, if the military activity is to attain its desired end. This is made clear, for example, by the fact that although prior diplomacy was closely associated with positive outcomes of the incidents in the sample, diplomacy during the course of the incidents themselves does not seem to have been particularly important for positive results. Obviously there are exceptions to this rule; Murphy's efforts in Lebanon and Bunker's in the Dominican Republic are just two examples.

Similarly, it was determined that prior U.S. military engagement in conflicts in a region was of some importance in determining the relative success of subsequent military demonstrations. The fact that the United States had been willing to engage in violence in the region previously seems to have made the threats or assurances implied by the subsequent demonstrative military activity more credible. Much less significant were previous demonstrative uses of force in the region. Still, previous demonstrative uses of force were associated with greater success when the U.S. objective was to assure a target state so that it would continue to do something.

Good examples are provided by U.S. naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean. U.S. military forces have not fought in that region since 1945, yet as concerns the assurance of Israel (and less frequently, Jordan), these displays of naval power seem to be effective. They have been far less successful, however, as means of modifying the behavior of Israel's (and Jordan's) enemies.

In short, prior actual or demonstrative uses of force were not sufficient to compensate for the previously noted difficulty of modifying a target state's behavior. Indeed, very little seems to compensate for this basic determinant of when a demonstrative use of force would, or would not be a successful means of gaining foreign policy objectives. That is, the question of whether the U.S. objective was to reinforce or to modify behavior seems to dominate most other factors in assessments of the relative effectiveness of these political uses of armed forces. Among the factors which are so dominated are: the sort of diplomacy which accompanied the military activity, the nature of the situation, and the timing, sire, composition, and activity of the military units themselves. In brief, when the U.S. objective was to reinforce behavior, political uses of the armed forces usually were effective, although successful outcomes also would depend upon whether or not the specific objective was compatible with prior U.S. policies. When the U.S. objective was to modify behavior, however, demonstrative uses of force were much less frequently effective, regardless of other circumstances.

Soviet Activity

A second group of factors which seem to influence the relative effectiveness of the use of the armed forces as a political instrument pertain to the Soviet Union—the character of U.S.—Soviet relations at the time and the specific role played by the Soviet Union in the incident.

One conclusion runs counter to presently prevailing views concerning the effect of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance on the relative fortunes of the superpowers. We did not find, as is often maintained, that the United States became less successful in the use of the armed forces for political objectives as the Soviet Union closed the U.S. lead in strategic nuclear weapons which had been maintained for the first twenty or so years following the Second World War. Whether or not discrete uses of U.S. armed forces were associated with positive outcomes seems to have been independent of this aggregate measure of relative U.S.-Soviet military capabilities.

This finding can do little but add fuel to the debate, as this study was not designed to test the hypothesis about the effects of the strategic balance. Its finding in this regard clearly is not definitive. Still, both the aggregate analysis and the case studies provide little support for the notion that decisions during crises are strongly influenced by aggregate military capabilities. William Quandt's studies of lebanon and Jordan, for example, and Robert Simmons' studies of several East Asian incidents would seem to indicate that to the extent that evaluations of the military balance played any role, they were more clearly concerned with local balances of power. More to the point, most actors in these incidents seem to have had only a rudimentary and impressionistic sense of relative military capabilities.

Soviet political and/or military involvement in the incident itself. on the other hand, was of great significance. Outcomes tended to be less favorable from the U.S. perspective when the Soviet Union was involved in an incident. Outcomes were particularly less favorable when the Soviet Union threatened to, or actually employed its own armed forces in the incident. Interestingly, this finding pertains more to the short term success rate than to the longer term outcomes. We believe that this disparity may be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union's own objectives tended to be more moderate than those of the actors which it was supporting in the incidents. For example, in those incidents in which North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, or Cuba were involved, and the Soviets provided political support, the objectives of the Soviet clients were likely to have included the overthrow of certain governments backed by the United States. Following a U.S. political use of its armed forces, these objectives may have been postponed, thus resulting in a relatively high percentage of favorable outcomes in the short term; but the objectives were not likely to have been abandoned, thus leading to longer term U.S. failure. In incidents in which the Soviet Union was involved directly, and employed its own armed forces, objectives were more likely to involve the establishment of some sort of compromise political relationships--say in Central Europe; outcomes which could be accomplished and maintained not only for the short term, but for the longer term as well.

The pernicious effect of Soviet involvement was eroded somewhat at times when broad U.S.-Soviet relations had been improving. The outcomes of incidents tended to be more favorable from the U.S. point of view when overall U.S.-Soviet relations were characterized by greater co-operation. And, as in the previous case, this finding was stronger when just those incidents in which the Soviet Union participated are considered, and stronger still when just those incidents in which Soviet military forces were involved are considered.

In brief, although the overall state of the U.S.-Soviet military balance does not seem to have been an important factor in determining the relative success of demonstrative uses of military forces for specific political objectives, the overall quality of U.S.-Soviet relations does seem to have been important. More particularly, at those times when broader U.S.-Soviet relations were relatively co-operative, then the Soviet Union tended to act in a more "co-operative" fashion in specific incidents as well, so as to help avoid conflict, thus insuring the satisfaction of U.S. demands. At those points in history when U.S.-Soviet relations were tense, however, the Soviet Union obviously would not act in such a "co-operative" fashion, and thus the relative success associated with the demonstrative use of force tended to be less. At least, this was the case in those situations either in which the Soviet Union participated directly, or in those regions like Europe in which Soviet interests were likely to be greater.

Nature of the Situation

The third group of factors which are likely to affect the question of whether or not a discrete political use of the armed forces would be successful, concerns the nature of the situation at which the use of the armed forces is directed.

Outcomes tended to be favorable more frequently when demonstrative uses of force were directed at intra-national situations, as contrasted to international situations. We do not have overwhelming confidence in this finding, however, because two other factors which also are closely associated with favorable outcomes are highly correlated with intra-national situations: Intra-national situations tended to require lesser amounts of force, and the U.S. objective in these situations more often was reinforcement as compared to modification. Both these factors are also associated with positive outcomes; it is difficult to tell whether they, or the fact that it was an intra-national situation, was the dominant factor.

In the international situations, success was most frequent in those incidents in which the United States was involved from the very onset of a conflict. This conclusion fits nicely with the previous conclusion concerning the need for the U.S. objective and the specific use of force to complement the prior framework of relationships characterizing the relevant international environment. In those situations in which the United States was involved initially, like the Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961, U.S. statements of aims and objectives were more likely to be considered seriously. And, the U.S. threat or promise implied by the demonstrative use of the armed forces was more likely to be perceived as a credible one. In the other international situations, when the U.S. was intervening, so-to-speak, in a situation which did not concern it directly (or at least not initially), there was likely to be some question in the minds of the other actors as to whether U.S. threats or promises were credible ones. Consider the Yugoslav situation in 1951, described by Windsor in chapter thirteen, for example. The U.S. military demonstrations then were not likely to have been taken too seriously, at first. Why, Soviet and Yugoslav leaders might have asked, would the United States become involved militarily? Such questions are less likely to be raised in those situations in which the United States, or U.S. interests or positions overseas are quite directly and obviously threatened.

Finally as concerns the nature of the situation, we might note one other interesting conclusion: Closed societies were not necessarily more susceptible to manipulation by U.S. decisionmakers than were more open democratic political systems. Thus, for example, in the Middle East, Israel and Lebanon have not been any less tractable than Jordan and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Egypt and Syria. This contradicts a frequently heard hypothesis. Our data would seem to indicate quite clearly that open political systems could be influenced just as much, or just as

little, by demonstrative uses of U.S. military forces as could closed political systems which, the general presumption runs, can more easily change course in response to demands.

Size, Activity, and Type of Military Forces Involved in the Incident

Here, we have at least one clear and one ambiguous finding.

It is evident that the firmer the commitment implied by the military operation itself, the more likely that the outcome of the situation will be positive. Thus, for example, forces actually emplaced on foreign soil tended to be more frequently associated with positive outcomes than were naval forces. Naval forces, after all, can be withdrawn just as easily as they can be moved toward the disturbed area. The movement of land-based forces, on the other hand, involves both real economic costs and a certain psychological commitment which is difficult to reverse, at least in the short term.

This is a very interesting finding, not so much because of its novelty--after all, it only confirms the common perception--but because its implication runs counter to common U.S. practice. The Navy has been the pre-eminent arm of the armed forces as concerns political operations. Naval forces participated in more than 80 percent of the incidents; and reliance on the Navy was the case almost regardless of region, time period, type of situation, or whether or not the Soviet Union participated the incident.

In political operations, naval forces have several advantages as compared to other types of military forces. For one thing, ships are simply easier to move around than are army units or land-based aircraft: A larger portion of their logistics tail is organic to the combat unit, crewmen expect to be separated from their families, and so forth. When they get to the scene of a disturbance, warships are less disruptive psychologically than are land-based forces and thus less offensive diplomatically; if desirable, naval forces can remain near-by, but out of sight. Thus, naval forces can be used more subtly to support foreign policy initiatives—to underscore threats, or warnings, or promises, or commitments—than can land-based units, and they can do so without inalterably tying the President's hand.

It is this last fact, however, which diminishes the effectiveness of naval forces in political roles. Foreign decisionmakers also recognize that warships can be withdrawn as easily as they can enter a region of tension and, hence, that the commitment they imply is not so firm as that implied by land-based units.

Positive outcomes were particularly frequent when land-based combat aircraft were involved in an incident. This would suggest, and particularly in view of the much greater mobility of contemporary land-based

tactical air units, that the Air Force might be used more frequently when political-military operations of this sort are contemplated than has been the case for the United States historically.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has utilized land-based Air Force units in limited ways for political objectives on relatively frequent occasions. Soviet pilots and aircraft are reported to have taken part in wars in the Sudan, Yemen, and Iraq; a full Soviet air defense system, including interceptor aircraft, was established in Egypt; and Soviet tactical aircraft detachments have made good-will visits to Sweden and France. In view of our findings, the United States might do well to emulate this greater reliance on land-based units under certain circumstances. Indeed, perhaps the United States already is moving in this direction. In the Summer of 1976, along with a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan, two U.S. Air Force squadrons were flown to Korea as part of a show of strength following the killing of two American officers. It was reported at the time that these units—one of which originated in Idaho—would have been available for combat missions within fifteen hours of their dispatch.

clearly, the Air Force is an instrument which could be used expeditiously and flexibly for political objectives. What is required is an examination of whether additional equipment or procedural changes might be desirable so as to enhance the potential Air Force role in political operations, and an examination of situations world-wide so as to determine in which potential crises there would be facilities suitable to base Air Force combat squadrons. Following such a study, U.S. contingency planning might be reviewed so as to determine whether the effectiveness of the armed forces as political instruments might be enhanced by substituting land-based air force units for naval forces in certain situations.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that such a shift in U.S. practice would not be without its costs. The use of land-based forces is perceived by foreign decisionmakers as greater evidence of commitment; that is precisely why they tend to be more often associated with positive outcomes than are sea-based forces. If the U.S. objective is not so certain, if all that is desired is to take an action which signifies interest and concern, but leaves room for maneuver, such as the naval deployments which were undertaken during each of the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974, then the use of land-based forces would not be advisable. Moreover, in situations in which what is desired is a bluff, or a military move to screen a political defeat—as was the case concerning Berlin in 1946—here too the use of land-based forces, which make a quick withdrawal difficult, would not be advisable. In all these types of situations, naval forces would provide greater flexibility to decisionmakers, and thus would be more appropriately used even if their probability of succeeding may be less.

There are ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the armed forces other than the use of land-based forces. Outcomes were more often favorable when the armed forces units involved actually did something, rather than merely emphasized their potential capability to intervene, and reduced the time delay between a decision to intervene and the actual operation, by moving toward the scene of the incident or by increasing their state of alert. The involvement of the military unit in a

specific operation, such as mine-laying, or mine-clearing or patrolling --and certainly when the actual exercise of firepower was involved--seems to have indicated a more serious intent on the United States' part. Each of these activities was used on different occasions. The movement of the force toward the region of concern alone could be an ambiguous signal; it may not be clear to foreign decisionmakers what the United States has in mind, or the movement may pass unobserved. A specific activity by the armed force units is a much clearer signal, and thus was associated more often with favorable outcomes.

The more ambiguous finding pertains to the consequence of variations in the size of the armed forces units involved in the incidents. We did not find greater success to be associated with the use of larger elements of the armed forces. Indeed, we found the opposite; the outcomes of incidents in which larger elements of force were involved were less often positive. We interpret this finding to mean that U.S. decisionmakers were able to estimate the degree of difficulty posed by a situation, and thus to judge the relative size of the force that would be commensurate with that degree of difficulty. In short, we would guess that larger forces generally took part in those situations in which the attainment of U.S. objectives seemed most difficult, or to imply the greatest risks. When smaller components of force were used, then, in most cases, the attainment of the U.S. objectives was not considered too difficult. Hence, it is not surprising that the use of smaller forces was associated with a greater likelihood of success: The larger forces had to deal with the tougher problems. What this indicates, however, is one of two things.

One possibility, is that U.S. decisionmakers frequently underestimated the amount of force required and, therefore, did not increase the amount of force involved sufficiently to bring about favorable outcomes. This seems to us to be unlikely. On the other hand, perhaps what this finding indicates is that increased force size alone simply cannot compensate for the increased difficulty of attaining an objective. Thus, what is more important than the involvement of larger forces, if it is expected that the U.S. objective will be difficult to achieve, is one of the several signs just mentioned which would indicate the seriousness of the U.S. intent; a sign such as the engagement of the armed forces units in some specific capacity, or the emplacement of forces on the ground in the region of concern.

There is one other possible way of indicating the seriousness of the U.S. intent. We did find that success was more often associated with larger force components when the forces involved in the situation also included units assigned to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Clearly, foreign decisionmakers perceived the use of strategic nuclear forces—whether they were or were not accompanied with specific threats to use nuclear weapons—as an important signal that the United States perceived the situation in a most serious way. Thus, in a sense, the

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employment of nuclear-associated forces--like Strategic Air Command aircraft or Sixth Fleet carriers when they were central to U.S. plans for nuclear war--served the same purpose as did the involvement of military units in a specific activity, or the use of ground forces as compared to naval forces: They bolster U.S. credibility.

The risks of such a policy should be evident. There is no guarantee that any military demonstration will be successful. When nuclear weapons are involved, and the demonstration is not successful, the result could be disastrous—U.S. policymakers being faced with the choice of admitting the emptiness of the nuclear threat or actually employing nuclear weapons. Selection of the first could undermine the credibility of fundamental U.S. commitments to Europe and Japan. The costs of choosing the second are too obvious to warrant discussion.

Moreover, it may be that positive outcomes have more often resulted when nuclear forces were involved in incidents, simply because these weapons have been used relatively infrequently; they were involved in less than 10 percent of the incidents. If this is the case, then the more frequently that U.S. decisionmakers turn to nuclear forces—even demonstratively—to ensure the credibility of signals in incidents such as those we have described, the more quickly the special message now associated with nuclear weapons will be eroded. Eventually, the movement of nuclear forces would not receive much more attention and would not convey any more credibility to U.S. messages than do the movements now of conventional forces. Thus, despite our finding that relatively greater success has been associated with the involvement of nuclear forces in past incidents, we would not conclude that greater reliance on these weapons would be appropriate.

A Last Word

By and large, the demonstrative and discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives should not be an option which decisionmakers turn to frequently, nor quickly, to secure political objectives abroad, except under very special circumstances. We have found that over the longer term these uses of the armed forces are not an effective foreign policy instrument; decisionmakers should not expect such uses of the armed forces to be able to serve as viable substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies; policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad, and incorporating diplomacy and the many other potential instruments available to U.S. foreign policy.

We have found, however, that in particular circumstances, demonstrative uses of the armed forces can sometimes be an effective way--at least in the short term--of securing U.S. objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to U.S. interests from worsening more rapidly than more fundamental policies can be formulated. Thus, at times, and although decisionmakers should view these options with some caution, the

demonstrative use of the armed forces for political objectives is a useful step to shore up a situation sufficiently so that more extreme adverse consequences can be avoided, so that domestic and international pressures for more forceful and perhaps counter-productive actions can be avoided, and so that time can be gained for sounder policies that can deal adequately with the realities of the situation to be formulated and implemented.

As we pointed out in the very first chapter of the report, to reach this conclusion about the <u>effectiveness</u> of the armed forces as a political instrument is not to reach any judgment about the wisdom of using the armed forces for these purposes. That question is a more difficult one, one which can only be answered in the context of the specific choices—and the various costs and benefits associated with each choice—facing decisionmakers at the time.

Over the past 30 years, six Presidents (or their designated foreign policy managers) have decided that a political use of the armed forces was the wise choice on more than 200 occasions. Although, on the average, there have been fewer such occasions in recent years than there were before the United States became involved in the War in Southeast Asia, the number of times each year which the armed forces are required to serve a political purpose abroad is not trivial.

There is little reason to expect further declines in this frequency; rather, one should more likely expect an increase. There is certainly no lack of situations abroad, in which American interests are heavily involved, that might well erupt in tension or violence at any time.

Attempting to predict in which specific future incidents the United States might attempt to gain political objectives by altering the disposition of its armed forces, would be imprudent. A few broad inferences, however, are worth considering:

- It seems likely that the frequency of these kinds of incidents will remain relatively low as compared to the peaks in the early 1960s, although it might rise somewhat from present levels. As the Vietnam War fades from the nation's consciousness, and as other recent blows to the nation's confidence—Watergate, the 1974-75 recession—likewise recede, voices urging a more active U.S. role in world affairs are likely to be heard more clearly. Political uses of the armed forces may be one way in which these calls are met.
- The Eastern Mediterranean would seem to be the most likely, and most frequent focus of those political activities which are undertaken by U.S. armed forces. Of those few types of situations which have provided the source for the majority of past incidents, those near the Eastern Mediterranean remain most active. These would include most importantly the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also might include inter-Arab conflicts, the Cyprus situation, and other disputes between Greece and Turkey.

- If incidents in the Eastern Mediterranean do recur, they are likely to require major committals of force insofar as the local participants are well-armed and the Soviet Union is more than likely to become involved.
- Elsewhere, as well as in this key region, greater emphasis is likely to be continued to be placed, as it has recently, on the use of the armed forces to improve or cement relations, as opposed to coercive uses of force.
- Finally, each of these inferences must be tempered by a simple observation. A number of the situations which previously provided the cause for a large proportion of the United States' uses of the armed forces for political objectives, although now quiescent, remain unsettled politically and are potentially renewable. The situation in Southeast Asia seems likely to be an exception to this observation, but included among the potential sources of renewed U.S. involvement would be:

 (a) the situation on the Korean Peninsula; (b) the possibility of renewed Cuban support for insurgencies in the Caribbean; and (c) new Soviet pressure on states in Southeastern Europe (e.g., in the event of a succession crisis in Yugoslavia). In any of these cases, based on past experience, it may be expected that the United States will turn to its armed forces as means of influencing the outcome of events so that U.S. interests are protected.

In view of this assessment, it makes sense to consider possible political uses of the armed forces more centrally in decisions on the structure of U.S. forces and, more to the point, in decisions on operational and deployment patterns of U.S. forces. Of course, these decisions must be based on many other factors as well; many of which —particularly those requirements which flow from plans for war-fighting—should be accorded higher priority. Still, if U.S. military forces are acquired and operated solely to meet the needs of the "worst case"—the big war—they are likely to be inappropriately configured for the needs of many more likely cases. The armed forces are an important political instrument. This role should receive close attention in force planning and operational decisions.

Appendix A

THE INCIDENTS

This study covers the time period of 1 January 1946 through 31 October 1975. The sources listed in appendix B indicate that the United States used its armed forces as a political instrument, as defined, on 215 occasions during this period.

These 215 incidents are listed below in terms of: a phrase describing the basic situation that attracted U.S. attention and led to the use of armed forces as a political instrument; and the month and year in which the use of armed forces was initiated. In many instances the situation of concern occasioned an almost immediate use of armed forces. In other instances, however, a lag of some months occurred.

It is important to note that certain situations—e.g., the political crises in Lebanon in 1958, in the Congo in 1960-64, and in the Dominican Republic in 1965-66—are considered to comprise two or more incidents rather than just one. This approach allows a more useful analysis of instances in which there occurred two or more clear modal uses of U.S. armed forces, or a significant change in the nature of the situation.

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The 215 incidents are as follows:

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LIST OF INCIDENTS

Coup and civil strife in Haiti	January 1946
Security of Turkey	March 1946
Political conflict in Greece	April 1946
Civil war in China	April 1946
Security of Trieste	June 1946
Security of Turkey	August 1946
Insurgents in Greece	September 1946
Inauguration of President in Chile	November 1946
U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
Political change in Lebanon	December 1946
Inauguration of President in Uruguay	February 1947
Civil war in Greece	April 1947
Cuba support for anti-Trujilloists	May 1947
Security of Turkey	May 1947
Security of Trieste	August 1947
Elections in Italy	November 1947
Improved relations with Argentina	January 1948
Security of Berlin	January 1948
Security of Trieste	January 1948
Arab-Israel war	January 1948
Interests in Persian Gulf	January 1948
Security of Norway	April 1948
Security of Berlin	April 1948
Security of Berlin	June 1948
	Security of Turkey Political conflict in Greece Civil war in China Security of Trieste Security of Turkey Insurgents in Greece Inauguration of President in Chile U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia Political change in Lebanon Inauguration of President in Uruguay Civil war in Greece Cuba support for anti-Trujilloists Security of Turkey Security of Trieste Elections in Italy Improved relations with Argentina Security of Berlin Security of Trieste Arab-Israel war Interests in Persian Gulf Security of Norway

Change of government in China	December 1949
Political developments in Indochina	March 1950
France - Viet Minh war	June 1950
Korean War: Formosa Straits	June 1950
Korean War: Security of Europe	July 1950
Political developments in Lebanon	August 1950
Security of Yugoslavia	March 1951
Inauguration of President in Liberia	January 1952
Improved relations with Spain	January 1952
Security of Turkey	. August 1952
Political developments in Lebanon	November 1952
China - Taiwan conflict	February 1953
Soviet aircraft fire on NATO aircraft	March 1953
End of war in Korea	July 1953
Security of Japan/South Korea	August 1953
France - Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu	March 1954
Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support	May 1954
France - Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu	July 1954
British sirliner shot down by China	July 1954
China - Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands	August 1954
Election in Honduras	September 1954
Accord on Trieste	October 1954
Nicaragua supports insurgents in Costa Rica	January 1955
Austria State Treaty	August 1955
China - Taiwan conflict	January 1956
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	France - Viet Minh war Korean War: Formosa Straits Korean War: Security of Europe Political developments in Lebanon Security of Yugoslavia Inauguration of President in Liberia Improved relations with Spain Security of Turkey Political developments in Lebanon China - Taiwan conflict Soviet aircraft fire on NATO aircraft End of war in Korea Security of Japan/South Korea France - Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support France - Viet Minh war: Dienbienphu British airliner shot down by China China - Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands Election in Honduras Accord on Trieste Nicaragua supports insurgents in Costa Rica Austria State Treaty

51.	British General Glubb ousted in Jordan	April 1956
52.	Egypt nationalizes Suez Canal	July 1956
53.	Suez crisis	October 1956
54.	Security of U.S. military personnel and bases in Morocco	October 1956
55.	Egypt - Israel conflict: Red Sea	February 1957
56.	Political - military crisis in Indonesia	February 1957
57.	Political - military crisis in Jordan	April 1957
58.	Civil strife in Taiwan	May 1957
59.	Coup and civil strife in Haiti	June 1957
60.	Civil strife and elections in Lebanon	June 1957
61.	China - Taiwan conflict	July 1957
62.	Political developments in Syria	August 1957
63.	Indonesia - Netherlands crisis	December 1957
64.	Coup and civil strife in Venezuela	January 1958
65.	Political - military crisis in Indonesia	February 1958
66.	Political crisis in Lebanon	May 1958
67.	Security of Vice President Nixon in Venezuela	May 1958
68.	Americans seized by insurgents in Cuba	July 1958
69.	Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
70.	Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
71.	China - Taiwan crisis: Quemoy & Matsu	July 1958
72.	Insurgents in Cuba	October 1958
73.	Castro seizes power in Cuba	January 1959
74.	Cambodia - Theiland crisis	January 1959
75.	Security of Berlin	February 1959
76.	Atlantic cables cut	February 1959

77.	Cuba supports insurgents: Panama	April 1959	
78.	Security of Berlin	May 1959	
79.	China - Taiwan conflict	July 1959	
80.	Civil war in Laos	August 1959	
81.	Cuba supports insurgents: Haiti	August 1959	
82.	Political developments in Cuba	November 1959	
83.	Improved relations with Indonesia	November 1959	
84.	Anti-Castro insurgents overfly Cuba	February 1960	
85.	Unidentified submarine off Argentina	February 1960	57.8
86.	Insurgents în Cuba	April 1960	
87.	Political - military crisis in Congo	July 1960	
88.	Political developments in Cuba	August 1960	
89.	Coup and civil war in Laos	August 1960	Variation .
90.	Civil war in the Congo	September 1960	
91.	Cuba supports insurgents: Guatemala/Nicaragua	November 1960	
92.	Security of Guantanamo base in Cuba	December 1960	
93.	Improved relations with Iraq	December 1960	
94.	Insurgents seize Portuguese ship Santa Maria	January 1961	
95.	Civil war in Congo	January 1961	
96.	Civil war in Laos	February 1961	
97.	U.S. ship Western Union seized by Cuba	March 1961	
98.	Bay of Pigs	April 1961	
99.	Trujillo assassinated in Dominican Rep.	June 1961	
100.	Unidentified submarine off Ecuador	June 1961	
101.	Elections and civil strife in Zanzibar	June 1961	
102.	Security of Berlin	June 1961	BEE:
103.	Security of Kuwait	July 1961	

104.	Trujillos refuse to leave Dominican Rep	November 1961
105.	Civil war in South Vietnam	December 1961
106.	Security of Guantanamo base in Cuba	January 1962
107.	Civil war in South Vietnam	February 1962
108.	Civil strife in Guatemala	March 1962
109.	Hostile Soviet Naval activity in the Baltic Sea	May 1962
110.	Civil war in Laos	May 1962
in.	Improved relations with Iceland	June 1962
112.	China - Taiwan conflict	June 1962
113.	Political developments in Haiti	August 1962
114.	Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
115.	China - India war	October 1962
116.	Political instability in Guatemala	. December 1962
117.	Inauguration of President in Dominican Rep	February 1963
118.	Insurgents seize Venezuelan mechantman Anzoatequi	February 1963
119.	Civil war in Yemen	February 1963
120.	Dominican Rep - Haiti conflict	April 1963
121.	Withdrawal of missiles from Turkey	April 1963
122.	Political crisis in Jordan	April 1963
123.	Civil war in Laos	April 1963
124.	Civil war in Laos	May 1963
125.	Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam	June 1963
126.	Dominican Rep - Haiti conflict	August 1963
127.	Coup in Dominican Rep	September 1963
128.	China - Taiwen crisis	September 1963
129.	Security of Berlin	October 1963

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130.	Indonesia - Malaysia conflict	November 1963
131.	Cuba supports insurgents: Venezuela	November 1963
132.	Improved relations with Israel	November 1963
133.	Assassination of Diem in South Vietnam	November 1963
134.	Improved relations with Soviet Union	December 1963
135.	Cuba supports insurgents: Mexico	January 1964
136.	Security of Panama Canal Zone	January 1964
137.	Coup and civil strife in Zanzibar	January 1964
138.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	January 1964
139.	Coup in South Vietnam	January 1964
140.	Coup in Brazil	March 1964
141.	Political developments in Cambodia	March 1964
142.	Security of Guantanamo base in Cuba	April 1964
143.	Civil war in Laos	April 1964
144.	Elections in Panama	May 1964
145.	Civil strife in British Guiana	May 1964
146.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	June 1964
147.	Cuba supports insurgents: Dominican Rep	July 1964
148.	Civil war in Congo	August 1964
149.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	August 1964
150.	Insurgents in Haiti	August 1964
151.	North Vietnam fires on U.S. ships: Tonkin Gulf	August 1964
152.	Indonesia - Malaysia crisis	September 1964
153.	Cuba supports insurgents in Venesuela	October 1964
154.	Civil war in the Congo: Hostages in Stanleyville	November 1964
155.	Viet Cong attack Bien Hoa barracks in So Vietnam	November 1964

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156.	Worsened relations with Tanzania	January 1965
157.	Viet Cong attack Pleiku air base in South Vietnam	February 1965
158.	Viet Cong attack Qui Nhon barracks in South Vietnam	February 1965
159.	Civil war in Dominican Rep	April 1965
160.	Cuba support insurgents: British Guiana	April 1965
161.	West German parliament meets in Berlin	April 1965
162.	Cuba supports insurgents: Venezuela	May 1965
163.	War in Vietnam: withdrawal of troops from Europe	July 1965
164.	Political developments in Cyprus	July 1965
165.	Civil war in Yemen	August 1965
166.	Civil war in Dominican Rep	September 1965
167.	India-Pakistan war	September 1965
168.	Attempted coup in Indonesia	October 1965
169.	Improved relations with Egypt	September 1966
170.	Israel attacks Jordan: Samu	December 1966
171.	Insurgents in Thailand	December 1966
172.	Coup in Greece	April 1967
173.	Improved relations with France	May 1967
174.	Arab-Israel war	May 1967
175.	Insurgents in the Congo	July 1967
176.	Political developments in Cyprus	August 1967
177.	Egypt sinks Israeli destroyer Eilat	October 1967
178.	<u>Pueblo</u> seized by North Korea	January 1968
179.	Invasion of Czechoslovakis	September 1968
180.	Israel attacks Lebanon: Beirut Airport	December 1968
181.	North Korea attacks South Korean fishing boats	December 1968

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182.	EC-121 shot down by North Korea	April 1969	100
183.	Civil strife in Curacao	May 1969	.005
184.	Political developments in Libya	November 1969	,014
185.	Insurgents in Haiti	April 1970	, it
186.	Civil strife in Trinidad	April 1970	
187.	Civil strife in Jordan	June 1970	u Linker
188.	Arab-Israel ceasefire agreement	August 1970	1,85.7
189.	Civil war in Jordan	September 1970	275
190.	Soviet submarine base in Cuba	October 1970	
191.	Civil war in Cambodia	January 1971	
192.	Withdrawal of troops from South Korea	February 1971	
193.	Duvalier dies in Haiti	April 1971	
194.	Improved relations with Soviet Union	April 1971	
195.	Standown in Sea of Japan	May 1971	
196.	India-Pakistan (Bangladesh) War	December 1971	
197.	Seizure of merchantmen by Cuba	February 1972	
198.	North Vietnam offensive in South Vietnam	May 1972	
199.	Breakdown in peace talks with North Vietnam	December 1972	
200.	Civil war in Laos	February 1973	
201.	Civil war in Cambodia	February 1973	
202.	Peace agreement with North Vietnam	February 1973	
203.	Civil strife in Lebanon	May 1973	
204.	Civil war in Cambodia	August 1973	
205.	Arab-Israel war	October 1973	
206.	Arab ôil embargo	October 1973	
207.	Civil war in Cambodia	January 1974	

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208.	Egypt-Israel Sinai agreement	February 1974
209.	Improved relations with Egypt	April 1974
210.	Cyprus-Greece-Turkey crisis	July 1974
211.	Arab oil policy	November 1974
212.	Collapse of regime in South Vietnam	March 1975
213.	Collapse of regime in Cambodia	April 1975
214.	Improved relations with Soviet Union	May 1975
215.	Cambodia seizes U.S. merchantmen Mayaguez	May 1975

APPENDENCE

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SOURCES OF INCIDENTS

A wide variety of sources were examined systematically in order to identify political uses of the armed forces, as defined, by the United States during the period covered by this study. Additionally, other sources were examined in order to identify potential situations in which armed forces might have been used as a political instrument, with the aim of guiding research to uncover additional incidents. It is doubtful that all of the political uses of U.S. armed forces during the period examined have been discovered. We are reasonably confident, however, that the list of incidents presented in the next section is virtually complete as regards the information available on an unclassified basis.

This last point deserves amplification. No classified materials have been examined in the course of this study. Some documents were declassified, however, upon request. Additionally, a number of organizations within the government were, at least, cooperative. These included:

The Department of the Air Force Air University, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center (Maxwell AFB, Ala.);

The Department of the Army Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.);

The Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Military History Historical Services Division;

The Department of Defense Office of the Comptroller Historical Staff:

The Department of the Navy U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters Director of Marine Corps History and Museums;

The National Archives General Archives Division. The Department of the Air Force Office of the Chief of Staff Office of Air Force History;

The Department of the Army John F. Kennedy School of Counterinsurgency (Ft. Bragg, N.C.);

The Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Secretariat Documents Division;

The Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center Naval History Division;

The Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Historical Office;

Most of the sources that have been examined in compiling the list

of incidents fall into the following three categories: official records of military organizations, such as air force, fleet, and division histories; chronologies of international events, such as the quarterly chronology in the Middle East Journal; secondary sources, including various events data files, and compilations of U.S. military activity prepared for other purposes.

These sources have various strengths and weaknesses. No doubt, some biases have entered the analysis because the sources themselves are systematically biased to some degree. For example, naval activity may be reported more frequently than other forms of military activity. Warships simply may be more visible than other military units. Moreover, many documents of potential interest are unavailable as a result of their being classified, filed at local headquarters, or misfiled. Also, historical records are often written unsystematically and only occasionally.

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SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS

Having decided on a 15 percent (33 incidents) sample size, the question arose as to whether the sample should be chosen randomly, or whether it should be structured with reference to particular variables. A random sample is likely to reflect more perfectly the "population" from which it is taken; however, if the sample size is not very large, the examination of a variable of particular interest may not be possible. In order to insure against this risk, the sample was stratified with reference to four variables: the level of armed forces used in the incident by the United States, the degree and nature of involvement by the Soviet Union and China, the overall quality of East-West relations at the time, and the situational context preceding U.S. action. Table C-1 presents the typologies for these four variables that were used in selecting the sample. Table C-2 presents a summary analysis of some of these characteristics and provides a comparison of the sample with the total 215 incident data file.

The categorizations of the level of U.S. armed forces used and the degree of USSR/PRC involvement are rank ordered or scaled. Similarly, the periodization of the overall East-West relationship may be converted into a rank ordering by rearranging the various sets of years. It was conceivable that two or more of these three variables might be correlated with one another and thus perhaps reflect only one or two factors. Not to entertain this possibility was to risk wasted effort as well as a misleading analysis. In fact, though, these variables are not correlated with each other; nor are they with any ordering of the situational context typology.

Obviously, it was impossible to obtain a perfectly stratified sample given the numbers of categories and the actual cell distribution. Nevertheless, this approach was useful insofar as it did provide a sample which allowed a more valid examination of variables of particular concern.

One hundred and sixty-two cells were obtained by multiplying together the numbers of categories of each variable--i.e., 3 x 3 x 6 x 3 = 162. Of these, 46 were "dead" cells (i.e., they contained no incidents) and 83 contained three incidents or fewer. In selecting cases for the sample, the latter were grouped in sets containing one, two and three incidents, and cases were selected randomly from each set. The remaining 33 cells, containing four or more incidents each, were considered large enough for a random choice to be made from within each cell. The number of cases selected from each cell, or set, was proportional to its relative size --e.g., one case was selected from a cell containing seven incidents and six cases were selected from a combined set of 14 cells in which each contained three incidents. In each individual selection the objective was to approximate, as closely as possible, 15 percent of the incidents in the cell or set.

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Table C-1

Selection Variables

- A. Level of U.S. armed forces used:
 - 1. Two or more major components a
 - 2. One major component
 - 3. Standard or minor components only
- B. Degree and nature of USSR/PRC involvement:
 - 1. Participated, and threatened or actually used force
 - 2. Participated, but did not threaten or use force
 - 3. Did not participate
- C. Periodization of quality of East-West relations:

1. 1946-1947

4. 1957-1962

2. 1948-1952

5. 1963-1968

3. 1953-1956

6. 1969-1975

- D. Context of U.S. involvement:
 - Inter-state (incident stemmed from relationship between two or more states other than the U.S.)
 - 2. Intra-state (incident stemmed from internal situation)
 - 3. U.S. involved directly (incident stemmed from relationship between U.S. and another actor, or hostile act directed at U.S.)
- a. Major components of the armed forces when used for political objectives are: more than a battalion of ground forces; or, two or more aircraft carriers (or batrleships); or at least one combat air wing. Standard components are: more than a company but no more than a battalion of ground forces; one aircraft carrier (or battleship); or one or more squadrons but less than a wing of combat aircraft.

Table C-2
Comparison of All Incidents and Sample:
Percentages of Totals

	All Incidents	Sample		All Incidents	Sample
Regional	le de la compa		Time Period		8 (8 (6)
Central America/					
Caribbean	23.3	24.2	1946_1950	14.0	6.1
East Asia	9.3	9.1	1951-1955	8.4	3.0
Europe	20.0	9.1	1956-1960	20.9	27.3
Middle East	17.7	27.3	1961-1965	34.9	30.3
Southeast Asia	19.1	24.2	1966_1970	10.7	18.2
Other	10.7	6.1	1971-1975	11.2	15.2
Situational Context	(A)		Situational Conf	ext (B)	
Inter-state	29.8	30.3	Violent/hostile		
Intra-state	43.3	45.5	at U.S.	68.8	72.7
U.S. directly involved	26.0	24.2	Non-Violent/ relations with U.S.(friendly	F	
Other	0.9	0.0	or unfriendly)	30.3	27.3
Jair.			Other	0.9	0.0
Actor Type				16 (10)	
National Governmen	nt 76.8	76.1			
Insurgents/civilia party or group	n 14.7	16,2			
Military faction	3.0	2.6			
International or regional organ-ization	5.4	5.1			

a. Between states other than the U.S.

Appendix D

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- e. content of communication and style or together the most together to state Bulletin
 - b. names/rules of communicators (e.g., President, ambassador, Secrebary of State, an "official");
 - o. forum of administration (e.g., sudience with target or representative, speech, media interview, press conference).
 - 4. How explicit, implicit, specific or vague were these communications? Did they serve to clarify or confuse target perceptions of U.S. operational objectives?
 - 5. Describe the activities of 0.5. milliary forces that were related to the incident -- e.g., size and composition of forces, their movements, tasks performed.
 - 6. How did the use of military forces relate to the President's operational objectives?

Appendix E

OUTLINE FOR CASE STUDIES

- A. Relate a brief history of the incident, including:
 - 1. its historical background;
 - 2. events most importantly leading up to the incident;
 - 3. the principal actors in the incident:
 - 4. the general objectives of those actors;
 - 5. the most important actions by those actors:
 - 6. the outcomes of the incident with reference to each actor's objectives;
 - 7. other important outcomes and the historical significance of the incident

B. U.S. Behavior

- 1. What general concerns and interests (e.g., economic, strategic, bureaucratic, domestic political) were of significance to the President and other members of the National Security Council (NSC) as they considered possible U.S. actions in the incident?
- 2. What specific behavior(s) -- i.e., operational objectives -- did the President (and other U.S. actors) desire of the target(s) in the incident? Was there unanimity or conflict among important U.S. decisionmakers as to operational objectives? How apparent was this unanimity or conflict to the target and to other foreign observers?
- 3. Insofar as the achievement of U.S. operational objectives required that some general or specific action be taken (or not taken) by the target(s), how, if at all, were those objectives communicated? Include in discussion:
 - a. content of communication and style or tone of presentation;
 - names/roles of communicators (e.g., President, ambassador, Secretary of State, an "official"):
 - c. forum of communication (e.g., audience with target or representative, speech, media interview, press conference).
- 4. How explicit, implicit, specific or vague were these communications? Did they serve to clarify or confuse target perceptions of U.S. operational objectives?
- Describe the activities of U.S. military forces that were related to the incident -- e.g., size and composition of forces, their movements, tasks performed.
- 6. How did the use of military forces relate to the President's operational objectives?

- 7. What explicit, implicit, specific or vague statements were made by American officials concerning the actual and/or potential use of U.S. armed forces during the incident? Include in discussion:
 - a. name/role of official(s):
 - b. content of statement(s) and style or tone of presentation;
 - c. timing;
 - d. forum of communication;
 - e. relationship between different statements.
- 8. What specific use was made of other policy instruments by U.S. officials during the incident (e.g., economic or military aid, cultural, international organizations and alliances, personal relationships)?
- 9. How necessary did the President and other members of the NSC consider the use of U.S. armed forces to the attainment of their operational objectives?

C. Target Behavior

- 1. Describe the target(s) of the U.S. behavior, including:
 - a. name:
 - b. relevant personal background;
 - c. role or position:
 - d. political and societal relationships;
 - e. attitudes toward the U.S.
- 2. Describe each target's:
 - a. general political interests and concerns;
 - b. operational objectives in this incident.
- 3. Was the target(s) aware of: (a) the President's operational objectives and; (b) the U.S. use of military force? Include in discussion:
 - a. manner in which target became aware;
 - b. indicators of this awareness;
 - c. public reactions;
 - d. evidence of private reactions

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- 4. Insofar as the target(s) was(were) aware of the President's operational objectives, did he view the U.S. use of military force as consistent or inconsistent with these objectives?
- 5. Did the target draw the same or different conclusions from the use of military force as were desired by the President? If different, how do you explain the difference (e.g., nature of signals and communications; target system of gathering information; target belief system or experiences)?
- 6. What were the implications of (a) performing, and (b) not performing the specific behavior desired by the United States for each target's:
 - a. personal safety and material interests;
 - b. self-image;
 - c. domestic political authority (or influence) and goals;
 - d. external influence and goals?
- 7. What were the implications of (a) performing, and (b) not performing the specific behavior desired by the United States for each target's primary political and social domestic alliances (e.g., faction, party, elite)? Consider in your discussion impacts upon the relevant group's (s')
 - a. domestic political authority (or influence) and goals;
 - b. external influence and goals;
 - c. personal safety and social and economic well-being.
- 8. What were the implications of (a) performing and (b) not performing the specific behavior desired by the President for each target's society in terms of its:
 - a. territorial sovereignty;
 - b. physical and economic well-being;
 - c. self-image;
 - d. relations with (i) neighbors, (ii) allies, (iii) Soviet Union?
- 9. Insofar as the performance or non-performance of the specific behavior desired by the U.S. had significant implications for any of the targets' potential interests as listed in questions C.6-8, what were the "weights" of these individual interests in the targets' value structures?

- D. Third Party Behavior -- i.e., behavior by actors involved in the incident other than target(s) and ones in the U.S.
 - 1. Describe third nation actors in terms of:
 - a. name/role or position;
 - b. relevant personal background;
 - c. political relationships;
 - d. attitudes towards the U.S.
 - 2. What were: (a) their concerns and interests and; (b) their operational objectives in the incident?
 - 3. What inferences did they make about: (a) the President's operational objectives; and (b) the U.S. use of military force? Consider in your comments, publicly stated as well as privately made inferences.
 - 4. What actions -- verbal, military, other -- did third parties take in the incident? What expected actions did they not take?
 - 5. How were these actions perceived by the U.S. targets? Did these actions serve to support or offset U.S. actions? Of what other significance were these third party actions?

E. Outcomes.

- To what extent, if at all, did the targets' behavior conform to that desired by the President? Please be specific about the behaviors in question and about your evidence.
- Considering the five-year period after the incident, of what (if any) significance was the behavior of the actors involved in the incident (including U.S. actors), and the nature of the conclusion of the incident to:
 - a. the physical safety of Americans at home and abroad;
 - b. defense alliances to which the U.S. is a party;
 - c. U.S. relations with the USSR;
 - d. U.S. relations with China;
 - e. U.S. relations with each of the other actors party to the incident;
 - Soviet military deployments in the area where the incident took place and capabilities to intervene militarily in such an incident if it was to occur again;

- g. images held atroad of the United States Government and of Americans;
- h. the general and specific economic interests of Americans;
- social inter-action (communications/travel) between Americans and other nations;
- j. the self-images of Americans;
- k. international law and norms;
- 1. American public opinion concerning the President in office during the incident;
- m. the President's position in his party;
- n. the President's chances of being re-elected;
- o. the President's position vis-a-vis the Congress with reference to his general influence and his influence on specific issues of note;
- p. the success of Democratic and Republican candidates in Congressional elections;
- 3. Of what significance for each of the interests mentioned in question E.2. would have been a decision by the President not to use military force in any way?
- 4. Of what significance for each of the interests mentioned in question E.2. would have been a decision by the President to use military force to a significantly greater extent?

Evaluation

- 1. To the extent that the targets' behavior did conform to that desired by the President, to what extent, if at all, can this be attributed to the use of military force by the United States?
- 2. To the extent that the targets' behavior did not conform to the behavior desired by the President, to what extent if at all, can this be attributed to the use of military force by the United States?
- 3. To what extent, if at all, can third party behavior be specifically related to the use of military force by the United States?
- 4. In your opinion, considering the concerns and interests of the President, was the use of military force wise?
- 5. Considering your conception of the national interest, was the use of military force wise?